Military Intervention In Kosovo Research Articles

LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE IDENTITY POLICY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN POSTWAR KOSOVO — A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Background: This paper aims to elaborate and analyse the legal context of the identity policy of the international community in post-war Kosovo. Through this policy, the nature of Kosovo was determined as an entity under the UN administration until 2008 and as an independent state after that. Given that NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo was initiated for humanitarian reasons and, therefore, was not an intervention aimed at resolving the historical conflict between Serbs and Albanians, the UN administration in Kosovo was also established by being neutral towards national interpretations on the “issue of Kosovo”. This paper will bring together arguments that the international community, in its approach to the people of Kosovo, has actively tried to establish a new political entity detached from any national projections, thereby preventing it from being perceived as a national victory, especially among the Albanian majority. For this reason, all laws, regulations, governing documents and policies of the UN mission, which delineated Kosovo’s political nature and way of governing, were based on the ‘principle of multi-ethnicity’. This paper also examines the negotiation process for determining Kosovo’s final status, through which independence was conditioned by the commitment to building a state based on the principle of multiethnicity. Methods: In this article, qualitative methods have been used since the focus of this paper has been the understanding of some of the concepts of the legal framework used in the process of state building of Kosovo after the war and the role that the international community played in the policies of identity. The authors try to connect the theoretical with the practical aspects to present a broader view of the topic of this article. This scientific article is a single case study research focusing on the state of Kosovo in the post-war period. Data analyses were collected from the official documents of international institutions and the state of Kosovo. The historical method content analysis of the legal documents used in this paper has helped to achieve a deeper understanding of the topic presented in this paper. Results and Conclusions: The authors’ findings indicate that in post-war Kosovo, the international community in post-war Kosovo has established a neutral political entity in terms of national identification. This has been achieved through a legal and constitutional framework that prioritises identity by promoting multi-ethnicity and civic identity as the political identity of the people of Kosovo. This discrepancy between state and national identity has given rise to an identity crisis, especially among the Albanian majority population. This has resulted in religious radicalisation in part of the population and a lack of loyalty to the state in other parts of the country.

Legal Aspects Related to the Termination of the Kumanovo Agreement (1999) and Possibilities for Serbian Armed Forces to return to Kosovo in Case of Termination of that Agreemen

This article examines the Kumanovo Agreement as an obstacle to possible Serbian military intervention in Kosovo and Metohija (hereinafter shortly: Kosovo) in case of uncontrolled Albanian invasion against the Serb population in Kosovo. The Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (“KFOR”) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, known as the Kumanovo Agreement, represents a legal limitation to any involvement of the Serbian military force(s). With respect to the Kumanovo Agreement the consent element required for such peacekeeping agreements appears to be missing. The absence of consent element of the agreement undermines the legal basis and thus the legal validity of the Kumanovo treaty reached under apparent coercion in 1999. It appears that Kumanovo Agreement in the absence of proper consent requirement may be interpreted as a dubious act under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter VCLT), particularly Article 52 (related to the Coercion of a State by the threat or use of force). Therefore, the Kumanovo Agreement, as an Annex to the Security resolution 1244 (1999), can be considered as an invalid act according to the VLCT. As a consequence of its invalidity, the Serbian government in warlike situations, in case of massive human rights violations by Kosovo authorities against Serbian population, may resort to termination of the Kumanovo Agreement (under Article 52 and even under Article 53 (jus cogens) of the VLCT) for aim to protect the Serbian population against ethnic cleansing, oppression and other human rights violations of International (humanitarian) public Law.

Nato Military Interventions In Kosovo, Libya, Afghanistan, And Their Impact On Relations With Russia After The Cold War

