Mill's Utilitarianism Research Articles

Matchmaking in Sunan Giri Salatiga Islamic Boarding School: A Review of J.S. Mill's Utilitarianism

This article analyses the concept of utilitarianism proposed by J.S. Mill and its application in the context of arranged marriages at Sunan Giri Islamic Boarding School in Salatiga. Furthermore, the purpose of this research is to analyse an arranged marriage that occurs in an Islamic boarding school using the theory of utilitarianism presented by J.S. Mill. The research applied is field research with a qualitative method that is descriptive analytical, and uses a phenomenological approach using J.S Mill's theory. Data was collected through interviews conducted with the parties involved both online and offline, which in this case is the Kiai of the pesantren or Abah Rikul and senior students and students who have been successfully matched. It was found that in terms of the causes and effects of matchmaking that occurred in line with the ultimate goal to be achieved by utilitarianism. The results showed that the arranged marriage that occurred at Pondok Sunan Giri was actually to maintain the principles of utilitarianism, namely as follows: a) In the aspect of usefulness that arranged marriages are actually to maintain the dignity of the santri themselves. b) Then in the aspect of justice, that arranged marriages that occur at the cottage are democratic in which the final decision holder is fully in the approval of the prospective bride and groom, c) Then then there are individual interests. As a basic capital, to serve in the community, d) Then the last is the public interest. In this case it is contained in the purpose of matchmaking where according to Abah Rikul the matchmaking must be able to have a positive effect on the benefit of as many people as possible.

Bain's Theory of Moral Judgment and the Development of Mill's Utilitarianism

AbstractIn Utilitarianism, Mill defers to Alexander Bain's expertise on the subject of moral judgment to answer common criticisms of the creed. First, we do not blame people or label them immoral when they are less than ideal. Judgments of immorality are commonly reserved for substandard behavior, not suboptimal comportment. Second, we do not commonly insist on full neutrality in benevolence. Indeed, some philosophers argue that we are obliged to exhibit partiality, insofar as it is demanded by our roles as friends, parents, or children. My primary aim in this essay is to explicate Bain's theory of moral judgment and explain how Mill used Bain's psychological doctrines to inform his development of an indirect utilitarian moral philosophy, immune to the criticisms described above.

Respect for individual autonomy and a collective benefit: Arguments in favor of compulsory SARS-CoV-2 vaccination among health care professionals.

With the development of SARS-CoV-2 vaccines, a new aspect to be taken into consideration in the midst of the pandemic is vaccine refusal. Since vaccination is voluntary, it is necessary to deal with the fact that some health care team members refuse to receive it. Here I put forward different bioethical arguments: Kantian deontology and the principles of universalizability, humanity, and autonomy; Mill's utilitarianism, with selfprotection as the sole end for which humankind is authorized to interfere with its members' freedom of action; Beauchamp and Childress' principlism and the concepts of beneficence and autonomy; Varo Baena's principle of opportunity; and the principle of solidarity resulting from the ethics of human rights. The contributions of contemporary philosophers like Roberto Espósito, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Alberto Giubilini are also included. Two counterarguments are presented: nonmaleficence and counter-production. Lastly, I suggest that, since common good (in this case, public health) is the intimate and final determining factor of individual freedom and is the same for all, it is above any individual benefit.

밀의 공리주의에 나타난 경험자의 판단과 가치

공리주의란 효용과 최대 행복의 원리를 도덕적 기초로 삼고 있는 이론을 말한다. 공리주의자들이 추구하는 행복은 개인의 좋음만을 추구하지 않는다. 이들은 공동체에서 추구되는 좋음의 가치를 최고의 행복이라고 생각했다. 공리주의는 행위자의 동기보다 결과를 중시 여긴다. 그렇다보니 공리주의는 자칫 지나친 결과중심주의로 빠져드는 것처럼 비춰지기도 했다. 밀(J. S. Mill)은 행위자의 결과에만 초점을 두지 않았다. 그는 개개인의 행위를 주의 깊게 다루었다. 밀은 공리주의가 결과에 치우치고 있다는 것을 알았다. 그래서 그는 경험자들의 판단과 그 가치에 집중했다. 밀은 개인은 교육을 받은 개인과 그 경험을 경청해야 한다고 했다. 이 논문은 공리주의가 행위자의 행동이 미치는 결과에만 초점을 두는 한계를 지적한다. 그리고 이 글은 밀의 공리주의에 나타나는 경험의 가치와 그것이 지닌 함의들을 찾는 데 집중할 것이다.

