Methodology Of Metaphysics Research Articles

Deflecting Ockham’s Razor: A Medieval Debate about Ontological Commitment

Abstract William of Ockham (d. 1347) is well known for his commitment to parsimony and for his so-called ‘razor’ principle. But little is known about attempts among his own contemporaries to deflect his use of the razor. In this paper, I explore one such attempt. In particular, I consider a clever challenge that Ockham’s younger contemporary, Walter Chatton (d. 1343) deploys against the razor. The challenge involves a kind of dilemma for Ockham. Depending on how Ockham responds to this dilemma, his razor will, Chatton argues, either prove unacceptably dull when it comes to determining ontological commitment or prove unacceptably sharp when it comes to determining commitments entailed by certain theological doctrines. While Chatton’s objection is subtle and interesting in its own right, the broader significance of the debate between these thinkers lies in the light it sheds on medieval approaches to issues surrounding metaphysical methodology.

Metaphysical Fundamentality as a Fundamental Problem for CS Peirce and Zhu Xi

0 Metaphysical Fundamentality as a Fundamental Problem for CS Peirce and Zhu Xi Fr. James Dominic Rooney, OP Department of Religion and Philosophy, Hong Kong Baptist University jdrooney@hkbu.edu.hk Contemporary metaphysics has begun to focus on questions having to do with the methodology of metaphysics. In particular, there are two prominent approaches to delineating the unique kinds of explanations offered by metaphysical theories. One is an approach associated with Aristotle, where metaphysics aims to provide explanations in terms of what entities or relations, etc., are more fundamental than others, identifying the right kinds of dependence relations among entities – i.e., “what grounds what”.i Another approach is one on which metaphysics aims to provide those concepts that are ‘joint-carving,’ giving us knowledge of the fundamental structure of the world, aiming to provide perfectly ‘natural’ representations of what the world is like.ii Even though advocates of grounding can also make use of a notion of joint-carving, their notion of what kinds of distinctions are joint-carving would highlight precisely the grounding relations. The entities and their relations are theoretically primary, with joint-carving-ness defined in terms of those relations. The inverse holds true of the advocates of a joint-carving approach: assuming there were entities which ground other entities, those relations will figure prominently in a well-constructed ontology. Yet this latter approach will understand metaphysics as primarily a matter of representing the world’s structure accurately. The conceptual issues 1 associated with metaphysical ideology take precedence over the substantive issues of whether there are fundamental entities or relations. In this paper, I attempt a contrast between two historical figures – the American pragmatist CS Peirce and the twelfth-century Confucian thinker Zhu Xi (朱熹). The contemporary approaches to metaphysics which highlight either grounding or joint-carving are mirrored, I argue, in these two historical figures, as epistemological assumptions made by these two are shared in some ways by the contemporary approaches to metaphysics. Pierce, for example, gives theoretical primacy to semiotic and other logical disciplines, whereas metaphysics has a subordinate role coordinating natural scientific theories. The hierarchy of sciences corresponds to the way in which Pierce understands the aim and nature of knowledge, i.e., as a pragmatist. One might therefore take Pierce to approach metaphysics as providing knowledge of fundamental entities, but instead – I argue – his position more resembles that of the joint-carving approach. Conversely, although Zhu Xi holds that knowledge of the world involves knowledge of the world’s structure, he does not approach metaphysics in as a joint-carver would. Instead, one comes to know that structure by means of knowing the entities in the world and their relation to one another. And the point is not merely epistemological. Zhu Xi paints the moral ideal of the sage as achieving unity with the world by means of his knowledge because the structure of the entities in the world involves an extra-mental unity or dependence – the sage comes to know and appropriate his own pre-theoretical unity with other things in knowing the world’s structure. 2 Even though interpretation of either thinker is controversial, my survey contrasts Pierce and Zhu Xi as exemplars of distinct approaches to metaphysics. I will conclude that there is an important divergence between Zhu Xi and Pierce because of the distinct ways in which they conceive of the epistemology of metaphysics. This points to a more perspicuous manner to contrast contemporary debates in metaphysics, because the joint-carving and grounding-centric approaches to metaphysics implicitly involve distinct epistemological presuppositions that lead them to their respective notions of metaphysical structure. Examination of Zhu Xi and Peirce sheds light on these divergent approaches to metaphysics and can help, I will propose, to decide between them. Zhu Xi, Li, and Self-Cultivation Zhu Xi, as a twelfth-century Confucian, was far removed from Peirce’s context. As a commentator on classical texts of the Confucian tradition, Zhu Xi needed to reconcile two tendencies found in that tradition. On one hand, it is uncontroversial that Confucianism aims at moral self-cultivation, “the purpose of Zhu Xi’s entire philosophical and educational system.”iii Self-cultivation is intimately connected to governing...

