Metaphysical Research Articles

Indeterminacy and the Immateriality of Thought: Ross on Natural and Formal Structures

This paper addresses a debate on the immateriality of thought, focusing on James Ross’s argument regarding the indeterminacy of physical processes with respect to pure functions. Ross posits that some human cognitive processes, particularly logical reasoning and mathematical functions, exhibit a formal determinacy that no physical process can have, challenging physicalist accounts of mind. A critical response by Peter Dillard, known as the “schmitosis objection,” attempts to undermine Ross’s argument by drawing a parallel between biological processes like mitosis and formal functions such as addition. This paper defends Ross’s position by highlighting an overlooked distinction between transcendent and formal determinacy. By demonstrating that biological processes like mitosis are transcendentally determinate while pure functions are formally determinate, the paper refutes Dillard’s objection and supports Ross’s claim of the partial non-physicality of thought. The argument contributes to ongoing debates in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics by clarifying the distinct ways physical and non-physical processes relate to determinacy.

Between Religion and Religiosity: Between the Death and Resurrection of God

The main thesis presented in this article rejects the identification of the “death of God” idea with atheism. Atheism is a metaphysical claim stating that the signifier God has no signified. By contrast, the “death of God” notion conveys a moment of crisis in believers’ lives where the God that had been present in their lives is dead. The “death of God” idea led, on the one hand, to the negation of God’s relevance in human life, as presented by Nietzsche, and, on the other, to its perception as a constitutive moment for religion itself due to God’s presence in the believer’s inner life, as outlined by Kierkegaard, Simone Weil, and others. Both approaches agree on the crucial role of religiosity, whether or not it has a transcendent object. This analysis challenges the dichotomy claiming that, on the one hand, believers cannot accept the idea of the death of God and, on the other hand, those who endorse the death of God negate the idea of religiosity.

Minimal metaphysics in moral and political philosophy

The aim of this paper is to apply the methodology of minimal ontological commitments to moral and political philosophy. As minimal metaphysics in the philosophy of science endorses scientific realism, so we subscribe to moral realism, arguing that the presumption of liberty is the fundamental assumption defining a person. What needs to be justified then are restrictions to liberty and, in particular, the application of coercion upon persons. In examining knowledge claims about normative facts going beyond the presumption of liberty, such as, for instance, facts about a common good, we show that an ontological commitment to such normative facts is at odds with minimal metaphysics. We thus show how minimal metaphysics vindicates a Kantian deontological stance in moral and political philosophy: moral realism is limited to the obligations that follow from extending the presumption of liberty to all human beings in virtue of them being rational animals, hence to respect every person as an end in itself.

Intertranslatability and Ground-Equivalence

AbstractWhen are logical theories equivalent? I discuss the notion of ground-equivalence between logical theories, which can be useful for various theoretical reasons, e.g., we expect ground-equivalent theories to have the same ontological bearing. I consider whether intertranslatability is an adequate criterion for ground-equivalence. Jason Turner recently offered an argument that first-order logic and predicate functor logic are ground-equivalent in virtue of their intertranslatability. I examine his argument and show that this can be generalized to other intertranslatable logical theories, which supports the following: intertranslatability implies ground-equivalence. I also argue, however, that this ground-equivalence argument can be challenged as it faces a dilemma. The dilemma arises because the argument allows two distinct readings, the ‘internal’ and the ‘external’ reading. I argue that the argument turns out to be unsuccessful in both readings. The upshot of this dilemma in both philosophy of logic and metaphysics is considered.

«Тонкие» объекты Эйстейна Линнебо: проблема референции

Introduction. The introduction formulates the problem of abstract objects for the philosophy of mathematics, epistemology, and metaphysics. Special attention is paid to the problem of reference. Theoretical analysis. The first section examines Linnebo’s proposed concept of abstract objects as “thin” i.e., not imposing substantial demands on the world. The second section is devoted to the criteria of identity as a special tool for introducing abstract objects into discourse. Linnebo interprets abstraction principles as a particular kind of identity criteria. They allow fixing reference and ensuring its success. The third section presents metasemantic arguments used by Linnebo to justify the preference for a realistic interpretation of the semantics of singular terms. The fourth section criticizes Linnebo’s proposed mechanism of referential access to abstract “thin” objects. In our view, the metasemantic constraints proposed by Linnebo are insufficient to determine the uniqueness of the referent. An additional principle is necessary. Lewis’s “referential magnetism” can be considered as such, but it threatens the concept of “thin” objects. Conclusion. In conclusion, the strengths of Linnebo’s project are acknowledged. His interpretation better reflects how we actually use language. The importance of Linnebo’s theses and ideas for contemporary philosophy is noted.

