Methodology Of Research Programmes Research Articles

Grace de Laguna’s 1909 critique of analytic philosophy: presentation and defence

Grace A. de Laguna was an American philosopher of exceptional originality. Many of the arguments and positions she developed during the early decades of the twentieth century later came to be central to analytic philosophy. These arguments and positions included, even before 1930, a critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction, a private language argument, a critique of type physicalism, a functionalist theory of mind, a critique of scientific reductionism, a methodology of research programs in science and more. Nevertheless, de Laguna identified herself as a defender of the speculative vision of philosophy, a vision which, in her words, ‘analytic philosophy condemns’. I outline her speculative vision of philosophy as well as what is, in effect, an argument she offers against analytic philosophy. This is an argument against the view that key parts of established opinion, e.g. our best theoretical physics or most certain common sense, should be assumed to be true in order to answer philosophical questions. I go on to bring out the implications of her argument for the approaches to philosophy of Bertrand Russell, Willard V. Quine and David Lewis, and I also compare the argument to recent, related arguments against analytic philosophy. I will suggest that de Laguna offers a viable critique of analytic philosophy and an alternative approach to philosophy that meets this critique.

Methodology of Research Programs by Imre Lakatos Half a Century Later

Methodology of Research Programs by Imre Lakatos Half a Century Later

Lakatos y Feyerabend: Un antagonismo sobre el desafío del Falsacionismo Popperiano

This paper presents the debate between Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend (close friends and also, disciples of Karl Popper) about the foundations of scientific method. First, as a sort of introduction, it presents Popper’s deductivist position, known as falsification, which states the ability of scientific theories to submit to falsation through a critical approach to its own basic conceptions. Then, Lakatos’ epistemological stance, known as the Methodology of Research Programs, is explained as a sophisticated version of falsification that started in a naive fashion with Popper. In the last two sections, the author analyzes Feyerabend’s position – which he himself baptized Methodological anarchism – whose main thesis is that any method is potentially valid in the set of discussions about the methodological and conceptual foundations of science.

Uniting the cognitive and the social

The proposed comment to the paper by W. Lynch provides another indirect argument in favor of the thesis about Lakatos's hidden Marxist roots. The methodology of research programmes and the sociology of scientific knowledge (social epistemology) share a common object of criticism, and a constant opponent. Lakatos calls him the naive falsificationist while a social epistemologist dubs him a metaphysical realist, or fact-objectivist. both criticized the non-critical trust in scientific theories and facts as well as their reification though using different means: the internal dialectic of science’s development and the socio-communicative interpretation of scientific knowledge. Still, the differences between them like the differences between Lakatos’s and Feyerabend’s approaches are two ways of expressing the similar position based on acceptance of some non-dogmatic Marxist ideas.

The power of “mapping the territory”. Why economists should become more aware of the performativity of their models

Economics is not simply about representing reality; it is also about shaping it, an approach encapsulated in Donald MacKenzie’s aphorism that economics is best conceived as an “engine, not as a camera” (MacKenzie and Millo (Am J Sociol 109(1):107–145, 2003). The making and application of economic theories and models contribute actively and intentionally towards the making of our social world, by encouraging, guiding and legitimizing actions and decisions, or discouraging others, and by steering them in certain directions. It follows that economists do not simply draw maps of the economic territory within their compass: they are not straightforwardly the cartographers of the economy, and cannot be seen as the disinterested observers that they commonly represent themselves to be, and indeed are often thought of as. Their theoretical work has or aims at practical consequences for the economy, and indeed for society at large, and their interests and influence are thus by no means confined to academia alone. This article calls for a discussion of the ethical responsibilities of economists, and of economics, and challenges the discipline properly to assume those responsibilities; and it concludes by considering the key questions—what makes a ‘good’ economic model; and what criteria should be used to distinguish the good models, and the ‘good ways’ of handling models and their results, from the bad ones. As far as epistemology, the methodology of research programmes and the relation of theory and (social) practice are concerned, the insights of mainly von Hayek (Br J Philos Sci 6(23):209–225, 1955, The pretence of knowledge. Lecture to the memory of Alfred Nobel, 1974; Individualism and economic order, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 33–56, 1980a; Individualism and economic order, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 57–76, 1980b; The theory of complex phenomena. Readings in the philosophy of social science, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1994) and Popper (e.g. The myth of the framework: in defence of science and rationality, Routledge, New York 1994a; Models, instruments, and truth. The status of the rationality principle in the social sciences, pp 154–184, 1994b) provide the background of my discussion of the mentioned issues.

Defeasible Reasoning + Partial Models: A Formal Framework for the Methodology of Research Programs

In this paper we show that any reasoning process in which conclusions can be both fallible and corrigible can be formalized in terms of two approaches: (i) syntactically, with the use of defeasible reasoning, according to which reasoning consists in the construction and assessment of arguments for and against a given claim, and (ii) semantically, with the use of partial structures, which allow for the representation of less than conclusive information. We are particularly interested in the formalization of scientific reasoning, along the lines traced by Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programs. We show how current debates in cosmology could be put into this framework, shedding light on a very controversial topic.

