Military Defeat Research Articles

Reform in the Russian Army, 1856–1861

Historians of imperial Russia have agreed unanimously and confidently that Russia's humiliation in the Crimean War (1853–1856) led directly to the emancipation of the serfs and to wide-ranging social, economic, political, and military changes of enormous historical significance. In addition, whether liberal interpreters were waxing eloquent about a so-called “epoch of great reforms” or Marxists were emphasizing pressures of a “revolutionary situation” in a country in transition from feudalism to capitalism, the reforms of the Russian army introduced by D. A. Miliutin, war minister throughout most of Alexander II's quarter-century long reign, have been acclaimed unanimously as one of the most successful and lasting attempts at modernization in this period of considerable change. Miliutin was appointed war minister only in November 1861, however, more than six and one half years after Alexander II acceded to the imperial throne, leaving an apparent gap at a time when preparations for reform were begun in most other spheres of government and society. Indeed, the period after the Crimean War is so well known as a time of change of enormous historical significance for the future of Russia that inactivity in the military seems remarkable, especially in the aftermath of military defeat.

Reform in the Russian Army, 1856–1861

Historians of imperial Russia have agreed unanimously and confidently that Russia's humiliation in the Crimean War (1853-1856) led directly to the emancipation of the serfs and to wide-ranging social, economic, political, and military changes of enormous historical significance. In addition, whether liberal interpreters were waxing eloquent about a so-called epoch of great or Marxists were emphasizing pressures of a revolutionary situation in a country in transition from feudalism to capitalism, the reforms of the Russian army introduced by D. A. Miliutin, war minister throughout most of Alexander II's quarter-century long reign, have been acclaimed unanimously as one of the most successful and lasting attempts at modernization in this period of considerable change. Miliutin was appointed war minister only in November 1861, however, more than six and one half years after Alexander II acceded to the imperial throne, leaving an apparent gap at a time when preparations for reform were begun in most other spheres of government and society. Indeed, the period after the Crimean War is so well known as a time of change of enormous historical significance for the future of Russia that inactivity in the military seems remarkable, especially in the aftermath of military defeat. For a long time this period was examined only in official or semi-official Russian military histories, for example M. I. Bogdanovich's six-volume Istoricheskii ocherk deiatel'nosti voennago upravleniia v Rossii (1855-1880) and N. A. Danilov's similarly titled Istoricheskii ocherk razvitiia voennago upralNeniia v Rossii, volume 1 of the massive Stoletie voennago mninisterstva, 1802-1902 produced by the war ministry at the beginning of this century.' When considering military affairs, survey histories ignored the period between 1856 and 1861 or stated that General N. 0. Sukhozanet, the war minister during this time, failed to understand the need for the reforms subsequently proposed and introduced by Miliutin.2 Even the Soviet scholar P. A. Zaionchkovskii in his classic study of the military reforms during the reign of Alexander II was satisfied simply to castigate Sukhozanet for incompetence. Western historiography has followed Zaionchkovskii closely.3 There are no specialized studies of this period. Receritly,

NOTES ON LOW-INTENSITY WARFARE

Abstract : Ex clades, victoria? That old commonplace-From defeat, victory-has it that from the deepest abyss of defeat as from the culminating point of victory, nations start on intersecting paths: the complacent winners to defeat, and the losers who have learned the lessons taught in blood and humiliation, to victory. Actually, history scarcely upholds the commonplace. The defeated may not survive to learn, and of course empires are made by those among the victorious who do not become complacent. Now it seems that this country, already unique in so many other ways, may offer a new precedent to history and a new refutation of the commonplace: the complacent defeated certainly cannot aspire to victory. Three allies and much of our international authority were lost in the Vietnam War as well as much blood and treasure, and yet delusions of adequacy persist. Because of the characteristic ambiguities of that war, the nation, though roundly defeated, has nevertheless been denied the customary benefit of military defeat. Little was therefore learned in the experience, except for two false lessons.

