ABSTRACT Over the past 2 years, since the beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine, there have been very few studies that have examined the war from the perspective of Russian military thinking. To be able to more accurately predict ways in which the Russian way of war and force structure may change, it is essential to study the Russian military scientific discourse on the lessons of the war in Ukraine. Taking for granted that the Russians come to the same conclusions as Western observers can lead to mirror-imaging and will ignore the likely prospect that Russian lessons learned from the war will not coincide with those of Western military experts. This article contributes to the understanding of Russian military thinking with regard to the war by focusing on three key aspects. (1) The evolution of Russian thinking about indirect strategy. (2) The changing Russian perspective on the concept of non-contact war. (3) The Russian military discourse about the challenge posed by the increasingly transparent battlefield of contemporary wars.
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