Metacognitive Decisions Research Articles

Pharmacological Elevation of Catecholamine Levels Improves Perceptual Decisions, But Not Metacognitive Insight.

Perceptual decisions are often accompanied by a feeling of decision confidence. Where the parietal cortex is known for its crucial role in shaping such perceptual decisions, metacognitive evaluations are thought to additionally rely on the (pre)frontal cortex. Because of this supposed neural differentiation between these processes, perceptual and metacognitive decisions may be divergently affected by changes in internal (e.g., attention, arousal) and external (e.g., task and environmental demands) factors. Although intriguing, causal evidence for this hypothesis remains scarce. Here, we investigated the causal effect of two neuromodulatory systems on behavioral and neural measures of perceptual and metacognitive decision-making. Specifically, we pharmacologically elevated levels of catecholamines (with atomoxetine) and acetylcholine (with donepezil) in healthy adult human participants performing a visual discrimination task in which we gauged decision confidence, while electroencephalography was measured. Where cholinergic effects were not robust, catecholaminergic enhancement improved perceptual sensitivity, while at the same time leaving metacognitive sensitivity unaffected. Neurally, catecholaminergic elevation did not affect sensory representations of task-relevant visual stimuli but instead enhanced well-known decision signals measured over the centroparietal cortex, reflecting the accumulation of sensory evidence over time. Crucially, catecholaminergic enhancement concurrently impoverished neural markers measured over the frontal cortex linked to the formation of metacognitive evaluations. Enhanced catecholaminergic neuromodulation thus improves perceptual but not metacognitive decision-making.

Metacognitive Decision-Making Framework for Multi-UAV Target Search Without Communication

Metacognitive Decision-Making Framework for Multi-UAV Target Search Without Communication

Factors that influence general chemistry students’ decision making in study strategies

This qualitative study delves into the intricate landscape of general chemistry students' study strategy decision-making processes, examining the guiding factors that shape their choices. Past work in chemistry education has shown that students’ study behaviors are dynamic in nature. Employing self-regulation theory, the study aims to provide a deeper understanding of how students decide to maintain or change their study behaviors. Semi-structured interviews were conducted to capture the study processes of nine students enrolled in first-semester general chemistry classroom. The results indicated these students’ study behavior decision-making process was either driven by metacognition or affect. Students who adopted metacognitive decision-making showed evidence of enactment of declarative, procedural, and conditional knowledge which could be influenced by either the nature of the content studied (content-driven), or the time-efficiency of the strategies employed (time-driven) during their self-regulation. On the contrary, students who adopted affective decision-making based their choices regarding their study behaviors on the emotional aspects and the value they attribute to the study strategies (intrinsic-value or instrumental-value driven). The findings of the study are foundational yet highlight the nuanced nature of changes and constancy within the study strategy decision-making process. This suggests a one-size-fits-all approach to improve student study behaviors may not yield fruitful outcomes and therefore, distinct methods should be devised to reach students with different decision-making processes.

Toward self-directed learning: How do Nepali adolescents learn with MOOCs?

The study investigated how adolescent students in Nepal explored massive open online learning courses (MOOCs) in a self-directed learning manner. It used a qualitative approach by conducting 13 individual interviews with these youth. Findings suggest that Nepali adolescent MOOC learners are strongly motivated by natural curiosity toward learning as well as encouragement and inspiration through the local learning community, which is significantly different from adult learners’ motivation. In terms of self-monitoring in self-directed learning, adolescent learners need scaffolding to support them in making metacognitive decisions. Furthermore, while self-management skills are necessary for successful MOOC learning, in turn, MOOCs improve self-management skills that can be transformed into other life activities. As shown in this study, the local community of practice plays a critical role in motivating adolescents to continue learning from MOOCs and serves as a significant resource to complement MOOC learning.

Age-Related Differences in Framing Selective Memory in Terms of Gains and Losses

ABSTRACT We examined whether framing younger and older adults learning goals in terms of maximizing gains or minimizing losses impacts their ability to selectively remember high-value information. Specifically, we presented younger and older adults with lists of words paired with point values and participants were either told that they would receive the value associated with each word if they recalled it on a test or that they would lose the points associated with each word if they failed to recall it on the test. We also asked participants to predict the likelihood of recalling each word to determine if younger and older adults were metacognitively aware of any potential framing effects. Results revealed that older adults expected to be more selective when their goals were framed in terms of losses, but younger adults expected to be more selective when their goals were framed in terms of gains. However, this was not the case as both younger and older adults were more selective for high-value information when their goals were framed in terms of maximizing gains compared with minimizing losses. Thus, the framing of learning goals can impact metacognitive decisions and subsequent memory in both younger and older adults.

