Miles Of Streets Research Articles

Early Trench Tactics in the French Army: The Second Battle of Artois, May–June 1915 by Jonathan Krause

an additional 85 miles of streets, 420 miles of sidewalks, 46,000 trees, 17,000 gas streetlamps, not to mention 700,000 new inhabitants in just 20 years; but Kirkland never loses sight of the “tremendous human and cultural cost” of the enterprise (2). He is an accomplished storyteller who interweaves, seemingly effortlessly, information on architecture, urban planning, politics, history, economics, and the arts, bringing to life an extensive cast of colorful characters from various walks of life. Readers will relish his animated accounts of lavish celebrations hosted by Napoléon III (the emperor’s inclination“to a sort of austerity”notwithstanding [105]); Queen Victoria’s visit to Paris; the quest for safer drinking water (before Second Empire advances, water was obtained directly from the Seine and left to sit for a day so the solids could settle); the expropriation of an astonishing 20% of the city’s population so that the grands travaux could be realized. Paris Reborn is a well-substantiated, measured treatment of a key period in French history, noteworthy above all for its ability to help us visualize the metamorphosis of the“old”Paris we will never know into the one we know and love. University of Arkansas Hope Christiansen Krause, Jonathan. Early Trench Tactics in the French Army: The Second Battle of Artois, May–June 1915. Farnham: Ashgate, 2013. ISBN 978-1-4094-5500-4. Pp. xviii + 180. £65. Krause focuses on two aspects of First World War history comparatively untreated in English-language studies: trench operations in the year 1915 (frequently dismissed in historical literature as a wasteful and stagnant year of pointless “mud and blood”), and the dominant role played by the French army and its commanders (whose part is often misleadingly left in the background in Anglophone studies) in the theory and execution of western front operations. Krause fills these two gaps in Great War historiography , overturning the general misconception surrounding 1915 as a year in which‘nothing happened,’while simultaneously demonstrating how the French army and its leaders were at the forefront of tactical innovations that would lead to later allied successes and final victory. Krause’s study is centered on a detailed analysis of “note 5779” (Conditions et buts d’une action offensive d’ensemble), the foundational tactical doctrine formulated by the French army for approaching trench warfare in early 1915, coupled with the manner in which that document’s ideas were applied during the second battle of Artois. Krause bases his arguments on a critical analysis of primary sources,mostly official army documents such as written orders,action reports, unit histories, and other records. The information provided in Krause’s study is very rich, including such minute but important points as unit frontages, ammunition allotments , and bombardment durations. By comparing and contrasting the performances of two infantry divisions participating in second Artois, and the conditions under which each of those divisions met, or failed to meet, their objectives, Krause is able to 288 FRENCH REVIEW 87.3 Reviews 289 examine the tensions between theoretical doctrine and practical battlefield experience which triggered an evolution of French trench tactics over the course of 1915 as a whole. Krause effectively makes the case that, far from being a year of stagnation, 1915 was a crucial year in the learning curve of trench warfare, and that French commanders in particular were quick to grasp that year’s lessons. The potential reader of this book should be aware that this is not a social, cultural, or political history of the First World War. Those looking for such a history should search elsewhere. However, for the reader interested in the military history of the war, this book is an excellent choice. It is tempting to oversimplify events of the Great War and embrace the standard clichés that have been reiterated decade after decade in its wake. The solid detail and analysis of Krause’s Early Trench Tactics shakes up those clichés and forces the reader to reconsider the commonly perceived‘sterility’of early trench warfare. For the specialist military historian, or for the very well read amateur, this book is highly recommended. Ohio University Christopher Coski Kuisel, Richard F. The French Way: How...

Paris Reborn: Napoléon III, Baron Haussmann, and the Quest to Build a Modern City by Stéphane Kirkland