Воля к власти в этногенезе: ницшеанские мотивы евразийской антропологии

Introduction.The article carries out a philosophical reconstruction of Eurasian anthropology based on the analysis of the theory of ethnogenesis by L. N. Gumilyov. In the conceptual developments of the classicist of Eurasianism, the motives of Nietzschean anthropology are explicated, which makes it possible to fit the Eurasian concept of man into the context of post-metaphysical philosophy. Theoretical analysis. The application of methodological principles and guidelines of philosophical comparative analysis allows us to reveal parallels between the basic concepts of the theory of ethnogenesis and the basic concepts of Nietzschean anthropology (the will to power, overman, eternal return). Conclusion. A comparative analysis allows us to conclude that the key point of both Nietzschean anthropology and the anthropological teachings of L. N. Gumilev advocates transgression, understood by the author as an ontological horizon opposite to transcendence. The article substantiates the thesis that the constitutive moment of understanding a person in the teachings of F. Nietzsche and the theory of L. N. Gumilev is the rejection of transcendence and the affirmation of the purely transgressive nature of human existence. The rethinking of the nature of the connection between Nietzschean anthropology and the heritage of antiquity is also carried out. It is concluded that Nietzsche’s appeal to antiquity was provoked by the situation of crisis in European metaphysics and Western Christianity. The thesis is substantiated that the crisis of metaphysical philosophy is at the same time the main motive for the Eurasians to turn to the East as a fundamentally non-European horizon of philosophical thought.

Deadly Language Games: Theological Reflections on Emerging Reproductive Technologies

Abstract This issue of Christian Bioethics explores theological, metaphysical, and ethical questions surrounding emerging reproductive technologies. Narratives concerning such technologies are often manipulated via “language games.” Language games involve toying with language to ensure that one’s vision of the good gains or retains political prominence. Such games are common in academic discussions of “artificial womb” technologies. Abortion proponents, for example, are already using language to dehumanize subjects within “artificial wombs.” This is unsurprising. Were relevant subjects considered persons, then abortion access (and other forms of “reproductive autonomy”) might be curtailed. Here, I show that abortion proponents’ language games often depend on dubious metaphysical claims. Second, I argue that Christians should oppose dehumanizing language games, since those games undermine “neighbor-love,” which Christians are commanded to show others. I also highlight how discussions of other technologies—such as medication abortion—are affected by confused (or manipulative) language. Ultimately, the language games I critique aim to preserve and expand the “rights” of the powerful to dehumanize, control, and kill vulnerable human beings. Since neighbor-love commands Christians to provide for “the least of these,” however, Christians must expose these manipulative language games, refute them, and resist the corrupt ideologies from which they flow.

A quadrilemma for theories of consciousness

Abstract In this paper, I argue that no theory of consciousness can simultaneously respect four initially plausible metaphysical claims—namely ‘first-person realism’, ‘non-solipsism’, ‘non-fragmentation’, and ‘one world’—but that any three of the four claims are mutually consistent. So, theories of consciousness face a ‘quadrilemma’. Since it will be hard to achieve a consensus on which of the four claims to retain and which to give up, we arrive at a landscape of competing theories, all of which have pros and cons. I will briefly indicate which kinds of theories correspond to the four horns of the quadrilemma.

Breaking through the doors of perception, consciousness, and existence: to what extent does psychedelic phenomenology ontologically depend on external factors?

