Philosophy Of Mind Research Articles

Indeterminacy and the Immateriality of Thought: Ross on Natural and Formal Structures

This paper addresses a debate on the immateriality of thought, focusing on James Ross’s argument regarding the indeterminacy of physical processes with respect to pure functions. Ross posits that some human cognitive processes, particularly logical reasoning and mathematical functions, exhibit a formal determinacy that no physical process can have, challenging physicalist accounts of mind. A critical response by Peter Dillard, known as the “schmitosis objection,” attempts to undermine Ross’s argument by drawing a parallel between biological processes like mitosis and formal functions such as addition. This paper defends Ross’s position by highlighting an overlooked distinction between transcendent and formal determinacy. By demonstrating that biological processes like mitosis are transcendentally determinate while pure functions are formally determinate, the paper refutes Dillard’s objection and supports Ross’s claim of the partial non-physicality of thought. The argument contributes to ongoing debates in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics by clarifying the distinct ways physical and non-physical processes relate to determinacy.

Disposisi, Kehendak Bebas, dan Kontingensi

This article discusses the long-standing philosophical challenge of integrating disposition, free will, and contingency. We place the above three realities into a coherent theoretical framework. Various disciplines have extensively studied the concepts of disposition, free will, and contingency. Nevertheless, their complex interrelationships still need to be more adequately explored. The result is a persistent dichotomy that gives rise to debates about causation, agency, and the reality of modalities. Thus, this article proposes a new framework called triadic relations to explain the mutual dependencies and emergent properties of the interaction of these fundamental ideas. The article uses a systematic synthesis approach of recent developments in dispositional essentialism, compatibilist theories of free will, and the metaphysics of the modal. We aim to show how dispositions provide the ontological foundation for free will and contingent possibilities. After all, free will operation actualizes specific potentials and introduces original novelty. This method offers an exciting resolution to the compatibilist libertarian debate by providing a new perspective on mental causation, moral responsibility, and the nature of contingency. Our findings suggest a dynamic ontology that transcends traditional philosophical categories. The findings redefine metaphysics, philosophy of mind, ethics, and interdisciplinary areas. Triadic relations emerge as a new paradigm for reconceptualizing the structure of reality and human agency to reshape the landscape of philosophical inquiry.

E Pur Si Move! Motion-Based Illusions, Perception and Depiction

ABSTRACT Can static pictures depict motion and temporal properties? This is an open question that is becoming increasingly discussed in both aesthetics and the philosophy of mind. Theorists working on this issue have mainly focused on static pictures of dynamic scenes and streaky images—such as futurists’ paintings or long-exposure photographs. And yet, we could ask: if there is some success in creating an illusory impression of movement in a static image—as is the case in optical illusions of movement, such as Bridget Riley’s Fall (1963: Tate, London), or Kitaoka’s Rotating Snakes Illusion—is this to say that such static images depict movement? As far as I know, no one working on the depiction of motion has specifically and systematically tackled motion-based illusions nor tried to answer this question. This paper considers two cases of optical illusions of movement and concludes that one of them is involved in the depiction of movement. While the declared goal of my analysis is to answer a quite circumscribed question, it is also the occasion to tackle motion-based illusions tout court—to account for the complex visual experiences they elicit and related phenomenology. Moreover, this account has interesting consequences for theorizing depiction and pictorial experience in general. In particular, it constitutes a counterexample to resemblance theories of depiction.

Tło filozoficzne teorii percepcji Thomasa Reida

The subject of this article is not explicity the theory of perception that Reid propounded. To present it would go beyond his modest framework because an essential part of Reid's view was the so-called common sense principles. The nature, number and cognition role of these principles would require a separate discussion. In this text, therefore, I concentrate on the specific preliminaries of the philosophy proposed by the founder of the Scottish school of common sense, which can be interpreted as a "negative reference point", which is the starting point for "positive" solutions, i.e. Reid's proposed theory of perception. He thus began with a critique of the "theory of ideas", which, in Reid's view, was the main reason for the failure to formulate a satisfactory philosophy of mind. Within this critique, we find his reflections on the method of philosophising itself, the differences that occur in the study of such different objects as material objects and cognitive mind, and his interpretation of the consequences of the adaption of the theory of ideas by the philosophers of modernity. The result of Reid's theoretical analyses is the rejection of the assumption of any mutual interaction between matter and mind, the questioning of the possibility of perception of material objects based on similarity of sense impressions and the things perceived, and the accusation of the proponents of this theory of dooming philosophy to idealism and scepticism.

