Metaphysical Arguments Research Articles

Brute Fact Cosmology and the Fundamentality of Consciousness

What is the fundamental nature of the physical universe? This paper generates new insights into this question through examining how brute fact metaphysics intersects with our best cosmological theories of the universe’s origin. To do this, I first make the case that fundamental physical things are – by necessity – ontologically brute. Ontological bruteness, I maintain, provides a rationale for the counterfactual claim that there is no reason why a fundamental has one physical identity rather than another. The paper then gives an overview of modern cosmology. This empirically oriented analysis is enjoined to a metaphysical argument that – since science’s candidate fundamentals are impermissibly complex – we can appeal to brute fact metaphysics to meaningfully entertain the possibility of simpler fundamentals. The paper then investigates a particular simple fundamental I take to be most plausible: consciousness (understood as the intrinsic nature of matter). This discussion draws on cosmic-level evolution and panpsychism. While I remain agnostic about whether consciousness’ instantiation in fundamental-level physics and cosmology will be empirically verified, the paper draws attention to a number of emerging experimental paradigms that can – at least in principle – contribute to this project.

Metaethics and the Nature of Properties

Abstract This paper explores the connection between two philosophical debates concerning the nature of properties. The first, metaethical debate is about whether normative properties are ordinary natural properties or some unique kind of non-natural properties. The second, metaphysical debate is about whether properties are sets of objects, transcendent or immanent universals, or sets of tropes. I argue that nominalism, transcendent realism and immanent realism are not neutral frameworks for the metaethical debate but instead lead to either metaethical naturalism or non-naturalism. We can therefore investigate the metaethical question on its own terms only within the framework of trope theory.

From pictures to employments: later Wittgenstein on ‘the infinite’

ABSTRACT With respect to the metaphysics of infinity, the tendency of standard debates is to either endorse or to deny the reality of ‘the infinite’. But how should we understand the notion of ‘reality’ employed in stating these options? Wittgenstein’s critical strategy shows that the notion is grounded in a confusion: talk of infinity naturally takes hold of one’s imagination due to the sway of verbal pictures and analogies suggested by our words. This is the source of various philosophical pictures that in turn give rise to the standard metaphysical debates: that the mathematics of infinity corresponds to a special realm of infinite objects, that the infinite is profoundly huge or vast, or that the ability to think about infinity reveals mysterious powers in human beings. First, I explain Wittgenstein’s general strategy for undermining philosophical pictures of ‘the infinite’ – as he describes it in Zettel; and then show how that critical strategy is applied to Cantor’s diagonalization proof in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics II.

The conceptual injustice of the brain death standard.

Family disputes over the diagnosis of brain death have caused much controversy in the bioethics literature over the conceptual validity of the brain death standard. Given the tenuous status of brain death as death, it is pragmatically fruitful to reframe intractable debates about the metaphysical nature of brain death as metalinguistic disputes about its conceptual deployment. This new framework leaves the metaphysical debate open and brings into focus the social functions that are served by deploying the concept of brain death. In doing so, it highlights the epistemic injustice of medicolegal authorities that force people to uniformly accept brain death as a diagnosis of death based on normative considerations of institutional interests, such as saving hospital resources and organ supplies, rather than empirical evidence of brain death as death, which is insufficient at best and nonexistent at worst. In light of this injustice, I propose the rejection of the uniform standard of brain death in favor of a choice-based system that respects families' individualized views of death.

Inconsistent metaphysical dependence: cases from the Kyoto School

Even though metaphysical dependence has been a subject of a lively debate in contemporary metaphysics, it is rare in such a debate to seriously consider the possibility that the metaphysical dependence relations among the things in the reality is inconsistent. This paper focuses on two philosophers of the Kyoto School, Kitaro Nishida and Keiji Nishitani, who challenge the common supposition that the structure of reality is consistent. In this paper, we show that Nishida’s logic of place is a version of inconsistent foundationalism, according to which absolute nothingness as a foundational element does not depend on anything but depends on itself, and that Nishtani’s theory of the field of emptiness is a version of inconsistent coherentism, according to which emptiness does not depend on anything but depends on everything else (and possibly on itself).

Breaking through the doors of perception, consciousness, and existence: to what extent does psychedelic phenomenology ontologically depend on external factors?

AbstractAs reliable facilitators of characteristically unique altered states of consciousness that are notoriously difficult to comprehend, psychedelics naturally attract a multidisciplinary scope for their research, with direct relevance to neuroscience, pharmacology, psychology, as well as philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and epistemology — disciplines united by the common inquiry into the nature of conscious experience. Accordingly, the central focus of this paper concerns the metaphysical debate between internalism and externalism about whether psychedelic phenomenology — in particular, its ‘breakthrough’ level — could be said to directly ontologically depend on external factors, as well as the interpretive implications arising from each of those positions. The main contributions of the author of this paper include the provision of a coherent account of the essential phenomenal characteristics of psychedelic experiences, the integration of relatively fragmented philosophical debates on psychedelic phenomenology into the traditional internalist-externalist framework in metaphysics, as well as the exploration of the extent to which the externalist position on psychedelic phenomenology — traditionally associated with non-naturalism — is compatible with naturalistic explanatory frameworks. In Part 1, psychedelic phenomenology will be outlined first, after which the central inquiries of this paper will be contextualised and qualified. In Part 2, the internalist position on psychedelic phenomenology — both its strong and weak versions — will be discussed. In Part 3, the externalist position will be explored, which will be followed by a final evalutation between the three positions presented in this paper. The paper will conclude in favour of the weak internalist position, and that whilst the externalist position remains significantly more speculative than both the strong and the weak internalist positions, the externalist position cannot be rejected altogether until further progress in consciousness research is made.