Progressive Historians and the Historical Imagination in Austria: Heinrich Friedjung and Richard Charmatz

“ Alles flieβt ”—All things flow! Thus did the German-Austrian historian Richard Charmatz invoke Heraclitus to convey the sense of flux which characterized Austrian intellectual life before World War I. The sense of chronic, pervasive instability in late nineteenth-century Austrian society was the result of problems released by the solvents of liberal ideology, military defeat (in 1859 and 1866) and industrialization. In Danubian Europe, the discontents of modernity were experienced most acutely by the Germans, socially and culturally the most advanced of the nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy. After 1848, the traditionally secure position of educated Germandom was threatened by the emergence of rival nationalisms, the growth of popular social protest, and the disintegration of a preindustrial value system. A culture accustomed to denying the Lebensfahigkeit of its neighbors was suddenly challenged by the need to demonstrate its own worth and capacity to survive. The Austro-German community reacted in a variety of ways; the result was a complex and extraordinarily rich cultural matrix which conditioned, on the one hand, the origins of psychoanalysis, logical positivism, musical atonality, and the philosophy of Wittgenstein, and nourished, on the other, the ideologies of Austro-Marxism, Christian Socialism, Zionism, and National Socialism. At the turn of the century, the capital of the backward “China of Europe” witnessed the birth of many of the major forces of contemporary history; cultural fecundity was the reflex of fear of decline and possible extinction.

Nationalist China at War. Military Defeats and Political Collapse, 1937-45.

Nationalist China at War. Military Defeats and Political Collapse, 1937-45.

Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse 1937–45

Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse 1937–45

Mexican Painting: Adapting To Capitalism

Mexican Painting: Adapting To Capitalism

The Inter-tribal Balance of Power on the Great Plains, 1760–1850

The culture of the equestrian nomads of the Great Plains was relatively short-lived. The more sedentary inhabitants of the plains — the Mandan, Arikara, Hidatsa, Pawnee, Wichita — had cultures stretching back hundreds of years. By contrast, that of the mounted hunting tribes — the Kiowa, Comanche, Crow, Blackfoot, Arapaho, Cheyenne and Sioux — developed rapidly with the acquisition of the horse, flourished for perhaps a century, then began its death throes under the pressure of white settlement and the catastrophic effects of European disease. The destruction of the buffalo herds removed the plains nomads' economic base, and their whole civilization finally collapsed in military defeat at the hands of the United States Army. Older, white-oriented studies of Indian history tended to concentrate on the years when this culture was in decline and to neglect earlier periods and developments. Such an approach is understandable, and to some extent inevitable, given the historical sources available, but it conveys an inaccurate impression of the situation on the Great Plains prior to white settlement. This paper considers the Plains Indians in their heyday and examines intertribal trade and warfare at a time when the spread of horses and guns was causing great upheavals in native power structures.Non-Indian powers on the peripheries of the Great Plains tentatively penetrated the region and largely determined the flow of horses, trade, and guns, while their conflicts caused shifts in location, allegiance, and power among the tribes.

Politics in medicine: the Georgia Freedmen's Bureau and the organization of health care, 1865-1866.

POLITICS IN MEDICINE: THE GEORGIA FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND THE ORGANIZATION OF HEALTH CARE, 1865-1866 Todd L. Savitt The mortality of the negroes in and near large towns and cities still continues to be very great. The small-pox still rages among them. One colored carpenter in this city [Macon], who employs four hands, said . . . that it was as much as he and his men could do to make the coffins that were ordered from him. New York Times, Jan. 22, 1866 I was sorry to hear that the small-pox had broken out in Athens ... as for the Negroes I don't care how many of themhave it—so they die. It isareal luxury now to know that they are shuffling off their thieving coils. Martin J. Crawford to Mrs. Howell Cobb, Nov. 3, 18651 For the present I do not regard it my duty to assume the charge ofthose cases of smallpox that may occur in the city—it is fully able to provide its own sanitary institutions, and support its own poor. Dr. J. W. Lawton, surgeon-in-chief, Medical Department , Freedmen's Bureau, Georgia, to Dr. A. T. Augusta, assistant surgeon, Lincoln Hospital, Savannah, Nov. 21, 18652 Of all the functions and activities of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands (Freedmen's Bureau), provision of medical care should have been the least controversial. Bureau physicians were not enforcing labor contracts, adjudicating disputes between former masters and slaves, or teaching blacks to read, write, and calculate . They were establishing and manning hospitals, dispensing drugs, treating smallpox, cholera, and malaria. Their mandate was to facilitate for blacks the transition from free medical care provided by slave1 Quoted in Alan Conway, The Reconstruction of Georgia (Minneapolis, 1966), p. 64. 2 Georgia, Surgeon-in-Chief, Letters Received Unentered, 1865-67, box 1; hereafter cited as Ga LRU. Civil War History, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1 Copyright©1982by The Kent State University Press 0009-8078/82/2801-0003 $01.00/0 46civil war history owners to self-care, and to ease for whites the problems of providing such care to large numbers of indigent freedmen during the unsettled immediate postwar period. Unfortunately, these ideals, conceived in Washington, were difficult to realize at the state and local levels. In organizing its operation, the Medical Department could not avoid entanglement in the Bureau's political disputes with civil authorities and local white residents simply because it was an extension of that federal agency. Its presence and assistance was necessary, even welcomed, but it was also resented for intruding into local affairs. Moreover, some of the Medical Department's actions seemed calculated to advance political points rather than to help the sick and injured. In addition, Bureau physicians encountered numerous bureaucratic and financial problems as they attempted to establish and maintain their facilities. The losers in all this disorganization and political manipulation during the Bureau's first year of operation were the sick freedmen. They, at times, received poor medical care and ultimately failed to receive assistance in developing medical independence. This situation existed throughout the South. Georgia is only one example. When General William T. Sherman departed Savannah in January 1865 to commence his march northward, the war in Georgiawas unofficially at an end. Governor Joseph E. Brown remained in office until April, however, presiding over the affairs of state as though military defeat and massive property destruction had not demoralized and disrupted the lives of most Georgians. This dislocation was most apparent in the cities and large towns where former slaves—hundreds and thousands of them who had trailed behind Sherman's forces through the state—now remained in expectation of something, though they knew not what. Blacks also began swelling the populations of towns more remote from the path of the Union invaders, especially in the weeks after the official surrender of Georgia to General James H. Wilson in April. With housing, food, and clothing quite scarce even forwhites, and with benevolent masters miles away on remote plantations, the newly freed black people experienced extreme hardships through the cold winter and wet spring months. During the transitional period, when the state and local governments were bankrupt or unwilling to...