AbstractAs reliable facilitators of characteristically unique altered states of consciousness that are notoriously difficult to comprehend, psychedelics naturally attract a multidisciplinary scope for their research, with direct relevance to neuroscience, pharmacology, psychology, as well as philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and epistemology — disciplines united by the common inquiry into the nature of conscious experience. Accordingly, the central focus of this paper concerns the metaphysical debate between internalism and externalism about whether psychedelic phenomenology — in particular, its ‘breakthrough’ level — could be said to directly ontologically depend on external factors, as well as the interpretive implications arising from each of those positions. The main contributions of the author of this paper include the provision of a coherent account of the essential phenomenal characteristics of psychedelic experiences, the integration of relatively fragmented philosophical debates on psychedelic phenomenology into the traditional internalist-externalist framework in metaphysics, as well as the exploration of the extent to which the externalist position on psychedelic phenomenology — traditionally associated with non-naturalism — is compatible with naturalistic explanatory frameworks. In Part 1, psychedelic phenomenology will be outlined first, after which the central inquiries of this paper will be contextualised and qualified. In Part 2, the internalist position on psychedelic phenomenology — both its strong and weak versions — will be discussed. In Part 3, the externalist position will be explored, which will be followed by a final evalutation between the three positions presented in this paper. The paper will conclude in favour of the weak internalist position, and that whilst the externalist position remains significantly more speculative than both the strong and the weak internalist positions, the externalist position cannot be rejected altogether until further progress in consciousness research is made.

A Comparative Analysis of the Phenomenology of Time in the Works of John McTaggart and John Mbiti

The issue of time remains a topic of ongoing discussion in both theological and philosophical literature. Currently, within the field of theology, there is a significant focus on the concept of time, which is the subject of disputes regarding the nature of God’s eternity. These discussions involve inquiries into whether God exists outside of time or within it. Philosophical discussions often centre around the ontology and metaphysics of time, exploring whether time is characterised by a static or dynamic nature. This paper did not delve into the controversies surrounding God’s eternity. However, it focused on the phenomenology of time as discussed by two contrasting theorists, namely John McTaggart (1866-1925) and John Mbiti (1931-2019). McTaggart, an English philosopher, contends that time is unreal. According to the African scholar Mbiti, time is indeed real, but it moves in a reverse direction instead of the forward direction generally perceived in Western tradition. Consequently, Mbiti refutes the existence of the future. As far as is known, there are no existing comparison studies on these two experts. Therefore, the objective of this paper was to address this vacuum. The paper utilised comparative lenses to assess the metaphysical claims of these two thinkers about the phenomenology of time, intending to gain a deeper comprehension of time from their respective viewpoints. The process was executed in three sequential stages. It first analysed McTaggart’s explanation of time, and then proceeded to investigate Mbiti’s notion of time. Finally, a comparative examination was conducted before concluding. The conclusion is that McTaggart and Mbiti neglect to consider the potential existence of objective time, which would be independent of events, change, and motion. This paper adds to the field of philosophical theology, specifically focusing on modern debates on God and time. Keywords: John Mbiti, John McTaggart, the Phenomenology of Time, Sasa, Zamani.

Causal and non-causal explanations in theology: the case of Aquinas's primary–secondary causation distinction

Abstract The basic question of this article is whether Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of divine providence through his understanding of primary and secondary causation can be understood as a theological causal or non-causal explanation. To answer this question, I will consider some contemporary discussions about the nature of causal and non-causal explanations in philosophy of science and metaphysics, in order to integrate them into a theological discourse that appeals to the classical distinction between God as first cause and creatures as secondary causes to explain God's presence and providence in the created universe. My main argument will hold that, even if there are some philosophical models of explanation that seem to allow one to suggest that, at least partially, this doctrine could be seen as a non-causal theological explanation, there are other models that offer seemingly stronger reasons to see this doctrine in full as a causal theological explanation.

