Military Assertiveness Research Articles

State Obligation in the East China Sea: Unilateral Activities and Countermeasures

Abstract Maritime disputes among the East Asian States have garnered increasing attention worldwide with expanding offshore activities in the East China Sea. To avoid confrontation and potential conflict, unilateral maritime claims in the East China Sea usually have been non-explicit. While maritime boundary disputes remain unresolved in the region, changes have taken place because of resource shortages, the rise in military assertiveness from Tokyo, and increased alliances with the United States. This article explores the limits of unilateral activities within the disputed maritime area under current international law and how East Asian States should behave when they encounter unilateral activities conducted by other States, including analysis on sovereign entitlement and the limits of unilateral activities in the region. A code of conduct among the East Asian States is needed to ensure peace and prosperity in the region.

Military might: a domestic economy explanation of Turkish foreign policy

ABSTRACT Turkish foreign policy has taken a military turn in recent years. Turkey is now a major arms exporter, it hosts military bases in its neighborhood and beyond, and has engaged in conflicts in Syria and Libya. Scholars have highlighted identity and international system theories to explain the military assertiveness in Turkish foreign policy. This study proposes a domestic economy explanation. It argues that national wealth, a take-off in defence industry, and an alliance of conservative bourgeoisie and political Islamists are the primary drivers of the military turn in foreign policy. Analysis of Turkish economic development and historical trajectories of economic and bureaucratic wings of the defence industry shows that complex business-politics interactions and commercial interests of defence companies propel military assertiveness. This domestic economy framework supplements insights from the identity and international system theories to significantly add to our understanding of the military turn in Turkish foreign policy.

IS JAPAN BACK? MEASURING NATIONALISM AND MILITARY ASSERTIVENESS IN ASIA'S OTHER GREAT POWER

AbstractObservers of East Asia frequently claim that Japanese nationalism is on the rise, and that Tokyo is abandoning its longtime military restraint. To determine whether these trends are indeed occurring, we define and measure Japan's nationalism and military assertiveness; we measure whether they are rising relative to Japan in the past, and relative to seven other countries.Drawing from social identity theory, we distinguish between “nationalism” and a more benign “patriotism.” We find in Japan (1) strong patriotism that is stable over time, and no evidence of rising nationalism. Furthermore we find that (2) military assertiveness remains generally low, but it has risen in terms of decreased institutional constraints and peacekeeping activities. Our findings have important implications for academic debates about nationalism and Japanese security policy, and for policy debates about a nascent balancing effort against China.

Exploring Sino-Russian-Nordics triangular relations: complex balancing along the Polar Silk Road

ABSTRACT The megatrends of climate change, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and the Western sanctions against Russia have made the once calm Arctic an arena of geopolitical competition. Before the Crimea crisis of 2014, the Nordics were the primary advocates for a Chinese role in the Arctic when Russia was still hesitant. In 2017 Russia and China agreed to build a Polar Silk Road along the Northern Sea Route, which complements China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road plans. Russia financially depends on China for its aspirational Arctic plans. Meanwhile, China increasingly perceives the five Nordic states as a unit to negotiate projects under the Belt and Road Initiative and suggested a 5 + 1 format. Thus, China’s rising Arctic presence made the age-old Nordics-Russia relations triangular. What does the Sino-Russian strategic partnership mean for the Nordics’ preference formation concerning the Polar Silk Road? This paper traces the triangular ties before and after the Crimea crisis and finds that the actors switched from liberal towards defensive neorealist perspectives. The Nordics have become worried about the Sino-Russian Arctic honeymoon, Russia’s Arctic military assertiveness and China’s intentions. As the triangular links are out-of-balance, the Nordics might apply complex balancing to achieve collective goods along the Northern Sea Route.

A New Alliance Axis in the Eastern Mediterranean Cold War: What the Abraham Accords Mean for Mediterranean Geopolitics and Turkey

The new Cold War has arrived in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the strategic level, Chinese economic and Russian military assertiveness have led the U.S. to think twice about its mistakes, which opened up a power vacuum in this strategic geopolitical realm. Until today, the U.S. has seemed to use three axes of alliances that have emerged as Israeli-based, flexible, and benefit-oriented alignments at the level of regional rivalry. These alignments, especially in the context of the Abraham Accords, are unfortunately expected to reinforce pre-existing divisions in the region unless a radical change occurs. This study examines how and why Washington must embrace the logic of alliance axes to shape the Eastern Mediterranean and explores the projected impact of the U.S.-initiated Abraham Accords on regional geopolitics.