THE VIETNAMESE REFUGEES AT OUR DOORSTEP: POLITICAL AMBIGUITY AND SUCCESSFUL IMPROVISATION

In the spring of 1975, the United States was faced not only with military defeat in Vietnam, but also with the challenge of processing, caring for and eventually resettling more than 130,000 persons fleeing Vietnam.This paper presents a case study of the operation‐“New Life” which evacuated these refugees and cared for them on Guam until they could be resettled. The account focuses on the logistic problems and pragmatic solutions reached in a situation where there existed a wide gap between public policy and i t s application. This discussion is especially instructive in light of the growing national and international problem of refugee relocation.

The Sale of Juros and the Politics of Reform in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1608–1695

During the first half of the seventeenth century the Spanish crown framed a series of administrative reforms for the Indies aimed at raising additional revenue for the overextended royal treasury. Military defeats in Flanders, Italy, and Germany between 1625 and 1650 undermined Spanish power and forced authorities in Madrid to look for new sources of revenue in their American empire. The deteriorating economic, political, and military position of Spain did not produce an attitude of ‘benign neglect’ towards the empire, but induced an intense level of government activity in Madrid to force greater financial contributions from the Indies to the beleaguered metropolis. The most successful of die new tax levies imposed in the viceroyalty of Peru was the sale of juros or state-supported annuities.

The Algerian and Mau Mau revolts: A comparative study in revolutionary warfare

Abstract While neither the FLN in Algeria nor the Mau Mau in Kenya was successful militarily (despite the impression to the contrary regarding the FLN), they were not political failures (which is sometimes forgotten with respect to the Mau Mau, largely because of its conspicuous military defeat). They contributed to the decisions by France and Britain to concede paramountcy to the African majority in their colonies. By comparing the FLN and Mau Mau on four levels— origins, resources and logistics, leadership, and civilian support—we find that although differences exist between them, they are differences of degree rather than kind.

German Attitudes to British Military Government 1945-47

This article analyses German reactions to British Military Government in the immediate post-war years 1945-47. From sullen acceptance of military defeat and occupation the mood of the German population changed to one of intense criticism of the British, culminating in the summer of 1947 in a series of widespread strikes. This development was to some extent to be expected: no authority would have been popular which had to run the country in a period of destruction, confusion and shortages of all kinds. However, the British had actually made tremendous efforts to provide basic transport and facilities, an achievement which was rightly termed 'British genius for improvisation under stress'.' Moreover, only a considerable subsidy of ?80,000,000 a year out of British taxpayers' money kept up even the limited food supplies which reached Ger