History biases reveal novel dissociations between perceptual and metacognitive decision-making.

Human decision-making and self-reflection often depend on context and internal biases. For instance, decisions are often influenced by preceding choices, regardless of their relevance. It remains unclear how choice history influences different levels of the decision-making hierarchy. We used analyses grounded in information and detection theories to estimate the relative strength of perceptual and metacognitive history biases and to investigate whether they emerge from common/unique mechanisms. Although both perception and metacognition tended to be biased toward previous responses, we observed novel dissociations that challenge normative theories of confidence. Different evidence levels often informed perceptual and metacognitive decisions within observers, and response history distinctly influenced first- (perceptual) and second- (metacognitive) order decision-parameters, with the metacognitive bias likely to be strongest and most prevalent in the general population. We propose that recent choices and subjective confidence represent heuristics, which inform first- and second-order decisions in the absence of more relevant evidence.

Uncertainty and the act of making a difficult choice

ABSTRACT A paradigmatic experience of agency is the felt effort associated with the act of making a difficult choice. The challenge of accounting for this experience within a compatibilist framework has been called ‘the agency problem of compatibilism’ (Vierkant, 2022, The Tinkering Mind: Agency, Cognition and the Extended Mind, Oxford University Press, 116). In this paper, I will propose an evolutionarily plausible, actional account of deciding which explains the phenomenology. In summary: The act of making a difficult choice is triggered by a metacognitive decision to intentionally stop deliberating, despite ongoing uncertainty. This decision is the output of a metacognitive cost–benefit computation, which weighs the value of uncertainty reduction against the costs of ongoing deliberation. Strikingly, contemporary theories of effort suggest that this cost–benefit computation is also the source of the feeling of mental effort, which tracks the costs of that decision. If this account is correct, the agency problem of compatibilism has been solved. The act of making a difficult choice and the associated paradigmatic experience of agency, felt effort, both follow from the metacognitive evaluation. Implications are explored.

Patients with psychotic disorders exhibit different audio-visual perceptual decision biases and metacognitive abilities

IntroductionIn the inherently noisy real world, we can rarely have full certainty about what we have just seen or heard. Thus, making a perceptual decision on sensory information, and simultaneously tracking our varying levels of certainty in these decisions (i.e., metacognitive abilities) are crucial components of everyday life.Hallucinations, such as confidently reporting a human voice or face when none was present, are a hallmark of psychotic disorders but also occur among the normal population. Particularly in patients with psychotic disorders, these misperceptions are linked to confident beliefs in their actual existence. However, whether patients’ confidence is only increased during such erroneous perceptions and whether perceptual and metacognitive decisions arise from supramodal mechanisms across sensory modalities remains unknown.ObjectivesIn the laboratory, we tested perceptual and metacognitive decisions under varying levels of sensory certainty in healthy adults and patients with psychotic disorders admitted to a psychiatry ward (Ncon=32, Npat=12; age = 19-49; F2x.x diagnoses).MethodsSpecifically, participants had to detect human voices or faces against briefly presented noisy backdrops and subsequently rate their confidence in the accuracy of their perceptual decision (Fig 1A,B,C). We further hypothesised that probabilistic cues prior to blocks of trials can bias participants’ choices and hallucination probability (i.e., confident false alarms).ResultsPatients exhibited higher perceptual sensitivity in the auditory than the visual task, alongside a generally stronger decision bias towards fewer ‘voice/face’ choices (Fig 2A,B). This bias was more pronounced in the visual domain. Decision performance was overall higher on the auditory task but lower for patients (predicted minimum > 55%; Fig 2C). Strong correlations between auditory accuracy and PANSS hallucination scores of patients and LSHS scores of healthy participants suggest an effect of these hallucinatory experiences on accurate perception.Metacognitive abilities were reduced in patients across both modalities: They exhibited general overconfidence, which was stronger for incorrect trials (Fig 3A). Patients’ confidence ratings were inversely related to the probability of choosing ‘voice/face’. Combining both perceptual and confidence decisions, patients showed higher hallucinations probability in the auditory task, particularly in more difficult trials (i.e., with less informative sensory evidence; Fig 3B).Image:Image 2:Image 3:ConclusionsIn sum, patients with psychotic disorders exhibit increased decision bias accompanied by increased confidence, and thus a reduced fidelity in their metacognitive abilities. The modality differences are in line with phenomenology and reported hallucination rates. These results suggest stronger priors in psychotic disorders resulting in worse perceptual acuity and assessment of this perception.Disclosure of InterestNone Declared

Human perceptual and metacognitive decision-making rely on distinct brain networks.