Reviews 287 Français entre eux dans une sorte d’âme collective. Hauter trouve ce bonheur dans la France profonde, celle des petits villages. C’est là la France chaleureuse, “une France du dimanche, si parfaitement heureuse”(114):“Et si‘la province’réapprenait quelque chose à Paris, le bonheur du moment présent?”(94). Paris est loin, on n’en a pas besoin. Il y a aussi le goût pour les bons repas où “plus aucune différence ne compte” (108), une relation vibrante avec le patrimoine,“façon de tenir l’ancre par rapport au monde moderne” (126), l’enracinement régional, la solidarité familiale, le goût pour un capitalisme“à visage humain”(167), et un attachement aux valeurs d’une République tolérante qui veut savoir accueillir les immigrés. Le tissu social tient encore bon. Le livre de Hauter s’adresse à tous ceux qui enseignent la société française. Randolph College (VA) Françoise Watts Kirkland, Stéphane. Paris Reborn: Napoléon III, Baron Haussmann, and the Quest to Build a Modern City. New York: St. Martin’s, 2013. ISBN 978-0-312-62689-1. Pp. 327. $29.99. Kirkland’s primary goal is to set the record straight regarding who should be credited for what is, to his mind,“one of history’s most extravagant examples of urban reinvention” (2). That Haussmann’s energy and tenacity were critical in seeing the projects through is indisputable, but it was Napoléon III himself who “defined the vision for Paris and gathered the political means to implement it” (63); indeed, the transformation of Paris would have been impossible without “the convergence of a whole array of social, cultural, and economic factors and the contributions of many individuals” (2). Evidence abounds that posterity has tended not to give credit where it is due: some of the ideas attributed to Napoléon III, for instance, were actually those of a prefect of the Seine during the July Monarchy; as for Haussmann’s own ideas, few were original—in fact, his aesthetic principles “went little beyond systematically ending avenues with domed structure” (274); he played no part, it turns out, in the conception of the so-called Haussmannian building. Yet the Boulevard Haussmann has kept its name, unlike streets named after other prominent figures of the Second Empire. Kirkland does not hesitate to elaborate on Haussmann’s flaws, describing him as“grossly ignorant”(110),“an impassioned and unabashedly partisan advocate for his own cause” (187) who brazenly bestowed the title of baron upon himself despite his lack of noble blood. Nor does Kirkland have qualms about calling the principles underpinning the modernization program “despotic and socially regressive” (171). The Second Empire’s failure to improve the living conditions of the working class constitutes, for Kirkland, “a great missed opportunity” (171); the financial and real estate dealings were “questionable” if not “downright reprehensible”; and the moral depravity of certain players was “appalling” (291). To be sure, Napoléon III’s regime could justifiably boast of myriad changes which most would consider improvements: an additional 85 miles of streets, 420 miles of sidewalks, 46,000 trees, 17,000 gas streetlamps, not to mention 700,000 new inhabitants in just 20 years; but Kirkland never loses sight of the “tremendous human and cultural cost” of the enterprise (2). He is an accomplished storyteller who interweaves, seemingly effortlessly, information on architecture, urban planning, politics, history, economics, and the arts, bringing to life an extensive cast of colorful characters from various walks of life. Readers will relish his animated accounts of lavish celebrations hosted by Napoléon III (the emperor’s inclination“to a sort of austerity”notwithstanding [105]); Queen Victoria’s visit to Paris; the quest for safer drinking water (before Second Empire advances, water was obtained directly from the Seine and left to sit for a day so the solids could settle); the expropriation of an astonishing 20% of the city’s population so that the grands travaux could be realized. Paris Reborn is a well-substantiated, measured treatment of a key period in French history, noteworthy above all for its ability to help us visualize the metamorphosis of the“old...

Needle sightings and on-the-job needle-stick injuries among New York City Department of Sanitation Workers.

The New York City Department of Sanitation (DSNY) is responsible for collecting and disposing of all residential waste in New York City, collecting and marketing recyclable materials from all residences, cleaning the city’s 6,200 miles of streets, and clearing the streets of ice and snow. Of DSNY’s approximately 9,500 employees, 6,400 are uniformed sanitation workers, whose primary responsibility is operating almost 4,900 “truck-shifts” (one truck, with a crew of two sanitation workers, on an 8-hour shift) per week to collect household garbage and another 2,300 truck-shifts per week to collect residential recyclables. In this paper, I describe the problems and processes associated with improper disposal of used syringes and needles in household garbage and recyclable materials in New York City.

Boulevard Tree Operations of Vancouver, B.C.

Vancouver, B.C. is a 100-year-old municipality with a population of 400,000 people. Vancouver's boulevard tree program started in 1896, and its current street tree population is about 130,000 trees. These trees are distributed along the City's 10,000 residential and commercial blocks, about 800 miles of streets. This paper discusses historical and operational aspects of the boulevard tree program.

Reduction of Street Traffic Congestion by Proper Street Design

POOR street design is the underlying cause of street traffic congestion. Traffic regulation and safety education, while important and necessary, can never constitute a solution of this universal problem. The automobile has given new significance to the city's street structure. The narrow, ill-arranged streets of most cities are not adapted to the needs of modern traffic. St. Louis had approximately 16,000 motor vehicles registered in 1916. The 1923 registration exceeded 100,000 motor vehicles and this figure will be increased to 200,000 by 1928. Traffic counts show an annual increase of 25 per cent in vehicle movements upon the city's streets. Something more than traffic regulation is needed. Freedom of traffic circulation is a commercial necessity. In 1916 St. Louis possessed 940 miles of streets. Three-fourths of this street milage was of 60-foot width. The other fourth, of varying greater width, was so unsystematically distributed as to be more or less useless in any citywide scheme of traffic circulation.

COST OF INCINERATION

At the meeting of the American Public Health Association held in Richmond in 1909, the subject of my paper was Utilization in Connection with Incineration. In the course of the paper it was predicted that we would be doing street lighting and furnishing electric power for general purposes. Minneapolis has since developed the plan as outlined at that time and something of the process of evolution may be of interest. Beginning in 1908 the incinerator furnished sufficient power to generate electricity for the lighting of Hopewell Hospital and the workhouse buildings. Later in the same year the heating of the same buildings was taken over. This service has continued up to the present time. In May, 1912, we began the systematic lighting of public streets. At first this light was extended to include twenty-two miles of the city's streets. This has been gradually extended until now the street lighting includes thirty-one miles of streets. At the time the crematory began to do street lighting, the city was paying to the Minneapolis General Electric company $70 per arc light per year. The crematory furnished the service from the start fqr $60. As a result of this competition, the rates of the General Electric were cut first to $65 and since to $62.50. t