Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset Research Articles

Erratum to The Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset: Putting Things in Perspective

Erratum to The Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset: Putting Things in Perspective

The Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset: Putting Things in Perspective

Abstract In their latest research note in our ongoing dialogue about the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset, Gibler, Miller, and Little (GML) reiterate their concerns about a high error rate in the MID dataset and challenge our prior replication studies, which showed that GML's recommended changes to the dataset caused few substantive changes in the core findings of two published studies. In this rejoinder, we offer further explanation of our decision-making, put GML's claims about the error rate in context, defend our replication methodology and results, and offer advice for MID dataset users.

Heterogeneity in the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs), 1816–2001: What Fatal MIDs Cannot Fix

We examine a major source of heterogeneity across cases in the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset, 1816–2001, and demonstrate that this variation across cases biases most analyses of conflict. Disputes are coded using two logics—the familiar state-to-state militarized action represents one case while the second relies on sponsor governments to protest state targeting of private citizens. We show that the latter introduces additional measurement bias and does not match well the original conceptualization of what constituted a dispute. The protest-dependent cases are caused by different processes, and omitting them from analyses provides truer estimates of the effects of most conflict predictors. We find that previous controls for heterogeneity in the dispute data—such as using fatal militarized interstate disputes only—substantially underestimates the dangerous effects of contiguity and the pacifying effects of regime similarity. We also show that governments are seldom willing to risk militarized conflict for private citizens during these unique cases. We provide a list of the protest-dependent cases for future conflict analyses.

Territorial disputes and the politics of individual well-being

Multiple studies argue that the division of territory between states is a root cause of war in the international system. This is often understood as a function of the unique importance of territory at the level of the individual citizen, because the territory itself directly affects an individual’s well-being on multiple dimensions. As such, disputes over territory should also have consequences for an individual’s overall subjective appraisal of their well-being. This article argues that disputes over the allocation of territory between states do affect an individual’s subjective well-being, but not uniformly. Citizens in states routinely targeted by a territorial threat from a revisionist neighbor are generally unhappy. However, citizens in states that initiate territorial disputes are happier as a result of the aggressive foreign policy of the state leader to secure the coveted territorial good. This is first demonstrated using mixed effects modeling on data drawn from the World Values Survey and Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset. In addition, this article provides an illustration of variations in territorial threat and subjective well-being using the case of Nigeria, finding that Nigerians were happier when their state was initiating territorial threat against its neighbors and less happy during a period when Nigeria itself was the target of territorial threat. The analyses provided advance the territorial conflict research program by measuring the individual-level effects of territorial disputes. In addition, the findings add to a growing scholarship on the political determinants of an individual quality of life, sometimes considered the ‘ultimate dependent variable’ in social science.

Too Many Resources or Too Few? What Drives International Conflicts?

International conflicts over natural resources are frequently cited as the most prominent threat to global peace in the decades ahead. However, this subject has not yet been adequately tackled in the academic literature. This paper contributes to filling the gap by, first, proposing a four-class typology of resource conflicts and by, second, testing these conflict types against data on fossil fuels and interstate conflicts derived from two major conflict datasets: the Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset (1960-2001) and the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset (1960-2008). The findings, although preliminary, suggest that resource scarcity may play a less prominent role in the aggression of belligerent countries than is often assumed and that the existence of large oil deposits and high resource-rent incomes are better predictors of conflict involvement.

Warfare, Civil Conflict and the Spatial Impacts on Domestic Investment: Evidence from South America, 1950-2000

This paper reports the effect of intra- and international conflict on domestic investment in South America from 1950-2000. We combine data from the Penn World Table 6.1 and the Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset from the Correlates of War project in a spatial investment accelerator model. We find that the magnitude of conflicts (total fatal casualties) is associated with diminished domestic investment, in magnitudes that range from 0.1 percent to one third of total investment across South America's experience in civil wars, conflicts and ethnic wars. We find no evidence of spatial spillovers in South America's civil wars. The paucity of international conflicts in the region leads us to conclude there is no more than suggestive evidence of large impacts and spatial spillovers of international conflicts.