The Megaric Possibility Paradox

Abstract In Metaphysics Theta 3 Aristotle attributes to the Megarics and unknown others a notorious modal thesis: (M) something can φ only if it is φ-ing. Aristotle does not tell us what motivated (M). Almost all scholars take Aristotle’s report to indicate that the Megarics defended (M) as a highly counterintuitive doctrine in modal metaphysics. But this reading faces several problems. First: what would motivate the Megarics to hold such a counterintuitive view? The existing literature tries, in various ways, to motivate (M) in a way neither trivial nor absurd. But, as we will argue, the main approaches end up attributing an unsustainable position to the Megarics. Second: most historical evidence for the Megaric lineage presents the group’s philosophical practice as dialectical or negative. So why think that the claim reported in Theta 3 presents a positive, and highly controversial, metaphysical claim? This paper addresses these problems by proposing a dialectical (or negative) reading of the Megarics in Theta 3. By ‘dialectical’ we here mean a mode of philosophizing that neither seeks to establish the truth or falsity of certain theses, nor takes a skeptical stance. There are different reasons why a philosopher might want to take up such a mode; in the case of the Megarics we argue that they might have wanted to put pressure on Aristotle’s idea of possibility and the ‘test’ for possibility that Aristotle mentions in several works. Reading, as we do, (M) as (part of) a paradox about possibility and actuality, we argue that the Megarics’ dialectical approach here aims to highlight a shortcoming of an intuitive conception of possibility, which underpins Aristotle’s idea of possibility and which features in his test for possibility.

Simone Weil’s Practice of Attention as a Ritual of Prayer: Robert Bresson and Georges Bernanos

In Simone Weil’s religious and metaphysical philosophy, the concept of attention is a human practice of concentrated awareness that can be directed toward a single thought, an object, another being, the self, or one’s soul. Attention is a learned practice, not an innate human characteristic. The practice of attention is integral to Weil’s philosophy because it assists one to identify attachment and through introspection, transcend affliction. The curé in Robert Bresson’s Le Journal d’un curé de campagne (The Diary of a Country Priest, 1951) loses his capacity for prayer when his faith becomes an attachment, and yet, his soul desires union with God, and thus grace. Grace, from the perspective of the curé, will provide reparation for his affliction: the acceptance of himself and the burden of his faith, the circumstances of his childhood, terminal illness, and the anticipation of death. This article engages in analysis of Journal, through the lens of Weil’s philosophical concept, attention, while it also examines the parallel between Weil and the curé in their demeanor, compromised health, and emphasis toward the ritual (or habit) of prayer. Georges Bernanos, author of the novel that Bresson adapted, shares a similar view of grace, which supports the comparison of Weil’s and Bresson’s attention toward the soul.

Weak Thought and Religion in Gianni Vattimo: Implications and Repercussions

In this paper, I focus on controversial issues in Gianni Vattimo’s later philosophy concerning religion. In his later writings, Vattimo employs his idea of “weak thought” (il pensiero debole) to (re)interpret Christianity by claiming that as opposed to metanarratives of modernity, a weak ontology not only weakens all foundations and dominant truth claims, but also enfeebles the strong metaphysical claims of atheism such as “God does not exist.” There is no reason to be an atheist, according to Vattimo, since weak thought enables emancipation from all ideological foundations, including atheism. Therefore, Vattimo offers a new definition of secularization: In contrast to modernity’s claim that secularization is to banish religion from the states of reason and progress, he changes the target of secularization from religion to metaphysics. Hence, the rigid distinction between faith and reason is nothing but another foundation that needs to be weakened. That is why the aim of secularization in the West is not separate faith and reason, but to weaken metaphysics in order to make room for faith. Put it differently, secularization is “weak thought” itself. This idea is strengthened by Vattimo’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s announcement of God’s death. However, in Vattiminian perspective, the God announced as dead by Nietzsche is not the God of the biblical text but the God of metaphysics which philosophers have believed since Pascal. Hence, the statement that “God is dead” is basically the rejection of the metaphysical foundation built by modernity this time. Like Jesus the crucified, God in the postmodern time, too, becomes weak and is tolerant toward the other. Furthermore, like the birth of Christianity, the postmodern return of religion, in fact, depends on those who receive this announcement. For postmodernity as a philosophy of event considers the Christian event in the sense of Ereignis. That means Nietzsche never comes to “claim” that God is dead, but rather he makes an announcement of the death of God as a historical event. That is why Vattimo maintains that postmodernity is not only the overcoming of metaphysics but also now the rebirth of Christianity after the second death of God, and proposes two constituents of the postmodern return of religion: (1) the reinterpretation of kénosis as a diminution of all foundations, and (2) the recognition of truth as caritas as opposed to the metaphysical agreement over truth as an obsession with objectivity. Thus, we can conclude that Vattimo in his later writings radicalizes hermeneutics in terms of scrutinizing the idea of “weak thought” with Christianity. However, it also should not be unnoticed that employing his earlier thoughts to (re)interpret Christianity after Nietzsche’s announcement and Heidegger’s ontology, Vattimo risks the major points of his earlier consideration of hermeneutics as koine in the postmodern era. Though he draws a modest picture of the postmodern era, Vattimo falls into the error of reducing hermeneutics as koine to the Christian discourse. On the other hand, Vattimo has an idiosyncratic and outmoded understanding of what it is to be an atheist “in postmodern times”. In this regard, by misapprehending the possible responses of atheistic arguments, Vattimo risks his weak thought (il pensiero debole) by making the religious approach “strong” in comparison not only with other religions and various traditions but also with atheism. Finally, I argue that Vattimo’s rhetoric of “the return” is doomed to constitute a fundamentalist approach regarding the future of Christianity.