Perceptual decisions depend on the ability to exploit available sensory information in order to select the most adaptive option from a set of alternatives. Such decisions depend on the perceptual sensitivity of the organism, which is generally accompanied by a corresponding level of certainty about the choice made. Here, by use of corticocortical paired associative transcranial magnetic stimulation protocol (ccPAS) aimed at inducing plastic changes, we shaped perceptual sensitivity and metacognitive ability in a motion discrimination task depending on the targeted network, demonstrating their functional dissociation. Neurostimulation aimed at boosting V5/MT+-to-V1/V2 back-projections enhanced motion sensitivity without impacting metacognition, whereas boosting IPS/LIP-to-V1/V2 back-projections increased metacognitive efficiency without impacting motion sensitivity. This double-dissociation provides causal evidence of distinct networks for perceptual sensitivity and metacognitive ability in humans.

"Should I keep studying? Consequences of a decision to stop learning in young and older adults." Correction to Krogulska et al. (2021).

Reports an error in "Should I keep studying? Consequences of a decision to stop learning in young and older adults" by Aleksandra Krogulska, Karolina Golik, Krystian Barzykowski, Jennifer Cox, Agata Jakubiak and Elizabeth A. Maylor (Psychology and Aging, 2021[Mar], Vol 36[2], 158-171). In the article (https:// doi.org/10.1037/pag0000594), there was a typographical error in the grant number awarded to Aleksandra Krogulska. The correct grant number is UMO-2016/21/N/HS6/02953. The online version of this article has been corrected. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2021-24143-001.) In situations of cognitive overload, the role of a metacognitive decision to stop learning is of utmost importance. We investigated how young and older adults decide to stop learning as a strategy for maximizing memory performance when they face to-be-learned material exceeding their memory capability. People may decide to stop learning for two main reasons: they experience a growing feeling of disfluency as a learning episode progresses and/or they perceive such a decision to be beneficial for future memory performance. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants studied lists of 50 words. The majority of young and older adults stopped learning in conditions where they were allowed to do so. This decision, counterintuitively, decreased the number of recalled words. Crucially, a similar number of young and older adults stopped the presentation of to-be-remembered material, and both age groups suffered comparable consequences in their memory performance. In Experiments 3a and 3b, participants read an experimental scenario and decided whether they would stop learning based on this description alone. People in different age groups predicted their metacognitive decisions similarly. However, participants' forecasted performance did not reflect the negative influence of these decisions. Regardless of their age, people tend to make a suboptimal decision to stop learning, unaware of its negative consequences. Together, our results suggest that young and older adults can exert metamemory control to similar degrees even though their decisions may not be beneficial for memory performance. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Why do learners ignore expected feedback in making metacognitive decisions about retrieval practice?

We report two experiments investigating why learners, in making metacognitive judgments, often seem to ignore or otherwise fail to appreciate that feedback following retrieval practice provides a restudy opportunity. Learners practiced word pairs for a final cued-recall test by studying each pair initially, making a judgment of learning (JOL), and then deciding whether to practice the pair again after a short or long spacing interval, or not at all. For different groups in Experiment 1, additional practice involved restudying, retrieval practice without feedback, or retrieval practice with feedback (the full pair). We used procedures (long feedback duration and covert retrieval practice) designed to rule out the possibility that feedback is ignored because it is usually brief or because participants' choices are influenced by a desire to look good by performing well on overt practice tests. In the relearning condition, learners preferred a long spacing interval for items at all JOL levels. Despite the feedback duration and the covert retrieval practice, learners in both retrieval-practice conditions preferred a short spacing interval for hard, low-JOL items and a long spacing interval for easy, high-JOL items, even though this may not be an effective strategy when feedback is provided. In Experiment 2, instructions framed feedback either as a presentation of the correct answer or as a restudy opportunity preceded by retrieval practice. Framing feedback as a restudy opportunity markedly changed the choices learners made. Apparently, the restudy function of feedback does not occur to learners unless they are specifically alerted to it.

Should I keep studying? Consequences of a decision to stop learning in young and older adults.