Mill's Metaethical Non-cognitivism

In section I, I lay out key components of my favoured non-cognitivist interpretation of Mill's metaethics. In section II, I respond to several objections to this style of interpretation posed by Christopher Macleod. In section III, I respond to David Brink's treatment of the well-known ‘competent judges’ passage in Mill's Utilitarianism. I argue that important difficulties face both Brink's evidential interpretation and the rival constitutive interpretation that he proposes but rejects. I opt for a third interpretative option that I call the psychological interpretation. This interpretation makes sense of otherwise difficult aspects of chapter IV of Utilitarianism. In section IV, I offer some reasons for rejecting Nicholas Drake's claim that Mill is ultimately best characterized as a Humean constructivist. If we accept Drake's suggestion that Mill's non-cognitivism is compatible with his being a constructivist, I argue, we should view Mill as putting forward a distinctively Millian form of constructivism rather than a Humean one.

Milovo shvatanje pravde kao "višeg zadovoljstva bezbednosti"

In contemporary ethical theory and political philosophy "revisionist" accounts of some key terms take very prominent place. Th e current debate on the role of the notion of security within Mill's conception of justice is an example of this trend. In some contemporary works on Mill's utilitarianism, the notion of security (or safety) takes a key role. Th e author examines whether these revisionist attempts are grounded in Mill's original work.

Huei-chun Su Huei-chun Su's Economic justice and liberty: the social philosophy in John Stuart Mill's utilitarianism. Routledge, 2013, 214 pp.

Review of Huei-chun Su's Economic justice and liberty: social philosophy in John Stuart Mill's utilitarianism. Routledge, 2013, 214 pp.For those who are inclined to discount John Stuart as erratic and eclectic thinker, Economic justice and liberty should be required reading. The book belongs to a steadily growing class of scholarly works which interpret with sympathy and a solid cognizance of his writings, and which confirm J. O. Urmson's judgement that if one studies his work diligently, an essentially consistent thesis can be discovered which is very superior to that usually attributed to and immune to common run of criticisms (Urmson 1953, 33). The author of this highly readable book, Huei-chun Su, goes even further than Urmson. Mill's position is not only superior to what sloppy, lazy or nit-picking readers ascribe to him. His social philosophy offers modern readers a serious alternative to that of contemporary luminaries such as Rawls, Sen, and Hayek. By ending book with remark that Mill deserves to be recognized as one of greatest thinkers in human intellectual history, author's praise may go a bit over top. But it is understandable reaction to ill-informed dismissiveness towards which is still de rigueur in some academic quarters. Many philosophers take liberties with they would never dare to take with G. E. Moore.Economic justice and liberty was developed from a PhD thesis supervised by John Maloney at University of Exeter. The later stages of book, however, took shape at Bentham Project at University College London, and one gets impression that this academic environment helped author to hammer out what utilitarianism was in 19th century and how it differed from its modern successor, as canonised by J. J. C. Smart. In order to mark difference between two as clearly as possible, Frederick Rosen once coined useful term 'post-utilitarian paradigm' to describe latter (Rosen 1997). The postutilitarian paradigm of Smart and others requires maximisation of total utility and is indifferent to how utility is distributed. Since it conceives utility to be a uniform and summable entity, post- utilitarian paradigm seems to open floodgates for justification of all kinds of injustices, ranging from imprisoning innocent people for fun to extreme inequalities in distribution of income and wealth. One of great merits of Economic justice and liberty consists in pointing out that a principle of justice is at very centre of Mill's utilitarianism and that his conception of justice is surprisingly close to that of Rawls, who did so much to discredit utilitarianism as a theory of political morality.The book has three parts. The concise first part elucidates important aspects of Mill's moral psychology. Everyone has heard that was both a utilitarian and a radical empiricist. Far less established, though, is how closely linked moral theory with empirical science. The bogus authority of moral intuitions must be replaced by a proper inductive basis for normative and axiological claims. Pursuing essentially Humean programme, was convinced that moral philosophy had to be based on a science of human nature containing in particular what he called the laws of mind. As frequently lamented, there was no scientific psychology in his day. This has important implications for status of Mill's moral philosophy and how modern sympathisers should deal with it. Measured against its own standard his moral theory is based on merely conjectural knowledge. It is thus in spirit of Mill's approach that Huei-chun Su sketches in book's concluding remarks what a scientific foundation for utilitarianism might look like if we used resources of modern psychology.Mill is certainly not to blame for lack of a scientific psychology in his day, but he could have presented his ideas about moral psychology in a more systematic fashion. …

In Defense of a Utilitarian Business Ethic

AbstractIn this article, I suggest and support a utilitarian approach to business ethics. Utilitarianism is already widely used as a business ethic approach, although it is not well developed in the literature. Utilitarianism provides a guiding framework of decision making rooted in social benefit which helps direct business toward more ethical behavior. It is the basis for much of our discussion regarding the failures of Enron, Worldcom, and even the subprime mess and Wall Street Meltdown. In short, the negative social consequences are constantly referred to as proof of the wrongness of these actions and events, and the positive social consequences of bailouts and other plans are used as ethical support for those plans to right the wrongs.I believe the main cause of the neglect of the utilitarian approach is because of misguided criticisms. Here, I defend utilitarianism as a basis for business ethics against many criticisms found in the business ethics literature, showing that a business ethics approach relying on John Stuart Mill's utilitarianism supports principles like justice, is not biased against the minority, and is more reasonable than other views such as a Kantian view when dealing with workers and making other decisions in business. I also explain utilitarian moral motivation and use satisficing theory to attempt to defend utilitarian business ethics from questions raised regarding utilitarian calculus.

