Mental Rotation Of Objects Research Articles

Switching between different cognitive strategies induces switch costs as evidenced by switches between manual and mental object rotation

Switching between tasks entails costs when compared to repeating the same task. It is unclear whether switch costs also occur when repeating the same task but switching the underlying cognitive strategy (CS). Here, we investigated whether CS switch costs exist despite overlap in mental processing between CSs and a lack of abstract goal (always “solve task X”) or answer key binding switches. Specifically, we asked participants to judge the identity of two misaligned objects by either mental or manual computer-mediated object rotation. In each trial of Block 1, to measure switch costs without choice-related cognitive processes, a cue indicated which CS (mental/manual) to use. In Block 2, the CS was freely chosen. Participants exhibited considerable CS switch costs for both cued and freely chosen switches. Moreover, Block 1 switch costs moderately predicted Block 2 switch frequency, while an overall tendency for CS repetition was observed. In sum, we found that switch costs are not confined to situations in which tasks are switched but generalize to situations in which the task stays identical and the CS is switched instead. The results have implications for modern computerized cognitive environments in which a multitude of cognitive strategies is available for the same task.

Human-body Analogy Improves Mental Rotation Performance in People Aged 86 to 97 Years

Mental rotation is a spatial ability allowing one to represent and rotate an object in one’s mind, and its performance declines with age. Given previous findings indicating that likening a to-be-rotated object to a human body improves mental rotation performance in young adults, we examined whether this human-body analogy would improve older adults’ mental rotation performance. We also tested whether the human-body analogy effect is age-dependent. In the present study, we analyzed data from 423 community-dwelling older adults (age range: 86–97 years; 219 men and 204 women) who answered two items of a paper-and-pencil mental rotation test: one on abstract cube objects (control condition) and one on cube objects with a human face (embodied condition). The results revealed that more participants correctly answered the item in the embodied condition (32.2%) compared to that in the control condition (19.6%), indicating that the human-body analogy is effective in an oldest-old population (i.e., people aged over 85 years). Notably, we found age differences in human-body analogy effects. While accuracy for mental rotation of abstract objects declined with age, accuracy for embodied objects was preserved with age. These findings suggest that the human-body analogy may prompt older adults to adopt a holistic, rather than a piecemeal, rotation strategy.

Mental object rotation based on two-dimensional visual representations

The discovery of mental rotation was one of the most significant landmarks in experimental psychology, leading to the ongoing assumption that to visually compare objects from different three-dimensional viewpoints, we use explicit internal simulations of object rotations, to 'mentally adjust' one object until it matches the other1. These rotations are thought to be performed on three-dimensional representations of the object, by literal analogy to physical rotations. In particular, it is thought that an imagined object is continuously adjusted at a constant three-dimensional angular rotation rate from its initial orientation to the final orientation through all intervening viewpoints2. While qualitative theories have tried to account for this phenomenon3, to date there has been no explicit, image-computable model of the underlying processes. As a result, there is no quantitative account of why some object viewpoints appear more similar to one another than others when the three-dimensional angular difference between them is the same4,5. We reasoned that the specific pattern of non-uniformities in the perception of viewpoints can reveal the visual computations underlying mental rotation. We therefore compared human viewpoint perception with a model based on the kind of two-dimensional 'optical flow' computations that are thought to underlie motion perception in biological vision6, finding that the model reproduces the specific errors that participants make. This suggests that mental rotation involves simulating the two-dimensional retinal image change that would occur when rotating objects. When we compare objects, we do not do so in a distal three-dimensional representation as previously assumed, but by measuring how much the proximal stimulus would change if we watched the object rotate, capturing perspectival appearance changes7.

A Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy Examination of the Neural Correlates of Mental Rotation for Individuals With Different Depressive Tendencies.

The present study aimed to examine the neural mechanisms underlying the ability to process the mental rotation with mirrored stimuli for different depressive tendencies with psychomotor retardation. Using functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS), we measured brain cortex activation of participants with higher and lower depressive tendencies while performing a left-right paradigm of object mental rotation or a same-different paradigm of subject mental rotation. Behavioral data revealed no differences in reaction time and rotation speed. The fNIRS data revealed a higher deactivation of oxyhemoglobin (HbO) change for the higher depression group in the perceptual stage of object mental rotation with mirrored stimuli in the superior external frontal cortex (BA46), inferior frontal gyrus (BA45), premotor cortex (BA6), and primary motor cortex (BA4) (study 1). In addition, there existed a significant difference between the two groups in premotor cortex (BA6) in subject mental rotation with mirrored stimuli (study 2). These results suggest that the neural mechanism of higher depression individuals connected with psychomotor retardation exists in the frontal and motor areas when processing object mental rotation with mirrored stimuli, and the motor cortex when processing subject mental rotation.

