Military Intervention In Politics Research Articles

Coup d’états in Africa: A cure or prophylactic for good governance?

Military Coups in Africa share a “cause-and-effect” relationship with civilian mal-administration, by way of the military auditing, disrupting and helping to arrest or capture, and re-organize defective governance system in politically sick-nations. This aim appears consistent with the mandate of the Military to serve, protect and defend the national interests, therefore, turning coups into constitutional cure and prophylactic? The analysis in this paper is conducted under the concept of Military-Coup-Symbiosis: consisting of mutualism, commensalism and parasitism. Military-Coup-Symbiosis espouses the cyclical nature of military-takeovers, and the beneficial effects on democracy in general. It also rationalizes the justification why coups are bound to co-exist with civilian governments, for as long as political leaders continue to support and engage in De-democratization processes, exhibiting inimical conducts such as neopatrimonialism, and non-meritorious job recruitment and promotions. This paper investigates the possible curative qualities of military coups on good governance by posing as perpetual threat caution to democracy, and the normative values as political prophylactic to arrest and prevent potential leadership abuses. The ultimate question is how military interventions in politics can be harnessed to clean up mal-administration in politically sick-nations?

Assessing the Political Clout of Thailand’s “Monarchized” Military in 2023

Abstract Since 1980, Thailand’s monarchy and military have enjoyed a partnership of power with the latter as a junior affiliate — a highly “monarchized military.” However, after 1992, direct military influence across the country diminished, and after the 2006 and 2014 coups, the military regained enormous clout. The country’s post-2019 facade democracy represents the continuation of a tutelary regime involving palace-endorsed military intervention in politics and apparent electoral governance. However, the armed forces-influenced government faces growing domestic challenges. This study examines Thailand’s military in late 2023. 2023 was profoundly significant because a new civilian government entered office that year, which might challenge monarchy-military primacy. The study chiefly asks: To what extent has the monarchy-military partnership clothed itself under the appearance of democracy (while indirectly interfering in it) to sustain its power, and what are the principal challenges this partnership faces? The study finds that in late 2023, Thailand remained a façade democracy, characterized by electoral authoritarianism and lorded over by monarchy and military — a situation the two institutions preferred to maintain.

The Truth About Africa's Coups

Abstract: The recent coups in Africa do not portend a return to praetorian politics in the region. They are the outcomes of country-specific historical processes associated with the underdevelopment of state capacity, the decay of political institutions, and the failures of electoral politics to improve citizens' material conditions. At the same time, the coups are an important warning regarding the state of democracy in Africa. Surveys show that majorities of Africans harbor both a deep dissatisfaction with democracy and an openness to military interventions to address civilian political dysfunction. While coup contagion is a remote possibility due to strong norms against military rule in much of the region, popular dissatisfaction with democracy and permissiveness towards military interventions in politics present a real risk of autocratization through elections.

Military Intervention in Politics

The Military exhibits discipline and is organised by a chain of command system from superiors to subordinates. In liberal democratic systems where democracy is deep-seated and the existence of vibrant civil society and elected democratic institutions with very sophisticated political culture keep military force within its determined ambit and thus restrain the military from meddling with politics. The military remains under the control of the civilian authority. The influence of military authority has been trammelled by the all-pervasive legitimacy of a democratic system and a very enriched level of political culture. So reasonable possibility of a military coup or direct military intervention in this system is almost eclipsed. Contrastingly the dearth of democratic elements and low level of political culture in the countries of the Middle East, Latin America, and some countries of Southeast Asia, such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar have turned them vulnerable to military coups and frequent intervention of the military in the political domain. Lack of social cohesion, political instability, political and administrative corruption, a vicious circle of poverty, the existence of extremist and separatist groups, and religious fundamentalism provide a conducive atmosphere for military intrusion in politics.