Global Good Samaritans: Human Rights as Foreign Policy. By Brysk Alison. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 287 pp., $27.95 paperback (ISBN: 978-0-19-538158-0).

Global Good Samaritans: Human Rights as Foreign Policy. By Brysk Alison. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 287 pp., $27.95 paperback (ISBN: 978-0-19-538158-0). In Global Good Samaritans , Alison Brysk assesses the emergence of human rights norms as the bases of foreign policy in six middle states: Sweden, Canada, Costa Rica, the Netherlands, Japan, and South Africa. A cosmopolitan approach supported by reliance on constructivism, Brysk postulates that in a number of nations, John Stuart Mill's utilitarianism is given full effect in the adoption of human rights as a critical element of foreign policy decision making and conduct of foreign relations. A willingness to engage in representation of human rights issues and adoption of human rights norms and international law into the national framework is driven as much by national self-interest as by a sense of the state in the world and vice versa. Driven by empirical analysis of the determinants of foreign policy, Brysk's conclusion is that the dynamic nature of national identity, relatively small size, and a far broader and longer-term view of global issues have driven these nations (barring Japan) to a …

Books before Chocolate? The Insufficiency of Mill's Evidence for Higher Pleasures

Recent attempts to defend Mill's account of higher and lower pleasures have overlooked a critical flaw in Mill's argument. Mill considers the question of pleasure and preference as an empirical one, but the evidence he appeals to is inconclusive. Yet, this distinction plays an essential role in Mill's utilitarianism because Mill uses this evidence to support his argument that most people actually prefer pleasures resulting from higher faculties over pleasures resulting from lower faculties. If this proves to be insufficient, then Mill's claim that these pleasures are clearly of a higher quality than others is left unsubstantiated. This article highlights the problematic nature of Mill's evidence, thereby exposing a significant problem for his, and for any utilitarian system which assumes Mill's distinction without providing additional argumentation for it.

The absolutism problem inOn Liberty

Mill argues that, apart from the principle of utility, his utilitarianism is incompatible with absolutes. Yet in On Liberty he introduces an exceptionless anti-paternalism principle—his liberty principle. In this paper I address ‘the absolutism problem, ’ that is, whether Mill's utilitarianism can accommodate an exceptionless principle. Mill's absolute claim is not a mere bit of rhetoric. But the four main solutions to the absolutism problem are also not supported by the relevant texts. I defend a fifth solution—the competence view—that turns on his attention to decision-making structures and, in particular, on the role of expertise considerations in his account.

Mill on Happiness

In this paper, I argue against the standard interpretation of Mill as a hedonistic utilitarian, and argue instead that Mill holds a ‘eudaimonic’ conception of happiness. I begin by clarifying exactly what I mean by a eudaimonic conception of happiness, and then examine the textual evidence for this eudaimonic interpretation, as well as the evidence against the standard hedonistic interpretation. Naturally, a great deal of the paper will revolve around an analysis of Mill's Utilitarianism, but special attention will also be paid to On Liberty, reading it as a development of Mill's moral theory rather than a mere application of it.

Millian Qualitative Superiorities and Utilitarianism, Part II

I continue my argument that Millian qualitative superiorities are infinite superiorities: one pleasant feeling, or type of pleasant feeling, is qualitatively superior to another in Mill's sense if and only if even a bit of the superior is more pleasant (and thus more valuable) than any finite quantity of the inferior, however large. This gives rise to a hierarchy of higher and lower pleasures such that a reasonable hedonist always refuses to sacrifice a higher for a lower irrespective of the finite amounts of each. Some indication of why this absolute refusal may be reasonable is provided in the course of outlining the content of the Millian hierarchy. It emerges that Mill's hedonistic utilitarianism has an extraordinary structure because it gives absolute priority over competing considerations to a code of justice that distributes equal rights and correlative duties for all. His utilitarianism also recognizes that certain aesthetic and spiritual pleasures may be qualitatively superior even to the pleasant feeling of security associated with the moral sentiment of justice. Thus, for instance, a noble individual may reasonably choose to waive his own rights so as to perform beautiful supererogatory actions that provide great benefits for others at the sacrifice of the right-holder's own vital interests.