The Anglo‐Najd treaty of December 1915

On the eve of the First World War, Ibn Saud, founder of the present kingdom of Saudi Arabia, was probably the most powerful ruler in the Arabian peninsula. Since his seizure of Riyadh in 1902, he had consolidated his authority in Najd in central Arabia and successfully defended his territory in numerous encounters with the forces of his hereditary enemy to the north, Ibn Rashid, the amir of Jabal Shammar. In May 1913 Ibn Saud had ousted the Turks from the valuable coastal province of Hasa, thereby gaining direct access to the Persian Gulf. And in May 1914 he had concluded a treaty with the Ottoman government in which the latter recognized his position in Najd and in Hasa in exchange for a nominal Turkish suzerainty.1 Notwithstanding this agreement, in June 1914 Captain William Shakespear, a former British political agent at Kuwait who had travelled widely in Arabia, reported that dissatisfaction with the Ottoman government was widespread in Najd, and that Turkish prestige had plummeted as a result of military defeats in Libya and in the Balkans. Indeed, according to Shakespear, Ibn Saud had recently become head of a loose anti-Ottoman confederation or alliance of most of the major rulers in the Arabian peninsula, including the Sharif Husayn of the Hijaz, the Idrisi of Asir, and the Imam Yahya of the Yemen. Ibn Rashid was, however, not included, as he was linked tightly with the Turks. The basis of the alliance, Shakespear noted, was the understanding that the chiefs would settle their own differences peaceably and that, in the event of an Ottoman attack against any one of them, all would combine for resistance and mutual help. Ibn Saud's stature was illustrated by the fact that 'The other sheikhs of the Arab alliance refer all kinds of matters to Bin Saud for his advice, more especially those affecting their relations with the Porte.'2 Although Shakespear undoubtedly exaggerated the closeness of the ties binding the various Arab rulers, it is clear that in 1914 Ibn Saud's prestige was great and his position in Arabia was strong. When Turkey entered the war at the end of October 1914, the Ottoman government made strenuous efforts to reconcile Ibn Saud and Ibn Rashid. After years of trying to control Arabia through divide-and-rule tactics, the Turks reversed this policy by attempting to integrate the rival chiefs into the Ottoman war effort, either in the Egyptian or in the Mesopotamian campaign. But the enmity between the two rulers was too deep to permit their collaboration. Besides, Ibn Saud had no intention of actively supporting the Turks in the conflict, because his newly acquired ports on the Persian Gulf coast were vulnerable to British bombardment. Moreover, Ibn Saud viewed the Turks as the most important threat to his independence, and an Ottoman victory would only strengthen their hold on Arabia. Indeed, before 1914 Ibn Saud had made numerous efforts to open relations with Britain in an attempt to bolster his position against the Turks. Consequently the prospect of

Understanding the Populists

Pushing on toward century after Populism burned its course across American horizon, we have yet to puzzle out what impelled that brief meteor. This is not for lack of trying. Even historian's infinite capacity for disagreement has barely accommodated quarrels over Populists. Were they racists? Were they anti-Semites? Were they victims of capitalism? Or of their own agrarian mythology? Radicals? Reactionaries? Conceivably liberals? Possibly Marxists without Marx? The reason for this confusion is simple. No one yet has plausibly explained why people voted Populist. But without understanding motivation of ordinary Populists, it is impossible to get to heart of their ideology or their politics. This is not to say that historians have never offered explanations of Populism's appeal. John D. Hicks thought that he had told story back in 1931, and he did tell it convincingly. Hicks, who studied at Wisconsin under lingering spirit of Frederick Jackson Turner, saw Populism as frontier movement. When railroads opened Great Plains, settlers poured in, mortgaging themselves to hilt to purchase and stake their farms. In 1887 drought broke boom and choked flow of eastern capital. The arid, westernmost areas simply collapsed, as settlers streamed back east; betterwatered easterly regions suffered but held their own. It was in central counties, with marginal rainfall, that the grinding burden of debt, made intolerable by falling crop prices and an appreciating dollar, finally provoked open revolt. ' The other hotbed of Populism, South, lacked frontier, except in Texas. Hicks evaded this difficulty by arguing that military defeat had produced a return to primitive and recreated frontier circumstances. In Dixie crop lien played role of mortgage. But it also helped to trap farmers in disastrous reliance on single crop, cotton. When cotton prices plummeted, southern farmers found themselves in same sinking boat with Kansans and Nebraskans; then weight of debt was keenly felt and frenzied agitation