Insights from Saint Teresa and Saint Augustine on Artificial Intelligence: Discussing Human Interiority

This article addresses the issue of attributing phenomenal consciousness to Artificial Intelligence (AI), a mistake that can lead to ethically dangerous consequences and that is becoming widespread due to the advances of Large Language Models such as ChatGPT. We juxtapose advancements in AI with the notion of inner experience as it is present in humans. The study draws from various disciplines, including philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence, and theological texts such as "The Inner Castle" by Saint Theresa of Ávila and "Confessions" by Saint Augustine. Firstly, it reviews the current state of the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and AI, followed by a critique of the idea that advanced language models, like ChatGPT, can achieve an inner experience in the same sense we use the term to describe the human inner experience. A common objection is raised, suggesting that AI can become conscious by increasing its complexity. This is countered by presenting theoretical and empirical evidence on the independence of computational intelligence and phenomenal consciousness. The study concludes that, despite AI's notable cognitive abilities, it lacks the inner experience that characterizes human experience. Then, our second main contribution is an analogy of the dwellings of the Inner Castle to the range of different subjective experiences that are available to human beings, together with actions associated to them, which can be useful to understand where the machine can perform tasks that are similar to the human and where subjective experience is key. We are now in a pivotal moment where it is essential to understand the limitations of AI for deploying it ethically.

A new variant of the electromagnetic field theory of consciousness: approaches to empirical confirmation.

There are various electromagnetic (EM) field theories of consciousness. They postulate an epineural EM field which, due to its binding properties, unifies the different neuronal information differences originating from various sensory and cognitive processes. Only through a real physical integration in space within this field could phenomenal consciousness arise. This would solve the binding problem mentioned in the philosophy of mind. On closer inspection, the electromagnetic interaction not only provides an explanation for the integrative property of the EM field, but also for the necessary differentiating contrasts of information. This article will take a closer look at the physical properties of a postulated EM field. It will also show how the problem of qualia in connection with emergentism could be solved by a new variant of EM field theory. If it can be clearly demonstrated that the postulated epineural EM field plays a decisive role in the origin of consciousness in addition to neuronal "wired" information processing, this also leaves less room for metaphysical assumptions that attempt to solve the binding problem. In experiments to prove the postulated epineural EM field by means of external electromagnetic manipulations, it can never be ruled out that these also have a direct effect on the "wired" neuronal signal processing. Therefore, on the way to proving the EM field theory of consciousness, an experimental method is needed that must ensure that external manipulations only affect the extensions of the EM field without directly influencing the neuronal network. A method will be discussed here that works with the shielding of EM fields instead of external electromagnetic stimuli.

Understanding delusions to improve our mutual interactions: A précis of <i>"Why Delusions Matter"</i>

Why Delusions Matter is a reflection on the importance of the study of delusions for better understanding and reshaping our mutual interactions. The study of delusions has transformed the philosophy of mind and psychology in the last thirty years, helping redefine the relationship between rationality and intentionality. It has still a lot to offer to emerging areas at the intersection of ethics and epistemology. These are areas where the focus of the investigation of beliefs is moving from a painstaking assessment of the individual’s cognitive achievements and failures to a broader examination of the environmental and social pressures on the adoption, revisions, and maintenance of beliefs at individual and collective levels. In the book, there is an exploration of the notion of delusionality across clinical and non-clinical contexts which shows how delusions are meaningful beliefs that matter to the speaker's identity but are received by the interpreter as implausible and unshakeable. Delusions are not pathological by default, but they can bring epistemic and psychological costs as well as temporary benefits. Although a speaker's delusions can make collaboration difficult, this should not discourage interpreters from attempts at genuine engagement. Delusions are not a sign of a breakdown in the speaker's capacity for agency and thus understanding them can help interpreters appreciate the speaker's perspective.

Understanding Others, Conceptual Know-How and Social World

In contemporary philosophy of mind, understanding others is often presented as an activity of attributing mental states to agents or mindreading – the central question being then how to access their minds. The paper argues that this pervasive approach should be rejected, in favour of the view along which identifying an action comes from exercising conceptual skills acquired through being inserted into shared practices characterizing a social world. Examining the conditions of their acquisition then sheds new light on the semantics of psychological concepts as well as on the roots of misunderstanding.

“We need to open our doors and windows and breathe the fresh air of the ocean”: Hountondji on Suffocation and the Need to Liberate the Philosophical Mind

“We need to open our doors and windows and breathe the fresh air of the ocean”: Hountondji on Suffocation and the Need to Liberate the Philosophical Mind

Is phenomenal consciousness really a special case in science?