Viewer and object mental rotation in young adults with psychotic disorders

Schizophrenia patients have difficulty with processing visuo-spatial information, which may explain their deficits with considering other people's point-of-view. Processing visuo-spatial information operates on egocentric and allocentric frames of reference. Here, we tested the ability of individuals at different stages of psychotic disorders, specifically ultra-high-risk for psychosis individuals, as well as first-episode psychosis, and chronic schizophrenia patients, to perform a viewer mental rotation task and an object mental rotation task. The two tasks were differentiated only by the instruction given. Healthy individuals and patients with a diagnosis of anxiety/depressive mood disorder served as non-patient and patient controls, respectively. The results show that first-episode psychosis and chronic schizophrenia patients, but not ultra-high-risk individuals, had more errors and longer response times with both mental rotation tasks than the two control groups. In addition, chronic schizophrenia patients had additional difficulty with the object rotation task. The difference in performance between groups and tasks remained significant even after controlling for age, IQ, and antipsychotic medication dose. The results indicate that patients with psychotic disorders have a deficit of mental spatial imagery that include both egocentric and allocentric representations. This deficit may explain the difficulty of these patients with perspective-taking, and inferring other people's point of view, thoughts or intentions which is at the core of the pathogenesis of schizophrenia.

Mental rotation of cubes with a snake face: The role of the human-body analogy revisited

ABSTRACT Previous research has demonstrated repeatedly that the mental rotation of human-like objects can be performed more quickly than the mental rotation of abstract objects (a body analogy effect). According to existing accounts, the body analogy effect is mediated by projections of one’s own body axes onto objects (spatial embodiment), and the mental emulation of the observed body posture (motoric embodiment). To test whether motoric embodiment facilitates the mental rotation of human-like objects, we conducted an experiment using a snake-like object that had its own body axes but would be difficult to emulate. Twenty-four participants performed the mental rotation of snake-shaped cubes with or without a snake face as well as human-shaped cubes with or without a human face. Results showed that the presence of a face increased mental rotation speeds for both human-shaped and snake-shaped cubes, confirming both the human-body and snake analogy effects. More importantly, the snake analogy effect was equal to the human-body analogy effect. These findings contradict the motoric embodiment account and suggest that any object that can be regarded as a unit facilitates holistic mental rotation, which in turn leads to improved performance.

The development of gender differences in spatial reasoning: A meta-analytic review.

Gender differences in spatial aptitude are well established by adulthood, particularly when measured by tasks that require the mental rotation of objects (Linn & Petersen, 1985; Voyer, Voyer, & Bryden, 1995). Although the male advantage in mental rotation performance represents one of the most robust gender differences in adult cognition, the developmental trajectory of this male advantage remains a topic of considerable debate. To address this debate, we meta-analyzed 303 effect sizes pertaining to gender differences in mental rotation performance among 30,613 children and adolescents. We found significant developmental change in the magnitude of the gender difference: A small male advantage in mental rotation performance first emerged during childhood and then subsequently increased with age, reaching a moderate effect size during adolescence. Procedural factors, including task and stimulus characteristics, also accounted for variability in reported gender differences, even when controlling for the effect of age. These results demonstrate that both age and procedural characteristics moderate the magnitude of the gender difference in mental rotation throughout development. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Acoustic Neurofeedback Increases Beta ERD During Mental Rotation Task

The purpose of the present study was to identify the effect of acoustic neurofeedback on brain activity during consecutive stages of mental rotation of 3D objects. Given the fact that the process of mental rotation of objects is associated with desynchronisation of beta rhythm (beta ERD), it was expected that suppression in this band would be greater in the experimental group than in the controls. Thirty-three participants were randomly allocated to two groups performing the classic Shepard–Metzler mental rotation task (1971). The experimental group received auditory stimuli when the level of concentration fell below the threshold value determined separately for each participant based on the engagement index [β/(α + Θ)]. The level of concentration in the control group was not stimulated. Compared to the controls, the experimental group was found with greater beta-band suppression recorded above the left parietal cortex during the early stage and above the right parietal cortex during the late stage of mental rotation task. At the late stage of mental rotation, only the experimental group was found with differences in beta ERD related to varied degrees of the rotation angle and the control condition (zero angles, no rotation) recorded above the right parietal cortex and the central area of cerebral cortex. The present findings suggest that acoustic feedback might improve the process of mental rotation.