Military Incursion into Politics: A Comparative Analysis of Civil-Military Relationship in Pakistan and Nigeria

Purpose:Objective number one in the current study seeks to understand the role of historical developments in shaping the direction of democracy with a testable hypothesis one having that the Military intervention in politics is a result of bad politics exercised by politicians while addressing problems caused by low political culture, this paper explores answers to that question in a context of renewed option rule in Pakistan and Nigeria.Methodology:This Research paper will provide an overview of the major historical events since the independence of these two countries to be in a position to evaluate the role of the military in politics. The Nigerian military's poor human rights record has had a devastating impact on its effectiveness.Findings:Severe abuse of civilian communities, from the Ogoni (in the mid-1990s) to Odi (1999) and Zaki Biam (2001), and more recent extrajudicial assassinations, frequently in the background of contradicting militant and separatist groups from Boko Haram and the Islamic.Implication:Movement of Nigeria (IMN) In recent days, Pakistan has had legitimate power to encompass the tenures of the chiefs of staff of the army, navy, and air force.

DOMINASI MILITER DALAM POLITIK DAN PEMERINTAHAN DI MESIR: KEGAGALAN DEMOKRATISASI DI MESIR PADA KUDETA 2013

This paper discusses how the democratization process that took place for the first time in Egypt, which was marked by the election of President Mohammad Morsi and the victory of Islamic groups' votes in parliament through this general election, did not run smoothly. The military, which has long been in an important position in Egypt, is not standing still. The democratic process in Egypt was marred by the coup carried out by the military group against the Morsi government on July 3, 2013. Through an analysis based on pretorian theory and the concept of military intervention in politics, this paper shows the dominance of the military as a very dominant actor in Egypt. Pretorian theory, in particular, emphasizes the dominant role of the military in all important political institutions, including political leaders. The military, which was previously allied with the Muslim Brotherhood and supported the Egyptian revolution that resulted in the ouster of President Mubarak, turned into opponents when IM won a majority in the Egyptian parliamentary elections. The military saw that the voice of Islamic groups was no longer in line with its interests, so the 2013 coup against Muhammad Morsi took place.

A Generation of Mysteries?

Abstract The history and the conflicts in which Sudanese Government armed forces have been involved are of interest both from the Sudanese historical and the military-historical angles. But while the agonies of Sudan’s civil wars have attracted significant academic interest, the structures, characteristics, and operating methods of official military institutions in Africa have been neglected, and there is little recent research. Sudanese military intervention in politics, including five successful coups, has been discussed since Ruth First’s book in 1970 and before. There were at least 16 coups and attempted coups by the Sudanese Armed Forces from 1957 to 1976. But there is little coverage of the security forces, and there is little available to cover the Sudanese army’s more specifically military record. Thus it is worthwhile to draw the available scattered threads together to start to form a basis for further research. The Sudanese Armed Forces’ frequent political involvement will be signposted and wound in as necessary—ultimately armies are a function of their governments—but is not the function of this article. What emerges is scattered fragments on military forces and operations, overlaid on the unrelenting drumbeat of horrible details from the first Sudanese civil war.

Back to basics: assessing military involvement in politics in contemporary Brazil

As Brazil showed signs of progress in civil-military relations in the late nineties and early 2000s, research moved from civilian control to defense policy topics, resulting in neglect of less obvious forms of military involvement in politics, which pre-date Bolsonaro. To support our claim, we begin by critically reviewing existing frameworks for assessing progress in civilian control and propose returning to the field’s primary concern with military intervention in politics by using three indicators - military presence in government; public commentary by military officers; and episodes of military contestation – and their implications regarding the armed forces, politicians, and society. Then, we make an account of instances of the three indicators during Dilma Rousseff’s and Michel Temer’s presidencies. We conclude that military involvement in politics in Brazil is a pervasive social phenomenon posing serious risks for democracy.

Forum: A Coup At the Capitol? Conceptualizing Coups and Other Antidemocratic Actions

AbstractThe term “coup” has been used to describe a diverse range of events. Although recent decades have seen the academic study of coups focus on an increasingly narrow type of military intervention in politics, the general public, governments, and international organizations frequently apply the coup label to a broader set of antidemocratic actions. This was dramatically illustrated after the overrunning of the US Capitol Building on January 6, 2021, when discussions of the event led to debates about whether or not it constituted a coup. More than a mere matter of semantics, describing an event as a coup can have analytical, normative, and practical implications. The scholars in this forum explore the challenges inherent in distinguishing coups from other types of antidemocratic actions, highlight gaps between academic and popular conceptions of the term, and identify ways in which scholars can productively contribute to public debates around contentious events.