Millian Qualitative Superiorities and Utilitarianism, Part I

Arrhenius and Rabinowicz (henceforth, AR) have argued that Millian qualitative superiorities are possible without assuming that any pleasure, or type of pleasure, is infinitely superior to another. But AR's analysis is fatally flawed in the context of ethical hedonism, where the assumption in question is necessary and sufficient for Millian qualitative superiorities. Marginalist analysis of the sort pressed by AR continues to have a valid role to play within any plausible version of hedonism, provided the fundamental incoherence that infects AR's use of such analysis is removed. But what AR call ‘Millian superiorities’ are never genuine qualitative superiorities in Mill's sense. Mill scholars need to appreciate this point and recognize that the interpretation of qualitative superiorities as infinite superiorities is the only interpretation which is compatible with the text of Mill's Utilitarianism. The continuing failure to appreciate the possibility of infinite superiorities has precluded any adequate understanding of the extraordinary structure of Mill's pluralistic hedonistic utilitarianism.

AN ETHICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS A TOOL OF FOREIGN POLICY

This paper is the third in a series of articles that examines the shortcomings of economic sanctions. Drawing on Mill's utilitarianism, Kant's categorical imperative and Rawls's theory of justice, the conceptual frameworks of consequentialism, deontology and contractualism are used to demonstrate the unethical nature of this increasingly popular instrument of foreign policy.

Utilitarianism without Consequentialism: The Case of John Stuart Mill

This essay argues, flouting paradox, that Mill was a utilitarian but not a consequentialist. First, it contends that there is logical space for a view that deserves to be called utilitarian despite its rejection of consequentialism; second, that this logical space is, in fact, occupied by John Stuart Mill. The key to understanding Mill's unorthodox utilitarianism and the role it plays in his moral philosophy is to appreciate his sentimentalist metaethics—especially his account of wrongness in terms of fitting guilt and resentment. Mill recognizes a fundamental moral asymmetry between the agent and others, which conflicts intractably with a presupposition of consequentialism. This allows him to differentiate three potentially conflicting evaluative spheres: morality, prudence, and aesthetics. This essay's account of Mill's utilitarianism coheres with his defense of individual liberty and his embrace of supererogation, both of which elude traditional interpretations.

Moral Virtues for Journalists

This essay outlines an account of virtue ethics applied to the profession of journalism. Virtue ethics emphasizes character before consequences, requires the “good” prior to the “right,” and allows for agent-relative as well as agent-neutral values. This essay offers an exploration of the internal characteristics of a good journalist by focusing on moral virtues crucial to journalism. First, the essay outlines the general tenets of Aristotelian virtue ethics. Second, it offers arguments touting virtue ethics in comparison with other popular normative theories such as Mill's utilitarianism and Kant's deontology. Finally, an original account of journalistic virtue ethics is offered, with an emphasis on the virtues of justice and integrity.

To Be Or Not To Be [Happy]: The Role of Employee Well-Being

The article presents a research brief of a study being conducted on the theory of employee well-being. It references a study by E. Diener et al published in a 2006 issue of “American Psychologist.” The study supposes that the misunderstanding of the nature of well-being can be traced to the hedonic treadmill model. The article addresses John Stuart Mill's utilitarianism and greatest happiness principle. The results of the research prompted the researchers to propose several modifications to the model, including the happiness or well-being set point. Other modifications are addressed.

Narrative, Imagination, and the Religion of Humanity in Mill's Ethics

This paper shows how the ethical benefits of Mill's Religion of HumanityÑa life imbued with purpose, an improved regard for others, and greater happiness for oneself from the pleasures of fellow-feelingÑare to be actualized through the imagination's creation of compelling narratives about humanity. Understanding the ethical importance of the Religion of Humanity therefore implies understanding the central role of imagination in Millian ethical life. This investigation serves to articulate a feature of Mill's utilitarianism that differentiates it from Bentham's, namely his commitment to the importance of a religious sensibility in the moral agent. It also raises the broader philosophical issue of what narratives a psychologically tenable humanist world-view requires.

The Significance of Tendencies and Intentions in the Moral Philosophy of J. S. Mill

I will argue that Mill used the concepts tendency and intention as technical terms a proper understanding of which is vital in interpreting his moral philosophy. I examine two interpretations of tendency, offered by Brian Cupples and Fred Berger, and proceed to show weaknesses in both. I will also sketch an interpretation of my own in which tendencies have an important place in Mill's understanding of not only science but moral philosophy as well. I will then show how my interpretation of tendency can help in understanding Mill's foreseeable consequences utilitarianism that relies heavily on Mill's unorthodox use of the notion of intention.