Metaphysical Realism Research Articles

Predicates in Linguistics as Tools for Analysing the Meaning of Words and Terms

The aim of the article is to underline the predicative character of the meaning of a lexeme and the coherence of the conceptual system underlying (ontological entity) the first meaning of a lexeme (word or term). After distinguishing between meaning and concept, then concept in knowledge engineering and concept in cognitive linguistics based on realist metaphysics, the author presents the Aristotelian predicate as that which expresses at the metalinguistic level the properties of a conceptualised entity of reality. It is characterised by different levels of expression and is linked to ontological structure. An ‘essentialist legacy’ of Aristotle's predicates is realised in essentialist definitions in natural language. They are studied in lexicographic and terminological definitions. The predicates that have their predicative structures in the ontological structure of an entity are illustrated by examples of French and Polish predicates of eagles taken from lexicographical definitions and ornithological terms. They are also used to analyse precisely the metaphors of the parts of an aircraft inherited from the properties of a bird, thus demonstrating the metaphorical conceptualisations specific to each speaking community. The method of analysing the meaning of a word using an Aristotelian predicate makes it possible to separate the ontological level from the level of signifiers, and makes it operational for application to formal language.

Wittgenstein and Poetry: A Reading of Czeslaw Milosz’s “Realism”

In this paper I hope to cast light on Wittgenstein enigmatic remark, “one should really only create philosophy poetically”. I discuss Wittgenstein’s ambition to overcome metaphysics by way of an appeal to ordinary language. For this purpose I contrast “realism” in philosophy (i.e., metaphysical realism, particularly its modern scientific version) with “realism” in poetry. My theme is the capacity of poetry to provide a model for Wittgenstein’s resistance to the inhumanity unleashed in metaphysics—exemplified by two distinct forms of skepticism—which obliterates the ordinary world under the guise of discovering its true nature. The poem I shall use to illustrate the difficulty in maintaining our grip on reality, hence our grip on our humanity, is Czeslaw Milosz’s poem “Realism”.

Realismo, Relatividad General y el Gato de Schrödinger

The present work examines the nature of reality, including the possibility of freedom, in the framework of modern physics. Additionally, it proposes a reform for the metaphysics of realism.For realism, the world is the way it is independent of the mind. However, general relativity supposesthat the speed of objects and the temporal order of events depend on the frame of referenceadopted. Which frame of reference is adopted depends on human interests. However, there are still physical facts independent of the frame of reference: the speed of light, spacetime distance,and the equivalence of matter and energy, amongst others. On the other hand, the CopenhagenInterpretation supposes that quantum states are in a superposition that is only realized at themoment of observation, leading to the implication that Schrödinger’s cat is both alive and deaduntil observed. However, less incredible realist possibilities are analysed. Modern physics, whetherdeterminist or indeterminist, also threatens the possibility of freedom. The compatibility of freedom as self-government and modern physics is analysed and developed. Although central aspectsof realist metaphysics are conserved, a philosophical-scientific conception of the universe that integrates mental beings within it emerges, which supposes a reform for standard scientific realism. The existence of facts independent of what we happen to think is saved alongside ineliminable mental phenomena.

Theology, Religious Studies, and Philosophy of Religion as Humanistic Disciplines: Critical Reflections on Realism

This metaphilosophical paper discusses the nature of the philosophy of religion as an academic discipline. It may seem self-evident that the philosophy of religion is one of the humanities – along with neighboring fields of research within theology and religious studies – but it may also be argued that this is not obvious at all, as philosophical investigation can study the way the world is at the fundamental metaphysical level. Philosophers of religion, in particular, may claim to “directly” discuss the question of God’s existence vs. non-existence. The paper argues that settling the metaphilosophical question about the nature of the philosophy of religion presupposes considering the underlying issue of realism. From a transcendental-pragmatist perspective, the philosophy of religion is a humanistic discipline, but this cannot be non-circularly demonstrated to those presupposing metaphysical realism.