Selection institutions and war aims

We explore how the sizes of the winning coalition and selectorate influence the war aims of states. Leaders who answer to a small winning coalition are more likely to seek territorial gain as a way to increase state resources. Nonterritorial war aims produce a commitment problem in that after the war the defeated state may not comply with the victor's demands. States with large winning coalitions are more willing to continue the war to remove the enemy leader as a solution to this commitment problem. We test our hypotheses against the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set, and we find some support for our argument.

Research Design and Estimator Choices in the Analysis of Interstate Dyads

Researchers face three basic questions when testing theoretically driven hypotheses. First is research design: for example, what population should be analyzed, what sample should be drawn from that population, and what cases should be excluded from the sample? What statistical estimator should one use? What set of control variables should one employ? Results drawn from several permutations of the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dispute data set are compared using three statistical models. For some theories and variables (international institutionalism—intergovernmental organization and alliance membership; realism—balance of power; expected utility theory—international interaction game equilibria), research design and estimator choices substantially influence the findings. For others (trade and democratic peace theory), the relationship between the dependent and independent variables is relatively impervious to research design and estimator choices.

Agreeing to Disagree: Domestic Institutional Congruence and U.S. Dispute Behavior

Domestic and international politics are linked so that domestic structure and domestic political preferences affect international conflict behavior. In particular, states' policy preferences can be characterized by the congruence of policy preferences between political institutions. As a state's policy preferences become more congruent, as policy preferences between political institutions are more similar, the state's conflict behavior changes. I hypothesize that as the domestic political institutions in a state share similar policy preferences or policy goals, disputes become more likely and tend to last longer. I employ event count and continuous-time hazard models to analyze U.S. conflict propensity and conflict duration during the period 1945-1992. Using the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set (version 2.1), I model U.S. militarized dispute behavior as a function of congruence between the policy preferences of the U.S. President and the Congress. The models reveal a strong relationship between preference congruence and both the amount of conflict and the duration of the disputes in which the U.S. engages. The congruence hypotheses are robust across a variety of measures. The results add substantial strength and substance to claims that domestic political characteristics affect international conflict. The theory and empirical analyses also refine the domestic-international linkage by allowing scholars to consider the effect of normal political change in a single state on that state's foreign policy decisions.

Gendered Conflict

This study quantitatively tests the relationship between state militarism and domestic gender equality. International relations literature on the impact and potential impact of women on foreign policy suggests that women are more peaceful in that they are less likely than men to support the use of international violence. Other research indicates that a domestic environment of inequality results in state militarism on the international level. Both lines of inquiry suggest that a domestic environment of equality between women and men would lead toward greater state pacifism, and four hypotheses are developed to test this relationship. The Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset is used with hostility level as the dependent variable to measure the level of militarism employed by any given state to resolve international conflicts. Independent variables for gender equality include percent women in parliament, duration of female suffrage, percent women in the labor force, and fertility rate. Several control variables (alliances, contiguity, wealth, and democracy) are added to the multivariate logistic regressions, and all four hypotheses are confirmed. This study substantiates the theory that domestic gender equality has a pacifiying effect on state behavior on the international level.

A two‐good theory of foreign policy: An application to dispute initiation and reciprocation

We develop a general theory of foreign policy based on the assumption that states pursue two goals: security, defined as the ability to prevent changes in favored aspects of the status quo, and proaction, defined as the ability to change the status quo in desirable ways. We also assume a relationship between state power and production advantages for security and proaction. The model produces specific hypotheses relating state power and changes in power with security‐ and proaction‐seeking behaviors. For instance, weak states gaining power are the most likely to engage in security‐seeking behavior while strong states gaining power are the most likely to seek proaction. We associate proaction‐seeking behavior with conflict initiation and security‐seeking behavior with conflict reciprocation and test several hypotheses using the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set. While hypotheses are generally supported, the evidence suggests that some modifications of the theory are in order.

Militarized disputes, incidents, and crises: Identification and classification

The Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset was generated as part of the broader data‐generation efforts of DDIR. The paper (1) briefly lays out the underlying rationale and procedures used in developing the MID dataset, (2) highlights some conceptual and empirical problems associated with the dataset, (3) discusses the conceptual and empirical distinctions made among incidents, disputes, crises, and wars, and (4) offers suggestions for updating and expanding the MID dataset.