Rawls’ ‘Justice as Fairness’: Not only Political but also Metaphysical

In his book A Theory of Justice, John Rawls develops an account of justice, ‘justice as fairness’ (JAF, henceforth). In his later works, he claims that JAF is supposed to depend on neither philosophical nor religious claims but on political claims. So, the conception of justice he wishes to defend is political but not metaphysical. This political (as well as moral in a specific sense) conception of justice is supposed to apply to political, social, and economic institutions. By presenting JAF, Rawls aims to show how free and rational persons would hold the same conception of justice he defends if they have been invited to construct a just social contract. This would be the case, Rawls reasons, only if those persons determine the principles of justice as if they are in a purely hypothetical situation. Rawls calls this situation ‘the original position’ and thinks that in the original position, parties and decision makers can be fair and impartial to construct a social contract if they can stand behind ‘The Veil of Ignorance’ which is the main feature of the original position. The parties (free and rational persons) who stand behind the veil of ignorance know nothing about their place, class position, social status, intelligence, abilities, and the like in society. They do not know their conceptions of the good either. Since the parties are rational and capable of having a sense of justice, the fundamental agreement they could make behind the veil of ignorance with respect to the principles of justice will be fair. Rawls also develops an account of law (the Law of Peoples) to show that the principles of justice will be universal in its reach. He claims that both reasonably just liberal and decent hierarchical peoples (like the Muslim peoples of the utopian state, Kazanistan) would accept the principles of justice. Rawls argues, however, that since a decent hierarchical society does not consider its members as free and equal citizens as a liberal society does, it cannot be as reasonable and just as a liberal society. So, liberal peoples must encourage decent peoples to recognize the advantages of having liberal institutions and try to convince them to become more liberal in order to have a reasonably just society. In this paper, I will argue that Rawls’s accounts of the original position and the Law of Peoples show that unlike what Rawls contends, JAF is not only political but also metaphysical. I will suggest that since Rawls’s accounts of JAF and person require some metaphysical assumptions, theists who necessarily hold comprehensive metaphysical claims on justice and person have a good reason to reject that they should step behind the veil of ignorance in order to construct a just social contract.

The Hinge of History Hypothesis: Reply to MacAskill

Abstract Some believe that the current era is uniquely important with respect to how well the rest of human history goes. Following Parfit, call this the Hinge of History Hypothesis. Recently, MacAskill has argued that our era is actually very unlikely to be especially influential in the way asserted by the Hinge of History Hypothesis. I respond to MacAskill, pointing to important unresolved ambiguities in his proposed definition of what it means for a time to be influential and criticizing the two arguments used to cast doubt on the claim that the current era is a uniquely important moment in human history.