In situations of cognitive overload, the role of a metacognitive decision to stop learning is of utmost importance. We investigated how young and older adults decide to stop learning as a strategy for maximizing memory performance when they face to-be-learned material exceeding their memory capability. People may decide to stop learning for two main reasons: they experience a growing feeling of disfluency as a learning episode progresses and/or they perceive such a decision to be beneficial for future memory performance. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants studied lists of 50 words. The majority of young and older adults stopped learning in conditions where they were allowed to do so. This decision, counterintuitively, decreased the number of recalled words. Crucially, a similar number of young and older adults stopped the presentation of to-be-remembered material, and both age groups suffered comparable consequences in their memory performance. In Experiments 3a and 3b, participants read an experimental scenario and decided whether they would stop learning based on this description alone. People in different age groups predicted their metacognitive decisions similarly. However, participants' forecasted performance did not reflect the negative influence of these decisions. Regardless of their age, people tend to make a suboptimal decision to stop learning, unaware of its negative consequences. Together, our results suggest that young and older adults can exert metamemory control to similar degrees even though their decisions may not be beneficial for memory performance. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Priors and payoffs in confidence judgments.

Priors and payoffs are known to affect perceptual decision-making, but little is understood about how they influence confidence judgments. For optimal perceptual decision-making, both priors and payoffs should be considered when selecting a response. However, for confidence to reflect the probability of being correct in a perceptual decision, priors should affect confidence but payoffs should not. To experimentally test whether human observers follow this normative behavior for natural confidence judgments, we conducted an orientation-discrimination task with varied priors and payoffs that probed both perceptual and metacognitive decision-making. The placement of discrimination and confidence criteria were examined according to several plausible Signal Detection Theory models. In the normative model, observers use the optimal discrimination criterion (i.e., the criterion that maximizes expected gain) and confidence criteria that shift with the discrimination criterion that maximizes accuracy (i.e., are not affected by payoffs). No observer was consistent with this model, with the majority exhibiting non-normative confidence behavior. One subset of observers ignored both priors and payoffs for confidence, always fixing the confidence criteria around the neutral discrimination criterion. The other group of observers incorrectly incorporated payoffs into their confidence by always shifting their confidence criteria with the same gains-maximizing criterion used for discrimination. Such metacognitive mistakes could have negative consequences outside the laboratory setting, particularly when priors or payoffs are not matched for all the possible decision alternatives.

Action information contributes to metacognitive decision-making

Metacognitive abilities allow us to adjust ongoing behavior and modify future decisions in the absence of external feedback. Although metacognition is critical in many daily life settings, it remains unclear what information is actually being monitored and what kind of information is being used for metacognitive decisions. In the present study, we investigated whether response information connected to perceptual events contribute to metacognitive decision-making. Therefore, we recorded EEG signals during a perceptual color discrimination task while participants were asked to provide an estimate about the quality of their decision on each trial. Critically, the moment participants provided their confidence judgments varied across conditions, thereby changing the amount of action information (e.g., response competition or response fluency) available for metacognitive decisions. Results from three experiments demonstrate that metacognitive performance improved when first-order action information was available at the moment metacognitive decisions about the perceptual task had to be provided. This behavioral effect was accompanied by enhanced functional connectivity (beta phase synchrony) between motor areas and prefrontal regions, exclusively observed during metacognitive decision-making. Our findings demonstrate that action information contributes to metacognitive decision-making, thereby painting a picture of metacognition as a process that integrates sensory evidence and information about our interactions with the world.

Awareness as inference in a higher-order state space.

Humans have the ability to report the contents of their subjective experience—we can say to each other, ‘I am aware of X’. The decision processes that support these reports about mental contents remain poorly understood. In this article, I propose a computational framework that characterizes awareness reports as metacognitive decisions (inference) about a generative model of perceptual content. This account is motivated from the perspective of how flexible hierarchical state spaces are built during learning and decision-making. Internal states supporting awareness reports, unlike those covarying with perceptual contents, are simple and abstract, varying along a 1D continuum from absent to present. A critical feature of this architecture is that it is both higher-order and asymmetric: a vast number of perceptual states is nested under ‘present’, but a much smaller number of possible states nested under ‘absent’. Via simulations, I show that this asymmetry provides a natural account of observations of ‘global ignition’ in brain imaging studies of awareness reports.

CDAS: A Cognitive Decision-Making Architecture for Dynamic Airspace Sectorization for Efficient Operations

In this paper, a cognitive decision-making architecture for dynamic airspace sectorization (CDAS) to handle increasing traffic flow and provide an efficient decision making process for operations is presented. The main objective of CDAS is to determine optimal 3-D sector shapes such that the conflicting workloads of air traffic controllers are balanced along with marginal changes to sector shapes over a time horizon. CDAS broadly comprises two major components, namely, a cognitive engine and a metacognitive decision maker. The cognitive engine includes an airspace sectorization model and a multi-objective optimization solver. The problem of 3-D dynamic airspace resectorization is cast as a multi-objective optimization problem with safety constraints and is solved using the non-dominated sorting genetic algorithm II. The metacognitive decision maker utilizes the Pareto-optimal solutions obtained from the cognitive engine along with the air traffic control requirements and predicted traffic pattern to identify the best solution that can be implemented along with a rule to decide on when-to-do a resectorization when needed. A detailed performance evaluation of CDAS is presented using the actual flight data over the Singapore flight information region. The results clearly indicate that CDAS provides an efficient dynamic sectorization solution over the existing solution of split-and-merge of a specific sector to handle heavy traffic.