Mapping Out the Possible Outcomes of the Security Dilemma in International Politics

Whilst a significant amount of work has been undertaken in the field of security dilemma theory, there is a gap in the academic literature concerning the possible scenarios that may result from this phenomenon in international politics. To date, no known systematic attempt has been made to consider the full range of scenarios that may result from the security dilemma. Six possible scenario outcomes may be identified, these being: first, the security dilemma is transcended; second, a security-seeking state leaves itself unilaterally vulnerable to external aggression; third, the inappropriate adoption of diplomatic and military assertiveness to reaffirm deterrence instead arouses the fears of another security-seeking state, thereby leading to inadvertent escalation of a crisis into a conflict; fourth, a ‘deep security dilemma’ based on long-running mutual hostility that does not escalate into conflict; fifth, a security dilemma that escalates to the brink of conflict but is then de-escalated; and sixth, mitigation of the security dilemma between rival states. This article will explore these respective scenarios in terms of their underpinnings, as well as their implications for security and diplomacy.

Russian responses to the changing character of war

Abstract For much of the post-Soviet era there was a widespread belief that improving capabilities required for dealing with local small wars and insurgencies was the central focus of Russian military reforms. As a result, Moscow's military assertiveness and return to geopolitical rivalries since 2014 came as a surprise to many in the West. The article argues that small wars were never the major focus of Russian military transformation and reforms. Tracing the country's experience of war and conflict regionally and internationally since the end of the Cold War, and the impact this had on Moscow's views on what kind of armed forces it required, the article shows that the Kremlin's military ambitions started to diverge dramatically from western expectations as early as the mid-1990s. Russia never really saw armed forces geared towards small and ‘new war’-type scenarios as sufficient for upholding its regional and international status ambitions. Moreover, the Kremlin's growing preoccupation with internal order and regime stability has increasingly reinforced the rhetoric of a hostile West, which is used to justify the increasing centralization of domestic politics. Russia's military revival has been long in the making and poses serious challenges to its neighbours and to the West.

Scared into Demanding Action: The Effects of the Perceived Threat from Terrorism on Policy Salience

What makes ordinary people demand that politicians address international terrorism? Using a cross-national survey, this article investigates the causes of terrorism policy salience in thirteen countries. Consistent with arguments that terrorists try to coerce governments by signaling to their residents that they are vulnerable to attack, we find that perceived personal threat from terrorism is a powerful and consistent predictor that survey respondents will make terrorism their first policy priority. Other variables, including age, ideology, gender, education, identification with terror victims, and military assertiveness, have more mixed relationships with policy salience.

The Myth of Saudi Power

In the past few years, especially after the outbreak of the Arab Spring in late 2010, Saudi Arabia has attempted to assert its military dominance in the Middle East region to realize two objectives: first, to maintain the status quo in the Gulf neighborhood through direct military interventions and the use of force; and secondly, to contain the rise of Iran, which Riyadh views as a destabilizing power in the whole Middle East region. Under the new King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, who ascended to the throne in January 2015, the military assertiveness has taken a new dimension, in terms of launching an air assault on Yemen in late March last year to downsize Houthi power and increasing support for the Syrian rebel group – the Islamic Army to topple the Bashar Al-Assad government, Iran’s only Arab ally. This piece probes Saudi Arabia’s potential and limitations to rise as the Middle East’s dominant power and concludes that Riyadh’s bid to emerge as the region’s preeminent military power and control regional affairs may come up short.

Soft Balancing in the Americas: Latin American Opposition to U.S. Intervention, 1898–1936

In the aftermath of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, scholars of international relations debated how to best characterize the rising tide of global opposition. The concept of “soft balancing” emerged as an influential, though contested, explanation of a new phenomenon in a unipolar world: states seeking to constrain the ability of the United States to deploy military force by using multinational organizations, international law, and coalition building. Soft balancing can also be observed in regional unipolar systems. Multinational archival research reveals how Argentina, Mexico, and other Latin American countries responded to expanding U.S. power and military assertiveness in the early twentieth century through coordinated diplomatic maneuvering that provides a strong example of soft balancing. Examination of this earlier case makes an empirical contribution to the emerging soft-balancing literature and suggests that soft balancing need not lead to hard balancing or open conflict.

Beliefs, Values, and Strategic Choice: U.S. Leaders’ Decisions to Engage, Contain, and Use Force in an Era of Globalization

Do ideational factors shape the strategic choices of American leaders in the realm of national security policy? If they do, what perceptions and value dispositions guide choices toward critical countries like Russia, China, Japan, and Iran? Macrotheories of international relations make assumptions about the microprocesses at the decision-making level that are rarely examined empirically. For instance, do leaders decide based on their perceptions of an adversary's intentions as neo-realists claim or do they give greater weight to their perceptions of similar and different political cultures as advocates of the democratic peace assume? If ideational factors matter at all, are they independent forces or simply determined by demographics and/or parochial interests? This project reports the results of a survey of 514 U.S. leaders designed to answer these questions. We find that military assertiveness remains related to decisions to use force as it was during the Cold War but that a new disposition—attitudes to...