Racism and German Protestant Theology: A Prelude to the Holocaust

The success of racism in modern Europe had a great deal to do with the experience of military defeat and political collapse; France after 1870 and Germany after 1918 were similar in this respect. As a modern ideology, racism be gins in the nineteenth century but older modes of race thinking are rooted in European ethnocentrism stretching backward in time to classical antiquity and the Christian ages. Race thinking was greatly accelerated during the great age of discovery, and even the Enlightenment suffered from white ethnocentric prejudice. When the old Christian universe was replaced by modern secular ideas, racism emerged as a secular myth, the Aryan myth, that soon became a rationale for anti- Jewish feelings in Europe. The alienated European found in this myth a form of spiritual reassurance during an age that seemed disappointing and decadent. German Protestant theology during the nineteenth century was slowly colored by romantic nationalistic ideas that eventually would open the door to racism. The nation, rather than the state, became an "order of creation," and in this way racist doctrines swept into Protestant theology.

The Berlin Strike of January 1918

Most historians of modern Germany, in describing the final year of World War I, generally note that a massive strike broke out in Berlin at the end of January 1918, spread to virtually every other major city of the empire, and then quickly collapsed. This said, they then usually move on to consider the events of great portent that followed: the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Russia, the spring offensive in the west, the military defeat of Germany, and the abortive revolution of 1918–19. The weakness of this approach is clear: it pays too little attention to the importance of the January strike.

Nationalities and Minorities in the Independent State of Croatia

After the military defeat of April 1941, the Axis powers divided Yugoslavia. The Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH) received the lion's share of the defunct state. At least in theory — since the NDH could claim no sovereignity in several regions — the new state included Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, parts of the Littoral, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Srem (Sirmium), and parts of Vojvodina. It sheltered most of the nationalities inhabiting the old Yugoslavia, while conferring the honor of the state-making nation on Croatians only. Minorities, albeit not recognized as nationalities, expanded the list of non-Croatian people living in the NDH. Without a regular census, which was never taken in the country, we do not possess exact data for the population; furthermore, the published statistics were twisted to support nationalistic ambitions.

After Secession: Jefferson Davis and the Failure of Confederate Nationalism (review)

362civil war history interesting information in his phrases, Webb destroys the myth that Kentuckians revealedhidden pro-Confederate sympathies in refusing to bow to reconstruction legislation or to ratify the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments. Rather, Kentucky acted owing to racial prejudices, to a desire to restore the South as a trading partner, and to protect abused civil rights by "challenging the illicit actions of a usurping Congress" (p. 18) . There is a fine line here regarding freedom for black and white alike, and Webb successfully handles it, showing the issue often to have been a keen Bluegrass sense of justice rather than any pro-Confederate leanings. These books suffer from lack of indexes, but I recommend them most highly to all students, libraries, and readers with an interest in American history from the 1820's through the 1870's. Frank F. Mathias University of Dayton After Secession: Jefferson Davis and the Failure of Confederate Nationalism. By Paul D. Escott. (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State Press, 1977. Pp. xiv, 295. $17.50.) The thesis of this book maintains that Jefferson Davis endeavored "to build a spirit of Confederate nationalism," to "build unity and determination among the people . . . but he failed to elicit the kind of support he needed." Therefore the people became dissatisfied, demoralized, and sometimes disloyal, causing "an internal collapse which preceded and promoted military defeat." Professor Escott attributes this crucial development to "the failure of the Davis administration to respond to the problems of the common people" (pp. ix, x). He never makes clear justwhathe means by "nationalism,"buthis working definition appears to be support for the Confederate government, and the executive branch in particular. The author begins with an examination of Jefferson Davis's antebellum career ("Preparation for the Presidency") and the state of Southern public opinion in 1860-1861. Then follows an extended account of the Confederacy's internal troubles, especially the various forms of discontent that stemmed from such things as conscription, impressment, hardship, profiteering, states' rights, and tax policies. There is nothing really new here, but Escott tries to extract fresh meaning from a familiar story by analyzing Davis's alleged failure to deal with those troubles so as to retain the people's support for the cause. He accuses the President of being ignorant of or insensitive to the plight of the yeomanry, of neglecting the mass of Southern whites while favoring measures that were partial to the rich. Instead of adopting policies tiiat would have "eased privation and ended injustice,"he clung to a counter-productive strategy of "singleminded concentration on BOOK REVIEW363 army strength," thereby undermining popular backing, discouraging enlistments, and paving die way for military defeat (p. 151). Escott's thesis is weakened by its reliance on several unproven assumptions. He assumes that it was within the power of one man to mitigate the Confederacy's internal deficiencies so as to avoid military defeat, evidently forgetting that Davis was not even able to feed and clothe the army adequately, let alone the civilian population. He also assumes that civilian disaffection was the main cause of military defeat, whereas the overwhelming weight of evidence, it seems to me, shows that failure in battle was, with all its consequences, by far the most important reason for declining morale. Finally, Escott assumes that the Confederacy lacked the allegiance of the majority of whites to such a degree as to justify his conclusion that Confederate nationalism failed. The fact is that three-fourths ofwhite male Confederates ofmilitary age served in the army, and more than half of those who served suffered wounds or death. If devotion to the cause is Escott's yardstick for nationalism, and if this remarkable display of patriotism and sacrifice is considered to have been insufficient, one wonders what would satisfy him. There is no doubt that Escott wants to be fair to Davis, and he has some very complimentary things to say about him. There are, in fact, inconsistencies in his presentation suggesting that he does not subscribe wholeheartedly to his own thesis, given his own presentation of the appalling difficulties with which David grappled so courageously. The book is written in a clear and straightforward style, and it...