In the metaphysics of science, it is often held that higher-level properties are grounded in micro-physical properties. According to many philosophers, however, phenomenal consciousness resists this view. Many famous arguments in Philosophy of Mind have been given to reject this notion. In this paper, we argue that there is something odd about the idea that phenomenal consciousness is a special case in science and give a constructive proposal on how consciousness can fit in the natural world. To do so, we will first introduce a general notion of what grounding is. Then, we will briefly explain how the arguments for the specialness of phenomenal consciousness work by considering two famous examples, namely the zombie and the knowledge argument. In a further step, we will briefly discuss two cases from other areas in science, i.e., in particle physics and chemistry. We will demonstrate that the standard view about the reductive relation does not hold, even in these paradigm cases of the natural sciences. If what we argue is true, we think that most arguments from phenomenal consciousness cannot defeat physicalism per se. Finally, we will introduce an alternative way to naturalize phenomenal consciousness.

Review of Freud and philosophy of mind, volume 1: Reconstructing the argument for unconscious mental states.

Review of Freud and philosophy of mind, volume 1: Reconstructing the argument for unconscious mental states.

Editorial Introduction

The articles in this issue are devoted to the question of whether consciousness is a fundamental feature of reality. In recent years the physicalist orthodoxy in the science and philosophy of consciousness has been challenged by a panpsychist insurgency (Chalmers, 2016; Goff, 2017; 2019), panpsychism being the view that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical universe. This new wave of panpsychists claim that their view avoids the deep challenges faced by physicalism as well as those faced by dualism, the traditional rival of physicalism. The best way to test whether panpsychism lives up to its promise is for philosophers and scientists to explore the pros and cons of panpsychism in discussion and in writing. Most of these articles were presented in some form at a workshop on the theme of 'Consciousness as Fundamental' at Marist College in Poughkeepsie, New York, in September of 2023. This was one of two workshops that are part of a John Templeton Foundation funded project (Grant #62683) co-directed by Andrei A. Buckareff and Philip Goff on the theme of 'Panpsychism and Pan(en)theism: Philosophy of Mind Meets Philosophy of Religion'. Yanssel Garcia's article, entitled 'Is Consciousness Fundamental?', was the winner of an essay competition hosted by the project. These articles address the theme of whether consciousness is fundamental from a variety of perspectives, most focusing on different puzzles that arise if we assume a panpsychist framework in trying to explain consciousness.

Powerful Qualities and the Metaphysics of Properties

AbstractIn debates about the metaphysics of properties, many have claimed that properties are powers. According to the powers view, a property's nature disposes objects to behave in certain ways in response to certain stimuli. For example, the property of fragility disposes objects to smash when a force is applied to them. But how should we understand powers? There has recently been a surge of interest in the powerful qualities view of properties. Other views in the field either claim that properties are pure powers, or that they are qualities. The powerful qualities view rejects this dichotomy, saying that properties are both powers and qualities. In this paper, I distinguish some versions of the powerful qualities view, and some of the reasons to hold it. I also outline one of the most exciting elements of the view, which is its relation to the philosophy of mind.

The Mind and the Political

In this commentary I present a brief overview of Maiese and Hanna’s work, The Mind-Body Politic, and highlight their valuable contribution in extending the insights from philosophy of mind to critically evaluate our contemporary social institutions and politics. Then I discuss some of the reservations and open questions about the way Maiese and Hanna lay out their version of a political philosophy of mind. In doing so, I focus on three main shortcomings in Maiese and Hanna’s work. First, I discuss how despite their critical view of Cartesian dualism, their own view of the way society is organized and works is dualistic. I argue that their dualistic view of society results in utopian thinking, and perhaps a more productive and constructive approach to our current predicaments would rather be an immanent critique. Second, I highlight the unclarity and confusion in some of their conceptual frameworks and their account of politics such as the way they use ideology and governmentality. Finally, I criticize their analysis of social institutions, especially the way they see new institutional structures can be formed. The project for a political philosophy of mind that Maiese and Hanna set up is worth pursuing and Maiese and Hanna already provide many hints and directions for its productive and constructive pursuit.

Précis: The Mind-Body Politic

The Mind-Body Politic is a study in the new discipline of political philosophy of mind, that aims to develop an embodied and enactive theory of social institutions, building on our 2009 study of the mind-body relation and mental causation, Embodied Minds in Action. In this sequel, we distinguish between (i) destructive, deforming social institutions–characteristic of contemporary neoliberal nation-states, and (ii) constructive, enabling social institutions, and defend what we call the mindshaping thesis and the enactive-transformative principle. The upshot is an activist, transformative philosophical theory.

