Microphysical Laws Research Articles

Emergence of Time

Microphysical laws are time reversible, but macrophysics, chemistry and biology are not. This chapter explores how this asymmetry (a classic example of a broken symmetry) arises due to the cosmological context, where a non-local Direction of Time is imposed by the expansion of the universe. This situation is best represented by an Evolving Block Universe, where local arrows of time (thermodynamic, electrodynamic, gravitational, wave, quantum, biological) emerge in concordance with the Direction of Time because a global Past Condition results in the Second Law of Thermodynamics pointing to the future. At the quantum level, the indefinite future changes to the definite past due to quantum wave function collapse events.

Mass additivity and a priori entailment

The principle of mass additivity states that the mass of a composite object is the sum of the masses of its elementary components. Mass additivity is true in Newtonian mechanics but false in special relativity. Physicists have explained why mass additivity is true in Newtonian mechanics by reducing it to Newton’s microphysical laws. This reductive explanation does not fit well with deducibility theories of reductive explanation such as the modern Nagelian theory of reduction, and the a priori entailment theory of reduction that is prominent in the philosophy of mind. Nonetheless, I argue that a reconstruction of the explanation that incorporates distinctively philosophical concepts in fact fits both theories. I discuss the implications of this result for both theories and for the reductive explanation of consciousness.

Physics in the real universe: time and spacetime

The Block Universe idea, representing spacetime as a fixed whole, suggests the flow of time is an illusion: the entire universe just is, with no special meaning attached to the present time. This view is however based on time-reversible microphysical laws and does not represent macro-physical behaviour and the development of emergent complex systems, including life, which do indeed exist in the real universe. When these are taken into account, the unchanging block universe view of spacetime is best replaced by an evolving block universe which extends as time evolves, with the potential of the future continually becoming the certainty of the past. However this time evolution is not related to any preferred surfaces in spacetime; rather it is associated with the evolution of proper time along families of world lines

Explanatory Pluralism and Macro-Causation

Contemporary reductionism nowadays comes in various strengths and flavors, ranging from restricted claims concerning the token identity of physical and mental events up to the more orthodox claims about the reducibility of psychological laws. This paper first provides a taxonomy of different versions of reductionism arranged in order of decreasing strength. Against this backdrop it is argued that classical arguments in favor of an absolute autonomy of psychology and of the special sciences fall far short of their intended conclusion. Instead the paper develops what it takes to be more promising arguments based on the notion of multiple supervenience that underwrite the notion of explanatory pluralism and make room for a systems account of higher-order processes sanctioning downward causation without violating the laws of micro-physics.

EFFECTIVE AVERAGE ACTION IN STATISTICAL PHYSICS AND QUANTUM FIELD THEORY

An exact renormalization group equation describes the dependence of the free energy on an infrared cutoff for the quantum or thermal fluctuations. It interpolates between the microphysical laws and the complex macroscopic phenomena. We present a simple unified description of critical phenomena for O(N)-symmetric scalar models in two, three or four dimensions, including essential scaling for the Kosterlitz-Thouless transition.

The problem of harmonizing laws

More laws obtain in the world,it appears, than just those of microphysics –e.g. laws of genetics, perceptual psychology,economics. This paper assumes there indeedare laws in the special sciences, and notjust scrambled versions of microphysical laws. Yet the objects which obey them are composedwholly of microparticles. How can themicroparticles in such an object lawfully domore than what is required of them by the lawsof microphysics? Are there additional laws formicroparticles – which seems to violate closureof microphysics – or is the ``more'' acoincidental outcome of microphysics itself? This paper argues that the appearance ofviolation is illusory, and the worry aboutcoincidence misleading. We cannot expect tounderstand the special sciences at the level ofthe microparticles.

Soft computing simulation design of intelligent control systems in micro-nano-robotics and mechatronics

The soft computing simulation design methodology of intelligent control system for mobile micro-nano-robots based on modeling of non-linear dissipative equations of robots motion with a minimum entropy production is described. It includes hierarchical levels for description of dynamic behavior of mobile micro-nano-robots based on laws of microphysics, quantum logic of intelligent dynamic behavior of control objects, optimal control of states and dynamic system theory of mechanical motion. The description of a thermodynamic intelligent behavior (with minimum entropy production) of control objects (robots) and their interrelations with Lyapunov stability conditions are introduced. The role of soft computing on the basis of GA with a fitness function as a minimum entropy production for intelligent control of mobile micro-nano-robots is discussed.

Physicalism and the Fallacy of Composition

Physicalism, as I treat it here, holds that every instance of causationreported by the special sciences is shadowed, even rivalled, by causation atthe level of microphysics. The reported ‘cause’ is embodied in one massive collection of microparticle events; the ‘event’ in another; the former brings about the latter in accordance with the laws of microphysics. I argue that while individual events in the ‘cause’ collection bring about individual events in the ‘effect’ collection, it does not follow, and typically is unbelievable, that the ‘cause’ collection itself brings anything about. For typically that collection is too sprawling and disconnected from the standpoint of microphysics to do anything. Causings reported by the special sciences can be traced only at that level. This is actually unsurprising, since the objects of such sciences are not mere parcels of microparticles, but genuine wholes with natures of their own.

