Middle Power Concept Research Articles

Steering a middle path in Sino-US rivalry: contending middlepowerism and South Korea’s challenges

Abstract Deepening Sino-US rivalry is motivating Cold War-style bloc diplomacy, undermining post-1945 institutionalism. This presents extensive challenges to states at the crossroads where the interests of Beijing and Washington collide. How do those states—loosely, ‘middle powers’—maintain their relevance in a changing order? Can a middle-power strategy outweigh the risk of being side-lined by US-China rivalry? Is the middle-power concept still relevant today? The concept evolved from initial formulations of ‘good international citizen’ committed to multilateral institution-building. But a new bifurcated world requires redefinition of middlepowerism. This article proposes a comparative analytical template to interrogate middle-power diplomacy. It empirically examines how South Korea defines national interest and how it seeks a compelling diplomatic edge at a time of great power politics. The article concludes by examining South Korea’s future international challenges.

South Korea’s middle power diplomacy and the South China Sea disputes

ABSTRACT The middle power concept is versatile enough to categorise any states in the middle range of the world order that display certain behavioural characteristics known as middle power behaviours. Meanwhile, the adoption of the middle power concept as an explicit policy position by Korean IR scholars and policy researchers can shape and influence the actual policy practice as South Korea’s academic discussions on ‘middle power diplomacy knowledge’ (MPD) have advanced with the purpose of serving its national interests. This research sought to better conceptualise South Korea’s middle power diplomacy particularly on the South China Sea disputes between the USA and China and determine whether or not it is essential for its national interests through active Korean IR scholars’ and policy researchers’ perspectives. It found that there is more uncertainty or concern about employing ‘middle power diplomacy’ due to their assessment of finding greater drawbacks than benefits. Yet, the utmost reason behind such discrepancy stems from the epistemic fallacies prevalent in the middle power scholarship. Ultimately, discussions on South Korea’s middle power diplomacy should begin with the awareness of such fallacies and attempt to address them by critically examining the ontology of South Korea’s middle power categorisation, which leads one to question what kind of reality entails South Korea’s being a ‘middle power’ in the SCS disputes and, from there, determine its appropriate role.

Global IR and the middle power concept: exploring different paths to agency

ABSTRACT The premise of Global IR for greater pluralism and inclusivity allows for reconsidering the relevance of established concepts in the IR discipline. This article discusses how Global IR can contribute to rethinking the question of agency in the middle power concept. While the concept has been used in a Western and non-Western context, there is a tendency to adopt a binary distinction between Western middle powers that are conformist in their approach to the liberal international order and Southern middle powers that adopt a reformist stance. The article argues that a Global IR approach can help overcome this dichotomy and open up the study of Western and Southern middle powers to new agential possibilities. To demonstrate this, the article discusses how the cases of Australia and Brazil are not limited to conformist and reformist middle power agencies respectively. The discussion shows how the two states have undergone periods of ambivalence to gradually project new forms of middle power agency that alter and redefine their roles within the liberal international order.

Perbandingan Sistem Pinjaman IMF dan BRICS New Development Bank serta Potensi Dominasi Sistem Moneter Internasional

America is the dominant power for a long time since the World War and gave many aid for many state developments in the world with their ‘Marshall Plan’ policy. America domination clarified by the existence World Trade Organization. United States of America legitimation not only limited to WTO, there are several international economic organizations such as World Bank and International Monetary Fund where the America hold an important power. Countries that want to compete with America legitimacy establish an organization called BRICS. BRICS consist of Brazil, Russia Federation, India, China, and South Africa. BRICS created a bank called BRICS NDB or National Development bank to compete IMF domination. This research will explain the differentiation between IMF and NDB, alongside with how NDB have capability to compete IMF as an international bank that give loans to countries. This research uses descriptive comparative method, so this research will have focused on comparation between the two banks. Analysis on this research will use Structural Power Theory with Middle Power concept to explain IMF domination and how NDB that created by Middle Powered countries can replace IMF domination.

The Middle Power Concept: Presenting a Complex Approach

Middle powers have traditionally played an important role in the international system. Nowadays, the label of middle power possesses relevant political implications and thus theorizing about middle powers is more significant than ever before. However, there is a lack of exact and complex middle power definition in academic as well as in political area. Hence, in the present study, an overview of the development of middle power theorizing from its beginning up to the present was offered in form of a literature review. Subsequently, the main conceptualizations of middle power were compared, the advantages and disadvantages of each particular attitude emphasized and a complex approach toward defining middle power was proposed. The results show that the complex approach towards the conceptualization of middle powers employs the strengths of previous approaches and overcomes their weaknesses. The emphasis on the relative position of a state in the power pyramid is based on the belief that this position, in combination with value orientation and self-image, affects both the state’s actions and its ability to create conditions for the functioning of the international system and the ability to influence the basic parameters of the international system.