Metacognition across sensory modalities: Vision, warmth, and nociceptive pain

The distinctive experience of pain, beyond mere processing of nociceptive inputs, is much debated in psychology and neuroscience. One aspect of perceptual experience is captured by metacognition—the ability to monitor and evaluate one’s own mental processes. We investigated confidence in judgements about nociceptive pain (i.e. pain that arises from the activation of nociceptors by a noxious stimulus) to determine whether metacognitive processes contribute to the distinctiveness of the pain experience. Our participants made intensity judgements about noxious heat, innocuous warmth, and visual contrast (first-order, perceptual decisions) and rated their confidence in those judgements (second-order, metacognitive decisions). First-order task performance between modalities was balanced using adaptive staircase procedures. For each modality, we quantified metacognitive efficiency (meta-d’/d’)—the degree to which participants’ confidence reports were informed by the same evidence that contributed to their perceptual judgements—and metacognitive bias (mean confidence)—the participant’s tendency to report higher or lower confidence overall. We found no overall differences in metacognitive efficiency or mean confidence between modalities. Mean confidence ratings were highly correlated between all three tasks, reflecting stable inter-individual variability in metacognitive bias. However, metacognitive efficiency for pain varied independently of metacognitive efficiency for warmth and visual perception. That is, those participants who had higher metacognitive efficiency in the visual task also tended to have higher metacognitive efficiency in the warmth task, but not necessarily in the pain task. We thus suggest that some distinctive and idiosyncratic aspects of the pain experience may stem from additional variability at a metacognitive level. We further speculate that this additional variability may arise from the affective or arousal aspects of pain.

Mathematics Anxiety and Metacognitive Processes

This paper presents a proposal for a new area of investigation that connects the metacognition literature, and especially the recently developed meta-reasoning framework, with research into mathematical reasoning, mathematics learning, and mathematics anxiety. Whereas the literature on mathematics anxiety focusses on the end result of learning and problem-solving, the metacognitive approach can offer further insight by a fine-grained analysis of the stages of these processes. In particular, it provides tools for exposing students' initial assessment of tasks and test situations, the targets they set for themselves, the process of monitoring progress, and decisions to stick with or abandon a particular solution. The paper outlines various ways in which the metacognitive approach could be used to investigate the effects of mathematics anxiety on mathematics learning and problem solving. This approach could help in answering questions like: Do anxious and non-anxious learners differ in how they prepare for an exam? Are anxious students more or less prone to overconfidence than non-anxious students? What metacognitive decisions mediate maths anxious participants' tendency to give up on problems too early? Additionally, this line of work has the potential to significantly expand the scope of metacognitive investigations and provide novel insights into individual differences in the metacognitive regulation of learning and problem solving. It could also offer some practical benefits by focusing the attention of educational designers on particular components within the learning process of anxious students.

Metacognitive judgments and perceptual decisions rely on different information.

Metacognitive judgments and perceptual decisions rely on different information.

The adaptive medical curriculum: A model for continuous improvement

This paper describes the medical curriculum designed to foster adaptive expertise. Engaging in the formal and informal curriculum, students learn to achieve desired outcomes in novel situations, perform comfortably with uncertainty, and are often recognized for creative problem-solving. Students learn by asking and answering their own and others’ questions. They readily operate at the metacognitive level, anticipating events, self-monitoring, and checking decisions and emotions. A key function of the reflective process is to identify gaps or shortcomings in the thinking process. The adaptive learner shifts into reflective thinking when confronted with complex contextual and situational demands. We are only beginning to understand how to create educational pathways to foster adaptive learning. An essential focus is the adaptive teacher who frames learning and assessment around predictive analytics, reflective spaced practice, and authentic learning material. To be effective, the teacher must engage the learner outside the formal classroom in the parallel curriculum. A major premise is that learning occurs individually and together with peers, teachers, and team members in multiple contexts. During the learning process, the learner readily operates at the metacognitive level, anticipating behavior, self-monitoring and assessing, and checking theirs and others decisions and emotions. The adaptive medical curriculum provides the pathway for such learning.