Abstract Abstract This thesis seeks to find out how NATO military interventions in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan have affected relations with Russia. In order to achieve the aim and hypothesis of the study, the critical geopolitical approach is chosen as a theoretical framework. A schematic critical geopolitics conceptualization of Gearóid Ó. Tuathail is used as the method of research. This thesis mostly pays attention to three essential parts of the critical geopolitics: “formal geopolitics” (analyses of think tanks, specialists, etc.), “practical geopolitics” (the decisions of policy makers, official statements, documents, strategies and speeches) and “popular geopolitics” (the discourse of the media and surveys). The combination of these three elements allows determining the certain NATO’s and Russian geopolitical discourses towards crises in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan. With regard to evidences of crises, NATO’s and Russian geopolitical discourses are assessed from very positive, positive, neutral, to negative and very negative. It provides an opportunity to see how both sides have acknowledged these crises and how in long terms NATO’s military interventions in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan have influenced relations with Russia in international order. Moreover, descriptive method, discourse analysis and a comparative approach are used to scrutinize Russian and NATO’s geopolitical discourses towards crises. The analyses of NATO’s and Russian geopolitical discourses show that the hypothesis different NATO and Russian geopolitical discourses towards crises in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan have affected reciprocal relations is correct. The crisis of Kosovo in 2008 marks the end of the Russian flexible policy towards NATO and marks a new beginning of a permanently hostile geopolitical discourse against NATO in Europe. NATO military interventions in Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan have negatively affected relations with Russia mostly in Europe. Mutual cooperation and diplomatic disputes towards crises in Libya and Afghanistan are minor in comparison with the NATO-Russian relations in the European continent. Consequently, Russia concentrates most of its attention to the geopolitical tradition towards Europe.

Culture As Soft Power In International Relations

Abstract A global approach has almost generalized over the last decades, suggesting that human security and, related to it – society security- are among the most important themes of contemporary international relations. The management of the Yugoslavian crisis, the terrorist attacks of September the 11th, 2001, as well as the debates over US and its allies’ military interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq, pointed out, on the one hand, that states are not prepared to deal with the cross-border threats of the 21st century alone, and, on the other hand, the fact that military interventions (the “hard” approach to security) do not always represent the optimum solution in managing international security. However, peace-building and security building (the ”soft” approach) are usually more discreet, do not attract attention, do not draw the media interest. In recent studies, the issue of “soft” power and “hard” power has been increasingly discussed. “Soft” power refers to the power derived mainly from cultural and imagological sources, exercising its influence more through persuasion or by attracting the weak one to a particular model rather than by coercion. ”Hard” power consists especially of military and economic means contributing to enforcing the will of one actor over another actor. These two forms of power do not exclude each other, but, on the contrary, combining “soft” with “hard” means facilitates greater efficiency in achieving the main goal.

Selective Memory: Augustine and Contemporary Just War Discourse

AbstractRecent moral justifications of military intervention in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq have drawn upon just war concepts set out by Augustine of Hippo in the early fifth century. Augustine, writing as the political hegemony of the Roman Empire was ebbing away, provides a valuable touchstone for anyone engaged in analysing the complex interplay of power, war, morality and religious faith. Like most of the problems Augustine addressed in his writings, his attitude to just war was rooted in a potent mix of imperial politics, concern for individual souls and establishing and defending church orthodoxy. Though his personal telos was to be found in the Heavenly City, Augustine did not try to avoid the difficulties of dealing with the contradictions involved in the Christian's encounter with the decidedly ungodly Earthly City. Though he never ruled out the need for political power to be wielded through the medium of martial force, Augustine would only accede to such action with great reluctance. This article investigates aspects of the use and misuse of Augustine and his ideas in both the political and academic arenas in the justification of recent military interventions. Analysis of statements made by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the book Just War Against Terror by American political theorist Jean Bethke Elshtain will show how Augustinian concepts have been used selectively to serve broader political agendas. Blair and Elshtain have been chosen for this study because they were both, in their respective fields, influential figures who advocated the 2003 invasion of Iraq; they are both declared Christians; Elshtain has explicitly associated herself with Blair's approach; and they both rejected any notion of religious crusade in the aforementioned interventions. By considering casus belli which included self-defence, opposing evil and liberating the oppressed, this article will demonstrate that the selective use of Augustine would eventually weaken the very case it was meant to strengthen. In the process, commonalities and discontinuities between Augustine's ideas in their original context and their application in the present will be highlighted. The article concludes that, in the process of using Augustinian concepts to justify recent military action, his renowned reticence regarding the use of force was undermined.

Military Intervention and the Humanitarian “Force Multiplier”

Recent military interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq have sparked controversy by using humanitarian aid to further military goals. In 1999, NATO forces set up refugee camps for fleeing Kosovars, even as NATO fighter pilots attacked Yugoslavia. US planes dropped both cluster bombs and food packets in Afghanistan in 2001. As the US military finalized plans for invading Iraq, the US Agency for International Development recruited nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to work in the war zone. Despite the heated rhetoric concerning militarized charity, military and humanitarian actors offer little examination of its effects. My analysis of recent military and NGO interaction reveals three types of interaction, which I term humanitarian soldiers, aid workers as government agents, and the humanitarian placebo. I find that in the absence of adequate security, “humanitarian soldiers” cannot create stability or meet local humanitarian needs. Additionally, aid organizations face the reality of non-neutrality...