The conceptual exportation question: conceptual engineering and the normativity of virtual worlds

Debate over the normativity of virtual phenomena is now widespread in the philosophical literature, taking place in roughly two distinct but related camps. The first considers the relevant problems to be within the scope of applied ethics, where the general methodological program is to square the intuitive (im)permissibility of virtual wrongdoings with moral accounts that justify their (im)permissibility. The second camp approaches the normativity of virtual wrongdoings as a metaphysical debate. This is done by disambiguating the ‘virtual’ character of ‘virtual wrongdoings’. Doing so is supposed to provide illuminating ontological distinctions that inform ethical aspects of the debate. We argue that each approach faces its own set of issues, and as a result, motivates consideration of an alternative. The alternative we suggest turns inquiry concerning the normativity of virtual wrongdoings into a distinctively conceptual question. Rather than asking whether some action is right or wrong, or whether some virtual phenomenon counts as a particular action at all, we argue that research into the normativity of virtual wrongdoings may be guided by reflecting on whether a concept that originated and developed within a non-virtual context should be exported into a foreign virtual domain. We consider this approach and several objections.

Why we do not need demonstrative proof for God’s existence to know that God exists

Abstract As a counterpoint to demonstrative proofs in metaphysics, Robert Nozick presented the case for God’s existence based on the value of personal experiences. Personal experiences shape one’s life, but this is even more evident with extraordinary experiences, such can be religious ones. In the next step, says the argument, if those experiences can be explained only by invoking the concept of the Supreme Being, then God exists. The second step mirrors scientific explanation constituting what Nozick calls the “argument to the best explanation.” The argument is set against the background of Nozick’s methodology which rejects demonstrative proofs in metaphysics. Its purpose is threefold. It aims to establish a certain sort of experience (religious/spiritual) as a legitimate basis for the argumentation; it aims to show that it is not philosophically blasphemous to explain such experiences by introducing a concept of divinity. Finally, it seeks to showcase the non-dogmatic, investigative nature of the argument. By exploring the merits of Nozick’s proposal, I will try to elucidate all three components, which should pave the way for a broader discussion on the role of non-demonstrative arguments in metaphysics.

Precis of Amie L. Thomasson, norms and necessity

ABSTRACT Claims about what is necessary or possible play a central role in debates in metaphysics and elsewhere in philosophy. But how can we understand such claims, and how can we come to know which are true? Modal discourse has long presented formidable ontological, epistemological, and methodological problems - problems that arise or are exacerbated by assuming that modal talk aims to describe or track special features of this world, or other possible worlds. Norms and Necessity aims to revive a non-descriptivist approach to modality, holding that the function of modal discourse is not to describe or track anything, but rather to convey norms or rules (and what follows from them) in the useful form of indicatives. The book develops this ‘modal normativist’ approach, showing how it avoids the most serious objections that have kept similar approaches off the table for the past several decades (including the Frege-Geach problem, and problems of accounting for de re and a posteriori necessities). It also shows how a careful development of the normativist approach can help avoid or resolve the classic ontological, epistemological, and methodological problems of modality, as part of an overall deflationary approach to metaphysics.

Would Carnap Have Tolerated Modern Metaphysics?

AbstractAbstractIt is well known that Carnap, early in his philosophical career, took most of metaphysics to consist of meaningless pseudostatements. In contrast to this meaning-theoretic critique of metaphysics, we develop what we take to be Carnap’s later value-based critique. We argue that this later critique is forceful against several central contemporary metaphysical debates, its origin in the principle of tolerance notwithstanding.

Panpsychism and Physical Idealism

There is a significant convergence between some contemporary panpsychist theories and idealism. Traditional phenomenal, macro idealism has been widely criticised for its implausible account of physical facts. This paper examines three idealism friendly contemporary panpsychist philosophies and suggests that with some revisions a plausible realist and physical idealism can be articulated. Taking from information-theoretic models of consciousness and metaphysical arguments for the ontological primacy of mind, it is suggested via a Schelling inspired perspective that aspects of consciousness??? intrinsic nature provide a promising approach to the decomposition problem which is currently a significant challenge to pan/cosmopsychist theories.