The international model citizen and the Syrian war: Canadian identity from a civilian power perspective

Canadian foreign policy analysis has traditionally drawn heavily on the middle power concept. This paper proposes to look at Canadian foreign policy from a new angle: Using the concept of ontological security, it shows how “civilian power” elements such as multilateralism, institution building, and the rule of law, are connected to Canada’s identity and foreign policy development. The article systematically compares public statements and speeches by government officials regarding the Syrian war. The comparison is conducted against the backdrop of the governments’ foreign policy actions. On a theoretical level, the paper contributes to the discussion on Canadian identity and ontological security. Furthermore, it offers a comparison of the Syria policies of the Harper and the Trudeau governments, adding to the literature on differences and continuities between Conservative and Liberal Canadian foreign policy, as well as on empirical analyses of Canadian foreign policy and the Syrian war.

Theory, Practice, and Analysis of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy

Indonesian foreign policy is considered as a uniqe and rare policy. This is because the main focus of Indonesian foreign policy is Free and Active. For country like Indonesia which had just got independence in 1945, the country is considered as a country with a pioneer foreign policy to stand in a non-block. Therefore, Indonesia was quite popular with non-block movement and Bandung Conference in the Cold War Period. This paper discusses Indonesian foreign policy and match its policy with underlying theory of Foreign Policies: Realism, Idealism, and Constructivism. Moreover, this essay also analyses Indonesian Foreign Policy through Middle Power Concept. Additionally, this essay also explains the practices of Indonesian Foreign Policy in current years, especially under Joko Widodo’s Administration. Last but not least, the author also reveals Indonesian foreign policy and its relations to media, society or public opinion.

Middle power identities of Australia and South Korea: comparing the Kevin Rudd/Julia Gillard and Lee Myung-bak administrations

ABSTRACTThis paper explores the middle power identities of Australia and South Korea during the Kevin Rudd/Julia Gillard (2007–2013) and Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013) administrations. Considering the problems in the existing position, behaviour, impact and identity-based definitions of middle powers, examining how self-identified middle powers have constructed such an identity would offer useful insights into the middle power concept. Relying on a framework that captures an identity's content and contestation, this paper argues that while Australia and South Korea have assumed a middle power identity, their visualisations of this identity are slightly different. Australia has understood its middle power identity in both economic and security terms, whereas South Korea appears to have connected such an identity more with the economic dimension. These differences affect how they envision their respective middle power roles in international affairs.

The emerging middle power concept: Time to say goodbye?

ABSTRACTTo deal with the wide range of states that are considered middle powers, scholars distinguish between traditional middle powers on the one hand, and emerging, non-traditional or Southern middle powers on the other. This article examines the middle power concept in light of such diversity. It rejects middle power conceptions based on a ranking of size, power or position, on performing morally commendable international actions, on playing niche roles in international diplomacy, or on national self-identification. The article then considers a conception of middle powers as international stabilisers. The difficulty with this latter conception is that new middle powers exhibit a counter-hegemonic streak and a preference for multipolarity. Both of these are destabilising. The proposed solution is to jettison adjectives such as ‘emerging’ or ‘Southern’ with regard to middle powers, to stop classifying mid-range states with counter-hegemonic tendencies as middle powers, and to restrict the middle power term to mid-range states that actively support the liberal hegemonic project.

A Dolphin in an Oil Sea : Application of the Korean Version of Middle Power State Concept to the Case of Kazakhstan

This article analyses the foreign policy of Kazakhstan through the prism of the modern version of the middle power concept that was elaborated upon by Korean scholars. Results of the research demonstrate that it is relevant to identify Kazakhstan as a middle power state in the fourth wave, of which the Republic of Korea is already part. This research allowed the detection of a couple of key factors (the essentially important role of President Nazarbayev in current foreign affairs and the energy-oriented and energy-dependent economy) that may negatively influence Kazakhstan’ s status as a middle power in future in case of an unsuccessful power transition.

Partners in Development? Robert McNamara, Lester Pearson, and the Commission on International Development, 1967–1973

In 1968, the newly appointed World Bank president, Robert McNamara, asked former Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson to chair a Bank Commission on International Development in hopes that he could revive the North’s flagging commitment to foreign aid promised under the banner of the Decade of Development. The Commission and its Report—Partners in Development—have a general reputation as farsighted approaches to problems of official development assistance. In Canada, the Pearson Commission is viewed through the lens of Canada’s commitment to Middle Power multilateralism. This analysis tests both interpretations by examining the Commission and the conception and reception of its work. Whilst the Middle Power concept circumscribed Pearson’s role and effectiveness, the Commission succeeded in helping Canada’s chief ally, the United States, share the burden of development assistance with its European allies. As in the realm of peacekeeping, Pearsonian development diplomacy was as much about shoring up relations with Northern allies as it was with developing new Southern friendships.