Back to basics: assessing military involvement in politics in contemporary Brazil

As Brazil showed signs of progress in civil-military relations in the late nineties and early 2000s, research moved from civilian control to defense policy topics, resulting in the neglect of less obvious forms of military involvement in politics, many of which pre-date the presidency of Jair Bolsonaro. After critically reviewing existing frameworks for assessing progress in civilian control we propose returning to the field’s primary concern with military intervention in politics by using three indicators -military presence in government; public commentary by military officers; and episodes of military contestation –and their implications regarding the armed forces, politicians, and society. Next, we examine these three indicators in the context of the presidencies of Dilma Rousseff and Michel Temer. We conclude that interactions between “soldiers, politicians, and civilians” in recent episodes of military involvement in politics revealthe full extent of the frailty of civil-military relations in Brazil.

Coup Agency and Prospects for Democracy

AbstractThis research note introduces new global data on military coups. Conventional aggregate data so far have conflated two distinct types of coups. Military interventions by leading officers are coups “from above,” characterized by political power struggles within authoritarian elite coalitions where officers move against civilian elites, executive incumbents, and their loyal security personnel. By contrast, power grabs by officers from the lower and middle ranks are coups “from below,” where military personnel outside of the political elite challenge sitting incumbents, their loyalists, and the regime itself. Disaggregating coup types offers leverage to revise important questions about the causes and consequences of military intervention in politics. This research note illustrates that coup attempts from the top of the military hierarchy are much more likely to be successful than coups from the lower and middle ranks of the military hierarchy. Moreover, coups from the top recalibrate authoritarian elite coalitions and serve to sustain autocratic rule; they rarely produce an opening for a democratic transition. Successful coups from below, by contrast, can result in the breakdown of authoritarian regimes and generate an opening for democratic transitions.

The Long Years of Military Rule in Nigeria: A Blessing or a Curse

Nigeria gained her independence in October 1960 after almost six decades of British colonial rule. The country’s journey into nationhood was herald by high hopes and prospects for national unity, peace and development. This was because of its vast human and material resources, and land mass. Nigeria is dominantly made of three prominent regions: the North (Hausa Fulani), the West (Yorubas) and the East (Igbos) with minorities in other regions.The military took over the leadership of the country barely six years into her independence as a nation. The military held sway for twenty nine years out of the ininitial forty years of the country’s post independence history before her return to civil rule in 1999.The county is still been confronted with challenges on all fronts ranging from insecurity and insurgency, economy, political uncertainty, electoral malpractices, high rate of unemployment, poor infrastructure amongst others. Literature have been skewed toward military intervention in politics as the root cause of the challenges bedeviling the country more than two decades after her return to civil rule.The study employed both quantitative and qualitative data. The study analysed the history of military rule in Nigeria and interrogated the crux of the military institution. It further analysed the peculiarities of each of the military regimes. The study also examined the post-military era in the country and concluded with recommendations.

Forças Armadas no Brasil: profissão e intervenção política

This article discusses military participation in politics, with an emphasis in the Brazilian context. Far from new, the discussed hypothesis – the continuity line between professionalization and military political neutrality – became commonplace ever since Samuel Huntington (1996). However, a literature review enables us to question such hypothesis in view of the persistent military intervention in politics. Our core argument is that military intervention in politics is a direct function of professionalization in certain social, historical, and political contexts in countries like Brazil, so that the act of professionalizing implies preparing military forces for intervening political action.