On the Methodological Restriction of the Principle of Characterization

The subject of this article is the Principle of Characterization—the most controversial principle of Alexius Meinong’s Theory of Objects. The aim of this text is twofold. First of all, to show that Bertrand Russell’s well-known objection to the Principle of Characterization can be reformulated against contemporary unrestricted interpretations of it. Second, to propose an alternative formulation of this principle. This refers to the methodology of metaphysics and is based on the distinction between pre-theoretical and theoretical languages. The proposed formulation fits well with every type of contemporary interpretation of the Theory of Objects and helps to overcome Russell’s criticism.

ПРИНЦИП ИНТЕРНАЦИОНАЛИЗМА: МЕТАФИЗИЧЕСКАЯ МЕТОДОЛОГИЯ СОЦИАЛЬНОГО ПОЗНАНИЯ

The article examines the internationalism principle. The author tackles the problem of ambiguous understanding of the internationalism principle. The originality of the study is in the philosophical analysis of the existing definitions of the internationalism conception and the peculiarities of its usage in social reality to characterize social practices. The author shows that the content of the internationalism conception depends on the philosophical methodology within which it is considered: the metaphysical and dialectical methods of cognition. The paper considers the internationalism conception in the context of the philosophical metaphysical methodology and justifies the differentiation of conservative and liberal approaches to the internationalism principle within the framework of the metaphysical methodology.

Cognitive Metaphysics.

In recent years philosophers have been interested in the methodology of metaphysics. Most of these developments are related to formal work in logic or physics, often against the backdrop of the Carnap-Quine debate on ontology. Drawing on Quine’s later work, I argue that a psychological or cognitive perspective on metaphysical topics may be a valuable addition to contemporary metametaphysics. The method is illustrated by means of cognitive studies of the notions “identity,” “vagueness,” and “object” and is compared to other extant metametaphysical positions.

The Formation of the Analogical Concept of Life: An Exposition of Metaphysical Methodology

The Formation of the Analogical Concept of Life: An Exposition of Metaphysical Methodology

Metaphysics and the Vera Causa Ideal: The Nun’s Priest’s Tale

L.A. Paul has recently defended the methodology of metaphysics on the grounds that it is continuous with the sciences. She claims that both scientists and metaphysicians use inference to the best explanation (IBE) to choose between competing theories, and that the success of science vindicates the use of IBE in metaphysics. Specifically, the success of science shows that the theoretical virtues are truth-conducive. I challenge Paul’s claims on two grounds. First, I argue that, at least in biology, scientists adhere to the vera causa ideal, which allows the theoretical virtues to play a much more limited role in scientific reasoning than Paul requires for metaphysical reasoning. The success of biology thus does not vindicate the methodology of metaphysics. Second, I argue that, at least in many cases, the successful reliance on the theoretical virtues in scientific contexts shows only that the theoretical virtues are truth-conducive within those local contexts, and not that they are truth-conducive generally. The upshots are (1) that Paul’s defense of the methodology of metaphysics fails, and (2) that any attempt to rescue her defense must pay more careful attention to what precisely is vindicated by successful science.

Feng Youlan’s Interpretation of Western Philosophy:A Critical Examination from the Perspective of Metaphysical Methodology

The paper aims to display a limited observation of Feng’s interpretation of Western philosophy through the window of metaphysical methodology. This paper concentrates on Feng’s interpretation of Western philosophy from the perspective of metaphysical methodology and aims to display a limited observation of Feng’s interpretation of Western philosophy through the window of metaphysical methodology. Based on a brief review the recent studies of Feng Youlan and Western philosophy, this paper analyzes the progress and insufficient aspects in current studies on this issue and particularly clarifies what are the metaphysics and metaphysical methods in the context of Feng Youlan’s philosophy. In clarifying Feng’s interpretation of Western philosophy from the perspective of methodology, this paper further critically analyzes the Feng’s positive metaphysical methods and negative metaphysical methods, and assumes that Feng’s negative metaphysical methods essentially is a kind of attitudes towards metaphysics but neither a kind of metaphysics nor a kind of metaphysical methods. Instead of characterizing metaphysical methods as positive and negative as Feng did, this paper suggests an alternative division of metaphysical methods: direct and indirect methods of dealing with metaphysical issues.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGIES AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

In given article one of important philosophical and scientific problems reveals: a question on theoretical severity. The author shows that the problem of theoretical severity - an accurate parity of system and a method - is realized by means of theoretical standards: naturalnesses, rationality, methodological standards, scientific character and a sociality. Infringement of theoretical severity conducts to destruction of system of any type: in particular, philosophical and scientific. In article it is proved that construction of philosophical and scientific systems is realized within the limits of two methodology: metaphysical and dialectic, the metaphysical methodology is under construction by freedom principle, and dialectic by a perfection principle. Deviation from the given principles in construction of this or that system conducts to eclecticism, to impossibility of creation and use by the subject of adequate system in world knowledge.