A letter on a hand: Rotating together or separately?

The motor system plays a role in some object mental rotation tasks, and researchers have reported that people may use a strategy of motor simulation to mentally rotate objects. In this study, we used images of a hand with a letter printed on the palm to directly determine whether a hand image can be automatically rotated during the deliberate mental rotation of an object and whether the hand and object are rotated in the same trajectory. A total of 41 participants were shown the stimuli and asked to decide whether the letters, which were upright or tilted at specific degrees, were normal or mirrored. The hand images in the background showed either a left or a right hand in the palm view, with fingers pointing upwards, medial, downwards, or lateral. Reaction times and error rates were measured to determine the speed and accuracy of mental rotation. A complex interaction between the hand posture and letter orientation revealed that the hand image was mentally rotated automatically, together with the deliberate mental rotation of the letter. The biomechanical constraints of the hand also influenced reaction times, suggesting the involvement of the motor system in the concomitant mental rotation of the hand image. Consistent with the motor simulation theory, the participants seemed to imagine the hand carrying the object in its movement. These behavioural data support the motor simulation theory and elucidate specific processes of mental rotation that have not been addressed by neuroimaging studies.

Objects Mental Rotation under 7 Days Simulated Weightlessness Condition: An ERP Study.

During the spaceflight under weightlessness condition, human's brain function may be affected by the changes of physiological effects along with the distribution of blood and body fluids to the head. This variation of brain function will influence the performance of astronauts and therefore create possible harm to flight safety. This study employs 20 male subjects in a 7-day−6° head-down tilted (HDT) bed rest model to simulate physiological effects under weightlessness condition, and use behavioral, electrophysiological techniques to compare the changes of mental rotation ability (MR ability) before and after short-term simulated weightlessness state. Behavioral results suggested that significant linear relationship existed between the rotation angle of stimuli and the reaction time, which means mental rotation process do happen during the MR task in simulated weightlessness state. In the first 3 days, the P300 component induced by object mental rotation followed the “down-up-down” pattern. In the following 4 days it changed randomly. On HDT D2, the mean of the amplitude of the P300 was the lowest, while increased gently on HDT D3. There was no obvious changing pattern of the amplitude of P300 observed after 3 days of HDT. Simulated weightlessness doesn't change the basic process of mental rotation. The effect of simulated weightlessness is neural mechanism of self-adaptation. MR ability didn't bounce back to the original level after HDT test.

Dissociating object-based from egocentric transformations in mental body rotation: effect of stimuli size.

The effect of stimuli size on the mental rotation of abstract objects has been extensively investigated, yet its effect on the mental rotation of bodily stimuli remains largely unexplored. Depending on the experimental design, mentally rotating bodily stimuli can elicit object-based transformations, relying mainly on visual processes, or egocentric transformations, which typically involve embodied motor processes. The present study included two mental body rotation tasks requiring either a same-different or a laterality judgment, designed to elicit object-based or egocentric transformations, respectively. Our findings revealed shorter response times for large-sized stimuli than for small-sized stimuli only for greater angular disparities, suggesting that the more unfamiliar the orientations of the bodily stimuli, the more stimuli size affected mental processing. Importantly, when comparing size transformation times, results revealed different patterns of size transformation times as a function of angular disparity between object-based and egocentric transformations. This indicates that mental size transformation and mental rotation proceed differently depending on the mental rotation strategy used. These findings are discussed with respect to the different spatial manipulations involved during object-based and egocentric transformations.

On the Relation Between Infants’ Spatial Object Processing and Their Motor Skills

From birth, infants encounter an environment full of objects and learn rapidly about their spatial characteristics. According to Newcombe, Uttal, and Sauter (2013), spatial development includes (1) the development of intraobject representations with the ability to transform them by mental rotation, and (2) the development of interobject representations with the ability to find and predict certain object locations. Infants’ remarkable improvements of these two strands of spatial object processing raise the major question of which factors may drive them. In this article, we discuss the extent to which infants’ development of intra- and interobject representations is related to their emerging motor skills. In particular, we provide a review on how far infants’ development of mental object rotation ability and their ability to localize objects are related to their manual object exploration and locomotion skills. We document a bulk of evidence suggesting such a link between infants’ motor development and their spatial object processing and also discuss and critically reconsider the implications of these studies.

Choosing the speed of dynamic mental simulations.