The Mother of Islamic Sciences in Al-Ghazali's Perspective

Al-Ghazali stated that Kalam is the foundation (mabadi) of Islamic sciences. Does it mean the mother of Islamic sciences? It must be clarified because it is the basis for the development of Islamic sciences. Therefore, the researcher formulated questions about the meaning and the nature of philosophy as the mother of Islamic sciences from al-Ghazali's perspectivei. This study uses philosophy as the method, and its character is rational, critical, reflective, and argumentative. Al-Ghazali's books on philosophy and logic are the data sources analyzed through the discourse analysis method. It shows that al-Ghazali criticized philosophy—as a product of thought—by using philosophy—in the sense of process—as the tool. This study found the essence of philosophy is a process that plays a role in criticizing beliefs (naqd al-i'tiqad). Philosophers do physical reflection (tabi'iyyah), mathematical reflection (riyadah), and metaphysical reflection (ilahiyyah) that produce three-level abstraction. At the highest level, the result of Kalam is an abstraction toward a pure metaphysical realm. Philosophy is just an abstraction of natural and social reality, which is not purely metaphysical. Al-Ghazali did not reduce philosophy to Kalam but placed it as the mother of the rational sciences, besides kalam that has its realm, namely pure metaphysical reality. Finally, Kalam led to the discovery of the basic assumptions of sciences, theoretical frameworks, and paradigms that are the foundation of Islamic sciences. This research concludes that the meaning of Kalam as a foundation (mabadi) is the mother of Islamic sciences, because Kalam played a role in forming basic assumptions, paradigms, and theoretical frameworks of Islamic sciences.

Aesthetics of the Fantastic in Pan's Labyrinth

The paper addresses the analysis of aesthetics in Guillermo del Toro's Pan's Labyrinth, a 2006 film in which the fantastic genre predominates. Various aspects are studied: The structure of the plot and composition of the story, which revolve around the presence of two fictional levels: one related to the events of the characters in the mimesis context of the historical and a second fictional level related to the fantastic, producing an understanding of the metaphysical reality of the film. Semiotics of the work in relation to the fantastic regarding the link between Ofelia and the pan. Semiosis of the internal pragmatics of the work in relation to the viewer and the PECMA flow. The acting role of the character Ofelia and her wisdom within the different options presented by the plot. The cultural construction and the attitudinal around gender, are analyzed in relation to their significance. The contribution made by this analysis is an approach to the perceptual process within the film and its relationship with the fantastic. The intervention of the fantastic causes the rupture of the real mimesis, where fantasy allows transgressing the limits of the understanding of the real and generates a character with unusual metaphysical projections.

Non-dual Reality and Empirical Existence in Advaita Vedānta and Ghazālī’s Metaphysics of Unity

AbstractThis essay explores the ways in which two distinct spiritual traditions, Ghazālī’s Ṣūfīsm and Śaṅkarian Advaita Vedānta, articulate an exclusive metaphysical affirmation of the Ultimate Reality with an empirical recognition of relative existence. Both perspectives are shown to be radically absolutist in their discernment of the Real and in their denying metaphysical reality to other-than-the-Absolute. This raises the question of the ontological status of relativity and empirical existence. Although Islam would seem to assign a greater reality to the world of relativity and human experience, Ghazālī’s most metaphysical treatise, Mishkāt al-anwār (The Niche of Lights), utterly denies the intrinsic reality of creatures in themselves. Similarly, Śaṅkara affirms the non-existence of māyā, the principle of ignorance and duality, as a superimposition upon ātman, the Divine Self immanent to all. Ghazālī concedes, however, that relative existence is “metaphorically” existent (majāz) while Śaṅkara acknowledges the “transactional” reality (vyāvahārika) of empirical existence. Such recognitions involve a multi-stratified view of reality that must account for both metaphysical consistency and empirical access to Reality. This essay shows that although fundamental parallels between the two worlds of meaning can be highlighted, their respective metaphysical perspectives and views of relativity are also quite distinct inasmuch as they are informed by profoundly different religious and traditional contexts.

Naturalized metaphysics in the image of Roy Wood Sellars and not Willard Van Orman Quine

AbstractThe naturalized metaphysics promoted by Ladyman and Ross, among others, is often described as (neo)‐Quinean metaphysics. This association with Quine's naturalism can, however, give a misleading impression of the aims and commitments of this kind of naturalized metaphysics. Contrary to Quine, these naturalized metaphysicians endorse metaphysical realism and offer wholesale arguments in favor of the epistemic standing of science‐based metaphysics. Accordingly, this naturalized metaphysics comes closer to Roy Wood Sellars's evolutionary naturalism, especially since the theory of evolution is central to the criticism that naturalized metaphysics levels at nonnaturalized metaphysics. The paper argues that Sellars's naturalism is furthermore helpful (1) for explicating the naturalism of naturalized metaphysics, (2) for theorizing a more general naturalist basis for naturalized metaphysics, and (3) for suggesting where naturalized metaphysics is perhaps not naturalist enough, especially when it comes to considering the implications of the theory of evolution for its positive program.