Directory of Archives and Manuscript Repositories in the United States (review)

BOOK REVIEW363 army strength," thereby undermining popular backing, discouraging enlistments, and paving die way for military defeat (p. 151). Escott's thesis is weakened by its reliance on several unproven assumptions. He assumes that it was within the power of one man to mitigate the Confederacy's internal deficiencies so as to avoid military defeat, evidently forgetting that Davis was not even able to feed and clothe the army adequately, let alone the civilian population. He also assumes that civilian disaffection was the main cause of military defeat, whereas the overwhelming weight of evidence, it seems to me, shows that failure in battle was, with all its consequences, by far the most important reason for declining morale. Finally, Escott assumes that the Confederacy lacked the allegiance of the majority of whites to such a degree as to justify his conclusion that Confederate nationalism failed. The fact is that three-fourths ofwhite male Confederates ofmilitary age served in the army, and more than half of those who served suffered wounds or death. If devotion to the cause is Escott's yardstick for nationalism, and if this remarkable display of patriotism and sacrifice is considered to have been insufficient, one wonders what would satisfy him. There is no doubt that Escott wants to be fair to Davis, and he has some very complimentary things to say about him. There are, in fact, inconsistencies in his presentation suggesting that he does not subscribe wholeheartedly to his own thesis, given his own presentation of the appalling difficulties with which David grappled so courageously. The book is written in a clear and straightforward style, and it provides a useful overview of the Confederacy's internal travails. Ludwell H. Johnson College of William and Mary Directory of Archives and Manuscript Repositories in the UnitedStates. (Washington, D.C: National Historical Publications and Records Commission, 1978. Pp. 905. $25.00.) Since the publication of Philip M. Hamer's A Guide to Archives and Manuscripts in the United States in 1961, various institutions have produced guides or catalogs of their holdings. Archives and manuscript repositories have also reported their more significant collections in the National Union Catalog of Manuscript Collections (NUCMC) and American Literary Manuscripts. In the knowledge that Hamer's Guide especially was outdated, the National Historical Publications and Records Commission (NHPRC) embarked on a program in 1974 to prepare a revised version. Rather than confine the project to Hamer alone, the NHPRC contacted repositories listed in NUCMC and in other publications. As a result, the number of entries more than doubled from some 1,300 in Hamer to 2,675 364CIVIL WAR HISTORY individual repositories in the Directory. As for its geographical scope, institutions are included for each of the fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Marianas Trust Territory. The entries are arranged alphabetically, first by state or territory, then by city, and last by the name of the institution. The Directory is useful for locating relatively current information on an archives or historical society. In addition to addresses, phone numbers and thehours when a repository is open, theDirectory includes a general description of individual holdings as well as appropriate sources to consult for more detail. Most entries also contain a section that lists the major subject areas for which an institution solicits material. Given the alphabetical arrangement of the work, one can easily consult the Directory to determine whether an institution in a particular geographical area might be interested in accepting material on a certain subject, such as letters to and from James A. Garfield. Should he wish to choose from among allknown repositories that collect Garfield material, however, he must first examine the entire volume in order to find most of the choices available. That is, he cannot simply rely on the index in the Directory. For those who require a comprehensive fist of known source material in a subject area, the name and broad subject index in this volume is not that useful. Under the "CONFEDERACY," for example, the index lists only six entries. In contrast, Hamer has eleven. More seriously, the index might actually tend to mislead novice or even experienced researchers...