Mental Model Theory Research Articles

Disjunction and access to knowledge: Educational implications

In classical logic, it is possible to derive ‘either p or q’ from ‘p’ (where p and q are sentences with any content). This is a cognitive problem, since people often tend not to make inferences of that kind. This paper analyzes the solution the theory of mental models gives for this problem. Based on that solution, the paper proposes to use tasks with inferences such as that mentioned in the educational context. The idea is that those tasks can allow assessing certain learnings. In particular, they can reveal in some cases whether students understand the relations between the semantic contents assigned to p and q. This is because, following the theory of mental models, whenever q implies p, the inference must be accepted.

Intentional or Designed? The Impact of Stance Attribution on Cognitive Processing of Generative AI Service Failures.

With the rapid expansion of the generative AI market, conducting in-depth research on cognitive conflicts in human-computer interaction is crucial for optimizing user experience and improving the quality of interactions with AI systems. However, existing studies insufficiently explore the role of user cognitive conflicts and the explanation of stance attribution in the design of human-computer interactions. This research, grounded in mental models theory and employing an improved version of the oddball paradigm, utilizes Event-Related Spectral Perturbations (ERSP) and functional connectivity analysis to reveal how task types and stance attribution explanations in generative AI influence users' unconscious cognitive processing mechanisms during service failures. The results indicate that under design stance explanations, the ERSP and Phase Locking Value (PLV) in the theta frequency band were significantly lower for emotional task failures than mechanical task failures. In the case of emotional task failures, the ERSP and PLV in the theta frequency band induced by intentional stance explanations were significantly higher than those induced by design stance explanations. This study found that stance attribution explanations profoundly affect users' mental models of AI, which determine their responses to service failure.

Mistakes in Thinking about Cognitive Science and How to Reduce Them.

This article allows readers to assess their ability to detect errors in thinking in seven case histories of psychologists' thoughts about cognitive science. It explains the nature of the errors and shows that some of them reflect faulty reasoning. It presents a "model method" to improve reasoning. It is based on the theory of mental models, which gives a general account of how individuals think, both deductively and indicatively, and which postulates that individuals construct mental models of possibilities in the world. The model method enhances both the accuracy and speed of reasoning. The article concludes with some general reflections on the role of knowledge of meanings, the world, and context in thinking.

Reasoning From Quantified Modal Premises.

Quantified modal inferences interest logicians, linguists, and computer scientists, but no previous psychological study of them appears to be in the literature. Here is an example of one: All those artists are businessmen. Paulo is possibly one of the artists. What follows? People tend to conclude: Paulo is possibly a businessman (Experiment 1). It seems plausible, and it follows from an intuitive mental model in which Paulo is one of a set of artists who are businessmen. Further deliberation can yield a model of an alternative possibility in which Paulo is not one of the artists, which confirms that the conclusion is only a possibility. The snag is that standard modal logics, which deal with possibilities, cannot yield a particular conclusion to any premises: Infinitely many follow validly (from any premises) but they do not include the present conclusion. Yet, further experiments corroborated a new mental model theory's predictions for various inferences (Experiment 2), for the occurrence of factual conclusions drawn from premises about possibilities (Experiment 3) and for inferences from premises of modal syllogisms (Experiment 4). The theory is therefore plausible, but we explore the feasibility of a cognitive theory based on modifications to modal logic.

Exclusive Disjunctions With Three Disjuncts from First-Order Predicate Calculus

First-order predicate logic seems to be incompatible with the way people understand embedded exclusive disjunctions with three disjuncts. In classical logic, an exclusive disjunction with three disjuncts holds when the three disjuncts hold. However, it is hard to note that for people. The theory of mental models can explain this fact. According to that theory, individuals tend to process embedded exclusive disjunctions with three disjuncts intuitively. Thus, they only consider possible situations in which just one of the disjuncts is the case. The present paper tries to explain this problem within first-order predicate logic. The main point is that, in the latter logic, in inferences having, as its first premise, an embedded exclusive disjunction with three disjuncts, and, as its second premise, the first disjunct of that very exclusive disjunction, it is possible to infer none of the other two disjuncts.

