Metaphysical Notion Research Articles

Kierkegaard’s reconceptualisation of divine immutability

In Søren Kierkegaard’s works, the relationship between the immutability of God and the concepts of time and motion emerges as a central theme. This paper examines how Kierkegaard reconciles the idea of an immutable God with the dynamic process of ‘coming into existence’. Through an exploration of Kierkegaard’s philosophical roots, this study elucidates his understanding of motion and change, delves into his ontological and metaphysical notions of time, and particularly focusses on the ‘moment’ as a synthesis that bridges the eternal God with the individual’s dynamical existence. Kierkegaard’s theory of divine immutability represents a genuine departure from traditional metaphysical thought; comparing his ideas with those of other philosophers would highlight the uniqueness of Kierkegaard’s approach.Contribution: This article aims to analyse the philosophical foundation of God’s immutability through a detailed interpretation of Kierkegaard’s writings, providing a new approach to understanding the movement and immutability of God.

What’s the Matter with Angels? Angelic Materiality and the Possible Intellect in Some Early Fourteenth-century Franciscans

While the question of whether angels are composed of matter and form, may seem, to the modern reader, somewhat odd, medieval thinkers saw it as a genuine puzzle. On the one hand, angels are purely intellectual creatures, which, according to some (perhaps most famously Aquinas), seems to imply that they are altogether devoid of materiality. On the other hand, however, angels are capable of change, which, according to the broadly-speaking Aristotelian framework, seems to imply an underlying material substrate. This paper traces the views of some early fourteenth-century Franciscan texts, according to which angels are material: the Disputed questions by Gonsalvus of Spain, a De Anima question-commentary sometimes attributed to the early Duns Scotus, and the Sentences commentaries of Peter of Trabibus and of Peter Auriol. As will be seen, the question of angelic materiality gave ample opportunity for these thinkers to elaborate on what they meant exactly by ‘matter’, and to hint at the ways in which this metaphysical principle is related to other important metaphysical notions in the neighborhood, such as change, corporeity, or potency.

African Metaphysics and Praxis: Revisiting the Idea of Human Development in Yoruba Metaphysical Notion of Omoluabi

The discourse on African metaphysics as it relates to human development is centered around the notion of personhood predominantly extractable from the layers of oral and written traditions across African cultural worldviews. This research aims to critically evaluate the idea of African metaphysics in the light of inquiries surrounding the meaning and nature of human development, through an interrogation of the concept of person and personhood, expressed within the subsets of African socio-cultural conceptualisations, particularly the Yoruba notion of Omoluabi, which will form a crucial layer of engagement for this research. Basically, while (on the one hand); the tendency to see a generic theory of human personality or personhood as tenable everywhere would create a clash of realities in different climes and cultures, (on the other) the differences from culture to culture are perceived dialogically as handed on through stories and histories of human development from birth until death. To this end, this research will interrogate the concept of human development on the basis of how socialisation processes specifically seen through the agencies of local folklores and folktales, customs and traditions tend to interact with, influence as well as impact upon the individual view of self and the other as it relates to the conception of personality, and its succeeding roles within the community. Keywords: Africa, Metaphysics, Communitarianism, Personhood, Human Development.

Linnebo on Analyticity and Thin Existence

Abstract In his groundbreaking book, Thin Objects, Øystein Linnebo argues for an account of neo-Fregean abstraction principles and thin existence that does not rely on analyticity or conceptual rules. It instead relies on a metaphysical notion he calls “sufficiency”. In this short discussion, I defend the analytic or conceptual-rule account of thin existence.