Constitutional Safeguards for the Independence of the Judiciary in African Democracies

This article considers the paramount importance of corruption-free judiciary in the development and entrenchment of democracy in any society. It does this by beaming its searchlight on the democratisation experimentation ongoing in Africa, military intervention in politics and the issue of corruption among members of African judiciaries. While this article takes a general look at these issues among some countries in Africa, it however, places heavy reliance on the current happenings in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. This is principally based on the recent suspension of the Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN), Justice WSN Onnoghen by the President on the failure of the CJN to declare or disclose some of his assets as required by law. The suspension of the CJN resulted in both legal and constitutional experts raising the question of whether the President has such a power. Some believe that the act of the President is a flagrant abuse of the Constitution and a grave affront on the cardinal principle of separation of power. Most importantly, many people have queried the effect and impact of the suspension of the CJN on the independence of the judiciary in a democracy. This article does not claim to be a representation of the happenings in all African judiciaries but rather some pocket of events as reported across selected African countries. It equally does not claim that all members of African judiciaries are corrupt but that the issue of judicial corruption remains a teething problem among some judiciaries in Africa. Nevertheless, it is argued that the issue of judicial corruption still remains a problem in Africa generally and Nigeria in particular, and this must be dealt with decisively if the independence of the judiciary is to be protected and if African democracies are to flourish. It therefore, puts forward what should be the parameters for safeguarding the independence of judiciary and the disciplining erring judicial officers. These are necessary considerations if constitutional democracies are to be entrenched globally.

A test of the democratic peacekeeping hypothesis: Coups, democracy, and foreign military deployments

While peacekeeping’s effects on receiving states have been studied at length, its effects on sending states have only begun to be explored. This article examines the effects of contributing peacekeepers abroad on democracy at home. Recent qualitative research has divergent findings: some find peacekeeping contributes to democratization among sending states, while others find peacekeeping entrenches illiberal or autocratic rule. To adjudicate, we build on recent quantitative work focused specifically on the incidence of coups. We ask whether sending peacekeepers abroad increases the risk of military intervention in politics at home. Drawing on selectorate theory, we expect the effect of peacekeeping on coup risk to vary by regime type. Peacekeeping brings with it new resources which can be distributed as private goods. In autocracies, often developing states where UN peacekeeping remuneration exceeds per-soldier costs, deployment produces a windfall for militaries. Emboldened by new resources, which can be distributed as private goods among the selectorate, and fearing the loss of them in the future, they may act to depose the incumbent regime. In contrast, peacekeeping will have little effect in developed democracies, which have high per-troop costs, comparatively large selectorates, and low ex-ante coup risk. Anocracies, which typically have growing selectorates, and may face distinctive international pressures to democratize, will likely experience reduced coup risk. We test these claims with data covering peacekeeping deployments, regime type, and coup risk since the end of the Cold War. Our findings confirm our theoretical expectations. These findings have implications both for how we understand the impact of participation in peacekeeping – particularly among those countries that contribute troops disproportionately in the post-Cold War era – and for the potential international determinants of domestic autocracy.

FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN BANGLADESH: A CASE STUDY OF MILITARY-BACKED CARETAKER GOVERNMENT IN 2007-2008

Foreign intervention in domestic politics is an old phenomenon. The colonial legacy of various countries is the manifestation of this intervention. In this globalization era, external factors are also important for developing countries’ democracy. Bangladesh’s post-independence journey was not as smooth as the country went through a long period of turmoil, characterized by assassinations, coups, counter-coups, and military rule. Since the independence army plays an important role in Bangladeshi politics and foreign powers took that opportunity to influence the country’s internal affairs especially India, China, the United States of America (USA), and other European countries. Earlier military intervention happened after the liberation war in August and November 1975, later in March 1982, December 1990 and May 1996. At last, the military intervened in politics in 2006 and continued until 2008. This period Bangladesh was ruled by the military indirectly and the power behind the Caretaker Government (CTG) is thought by some to reside with the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI). During this military-backed caretaker government, global actors were involved in Bangladeshi politics both directly and indirectly to serve their purposes. The present research has investigated the nature, causes, and consequences of foreign interference in Bangladeshi politics during the last military-backed interim government. This study applied a qualitative research methodology by collecting data from primary sources, i.e., through content review, which will include newspapers, periodicals, party documents such as constitutions, manifestoes, press statements, etc. From the secondary sources, the historical background of the caretaker government, military interventions in politics, failure of political parties after the independence and characteristics of political cultures in Bangladesh have understood. The paper concludes that the failure of political institutions, undemocratic political culture, and lack of consensus among major political parties regarding national issues was one of the main reasons for foreign interference in Bangladeshi politics during 2007-08. Article visualizations:

Public Policy Formulation in Pakistan During Military Regimes

Pakistan has faced intermittent military interventions in politics since its establishment. In altered military governments, Pakistan faced severe swipes in public policy formulation since first martial law of Ayub Khan to the last military government of General Musharraf. Military governments tried to get de-jure prestige after coming into power and designed the government structure to sponsor their interests. Under military governance, performance of judiciary, religious leaders, external players and local administration persisted in critical situation. During military regimes, transformation program was executed in the country through public policy formulation intended to bring broadminded modifications in the constitution, legal and public domains of the country. This study will observe the major policies of the military regimes in Pakistan and their impacts on social setup of the country. The core purpose of this study is to scrutinize the process of public policy formulation in Pakistan during military regimes, their effects upon the socio-political environment of Pakistan and addresses the key causes of disappointing results of these policies. The causes of armed forces interventions in politics of Pakistan will also be analyzed. The findings specifies that pitiable articulation of policies, feeble establishment, dominating behavior of military executives, poor structure of funds management, varied interests of community and that execution of public policies blemished by exploitation are noteworthy reasons to failure of public policies in the country. The study acclaims rearrangement of socio-political situations as benevolent expansions for difficulties of public policy.

Revolutions and the Military: Endgame Coups, Instability, and Prospects for Democracy

This article presents a systematic analysis of military coups following popular mass uprisings in nondemocratic regimes, conceptualized as endgame coups. Drawing on our original, medium- n data set of revolutionary situations, we find that such endgame coups form a distinct type of military intervention in politics. Compared to regular coups, episodes of popular mass contestation prompt conservative interventions in politics of the military’s leadership aimed at preserving the regime’s authoritarian infrastructure. A systematic test of factors characterizing postcoup political trajectories is based on Cox proportional hazard models and provides empirical evidence in contrast to the widely held notion of “democratic coups.” Our findings reveal that endgame coups are conservative rollback coups, executed by military leaderships, that result in continued political instability and illiberal politics.

BISNIS MILITER PASCA ORDE BARU

After the fall of the Suharto regime, the TNI's existence as a socio-political force was sued by many parties. They assume that TNI should not occupy positions outside of Hankam that should be a portion of civilian groups. According to Bilveer Singh, in most western societies, the role of the military is essentially to support the political aspirations of society under civilian leadership. This statement is based on the opinion of Samuel P. Hutington who said that the majority of military professionals in the west accept civil power as a right that should exist. Therefore, when the military "deviates" and interferes in civil affairs, then, as Taufik Abdullah says, there is a concern based on the assumption that illegal acts have been committed. Thoughts that place the military as a civic-supporting force to carry out the affairs of its "part" are not fully applied in third world countries including Indonesia. Studies showing military intervention in politics show that military interests and the crisis facing a country push the military to interfere in civil affairs. Military intervention in politics can not be separated from military control in other fields such as economics.

The dog that did not bark: the army and the emergency in India

ABSTRACTIn June 1975, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi imposed Emergency rule, capping off a decade long process of the ‘deinstitutionalisation’ of the founding Congress party, increased social mobilisation, and political instability – factors generally considered conducive to military intervention in politics. Organisational factors encouraging military praetorianism, such as military involvement in internal security missions and the growth of ‘rival’ paramilitary institutions, accompanied this process of political decay. But the Indian military did not exploit this window of opportunity. This article offers an institutionalist explanation of the military’s political restraint based on two factors. First, institutionalised mechanisms of civilian control, forged during the critical juncture following independence, insulated the military from politics and the politicians from the military despite the weakening of the political system under which these were created. Second, military internalisation of the norm civilian supremacy, continually reinforced via professional socialisation processes, acted as an internal barrier to military role expansion.