HAZMAT Technician-level Emergency Response: A Mental Model Framework for Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) Incidents.

This research examines the cognitive frameworks used by HAZMAT technicians when responding to incidents involving Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs), which are conventional explosive devices with radioactive materials incorporated. The objective is to introduce the Expected Mental Model State (EMMS) as a comprehensive evaluation tool for assessing and enhancing the expertise and situational awareness of emergency responders dealing with radiation crises. Through a series of expert focus group sessions using the well-established qualitative methodology of grounded theory, an Expected Mental Model State (EMMS) was developed. The methodology used an influence diagram architecture to conceptually capture and codify key areas relevant to effective emergency response. The research identifies fourteen EMMS key conceptual domains, further elaborated into 301 subtopics, providing a multi-dimensional structure for the proposed mental model framework. Three pivotal notions of mental model emerged within the EMMS framework: Knowledge Topology, Envisioning (Belief), and Response and Operability. These notions were found to align with previous theories of mental models and are vital for understanding how HAZMAT technicians conceptualize and respond to RDD incidents. The study emphasizes the critical role of mental models in enhancing preparedness and effective response strategies during radiation emergencies. The EMMS framework offers a versatile methodology that can be adapted across various kinds of emergency responders and high-risk situations, including the broader Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) spectrum. Using this EMMS framework to develop an EMMS Diagnostic Matrix can provide a roadmap for identifying areas for the development of specialized training modules that have the potential to significantly elevate both the quality and efficacy of responder training and preparation.

From human-centred to humanity-ecosystem centred design. How can we dialogue with AI?

AbstractWith the swift entry of artificial intelligence (AI) into everyday life, human-product interactions are becoming increasingly complex. We suggest an ecosystem-minded, humanity-centered design approach to better understand this complexity. Simultaneously with the development of interaction types, discussions and developments on theories of mental models are crucial to understanding and improving the nature of these interactions. In this paper, we address the gap in mental model theories and extend Norman's conceptual model at three dialogue levels: dialogue in language, mind, and use.

Progressive Confirmation of Two Mental Systems

From current cognitive science, some theories propose that the human mind includes two systems: a system leading quick intuitions and a system ruling slow logical reasoning. Given that the systems are in the mind, one might think that their existence is difficult to check. This paper presents a way to gradually confirm the hypothesis about the two systems. It adopts the conception of the two systems as presented by the theory of mental models. Moreover, following Carnap’s proposal of reduction, the paper describes two procedures to incrementally confirm the hypothesis. One of them investigates human performance at inferences in the form of Modus Tollendo Tollens. The other one investigates inferences from an exclusive disjunction having three disjuncts.

The reduction sentences are easy even within a Popperian view

Rudolf Carnap proposed three reduction rules to improve scientific language. Those rules indicate when it is correct to add a property in situations in which other properties are already had. Assuming the theory of mental models, it has been shown that the rules are not hard to use from the cognitive point of view. The key to argue that is to accept that the human mind works as dual-process theories claim. According to these theories, people can use two different systems. One of them implies effort but the other one does not. Thus, the idea is that Carnap’s reduction rules can be applied resorting just to the system not implying cognitive effort. This paper goes one step further and poses that even from a Popperian perspective the reduction rules keep not being difficult. One might think that falsifiability requires cognitive effort because it needs to address situations in which the sentences are false. However, this paper tries to explain that, following the theory of mental models, that is not hard if the sentences are conditionals, and the sentences in the reduction rules have conditional structures.

Are There Two Kinds of Reasoners?