Artificial Intelligence and an Anthropological Ethics of Work: Implications on the Social Teaching of the Church

It is the contention of this paper that ethics of work ought to be anthropological, and artificial intelligence (AI) research and development, which is the focus of work today, should be anthropological, that is, human-centered. This paper discusses the philosophical and theological implications of the development of AI research on the intrinsic nature of work and the nature of the human person. AI research and the implications of its development and advancement, being a relatively new phenomenon, have not been comprehensively interrogated in the social and ethical teachings of the Catholic Church. This paper, therefore, proposes a path for this interrogation by expounding a discourse which is believed to be epistemically helpful in the developing discourse of AI in the ethical and social teachings of the Church. The advancement in the research on AI is not only redefining the meaning of work, but, even more so, it is questioning the metaphysical notion of the human person and the theological notion of work as an intrinsic part in the selfhood and dignity of the human person.

The Love Argument for the Trinity

The central focus of this article is to provide a new “Love Argument” for the necessary truth of the Latin' model' of the doctrine of the Trinity—termed “Latin Trinitarianism”—from an a priori standpoint. This new argument, called the Agápēic Argument, will be formulated in light of the metaphysical notions of a “trope,” introduced by D. C. Williams, and “multiple location,” posited by Antony Eagle, and the ethical concept of agápē, proposed by Alexander Pruss. Doing this will provide a specific argument that provides strong grounds for affirming the necessary truth of the Trinity, without, however, being subject to the primary objections that have been often raised against the existing versions of the argument.

Nondual States Are Not a Thing: This Inspiring New Age Spiritual Idea is Neither Advaita Vedanta Nor Psychology

The term “nondual states” has gained some currency as applied to states of mind in which the sense of self is softened, expanded, or shifted from conventional experience. Nonduality is a metaphysical concept about the nature of reality, commonly associated with the Advaita Vedanta school of Indian religion. New Age religious thought has applied the term “nondual” to states of consciousness that are believed to contact or apprehend this speculated metaphysical ideal. However, this use is incompatible with lineage-based teachings of Advaita Vedanta, inadequately precise to serve as a psychological construct, and improper as an insertion of New Age metaphysical notions into a psychological context. The paper draws on the author’s personal engagement with doctrines of Advaita Vedanta received from a scholar and lineage-holding teacher, Carol Whitfield.

Do sertão do brabo à cidade. Obediência e liberdade, ousadia, coragem e a metafísica da vontade em O Sargento Getúlio

Innovative novel-monologue due to its language, structure and revision of the figure of the militia gunman, Sergeant Getúlio brings together rural and urban aspects. Violent, cruel, dominated by the politician who elevated him to the status of sergeant, Getúlio fulfills his role: taking Paulo Afonso’s prisoner to Barra de Coqueiros. The narrative is a Bildungsroman, as Getúlio – invisible since the beginning – discovers and ends up asserting his identity – and freedom, which costs him his life. Or: the Author informs that it is an aretê story. Our task is to understand, verify and explain the nobility, moderation and self-control of a rude, extremely violent henchman – and how this is explained in the socio-economic context of Brazilian colonization and domination. The notion of Metaphysics of Will, a concept by Schopenhauer, helps us.

A Tension in Some Non-Naturalistic Explanations of Moral Truths

Recently, there has been some excitement about the potential explanatory payoffs the newish metaphysical notion of grounding seems to have for metaethical non-naturalism. There has also been a recent upsurge in the debate about whether non-naturalism is implausibly committed to some acts being wrong because of some sui generis piece of ontology. It has, in response, been claimed that once we have a clear enough picture of the grounding role of moral laws on non-naturalism, this is not (objectionably) so. This move, I argue, is inconsistent with certain constraints on what non-naturalist-friendly moral laws must be for them to do the explanatory work non-naturalism requires of them elsewhere. In other words, there is tension between the grounding reply to the supervenience objection and the grounding structure implied by some responses to the normative objection.