The brain continuously maintains a current representation of its immediate surroundings. Perceptual representations are often updated when the world changes, e.g., when we notice an object move. However, we can also update representations internally, without incoming signals from the senses. In other words, we can run internal simulations of dynamic events. This ability is evident during mental object rotation. These uncontroversial observations lead to an obvious question that nevertheless remains to be answered: How does the brain control the speed of dynamic mental simulations? Is there a central rate controller or pacemaker module in the brain that can be temporarily coupled to sensory maps? We can refer to this as the common rate control theory. Alternatively, the primitive intelligence within each map could tune into the speed of recent changes and use this information to keep going after stimuli disappear. We can call this the separate rate control theory. Preliminary evidence from prediction motion experiments supports common rate control, although local predictive mechanisms may cover short gaps of <200ms. The putative rate controller might turn out to be the same thing as the velocity store described in smooth pursuit eye movement models and/or the pacemaker module proposed in the cognitive timing literature. Indirect neuroimaging evidence suggests rate control is a function of the core timing system in the dorsal striatum.

An observational study of implicit motor imagery using laterality recognition of the hand after stroke

Objective: To explore the relationship between laterality recognition after stroke and impairments in attention, 3D object rotation and functional ability.Design: Observational cross-sectional study.Setting: Acute care teaching hospital.Participants: Thirty-two acute and sub-acute people with stroke and 36 healthy, age-matched controls.Main outcome measures: Laterality recognition, attention and mental rotation of objects. Within the stroke group, the relationship between laterality recognition and functional ability, neglect, hemianopia and dyspraxia were further explored.Results: People with stroke were significantly less accurate (69% vs 80%) and showed delayed reaction times (3.0 vs 1.9 seconds) when determining the laterality of a pictured hand. Deficits either in accuracy or reaction times were seen in 53% of people with stroke. The accuracy of laterality recognition was associated with reduced functional ability (R2 = 0.21), less accurate mental rotation of objects (R2 = 0.20) and dyspraxia (p = 0.03).Conclusion: Implicit motor imagery is affected in a significant number of patients after stroke with these deficits related to lesions to the motor networks as well as other deficits seen after stroke. This research provides new insights into how laterality recognition is related to a number of other deficits after stroke, including the mental rotation of 3D objects, attention and dyspraxia. Further research is required to determine if treatment programmes can improve deficits in laterality recognition and impact functional outcomes after stroke.

The visuospatial functions in children after cerebellar low-grade astrocytoma surgery: A contribution to the pediatric neuropsychology of the cerebellum.

The aim of this study was to specify whether cerebellar lesions cause visuospatial impairments in children. The study sample consisted of 40 children with low-grade cerebellar astrocytoma, who underwent surgical treatment and 40 healthy controls matched with regard to age and sex. Visuospatial abilities were tested using the spatial WISC-R subtests (Block Design and Object Assembly), Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure, Benton Judgment of Line Orientation Test, PEBL Mental Rotation Task, and Benton Visual Retention Test. To exclude general diffuse intellectual dysfunction, the WISC-R Verbal Intelligence IQ, Performance IQ, and Full-Scale IQ scores were analysed. Post-surgical medical consequences were measured with the International Cooperative Ataxia Rating Scale. Compared to controls, the cerebellar group manifested problems with mental rotation of objects, visuospatial organization, planning, and spatial construction processes which could not be explained by medical complications or general intellectual retardation. The intensity of visuospatial syndrome highly depends on cerebellar lesion side. Patients with left-sided cerebellar lesions display more severe spatial problems than those with right-sided cerebellar lesions. In conclusion, focal cerebellar lesions in children affect their visuospatial ability. The impairments profile is characterized by deficits in complex spatial processes such as visuospatial organization and mental rotation, requiring reconstruction of visual stimuli using the imagination, while elementary sensory analysis and perception as well as spatial processes requiring direct manipulation of objects are relatively better preserved. This pattern is analogous to the one previously observed in adult population and appears to be typical for cerebellar pathology in general, regardless of age.

"Put Myself Into Your Place": Embodied Simulation and Perspective Taking in Autism Spectrum Disorders.

Embodied cognition theories hold that cognitive processes are grounded in bodily states. Embodied processes in autism spectrum disorders (ASD) have classically been investigated in studies on imitation. Several observations suggested that unlike typical individuals who are able of copying the model's actions from the model's position, individuals with ASD tend to reenact the model's actions from their own egocentric perspective. Here, we performed two behavioral experiments to directly test the ability of ASD individuals to adopt another person's point of view. In Experiment 1, participants had to explicitly judge the left/right location of a target object in a scene from their own or the actor's point of view (visual perspective taking task). In Experiment 2, participants had to perform left/right judgments on front-facing or back-facing human body images (own body transformation task). Both tasks can be solved by mentally simulating one's own body motion to imagine oneself transforming into the position of another person (embodied simulation strategy), or by resorting to visual/spatial processes, such as mental object rotation (nonembodied strategy). Results of both experiments showed that individual with ASD solved the tasks mainly relying on a nonembodied strategy, whereas typical controls adopted an embodied strategy. Moreover, in the visual perspective taking task ASD participants had more difficulties than controls in inhibiting other-perspective when directed to keep one's own point of view. These findings suggested that, in social cognitive tasks, individuals with ASD do not resort to embodied simulation and have difficulties in cognitive control over self- and other-perspective.