There is little consensus about the underlying parameters of human reasoning. Two major theories have been proposed that suppose very different mechanisms. The mental model theory proposes that people use working memory intensive processes in order to construct limited models of problem parameters. Probabilistic theories propose that reasoning is a process by which people use the sum of their existing knowledge in order to generate an estimate of the probability of a conclusion given problem parameters. Following an initial proposition by Verschueren et al., the dual-strategy model supposes that these different approaches to reasoning are in fact an important individual difference. Specifically, a recently developed diagnostic questionnaire has identified two major categories of reasoners: Counterexample reasoners use a mental model form of processing, while Statistical reasoners use a probabilistic form of processing. In the following, I describe results that show that the Counterexample/Statistical distinction affects information processing across a variety of reasoning and judgment tasks. In addition, strategy use correlates with performance on very different kinds of thinking, such as contingency judgments, processing of negative emotions, or susceptibility to social biases. Although this distinction is related to differences in cognitive ability, it has been found to predict performance over and above these differences. More recent results have shown that it is possible to experimentally modify strategy use. These results suggest that strategy use is an important individual difference that can affect performance in a wide variety of contexts.

HEURISTICS, DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES, LOGIC, AND MENTAL MODELS

Dual-process theories differentiate two components in the human mind. Intuition is the main ability in one of them: System 1. The essential ability of the other one, System 2, is deliberation. Heuristics have been linked to System 1, to System 2, and to both of them. The latter alternative is adopted by Nadurak. This paper follows that alternative too. It takes an example Nadurak gives and, based on it, shows that deliberation is indeed necessary to modify heuristics. The paper shows this from two perspectives: from an approach considering the human mind to be led by standard logic, and from a framework rejecting that very idea: the theory of mental models.

Can we change how people reason? Effects of instructions to reason differently and reasoning strategy.

Mental model (Johnson-Laird, 2001) and probabilistic theories (Oaksford & Chater, 2009) claim to provide distinct explanations of human reasoning. However, the dual strategy model of reasoning suggests that this distinction corresponds to different reasoning strategies, termed counterexample and statistical, respectively. There is clear evidence that most people have a preference for a given strategy, and that this predicts performance on a variety of forms of reasoning and judgment (Thompson & Markovits, 2021). To date, however, the evidence for this conclusion has been correlational in nature; in the current studies, we manipulated strategy use. To this end, we gave people (N = 885) explicit instructions to reason either using a counterexample strategy or a probabilistic strategy. In two studies, we observed that the ability to follow these instructions was constrained by people's spontaneous strategy use, and that the effect of instructions carried over to two subsequent forms of reasoning (a) belief-biased inferences and (b) base-rate judgments. Finally, the ability to follow instructions was correlated with reasoning accuracy on both tasks. These results provide strong evidence for the underlying reality of the dual strategy model and show that explicit instructions to reason differently can modify performance on different forms of reasoning. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Induction: Possibilities, frequency, and confidence

The theory of mental models describes how human beings often make inductive inferences. That account is based on possibilities. It claims that, in inductions, people tend to prefer the possibility that seems to be more probable. The present paper tries to develop the account by proposing an additional quantitative method to determine which of the two possibilities in inductive processes is preferable. The paper resorts to a Non-Axiomatic Logic: NAL. NAL assigns quantitative values to the frequency and confidence of sentences. It also shows how those values can be transmitted from premises to conclusions in inductive inferences. This part of NAL is applied to the account of induction the theory of mental models gives.

The suppression task and first‐order predicate calculus

AbstractThe suppression task challenges classical logic. Classical logic is monotonic. However, in the suppression task, an inference with the form of modus ponendo ponens is inhibited by adding a new premise. Several explanations have been given to account for this fact. The present paper indicates three of them as examples: that of the theory of mental models, that based on logic programming and closed world assumption, and that referring to Carnap's concept of state‐descriptions. Besides, the paper offers one more explanation linked to Carnap's idea of reduction. It proposes sentences akin to a reduction sentence, a pair reduction, and a bilateral reduction sentence. Those sentences are related to the initial conditional in the suppression task. This proposal tries to stay within first‐order predicate logic.