Gertrud Kuznitzky and Edith Stein on (non)conceptual experience

AbstractThis article considers a largely overlooked phenomenological account of nonconceptual experience that turns on experience having a sense that is unique to intuition, and which can be invoked to explain how we come to view what we experience in objective terms without referring to ready‐made concepts. The two early phenomenologists Edith Stein and Gertrud Kuznitzky are discussed as having elaborated two distinct, yet related, versions of this intuitive sense. My discussion identifies two common assumptions of both philosophers: firstly, the idea that the objective character of intuition hinges on the structure of apprehension, which is found by investigating the regularities of the appearance of objects; secondly, the objective character of intuition presupposes a metaphysical notion of things having a sense in themselves. Importantly, both philosophers do not take this “sense in itself” to be a direct part of the contents of experience, showing objectivity to arise out of intuition instead.

A no-individuals account of quantum mechanics.

One of the most famous metaphysical problems in the philosophy of quantum mechanics concerns the individuality status of quantum entities: are they individuals, or non-individuals? The typical approach to the problem consists in defending one of the options by appealing directly to features of quantum mechanics with the addition, eventually, of theoretical virtues the favoured proposal may have. In this paper, we argue that this strategy is inappropriate, because the problem of individuality is ill formulated in the case of quantum mechanics. In a nutshell, our point is that considerations exclusively from quantum mechanics are too general and generic to grant the level of particularity required for providing for a principle of individuality. Problems of individuality appear only at the level of particular applications of the theory in specific contexts, and in these cases, we shall argue, search for a metaphysical notion of individuality may be substituted by an epistemic notion of individuation. The approach also has the benefits of dissolving the problems created by metaphysical underdetermination on this front. This article is part of the theme issue 'Identity, individuality and indistinguishability in physics and mathematics'.

Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas III by John F. Wippel

Reviewed by: Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas III by John F. Wippel Cecilia Trifogli Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas III. By John F. Wippel. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2021. Pp. 317. $65.00 (hard). ISBN: 978-0-8132-3555-0. This volume is the third collection of essays on Aquinas’s metaphysical thought by John Wippel, an eminent scholar of Aquinas. It consists of nine substantial essays, which Wippel completed after the publication of his monumental work, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas (2000), and which were originally published as journal articles or book chapters. In a forty-page Introduction, Wippel offers a detailed outline of each of the essays, which provides a helpful guide to their reading. The essays cover topics central to Aquinas’s metaphysical thought: the subject of metaphysics (chap. 1), the preambles of faith (chaps. 2 and 5), the distinction of essence and esse (chap. 3), the Fourth Way (chap. 4), the unity of substantial form (chap. 6), the cognitive status of the separated soul (chap. 7), the metaphysics of evil (chap. 8), and the composition of angels (chap. 9). In the essay on the subject of metaphysics Wippel first draws an important distinction between a prephilosophical notion of being and the metaphysical notion of being as being, that is, being as the subject of the metaphysics. He points out that, according to Aquinas, there is a corresponding distinction between the intellectual processes by which we discover these two notions. Wippel then devotes special attention to the most difficult side of this distinction: the discovery of the metaphysical notion of being. He argues that the negative judgement Aquinas refers to as separatio and contrasts with abstractio is the relevant cognitive process. Wippel is well aware that his interpretation is not universally accepted, and he takes into account alternative views on this controversial topic. He offers a convincing defense of his interpretation by providing an accurate assessment of the textual evidence in support of it. The general issue addressed in the two essays about the preambles of faith is that of the harmony between faith and philosophy or reason. Wippel’s crucial concern in the first essay is to reach an accurate understanding of what Aquinas means by a preamble of faith. According to Wippel’s careful reconstruction of Aquinas’s scattered remarks on this topic, a preamble of faith is a truth about [End Page 343] God that can be discovered by natural reason and is logically presupposed by articles of faith. In other words, preambles of faith provide the rational foundation that Aquinas thinks is required for faith. Wippel also points out that, while Aquinas’s standard examples of preambles of faith are the claims that God exists and that he is one, there is textual evidence for the inclusion of eleven other theological truths in this category. In the second essay on this topic Wippel investigates Aquinas’s view about the preambles of faith as applied to the specific case of creation. The question addressed here is, which parts of Aquinas’s account of creation are preambles of faith and which are articles of faith? This is indeed a question of crucial importance. Wippel points out that in order to answer this question we need to be clear about what Aquinas means by creation. Aquinas’s discussion of creation ex nihilo indicates that he distinguishes two meanings of creation. According to both meanings, creation is a production of something from no preexisting subject and involves the priority of nonexistence to existence. The difference between the two meanings is in the notion of priority involved: according to the first meaning, the priority is in order of nature, not necessarily in the order of time, whereas according to the second meaning, the priority is in the order of time. The distinction is approximately that between the possibility of eternal creation and temporal creation. Aquinas maintains that creation in the first sense can be proved philosophically, and it is indeed a preamble of faith. And the article of faith of which it constitutes the immediate rational foundation is temporal creation, which cannot be proved philosophically. Wippel then turns to the...