Successful and unsuccessful remembering and imagining: Editorial introduction

The relationship between memory and imagination has long intrigued philosophers. One focus of recent debate in this area has been the question whether memory and imagination differ in kind or merely in degree, with discontinuists holding that remembering indeed differs in kind from imagining, while continuists hold that even successful remembering differs from imagining only in degree. Another recent focus has been the need to approach memory and imagination from a broadly normative perspective, in an attempt to explain what it is for remembering and imagining to succeed or fail. The goal of this special issue, which builds on an online workshop organized in 2022 by the Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition at the National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University and the Centre for Philosophy of Memory at the Université Grenoble Alpes, is to explore memory, imagination, and the relation between them from this normative perspective.

Techno-Wantons: Adaptive Technology and the Will of Tomorrow

AbstractRecent work within the tradition of 4E cognitive science and philosophy of mind has drawn attention to the ways that our technological, material, and social environments can act as hostile, oppressive, and harmful scaffolding. These accounts push back against a perceived optimistic bias in the wider literature, whereby, according to the critics, our engagements with technology are painted as taking place on our terms, to our benefit, in ways uncomplicated by political realities. This article enters into that conversation, and aims to highlight a specific form of threat from emerging technology: the threat of the ‘techno-wanton. ’ Drawing on classic work on personhood by Harry Frankfurt, I argue that emerging forms of adaptive technology threaten to degrade the depth and reflexivity of our economy of preferences. Techno-wantonness is a wanton-like state of diminished agency and personhood, whereby adaptive technology facilitates the wanton satisfaction of shallow preferences and the weakening of higher order volition. I argue that the concept of ‘mind invasion’, within the context of the hostile scaffolding literature has been applied too broadly, to the detriment of our analysis, and argue that the notion of ‘techno-wantonness’ should replace ‘mind invasion’ in regard to a specific class of case. In short, the new concept allows for a more subtle distinction between scaffolding impinging on an unwilling mind and technology that panders to the preferences of initially often very willing users.

Wang Yangming’s Concept of Oneness from the Perspective of Mysticism

Wang Yangming’s emphasis on the concept of oneness establishes a significant connection between his philosophy and mysticism. This comparative study draws upon his mystical encounters and conceptual framework. Although “all things form one body” appears to be a typical formula of extrovertive mysticism, his doctrine is more inclined to be classified as a type of introvertive mysticism because of the special definition of “thing” and the deep involvement of heart–mind. The realm of oneness is based on the mode of a heart–mind pervading the entirety of the universe and all things, with the core concept of liangzhi as both pure consciousness and the base of the world. The adoption of a mystical philosophical perspective highlights Wang’s theory of oneness as a spiritual philosophy, transcending general ethical claims, thus enriching our understanding of Wang’s philosophy of mind.

Ideological Mind-Shaping or Brain-Shaping: Fusing Empirical Biopolitics and Political Philosophy of Mind

There are two primary philosophical approaches to examining the relationship between human bodies and political bodies. The first, reflected in traditional political theory on the body politic, is concerned with the question of how individuals aggregate into functioning or malfunctioning collectives—how singular citizen bodies come to constitute wider political entities. The second approach, maturing later in 20th century social and political philosophy, considers the opposite relation: instead of evaluating how the body politic emerges from the bottom-up, it focuses on how bodies become politicized from the top-down. This, more sociological, perspective explores how human bodies are disciplined and learn to self-discipline into particular physical forms and functions. Dominant ideologies can infiltrate the bodies of adherents, and the task of the social critic or political philosopher is to delineate how, why, where, and when political structures shape the minds and bodies of citizens, as well as whether the effects are coercive, destructive, or liberatory. I will argue that a political philosophy of mind cannot flourish without attention to the cognitive science of ideologies. Until recently there has been little serious dialogue between biology and political philosophy, partly due to disciplinary balkanization and mostly because of the infancy of empirical biopolitics, the science of how cognitive and neurobiological processes are molded by political ideologies. I will suggest that attending to the emerging science of ideological cognition can allow us to build a stronger, more compelling, and provocative thesis on the mind-shaping consequences of immersion in ideologies than is possible with conceptual tools alone

Evaluating the explanatory power of the Conscious Turing Machine

The recent “Conscious Turing Machine” (CTM) proposal offered by Manuel and Lenore Blum aims to define and explore consciousness, contribute to the solution of the hard problem, and demonstrate the value of theoretical computer science with respect to the study of consciousness. Surprisingly, given the ambitiousness and novelty of the proposal (and the prominence of its creators), CTM has received relatively little attention. We here seek to remedy this by offering an exhaustive evaluation of CTM. Our evaluation considers the explanatory power of CTM in three different domains of interdisciplinary consciousness studies: the philosophy of mind, cognitive neuroscience, and computation. Based on our evaluation in each of the target domains, at present, any claim that CTM constitutes progress is premature. Nevertheless, the model has potential, and we highlight several possible avenues of future research which proponents of the model may pursue in its development.