Physicalism and the Fallacy of Composition

Physicalism, as I treat it here, holds that every instance of causationreported by the special sciences is shadowed, even rivalled, by causation atthe level of microphysics. The reported ‘cause’ is embodied in one massive collection of microparticle events; the ‘event’ in another; the former brings about the latter in accordance with the laws of microphysics. I argue that while individual events in the ‘cause’ collection bring about individual events in the ‘effect’ collection, it does not follow, and typically is unbelievable, that the ‘cause’ collection itself brings anything about. For typically that collection is too sprawling and disconnected from the standpoint of microphysics to do anything. Causings reported by the special sciences can be traced only at that level. This is actually unsurprising, since the objects of such sciences are not mere parcels of microparticles, but genuine wholes with natures of their own.

Microphysicalism without contingent micro-macro laws

In 'A Definition of Physicalism' [6], I sought to avoid an old dilemma for physicalism to which Tim Crane and Hugh Mellor [3] have recently given their support. Physicalism says, in their words, that the empirical world 'contains just what a true complete physics would say it contains'. The alleged dilemma is that physicalism is obviously false if 'physics' means 'actual physics', and that it is trivially true if it means 'ideal physics'. I argued that if we see the world as layered in different levels of composition, and if we identify the microphysical realm with the realm of subatomic (or whatever) levels, then we can define physicalism quite straightforwardly. Physicalism better, perhaps, microphysicalism is the doctrine that actually (but not necessarily) everything non-microphysical is composed out of microphysical entities and is governed by microphysical laws: and this, in a sense which means that the non-microphysical facts supervene contingently on the microphysical; more on supervenience later. Such a microphysicalist approach has no truck with talk of ideal physics and it only requires us to believe that actual physics is on track in postulating a microphysical realm, not in any matters of detail. On the face of it, the approach sails right through the horns of the dilemma. In a reply to my paper, Tim Crane [2] does not discuss this apparent capacity of the microphysicalist strategy to avoid the older dilemma. But he directs attention to a different challenge, and one that he may well consider more important.' He suggests that 'if the macro and micro levels are systematically connected' systematically but contingently connected, as in the microphysicalist picture 'then the connections between them

Reply to Pettit

Philip Pettit [4] accepts this challenge, and responds with a definition of physicalism which he thinks avoids the dilemma. Pettit's definition of physicalism involves four claims, two about entities, two about laws. Claims 1 and 3, concerning the existence of microphysical entities and microphysical laws, should not be questioned. Claims 2 and 4 are what make Pettit's theory physicalist: 2 says that microphysical entities constitute everything, 4 says that microphysical laws govern everything. I shall argue that the various ways Pettit offers of understanding these claims are in tension with one another, with the result that his definition does not avoid the dilemma posed in [3]. Claim 2 says that (A) everything empirical is composed out of microphysical entities, and that (B) no two things can differ without differing microphysically. Pettit rightly says that (A) would be denied by a dualist who holds that immaterial minds inhabit the empirical world but are not composed of anything. Fair enough; Mellor and I exaggerated when we said that there is no question of physicalism whatsoever: there is the question of whether this sort of dualism is true.

Reversible computing: All-optical implementation of interaction and priese gates

Integrated optics offers a particularly interesting candidate for implementing parallel, reversible computing structures operating in closer correspondence with the underlying microphysical laws which presume nondissipative interactions and global interconnections. An implementation of the computation-universal Interaction Gate is described, based upon Kaplan's bistable nonlinear interface. The gate, together with an optical crossover using a half-wave plate, comprise a construction-universal set.

Remarks on the relation between general relativity and quantum theory

A discussion of the diffraction and scattering of particles by a grating shows that the experiment discussed by H. Honl and by L. Rosenfeld in 1965 and again in 1981 does not reveal any contradiction between general relativity and quantum theory. Moreover, these theories, in principle, cannot refute one another because the (weak) principle of equivalence, underlying general relativity theory, entails that gravitation does not alter the laws of microphysics.

A quantum-theoretic approach to genetic problems

A quantum-theoretic picture of the transfer of genetic information is described. The advantage of such an approach is that a number of genetic effects appear to be explicable on the basis of general microphysical laws, independent of any specific model (such as DNA-protein coding) for the transmission of genetic information. It is assumed that the genetic information is carried by a family of numerical observables belonging to a specific microphysical system; it is shown that a single observable is theoretically sufficient to carry this information. The various types of structure that this observable can possess are then described in detail, and the possible genetic effects which can airse from each such structure are discussed. For example, it is shown how the assumption that the genetic observable possesses degenerate eigenvalues may lead to a theory of allelism. To keep the treatment self-contained, the basic quantum-theoretical principles to be used are discussed in some detail. Finally, the relation of the present approach to current biochemical ideas and to earlier quantum-theoretic treatments of genetic systems is discussed.