Rigid Designators and Descriptivism

Kripke distinguishes necessity and priority as two different categories: priority is a notion of epistemology, while necessity is a notion of metaphysics. Based on this fundamental argument, Kripke objects to Descriptivism, which takes certain properties as the criteria of identity across all possible worlds, and he argues for the legitimacy of a posteriori necessary truths. Kripke also criticizes Russell’s methods for dealing with empty descriptions, and he puts forward a modal world to explain the rigidity of proper names. However, the concept of rigid designation faces some challenges, including Kripke admitting to weak essentialism when he rejects transworld identification, and the fact that the truth value of a sentence containing a rigid designator may change.

Introduction

Introduction

African Metaphysics, Epistemology and a New Logic: A Decolonial Approach to Philosophy, by Jonathan O. Chimakonam and L. Uchenna Ogbonnaya

<i>African Metaphysics, Epistemology and a New Logic: A Decolonial Approach to Philosophy</i>, by Jonathan O. Chimakonam and L. Uchenna Ogbonnaya

With or Without Monism?

The aim of this article is to provide a roadmap to assess the contemporary appeal of Hegel’s metaphysics. I will take the contemporary debate between “metaphysical”, “revised-metaphysical” and “post- Kantian” or “transcendental” interpretations of Hegel as a framework. I will claim that, more or less explicitly, all of the readings involved in the debate establish the contemporary interest of Hegel’s metaphysics by comparing it to a specific kind of philosophical theory, either present or absent in the wider contemporary (Anglo-American) philosophical conversation. Paragraphs 2 and 3 will be devoted to understanding these metaphilosophical commitments, presenting a brief reconstruction of the history of the consideration of metaphysics in XX- and XXI-century Anglo-American philosophy, and a brief presentation of the three main interpretations in the debate. In paragraph 4, I will provide insights on whether Hegel’s notion of metaphysics actually corresponds to one of those suggested in the debate, and whether it could consequently be considered ofcontemporary relevance. I will hold that Hegel’s metaphysics not only exceeds all of the three interpretations in the debate, but also contains insights that challenge the contemporary meta-philosophical assumption of what should be “in” and what should be “out” in metaphysics

An Ethics of Unseen Consequences: Rabbi Nahman of Bratslav's Sefer Ha‐Middot

ABSTRACTThis essay is a close examination of one of Nahman of Bratslav's early and largely unexamined texts, Sefer ha‐Middot. The question it addresses is whether one can call this a study of “ethics” or, in Jewish nomenclature, musar, a work that seeks to cultivate human behaviors and describe ethical formation. In addition, it asks whether Sefer ha‐Middot can be called a text of “virtue ethics” given its focus on virtues and their enactment. The essay argues that Nahman's peculiar metaphysical notion that all mitzvot are inextricably intertwined prevents any analysis of behavioral causality severing his “ethics” from any Aristotelian or Kantian tradition and brings him closer to Alasdair MacIntyre's notion of ethics as tied to traditional norms. And even with MacIntyre, the comparison is quite limited. Discussing “faith,” the “zaddik,” and “money,” the essay explores Nahman's view of how these and other virtues are cultivated and achieved.