On some recent Fitchian arguments

Abstract Both Jago, in his 2020 article ‘A short argument for truthmaker maximalism’ and his 2021 article ‘Which Fitch?’, and Loss in his 2021 article ‘There are no fundamental facts’, employ arguments similar to that familiar from the Church–Fitch Paradox to infer some substantial metaphysical claims from their mere logical possibility. Trueman in his 2022 article ‘Truthmaking, grounding and Fitch’s paradox’ and Nyseth in his 2022 article ‘Fitch’s paradox and truthmaking’ respond by using exactly the same kind of argument to prove contrary theses. Intended as bad company objections, these counterarguments cast doubt on the original arguments, but do not actually identify their flaw. This paper aims to fill this gap.

EVAAN: An empirical verification argument against naturalism

Alvin Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN) claims that if both naturalism (N) and evolutionary theory (E) are true, then all our beliefs are unreliable (premiss 1). Consequently, given N&E, the belief in N&E is unreliable (premiss 2) and N&E is self-defeating (conclusion). The empirical verification argument against naturalism (EVAAN) is more cautious and improves EAAN by withstanding a rejoinder of the evolutionary naturalist to premiss 1. EVAAN claims that non-abstract beliefs that are not empirically verifiable are unreliable, given N&E (premiss 1a). This anticipates the evolutionary naturalist’s claim that empirical verifications play a crucial role in peer assessments and sexual selection of intelligence, and that, therefore, N&E makes empirically verifiable beliefs often reliable (premiss-1 rejoinder). However, even then it can be argued that the belief in N&E is unreliable, given N&E (premiss 2), because N&E is neither abstract, nor empirically verifiable (premiss 1b). EVAAN distinguishes reliably verifiable intelligence from metaphysical intelligence and claims that, if N&E is true, humans are lacking metaphysical intelligence. This paper also contains an argument against EAAN, by supporting the premiss-1 rejoinder.

Human Rights and Views of the Catholic Church under Habermas Discourse Theory


 
 
 This article aims to explain the views of the Catholic Church on human rights and put them into dialogue with the concept of human rights based on discourse theory as put forward by Jürgen Habermas. In the view of the Catholic Church, the ethical basis for the concept of human rights is the biblical view of human beings as being made in the image of God, which later became the forerunner to the birth of the concept of human dignity and the ethical basis for human rights. This article shows that the discourse theory rejects this theological model of justification for human rights. The criticism of the discourse theory as it relates to an absolute paradigm is that the absolute paradigm requires metaphysical premises. However, in a modern society characterized by a pluralism of worldviews and philosophical and religious beliefs, such metaphysical claims are no longer acceptable. Through the lens of discourse theory, the foundation of the notion of human rights cannot be based on the pre-political basis of religious values. This discourse theory grounding model is based on the conditions of contemporary post-metaphysical society, characterized by a plurality of comprehensive doctrines. However, Habermas emphasizes the role of religion in the public sphere in promoting human rights. He advocates for the reinvention of public reason by encouraging religious people to translate sacred terms into secular language when entering formal political spaces. According to Habermas’ theories, democratic decision-making must allow citizens the right to use religious terms in public debate. Furthermore, this article shows that discourse theory creates a roadmap for human rights by allowing religion, law, and politics to coexist. Only if we adhere to the principles of discourse theory can we guarantee the fair and just participation of both secular and religious members in a democratic constitutional state.
 Keywords: Human Rights, Catholic Church, Religion, Habermas’s Discourse Theory
 
 

The Unbecoming of Being

Like the Copernican revolution which initiated the Modern project, there has been a thermodynamic revolution in the empirical sciences in the last two centuries. The aim of this paper is to show how we might draw from this revolution to make new and startling metaphysical and ethical claims concerning the nature and value of reality. To this end, this paper employs Aristotle’s account of the relation of the various philosophies and sciences to one another to show how we might assert a new theory of being, moral value, and practical action from the primacy of entropic decay asserted in the contemporary mathematical sciences. This paper proceeds to show how, from what the contemporary sciences have concluded concerning the primacy of entropic decay within reality, unbecoming might be forwarded as a new account of the essence of existence: i.e., the first cause and motivating principle of reality’s formal, material, efficient, and final nature. The paper concludes by arguing that a new and surprising account of universal ethical value and normative duty can be deduced from such a metaphysics of decay.