In this paper, a novel message authentication model using the same key over wiretap channel is proposed to achieve <i>information-theoretic security</i>. Specifically, in the proposed model, there is a discrete memoryless channel <i>W</i><sub>1</sub> : <i>X</i> →<i>Y</i> between transmitter Alice and receiver Bob, while an attacker Oscar is connected with Alice via discrete memoryless channel <i>W</i><sub>2</sub> :<i>X</i>→<i>Z</i>. Alice encodes message <i>M</i> to codeword (<i>S</i>,<i>X<sup>n</sup></i>), using an encoding function with secret key <i>K</i>. Then, <i>S</i> is sent to Bob over a one-way noiseless channel (fully controlled by Oscar), and <i>X<sup>n</sup></i> is sent over the wiretap channel, say <i>X</i>→(<i>Y</i>,<i>Z</i>). Building on this model, a new message authentication scheme is proposed. The scheme incorporates a secure channel coding, which uses random coding techniques to detect man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. The authentication channel capacity is studied in a specific channel model when <i>W</i><sub>2</sub> is not less noisy than <i>W</i><sub>1</sub>. We theoretically demonstrate that the authentication channel capacity is much larger than the secrecy capacity, since Bob does not need to recover information transmitted over the noisy channel.
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