Kant on the givenness of space and time

AbstractFamously, Kant describes space and time as infinite “given” magnitudes. An influential interpretative tradition reads this as a claim about phenomenological presence to the mind: in claiming that space and time are given, this reading holds, Kant means to claim that we have phenomenological access to space and time in our original intuitions of them. In this paper, I argue that we should instead understand givenness as a metaphysical notion. For Kant, space and time are “given” in virtue of three related facts: (a) they are necessary grounds for the existence of all other spatial and temporal possibilities; (b) in virtue of being such grounds, they are metaphysically linked to all other represented spatiotemporal things; and (c) as representations, space and time issue from the nature of our faculty of sensibility rather than from an arbitrary act of choice. Understanding givenness in this non‐epistemological way helps us recover what is plausible in both “intellectualist” and “anti‐intellectualist” readings of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Anti‐intellectualists are correct that space and time are given in mere sensibility, but intellectualists are correct that we depend on the understanding for consciousness of space and time.

Rethinking John S. Mbiti’s Metaphysical Trajectory of Time in Africa

Purpose: To reawaken the consciousness of all Africans to the implications of the metaphysical trajectory of time in Africa, which John S. Mbiti presents, in relation to personal and collective human development in Africa.&#x0D; Methodology: This work is expository, critical, and evaluative in its methodology.&#x0D; Findings: In Western thought, there is mathematical and linear time, as dominant ideas. Dominant because some philosophers, in particular Bergson, have their notion of time as mainly inclined to be lived, organic. It is linear time in the sense that, it is an imagined line through which the distant past, present and infinite future is figured. Linear time as such does not exist, but it is a metaphysical notion existing in our minds. Linear time is unidirectional and mathematical. In Africa, African Philosophy is still fledgling. That is, it is not fully developed and documented. Consequently, even the field of “time” lacks a robust written commentary.&#x0D; Unique Contribution to theory, practice and policy (recommendation): Within the traditional African milieu, according to Mbiti, time is a two dimensional phenomenon, with a long past, a present and virtually no future. This is contrary to the linear time concept in western thought, with an indefinite past, present and future. This work is expository, analytical and critical in its methodology. The first part of the discussion is concerned with the nature of time (and its constituent elements) as a metaphysical concept. The second part focuses on the ordering of time as found among the Africans. Finally, the third part discusses some of the different activities (in customs and traditions), which point to the future. These include the meaning of life, rites of passage, painting and divination, etc. In the conclusion, a fundamental question is raised regarding, whether or not, the present organization of time, in Africa, as presented by John S. Mbiti, be perpetuated or changed, taking into account the pros and cons it bears.&#x0D;

Soul in Vedanta Metaphysics and Emersonian Philosophy

Vedanta philosophy, as the foundation of Hindu philosophy, has talked much about the existence and role of Atma in life in depth, and Atma’s relationship to Paramatma as the unity of the worldly living beings and the absolute, Brahma. This notion deals with the idea that Atma is immortal and unchanged, but it undergoes transformation from body to body. The western Christian philosophy also has the notion of Atma with the name "the soul," but Christian philosophy gives the message of the changeability of the soul. Being brought up in Christian culture and tradition, Emerson focuses on the soul's spirituality in his writings and develops the theory of transcendentalism, but as influenced by Vedantic philosophy, his concept of the soul departs from pure Christian tradition and gets linked with the Vedantic concept of Atma and Paramatma. This study examines how Vedanta metaphysics and Emersonian transcendentalism share common ground in the perception of Atma and Paramatma, and finds the connection between Vedantic metaphysical notion of the soul as Atma and Paramatma and American transcendental view of the soul and the Over-soul proposed in Emerson’s writings. This study is significant to make a meaningful connection between the Eastern Vedic viewpoints with the Western viewpoints in the mode of philosophical understanding.