Putnam’s Natural Realism and Its Problems

Hilary Putnam (1926–2016) was prone to change his mind on variety of philosophical issues and almost constantly to modify his views. The last period of the development of his philosophy is known as the phase of commonsense or natural realism, eloquently presented in his 1994 Dewey Lectures. This paper is focused on three facets of his position and tries to identify three difficulties it encounters. Firstly, Putnam claims that in the contemporary realism debate we have, on the one hand, proponents of extravagant metaphysical realism, and, on the other hand, advocates of various versions of irresponsible antirealism. Unfortunately, the delineation of the debate is too coarse-grained, since there are many forms of metaphysical realism, and lumping together various antirealisms is confusing and unhelpful. Secondly, Putnam’s naïve direct realism in the philosophy of perception seems incompatible with his transactional account of perception. Thirdly, for some time Putnam was under a spell of Wittgensteinian quietism that distorted the true character of his philosophical ideas.

Psychopathology and Metaphysics: Can One Be a Realist About Mental Disorder?

Metaphysical realism about mental disorder is the thesis that mental disorder exists mind-independently. There are two ways to challenge metaphysical realism about mental disorder. The first is by denying that mental disorder exists. The second is by denying that mental disorder exists mind-independently. Or, differently put, by arguing that mental disorder is mind-dependent. The aim of this paper is three-fold: (a) to examine three ways in which mental disorder can be said to be mind-dependent (namely, by being causally dependent on the human mind, by being weakly dependent on human attitudes, and by being strongly dependent on human attitudes), (b) to clarify their differences, and (c) to discuss their implications regarding metaphysical realism about mental disorder. I argue that mental disorder being mind-dependent in the first two senses is compatible with metaphysical realism about mental disorder, whereas mental disorder being mind-dependent in the third sense is not.

기무라 다이켄 『원시불교사상론』의 유정론(有情論)과 의지주의

Taiken Kimura (木村泰賢) was a distinguished Buddhist scholar active during Japan's Taisho period. As a monk affiliated with the Japanese Soto Zen, he completed his education in the Department of Indian Philosophy at Tokyo Imperial University. Subsequently, he pursued further studies in Europe, including stints in England and Germany. During his European sojourn, he authored On Primitive Buddhist Thought (Genshi bukkyō shisōron), which was published in Japan in 1922. Within this publication, Kimura posited that both Primitive Buddhism and Mahayana Buddhism were underpinned by voluntarism. He underscored Mahayana Buddhism's continuity with Primitive Buddhism. Kimura extensively employed voluntarism to analyze the Twelvefold Dependent Origination in Primitive Buddhism. Notably, he associated the concept of “ignorance”(avijjā) within the Twelvefold Origination with “blind will”, a notion articulated by Schopenhauer.
 Central to Kimura's perspective was the belief that the essence of sentient beings lay in desire, constituting the driving force behind life's activities. He identified two desires within the Twelvefold Dependent Origination, “craving”(taṇhā) and “ignorance”(avijjā), understanding them as manifestations of will. According to his viewpoint, the life activities of sentient beings unfolded as expressions of desire or will.
 Nevertheless, Kimura contended that desire transcended its role as a mere producer of “defilements” (kilesa), extending into an absolute “actual reality”(dharmatā). He frequently associated the concept of “nibbana without residue”(anupdisesanibbana) or absolute “actual reality” with the will, sometimes identifying it as a material or metaphysical reality. His theoretical framework could be characterized as a form of Metaphysics of Will. Drawing from the apparent reality of sentient beings as driven by desires, Kimura aimed to elucidate not only the life activities of sentient beings amid suffering but also to expound upon the absolute world that transcends suffering.

Probing Tagore in 21st-century Bangladesh: Shifting Faces of Metaphysical Reality and the Role of New Media

This study explores the shifting faces of reality in 21st-century Bangladesh as propagated by the questionable role of new media. The research hypothesizes that the stakeholders of the new media are fragmented into disparate groups, and the faces and aspects of metaphysics have been substantially altered to fit the motives of those in power, reversing the original intent. The study critically analyses the role of faith in goodness in human life, compares the views of Tagore to contemporary power relations, and investigates how the new media acts as a catalyst in perpetuating these mechanisms. The findings suggest that further research is needed to comprehend the potential benefits and limits of new media in these subjects.