From Province to Protectorate to State? Speculation on the Impact of Kosovo's Genesis upon the Doctrines of International Law

The province of Kosovo – 2 million people in 11,000 square kilometres of territory nestled between Serbia to the North and Albania and Macedonia to the South – was thrust into the international limelight when Serbian actions to repress Kosovo Albanian calls for independence made it a subject of international concern at the end of the 1990s. While Kosovo is not unique in becoming well-known for suffering the repressive actions of a parent state, and while it has not even enjoyed the distinction of being the only territorial administration of its time, it appears to be unique in its (potential) impact on the doctrines of international law. On a number of levels, the international community's response to the situation created by Milosevic's actions and NATO's intervention threaten to call fundamental pillars of the post-World War II order into question. It is too early to speculate conclusively on whether the NATO action in KosovosansSecurity Council approval in some measure paved the way for an emerging doctrine of “humanitarian intervention” that, in turn, opened the door to the illegal invasion of Iraq. It seems not implausible to suggest that the apparent success of unauthorised military intervention in Kosovo in stopping mass human rights violations emboldened politicians on both sides of the Atlantic in opting for a moral path over the formally legal one. In any event, grounded as they are in that history, the final status talks on the future of Kosovo represent a serious challenge to the current framing of the international order. It is these issues that this symposium wished to raise and examine.

The Rules on the Use of Force at the Beginning of the XXI Century

The article discusses the impact of recent military interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq on the rules governing the use of force in international law. It argues that, in spite of some egregious violations, existing rules have not been changed or fallen into desuetude. The attempt to dismantle the collective security system and the claim to relax beyond recognition the general prohibition on the use of force have found the strong opposition of the overwhelming majority of the UN membership. Furthermore, existing rules and Article 51 of the UN Charter have proved flexible enough to protect States against the threats posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Their application, nonetheless, remains extremely problematic and confirms the need for a collective control over the use of military force.

Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War

The legal status of humanitarian intervention poses a profound challenge to the future of global order. The central question is easy to formulate but notoriously difficult to answer: Should international law permit states to intervene militarily to stop a genocide or comparable atrocity without Security Council authorization? That question has acquired even greater significance in the wake of military interventions in Kosovo and Iraq, and nonintervention in the Sudan. Concerted deliberation on these issues, however, has reached an impasse. A key obstacle to legalizing unilateral humanitarian intervention (UHI) is the overriding concern that states would use the pretext of humanitarian intervention to wage wars for ulterior motives. In this article, I argue that it is just as likely, or even more likely, that the impact on states would be the opposite. Drawing on recent empirical studies, I contend that legalizing UHI should in important respects discourage wars with ulterior motives, and I discuss changes to international legal institutions that would amplify that potential effect.

The Impact of Analogical Reasoning on US Foreign Policy Towards Kosovo

NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo, the southernmost province of Yugoslavia, in March 1999, was legitimized as the last resort to alleviate the suffering of the Kosovo Albanians. Diplomatic initiatives at Rambouillet, France, had earlier failed to broker an agreement between the Yugoslav authorities and the Kosovar Albanians, leading NATO to assert a moral imperative to intervene. Critics of the intervention maintain that the negotiations were a charade designed to facilitate the execution of a military operation. This article suggests that the failure to reach agreement was a direct consequence of the analogical reasoning employed by the chief US negotiators at the time, Madeleine Albright and Richard Holbrooke. It is difficult to identify what exactly Slobodan Miloševic’s military advisers said during this period without undertaking exhaustive research into Yugoslav military correspondence during the period or conducting interviews with the people themselves, many of whom, such as Miloševic and Dragoljub Ojdanić, are standing trial, or have been tried, at The Hague. The main focus of this article, therefore, is on the analogical reasoning employed by US diplomats. The analogical lens, through which the events in Kosovo were viewed, steered the negotiations down a necessarily confrontational channel, which made it impossible to achieve an agreement. The use of analogical reasoning in international diplomacy is not unique to Kosovo, and this article will argue that future, and ongoing, analysis of US interventions, and foreign policy in general, must take account of the role played by analogical reasoning. Rather than searching for imperial motives behind US foreign policy, observers and academics should initially examine the suitability of the analogies employed by US policymakers and the extent to which they dictate action. Using Kosovo as a case study, this article will outline both the dangers inherent in the over-reliance on analogical reasoning in foreign policy situations and the need to understand the role played by analogies when formulating an accurate analysis of US foreign policy.