Personal Identity, Sexual Difference, and the Metaphysics of Gender

AbstractIssues pertaining to sex and gender continue to be some of the most hotly debated topics of our time. While many of the most heated disputes occur at the level of politics and public policy, metaphysics, too, has a crucial role to play in these debates. In this essay, I explore several key metaphysical debates concerning sex and gender through the lenses of two important areas in contemporary metaphysics: the metaphysics of essence and the ontology of the human person. The goal here is not to advocate any particular position on these issues, but to show how the tools of contemporary metaphysics can help to offer a more comprehensive map of the conceptual terrain, indicating where major areas of agreement can be found and where the most important disagreements really lie.

The Perils of Rejecting the Parity Argument

AbstractMany moral error theorists reject moral realism on the grounds that moral realism implies the existence of categorical normativity, yet categorical normativity does not exist. Call this the Metaphysical Argument. In response, some moral realists have emphasized a parity between moral normativity and epistemic normativity. They argue that if one kind of normativity is rejected, then both must be rejected. Therefore, one cannot be a moral error theorist without also being an epistemic error theorist. Call this the Parity Argument. In this paper, we address three possible responses to the Parity Argument from moral error theorists: (1) accept the parity but still reject epistemic error theory, (2) reject the parity, (3) accept the parity and defend epistemic error theory. We argue that there are problems with each of these responses, so the Parity Argument stands as a strong counterargument to the Metaphysical Argument. We conclude by drawing some lessons for any future challenges to the Parity Argument.

Existence and the existential quantifier

AbstractThis paper draws a distinction between the existential quantifier and the symbol ‘∃’ used to express it, on the one hand, and existence and ‘exists’, on the other. It argues that some popular arguments in metaphysics, including arguments against vague existence and arguments against deflationary metaontology (which views ontological disputes as lacking substance), are guilty of fudging this distinction. The paper draws some lessons for metaphysical debate about existence and highlights some heretofore ignored and attractive positions in logical space.

Processes and their modal profile

A widely debated issue in contemporary metaphysics is whether the modal profile of ordinary objects has to be explained in non-modal terms (that is, Thesis 1). However, how to solve such an issue with respect to occurrences – namely, processes and events – is a question that has been largely neglected in the current metaphysical debate. The general goal of this article is to start filling this gap. As a first result of the article, we make it plausible that, if Thesis 1 holds for objects, then it also holds for processes and events. Then, we develop a metaphysical account of processes derived from Fine’s (1999, 2022) suggestions, according to which a process is a variable embodiment that is manifested by different events at the different times it goes on – namely, Thesis 2. We raised the challenge from the completion of a process that asks the Finean account of processes to explain relevant modal features of processes in non-modal terms. As a second result, we argue that four initially plausible strategies for solving such a challenge fall short of solving it. As a third result, we show that the theory of variable embodiments Fine formulates for objects must differ from the theory of variable embodiments that aims to model processes. We conclude by investigating some revisions to a theory of variable embodiments that aims to model processes.

Exploring the Interactions between Metaphysics and Science

The debate in Metaphysics of Science concerning the interaction between metaphysics and science has been mainly approached from the perspective of the scientificdiscipline of physics. In this paper, I address this debate from a different framework, namely that of biology. I pay attention to the recent characterization of Metaphysics of Biology and the different forms in which philosophers use metaphysics when addressing conceptual biological problems. In doing so, I argue that two main lessons can be obtained that can serve to enrich the debate in Metaphysics of Science: i) that the interaction between metaphysics and science seems to be more complex than generally considered; and ii) that the type of metaphysics that is interacting with science when characterizing the ontological status of the world is neither the a priori nor the naturalized one, but a different form of metaphysics that will be labelled here as applied metaphysics.

Moral Responsibility Skepticism and Semiretributivism

Moral responsibility skepticism has traditionally been dismissed as a nonstarter, but because of the important work of Derk Pereboom, Gregg Caruso, and others, it has become increasingly influential. I lay out this doctrine, and I subject it to critical scrutiny. I argue that the metaphysical arguments about free will do not yield the result that we do not deserve (in a “basic” sense) the attitudes and actions definitive of moral responsibility. Further, I argue that skepticism leaves out crucial components of our considered views about moral responsibility, making it seriously problematic.

Introduction

Introduction

Existence and Modality in Kant: Lessons from Barcan

This essay considers Kant’s theory of modality in light of a debate in contemporary modal metaphysics and modal logic concerning the Barcan formulas. The comparison provides a new and fruitful perspective on Kant’s complex and sometimes confusing claims about possibility and necessity. Two central Kantian principles provide the starting point for the comparison: that the possible must be grounded in the actual and that existence is not a real predicate. Both are shown to be intimately connected to the Barcan formulas, and Kant’s views on what he distinguishes as three different kinds of modality are then considered in light of this connection.

A Revised Metaphysical Argument for Berkeley’s Likeness Principle

Contra Todd Ryan’s interpretation, I argue that it is possible to reconstruct a metaphysical argument that does not restrict likeness in general to ideas. While I agree with Ryan that Berkeley’s writings provide us with the resources to reconstruct such an argument, I disagree with Ryan that this argument entails a restriction of likeness to ideas. Unlike Ryan, I argue that Berkeley is not committed to the claim that we can compare only ideas, but to the view that the only thing that can be compared to an idea is another idea.