On pfukwa/mhvuko and the Ndau Christian Dilemma: A Case of the United Church of Christ in Zimbabwe (UCCZ)

The article engages with the notion of pfukwa/mhvuko (avenging spirits) among the Ndau Christians using the case study of the United Church of Christ in Zimbabwe (UCCZ). The study was motivated by a recurring question among some members of UCCZ on the phenomenon of the avenging spirits and the plight of the Ndau Christians. The article argues that the Ndau Christian converts are not immune to the effects of the avenging spirits in the metaphysical spaces of the Ndau because of the elaborate notion of collective existence (unthu/ubuntu) that defines the Ndau identity. The article unpacks the notion of pfukwa/mhvuko and its embeddedness in the whole matrix of Ndauness that does not spare the converted Ndau. The article is both a theoretical and empirical qualitative phenomenological enquiry that employs the netnographic research design. It uses the UCCZ WhatsApp social media microblogging site Eya Eya Haiwa Haiwa, to gather data through seminar (group) presentations and discussions. The article utilizes discourse analysis to filter data. It also engages with available relevant literature on the subject. The article uses two theoretical frameworks of unthu/ubuntu, and Goffman’s back and front stage theory to traverse the pfukwa/mhvuko phenomenon among the Ndau. The findings are that the Ndau notion of pfukwa/mhvuko is an existential metaphysical reality among both the Ndau practitioners of indigenous spirituality and Ndau Christians. The study recommends an authentic dialogue between the two spiritualties to build a contextually relevant Christian doctrine of pfukwa/mhvuko. It also raises the challenges that may stifle progress on the recommended trajectory.

Dancing in Movements, Movements in Sports: a Comparative Approach Toward a Metaphysical Realist Ontology

ABSTRACT Ontological approaches to the arts have neglected art forms such as dance. This hinders analysis of the metaphysical similarities and differences between different art forms. In this paper, I develop a metaphysical realist ontological approach to dance and sport that is grounded in embodiment. I first examine the debate between descriptivism and metaontological realism in the philosophy of arts in the context of Thomasson’s descriptive approach and Dodd’s metaontological approach of folk-theoretic modesty. Following Dodd, I adopt a realist metaontological approach to dance as an art form, drawing on philosophical debates within dance. I then review metaphysical approaches to sport and argue that most such approaches are based on abstract, top-down models. I therefore propose an ontological account of sport and dance based on metaontological realism and grounded in embodied movement knowledge. Drawing on Schaffer’s concept of ground functionalism, I use this approach to compare the aesthetic and bodily aspects of sport and dance in terms of elite-level movement knowledge. I describe how the embodiment of such movement knowledge through practice permits dancers and athletes to create expert movements. Drawing on findings from neuroscientific research, I argue that dancers and athletes, through the process of physiological plasticity, acquire embodied memories that are transformed into new bodily and behavioral dispositions. I believe that the metaphysical realist ontological approach presented here could help to broaden the focus in arts ontology to encompass movement disciplines such as sport and dance. This account may also engender cross-disciplinary research and encourage philosophers to explore the role of movement in arts such as music.

GroundUp Ontology

The first pathway toward a new conceptualist answer to the existence of universals begins with Descartes. The article is guided by a Cartesian method of starting anew in metaphysics and our knowledge of mind-dependent universals. Relevant examples and learning experiments defend and validate the pragmatic utility of conceptualism. It is past time for analytic ontology to set aside its assumptions, reevaluate its methodology and simplify itself. I raise novel objections through metaphor and analogy against standard and Platonic realism. Independent universals of realism are speculative and are neither necessary nor sufficient. This rejection of metaphysical realism defends the validity of scientific empiricist realism. Historical arguments such as William James’ empirical conceptualism and J.S. Mill’s criticisms strengthen this position. Nominalist methods are also considered. My theory is confirmed and useful for a preliminary epistemic-ontology which evaluates concepts and universals of mineral species. This appendix is consistent with Descartes’ theory of attributes and provides a new important approach to this field of study. The article, long dormant, is made possible by the work of Rene Descartes.