Reinterpreting India's Rise through the Middle Power Prism

India's spectacular rise in recent years has been the source of hyperbolic theorising and speculation on its major power status. Middle power theory offers a set of dynamic analytical parameters which allow for re-evaluating India's global influence and identifying both strengths and weaknesses of its power projection and resources. Placing emphasis on themes of Third World leadership, good international citizenship, multilateral activism, bridge-building diplomacy, and coalition-building with like-minded states, the middle power concept can encapsulate key aspects of India's contemporary agency and account for structural dynamics which constitute a reformist world-view through the reconfiguration of the Indian state within the existing world order. Overall, middlepowermanship delineates fundamental continuities in India's foreign policy tradition, epitomises India's existing position in the neoliberal world order, while providing a good indication of the directions India will take on the global stage in the short and medium-term.

The “Middle Power” Concept in Australian Foreign Policy

During the early 1990s, the Hawke and Keating Labor governments promoted Australia's diplomatic credentials as an activist and independent middle power. Labor claimed that by acting as a middle power Australia was constructing a novel diplomatic response to the challenges of the post‐Cold War world. But a closer reading of the official foreign policy record since 1945 reveals that previous conservative governments have also taken a similar view of Australia's place and position on the international stage. This essay traces the historical evolution of the middle power concept in Australian foreign policy and concludes with an assessment of the Howard government's more recent reluctance to use this label and its implications for Australia's future middle power credentials. Although its use has waxed and waned in official policy discourse and it is more commonly associated with Labor governments, the middle power concept itself and the general diplomatic style it conveys have been one of the most durable and consistent elements of Australia's diplomatic practice.

The Canadian Middle Power Myth

THE RHETORIC OF 'MIDDLEPOWERHOOD' has dominated Canada's external political identity since the Second World War. Middle-power status has been used to justify a voice in international organizations, leadership in international initiatives, and consultation with Canadian officials on matters of concern to the international community. Canada has used the middle power concept to further its foreign policy aims and to promote nationalism through an internationally recognized identity.For all its importance, 'middle power' is rarely defined, and limited explanations are never specific. This vagueness is deliberate and conceals a striking reality: Canada's status as a middle power is a myth. The history of middlepowerhood uncovers a tradition of Canadian rhetoric crafted to justify the attainment of disproportionate influence in international affairs.(f.1) This subtle process of nationalist self- promotion had its genesis in 1942 when diplomat Hume Wrong introduced the functional principle, and it continues to be manifest in the Canadian human security agenda today.In 1933, David Mitrany legitimized the concept of functionalism in international relations, evaluating the potential for a successful world government by dividing the world into two types of states: great and small. Recognizing that some of the smaller states were increasing in strength, and seeking to ensure successful and co-operative international governance, he proposed to acknowledge the differing capacities of the smaller powers through 'a functional structure of political authority.'(f.2)Mitrany's ideas undoubtedly influenced Hume Wrong when he wrote to Norman Robertson, the undersecretary of state for external affairs, about Canada's role and status in the direction of war and the shaping of peace during inter-allied World War II negotiations: 'the principle, I think, is that each member of the grand alliance should have a voice in the conduct of war proportionate to the general war effort. A subsidiary principle is that the influence of the various countries should be greatest in connection with those matters with which they are most directly concerned.'(f.3) Wrong's 'functional principle' was narrower than Mitrany's 'functionalism.' It stipulated that individual small-state involvement in international affairs should be based upon certain conditions: the relevance of the state's interests, the direct contribution of the state to the situation in question, and the capacity of the state to participate.(f.4) Wrong did not intend to contest the role of the great powers - their inherent right to influence over all aspects of global governance was conceded. The principle was to apply to all remaining states. There were indeed two tiers of powers in the international system. However, some of the smaller powers deserved greater relative status predetermined by three criteria: relevance, contribution, and capacity. Functional powers were small powers. The functional principle was a 'functional' means of differentiating between smaller states, based on their relative capacities at a specific time.The tenets of the functional principle helped elevate Canada's status within the international community during World War II. Canada became a leading non-great power. It had a functional voice in the shaping of international relations. Over time, however, that was not enough. With the war coming to a close, Brooke Claxton, the minister of defence, proposed to extend the principle beyond its original meaning: 'the nations of the world must come to think of representation in terms of function rather than status.'(f.5) Claxton hoped to change the power structure.Great powers had formal status that would soon be recognized in the charter of the United Nations. Regardless of the state of the French economy, the British military, or Soviet political stability, the three remained great powers. Great-power status was differentiated objectively. It hardly fluctuated, and it allowed certain states to maintain a disproportionate influence in international affairs. …