Science, metaphysics and method

While there are many examples of metaphysical theorising being heuristically and intellectually important in the progress of scientific knowledge, many people wonder how metaphysics not closely informed and inspired by empirical science could lead to rival or even supplementary knowledge about the world. This paper assesses the merits of a popular defence of the a priori methodology of metaphysics that goes as follows. The first task of the metaphysician, like the scientist, is to construct a hypothesis that accounts for the phenomena in question. It is then argued that among the possible metaphysical theories, the empirical evidence underdetermines the right one, just as the empirical evidence underdetermines the right scientific theory. In the latter case it is widely agreed that we must break the underdetermination by appeal to theoretical virtues, and this is just what should be and largely is done in metaphysics. This is part of a more general line of argument that defends metaphysics on the basis of its alleged continuity with highly theoretical science. In what follows metaphysics and theoretical science are compared in order to see whether the above style of defence of a priori metaphysics is successful.

Two accounts of laws and time

Among the most important questions in the metaphysics of science are “What are the natures of fundamental laws and chances?” and “What grounds the direction of time?” My aim in this paper is to examine some connections between these questions, discuss two approaches to answering them and argue in favor of one. Along the way I will raise and comment on a number of issues concerning the relationship between physics and metaphysics and consequences for the subject matter and methodology of metaphysics.

Metametaphysics and Substance: Two Case Studies

This paper examines an often-ignored aspect of the evaluation of metaphysical analyses, namely, their ontological commitments. Such evaluations are part of metaphysical methodology, and reflection on this methodology is itself part of metametaphysics. I will develop a theory for assessing what these commitments are, and then I will apply it to an important historical and an important contemporary metaphysical analysis of the concept of an individual substance (i.e., an object, or thing). I claim that in evaluating metaphysical analyses, we should not only rule out counterexamples, but also compare them with respect to their ontological commitments, and we should hold that if they are comparable in other respects, then an analysis with fewer such commitments is preferable to one with more (There is, of course, a connection between counterexamples and ontological commitments. If the existence or possible existence of something one is committed to the existence or possible existence of is incompatible with an analysis, then one should reject that analysis as inadequate to the data. On the other hand, if one is uncertain about the existence or possible existence of something that is incompatible with an analysis, then while this does not refute the analysis for one, it raises doubts about it. The fewer such doubts are raised by an analysis, the better it is.).

Fakto problema istorijoje

Straipsnyje analizuojamas fakto ir interpretacijos santykis istorijos moksle. Teigiama, kad empiristinė ir metafizinė metodologija sukūrė istorinių faktų kultą, o po to jo priešybę – nuostatą, kad istorinis faktas tėra istorinio mąstymo rezultatas. Pasisakydamas prieš moralizuojančiąją istoriją, L. Rankė laikė istoriko pareiga parodyti, kaip iš tikrųjų buvo, todėl rėmimasis faktine medžiaga yra teorijos teisingumo ir objektyvumo garantija. Faktai yra objektyvūs, nepriklausomi nuo istoriko sąmonės ar interpretacijos, juose slypi žinios apie tikrovę; tereikia juos surasti ir atskleisti. Interpretacija visada slepia savy subjektyvumo pavojų; jei pripažįstamas faktų primatas, išgelbstima istorija kaip mokslas, teikiantis objektyvių žinių, bet istoriko vaidmuo tada labai menkas. Jei pirmenybę suteikiame istorikui, jo teorinei ir socialinei nuostatai, tai paneigiama istorija, kaip objektyvus mokslas. Taip pat negalima priešpriešinti istorijos kitiems mokslams, nes tik šiame moksle socialinė praktika ir socialinė veikla yra itin svarbūs.

Pragmatism and the Methodology of Metaphysics

Pragmatism and the Methodology of Metaphysics

Experience as Revelatory of Nature in Dewey’s Metaphysical Methodology

Experience as Revelatory of Nature in Dewey’s Metaphysical Methodology