On evolutionary technological change and economic growth: Lakatos as a starting point for appraisal

This paper proposes a discussion on evolutionary technological change and economic growth theory, using the Lakatosian Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes as an appraisal criterion. Since the persistence of some inflexibility in this approach made it difficult to capture fundamental features of the scientific undertaking at hand, an alternative hypothesis was explored, that developed by Hoover (Scientific research program or tribe? A joint appraisal of Lakatos and the new classical macroeconomics. In: de Marchi N, Blaug M (eds) Appraising economic theories: studies in the methodology of research programmes. Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1991). This latter framework is used here not as a formal methodology but rather as a language to find patterns in these theories. This exercise evolved then towards a number of considerations on the confrontation between these evolutionary theories particularly in terms of that which can be seen (in a loose sense) as their “rival research programme”, the new neoclassical growth models.

Which Way Cognitive Development?

The article addresses the current status of Piaget's theory as a perspective on the nature of the human intellect and its development. As a framework for discussion, we adopt Lakatos's methodology of research programs, which has been used by several authors to debate the role of Piaget's and other perspectives on cognitive development. The position we advocate is that, in recent years, research in cognitive development has undergone a profound change of perspective, in the course of which the basic ontological commitments of the Piagetian approach have been challenged and undermined. We argue that Piaget's fundamental assumptions of overarching structures and the process of equilibration have been superseded by a new perspective represented by a synthesis of domain-specific and domain-general processes, which has become the dominant impetus in the field.

Appraising Economic Theories: Studies in the Methodology of Research Programs

Appraising Economic Theories: Studies in the Methodology of Research Programs

Appraising Economic Theories: Studies in the Methodology of Research Programs.

Journal Article Appraising Economic Theories: Studies in the Methodology of Research Programs Get access Appraising Economic Theories: Studies in the Methodology of Research Programs. Edited by Neil De Marchi and Blaug. (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1991. Pp. ix + 566. ISBN 1 85278 515 2 hardback.) Andrea Salanti Andrea Salanti Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 102, Issue 415, 1 November 1992, Pages 1534–1536, https://doi.org/10.2307/2234811 Published: 01 November 1992

Logic of discovery or psychology of invention?

It is noted that Popper separates the creation of concepts, conjectures, hypotheses and theories—the context of invention—from the testing thereof—the context of justification—arguing that only the latter is susceptible of rigorous logical analysis. Efforts on the part of others to shift or eradicate the demarcation established by this distinction are discussed and the relationship of these considerations to the claims of “strong artificial intelligence” is pointed out. It is argued that the mode of education of scientists, as well as reports of celebrated scientists, support Popper's judgement in this matter. An historical episode from Faraday's later career is used to illustrate the historiographical strength of Lakatos' “methodology of research programs.”

Two methods in search of science

Two methods in search of science

Marxist Historiography and the Methodology of Research Programs

claim of Marxist historiography to be has always been rooted in a conception of derived from the natural sciences; and that conception in turn is represented by a philosophy of which purports to elucidate the function of laws, the structure of theories, and the logical relations between hypotheses and empirical data. social sciences for more than a generation modeled themselves on the philosophy of known as logical empiricism, or positivism, or logicism. As C. G. Hempel's classic The Function of General Laws in History showed, historiography and a fortiori Marxist historiography could not accommodate itself to the logicist account of without radical and perhaps impossible changes such as the development of logically rigorous theory and the discovery of testable general laws. Sir Karl Popper's version of agreed with the logicists in rejecting Marxist theories of history (though not necessarily empirical historical research by Marxists) as unscientific. Scientific and unscientific have come to deserve the noncommittal quotation marks in which they now commonly appear. Provocative arguments such as those by Kuhn and Feyerabend have questioned whether the natural sciences, and therefore the methodologically imitative social sciences, can be characterized by any set of logical or empirical criteria internal to itself, as distinguished from external criteria such as the institutions by which scientific activity is supported and acknowledged. But there are alternatives to the anarchistic theory of which abandons any attempt to demarcate the boundary between what can legitimately be called science and what can't. Imre Lakatos,l in particular, and Larry Laudan in his important book

Methodological appraisals, advice, and historiographical models

In the paper I examine (Section I) the best defense for the claim that methodologies shouldnot function heuristically (thesis-LW) as it appears in John Worrall. I then evaluate (Section II) his proposal of a criterion*M which is offered as a criterion for evaluating competing methodologies such as falsificationism, conventionalism, methodology of research programmes. etc. Finally, I consider (Section III) the consequences of arguments presented earlier (Section I and II) as they bear on the problem of selecting a historiographical model.