Mental object rotation and motor development in 8- and 10-month-old infants

Recent evidence indicates that 6-month-old infants’ mental rotation of objects profits from prior manual experience, whereas observational experience does not have the same beneficial effect. The current study investigated whether older infants, at 8 and 10months, succeed in a mental rotation task after observational experience only and whether performance is related to infants’ motor development. Using the violation-of-expectation paradigm, infants (N=40) were presented with an asymmetrical object that was moved straight down behind an occluder. After the occluder was lowered, infants saw either the original object (possible event) or a mirror image of the original object (impossible event) in one of five different orientations (0° to 180° in steps of 45°). Results indicated that it was not until 10months of age that infants looked longer at the impossible outcome. Analyses including parent questionnaire data showed that mental rotation performance was related to infants’ motor development, emphasizing the importance of action experience for early cognitive development.

Developmental changes of the biomechanical effect in motor imagery

Motor imagery has been investigated in childhood and early adolescence, but not across adolescence stages; moreover, available evidence did not clarify whether the involvement of motor information in mental rotation of body parts becomes stronger or weaker during development. In the present study, we employed the hand laterality task to assess motor imagery in ninety-seven typically developing adolescents divided into three age groups (i.e., 11-12, 14-15, and 17-18 years); mental rotation of objects and letters were also assessed. As a specific marker of the motor involvement in mental rotation of body parts, we assessed the so-called biomechanical effect, that is, the advantage for judging hand pictures showing physically comfortable positions with respect to hand pictures showing physically impossible or awkward positions. Results demonstrated that the biomechanical effect did not significantly affect early adolescents' performance, whereas it became significant in 14- to 15-year-old participants and even more stronger in 17- to 18-year-old participants; this pattern did not depend on an increase in processing speed to mentally rotate both corporeal and non-corporeal (objects and letters) stimuli. The present findings demonstrated that: (1) motor imagery undergoes a continuous and progressive refinement throughout adolescence, and (2) full exploitation of motor information to mentally transform corporeal stimuli can be attained in late adolescence only.

On the relation between spontaneous perspective taking and other visuospatial processes

Common processes and representations engaged by visuospatial tasks were investigated by looking at four frequently used visuospatial research paradigms, the aim being to contribute to a better understanding of which specific processes are addressed in the different paradigms compared. In particular, the relation between spontaneous and instructed perspective taking, as well as mental rotation of body-part/non-body-part objects, was investigated. To this end, participants watched animations that have been shown to lead to spontaneous perspective taking. While they were watching these animations, participants were asked to explicitly adopt another perspective (Experiment 1), perform a mental object rotation task that involved a non-body-part object (Experiment 2), or perform a mental rotation of a body-part object (Experiment 3). Patterns of interference between the tasks, reflected in the reaction time patterns, showed that spontaneous and instructed perspective taking rely on similar representational elements to encode orientation. By contrast, no such overlap was found between spontaneous perspective taking and the rotation of non-body-part objects. Also, no overlap in orientation representation was evident with mental body-part rotations. Instead of an overlap in orientation representations, the results suggest that spontaneous perspective taking and the mental rotation of body parts rely on similar-presumably, motor-processes. These findings support the view that motor processes are involved in perspective taking and mental rotation of body parts.

Level 2 perspective taking entails two processes: Evidence from PRP experiments.

In many situations people need to mentally adopt the (spatial) perspective of other persons, an ability that is referred to as "Level 2 perspective taking." Its underlying processes have been ascribed to mental self-rotation that can be dissociated from mental object-rotation. Recent findings suggest that perspective taking/self-rotation may not require central capacity. By using the psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm and the locus-of-slack logic, the present study scrutinized these results, ruled out alternative explanations, and extended the conclusions. In sum, the findings converge on the notion that Level 2 perspective taking entails 2 processes: a first effortless process that handles rotations of 60° or less, and a second capacity-limited process of mental self-rotation proper that is only invoked at higher degrees of required perspective taking.