Gender, Species and Essence in Husserl's Phenomenology and St. Thomas Aquinas' Theory of Knowledge: Necessary Understandings of Metaphysical Realism for a Transcendental Phenomenology

O presente ensaio tomou como hipótese de ensaio a premissa de que a Neutralidade Metafísica proposta por Husserl desde seus estudos iniciais precisa ser reconhecida com limites metodológicos e analíticos. Para a superação deste limite, realizou-se um resgate da Metafísica e Teoria do Conhecimento de Santo Tomás de Aquino, interpretando esta teoria através de um Realismo Moderado e Direto. Enquanto conclusão, foi possível identificar que há uma similaridade importantíssima entre ambas as teorias, como também, que para as investigações fenomenológicas alcançarem seu intento cognitivo primordial, é necessário o cuidado de não aniquilar a metafísica realista moderada.

STUDI KOMPARASI KONSEP TUHAN MENURUT BARUCH DE SPINOZA DAN KARL THEODOR JASPERS

Recognizing God in empirical knowledge is indeed very difficult and even impossible to understand the reality of God. Philosophers and theologians both have different understandings of God, so that from the time of Ancient Greece to modern human civilization, there is no agreement about God. Various views of God emerged along with the development of human thought. Various characters appear with different concepts. This research focuses on examining the thoughts of Baruch de Spinoza and Karl Theodor Jaspers. This research uses a philosophical hermeneutic method. The results of this research are as follows: according to Spinoza, God is a single substance and has many attributes, everything in this universe comes from God. Spinoza also thought that the universe was identical with God. Meanwhile, according to Jaspers God is a mystery and transcendence. God can only be trusted, but cannot be recognized as an empirical object. God also cannot be reached by logical thinking. God can only be understood as a metaphysical reality.

Les démons étaient-ils vraiment le problème à Corinthe ?

Abstract A consensus of opinion exists among scholars that Paul appears to contradict himself in 1 Cor 10:17–22: on the one hand, he makes clear that idols have no existence beyond the material objects themselves ; on the other hand, he appears to warn the Corinthians that they are exposing themselves to a dangerous metaphysical reality, namely demons (i.e., evil supernatural beings), by taking part in pagan cults. This supposed non sequitur is generally resolved by claiming that Paul adheres to two Jewish traditions simultaneously. The Jewish witnesses, however, do not support such a conclusion. In fact, the Jewish sources offer an alternative solution to this supposed problem, namely that Paul uses the word δαιμόνια to designate foreign gods to which he attributes no metaphysical reality. In short, there are no demons involved. As such, he maintains a biblical position : even if the idols are nothing but wood and stone, idolatry is forbidden.

Constructing Reason

AbstractIn The Architectonic of Reason, Lea Ypi provides an illuminating and innovative interpretation of the Architectonic in the first Critique. Ypi argues that Kant’s project of uniting practical and theoretical uses of reason in a critical metaphysics ultimately fails because practical reason does not have its own domain in which to legislate. This article challenges Ypi’s objection to practical reason’s lack of a domain in the first Critique. Its main contention is that reason’s need for unity in legislation may be satisfied by a belief in God as a necessary practical presupposition rather than a dogmatic metaphysical reality.

Mizán of Affect in Material v. Metaphysical Models of Human Consciousness

From the viewpoint of the description of the human reality in the Bahá’í authoritative texts, the essence of a human being is the soul, a metaphysical reality from which emanate all our distinctively human capacities. Unlike materialist views of the human reality, the Bahá’í teachings assert that our essence—the spiritual “self”—takes its beginning during the process of conception, whereupon it associates with the body so long as the physical temple remains capable of manifesting the reality and powers of the soul. Once the body/brain deceases, the soul dissociates from this relationship and exists and functions and progresses eternally. This hypothesis in no way diminishes the importance of a healthy brain as essential to our physical, intellectual, and spiritual development; indeed, it posits the brain as a transceiver by means of which the self manifests the soul’s condition and development in action, speech, and comportment. Therefore, when the brain becomes dysfunctional, whether through trauma or mental illness, the transparency of the soul’s relation to reality ceases. This paper explores the implications of this relationship for our understanding of emotion and presents a model for understanding the function of emotion as providing us essential feedback on, and guidance for, our lives, feedback whose ultimate purpose is to help us better calibrate our approach to spiritual growth. Given the brain-as-transceiver model, this emotional feedback is reliable only so long as the brain remains transparent in this systematic relationship. The paper suggests ways in which the model could inform approaches to treatment for affective disorders.