Justifying Kosovo: Representations of Gendered Violence and U.S. Military Intervention

This essay examines the public discourse, comprised of both official governmental communication and media coverage, of the American-led military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 as a site of representations of gendered violence. The project considers the implications for such representations for both the prevention of gendered violence and its future employment as a justification for military operations. The essay concludes by cautioning that prominent rhetorical strategies employing such representations ultimately undermine efforts to prevent gendered violence.

The Clinton Administration and War Powers

The strongest of all governmental powers is the power to engage in war; and the strongest challenge for constitutionalism is to bring the war power of the state under meaningful control. The 1787 Constitution allocated some military powers to the Congress and others to the President as part of the scheme of constitutional checks and balances. To this day, however, the distribution of authority between the branches remains contested and uncertain. The Clinton Administration has had substantial opportunity to contribute to the evolution of constitutional practice concerning war powers, by virtue of numerous occasions of combat deployments, cruise missile strikes, and other forms of military engagement since January 1993. In broad outline, the constitutional practice of the Clinton Administration concerning war powers is similar to that of previous administrations in the sense that sweeping claims of executive authority have been tempered through pragmatic political accommodation. The legal opinions issued to explain the constitutional and statutory rationales for executive military initiatives embody some subtle differences from those of other administrations. This article compares the record of the Clinton Administration with those of its predecessors, after first briefly locating U.S. war powers practice in the context of crossnational comparisons. The subject of the Clinton Administration and war powers can be addressed from a crossnational perspective, along the lines of the comparative constitutional research on war powers I have been pursuing in other writing. In relation to the military intervention in Kosovo, for example, how did President Clinton's exercise of executive power compare to the authority of the heads of state or heads of government in the other member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that participated in the operation? Were other chief executives constitutionally authorized to commit their forces to a military campaign without reference to their national parliaments, as President Clinton effectively did, or are such decisions shared with parliament in the respective constitutional systems? Crossnational comparisons show variations in the degree to which national parliaments participated in determining the nature of a given state's commitment to the NATO engagement in Kosovo. President Clinton was not the only NATO leader who initiated his country's participation in the Kosovo operation without obtaining explicit authorization from the legislative branch. In the parliamentary system of the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Tony Blair may assume support from the House of Commons without necessarily putting the matter to a formal vote. In France's mixed system, President Jacques Chirac operates under Gaullist premises that military decisions belong to the presidential domaine reserve with little scrutiny from the Assemblee Nationale. In other countries, however, parliamentary control is considered a fundamental constraint on executive war-making powers. Germany's postwar constitution broke with the past by renouncing war, but participation in collective defense or collective security organizations is constitutionally permitted, subject to parliamentary approval. Notably, as required by a decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court at an earlier stage of the Yugoslav conflict, the Bundestag had to act affirmatively to approve German involvement in the Kosovo campaign. Polities in transition have looked to diverse constitutional models in developing their own approaches to executive-legislative relations with respect to war powers. The newest NATO members and NATO aspirants had their first tests of constitutional control of war powers in the post-cold war era with the Kosovo crisis. Hungary, a front-line state for this conflict, which borders on Yugoslavia and has close ties to ethnic Hungarians in the Vojvodina region of Serbia, submitted certain critical decisions for the affirmative authorization of the national parliament. Bulgaria and Romania, not yet NATO members but eager to prove themselves to be suitable partners, had parliamentary votes to approve opening their airspace to NATO planes. The remainder of this article focuses on comparisons between the Clinton Administration and its predecessors: Does President Clinton's approach to war powers and other foreign policy problems cohere with that of previous Presidents, or has the present administration forged a new approach in these domains? This general question also addresses the theme of Dawn Johnsen's paper: To what extent has the executive branch under Clinton declined to comply with congressional enactments regarding war powers on the basis of an executive position that the law in question is unconstitutional?