Human verifications: Computable with truth values outside logic

Cognitive scientists treat verification as a computation in which descriptions that match the relevant situation are true, but otherwise false. The claim is controversial: The logician Gödel and the physicist Penrose have argued that human verifications are not computable. In contrast, the theory of mental models treats verification as computable, but the two truth values of standard logics, true and false, as insufficient. Three online experiments (n = 208) examined participants' verifications of disjunctive assertions about a location of an individual or a journey, such as: 'You arrived at Exeter or Perth'. The results showed that their verifications depended on observation of a match with one of the locations but also on the status of other locations (Experiment 1). Likewise, when they reached one destination and the alternative one was impossible, their use of the truth value: could be true and could be false increased (Experiment 2). And, when they reached one destination and the only alternative one was possible, they used the truth value, true and it couldn't have been false, and when the alternative one was impossible, they used the truth value: true but it could have been false (Experiment 3). These truth values and those for falsity embody counterfactuals. We implemented a computer program that constructs models of disjunctions, represents possible destinations, and verifies the disjunctions using the truth values in our experiments. Whether an awareness of a verification's outcome is computable remains an open question.

Jaina logic: a model-based analysis of the seven predications

A relevant part of Jainism is its logic. Jaina logic gives tools to communicate and argue. However, it is problematic from the western perspective: it seems to be a paraconsistent system, that is, a system in which a fact and the denial of that very fact can be true at once. Those difficulties have been overtaken from interpretations that ignore classical standard logic and assess Jaina logic from a point of view more linked to reasoning and the real use of natural language. One of those interpretations have resorted to the theory of mental models, and that interpretation is the one the present paper develops. This is because the theory of mental models has been updated and, hence, any relation provided between Jaina logic and this last theory should be updated as well.

Shared mental models: a new approach to understanding entrepreneurs’ and investors’ representations

ABSTRACT The literature on venture-capital investment and entrepreneurship has demonstrated the important role played by mental representations in the entrepreneur – investor relationship. This research draws on shared mental model (SMM) theory to structure a comparative analysis of investor and entrepreneur representations regarding success and the factors that influence it. Through 16 interviews conducted with four entrepreneur – investor pairs, we highlight the need to study representations in greater depth in order to identify potential misalignments. We demonstrate the relevance of SMMs and the use of cognitive maps in capturing and comparing actors’ representations through multi-level and multi-approach analysis.

Truth Logic of Modalities Consistent and Incompatible: A Computational Program and Experimental Studies among College Students

College students give true judgment routinely, logicians can infer modal inferences, i.e., inferences that concern three alethic modalities; necessary (⸧), possible (◊), and impossible (⟢) from the premises that are logically consistent and incompatible. To achieve the desired results, logicians have intermingled alethic modalities with logical consistency and incompatibility, i.e., necessary consistent, impossible incompatible, possible consistent, or possible incompatible, and write them in classical modal logic as ⸧C (necessary consistent), ◊C (possible consistent) or ◊I (possibly incompatible) and ⟢I (impossible incompatible). M paradigm [Modality, Mental logic theory (MLT), and Mental model theory (MMT)] have been built to enlighten this truth logic. The basic idea of this study is to examine the theory; how do students judge whether two or more different propositions are possible? and, whether their judgment is true. Truth logic is used to construct some principles that help to justify the above theory. First, inferences have either ◊C/ ◊I or ⸧C but assertions are consistent. Second, each ◊C/ ◊I inference and premise is evaluated for both single and double model assertions, and they have consistency (i.e., ⸧C/◊C) and incompatibility (i.e., ◊I or ⟢I). As logicians have predicted, students mostly endorse inferences as ◊C/ ◊I rather than ⸧C and the ⟢I rate is higher in multi-model assertions. Syllogistic logical reasoning with conditionals (if, then...), conjunctions (and), disjunctions (or), and quantifiers “all” and “some” have been used in the M paradigm to evaluate predictions. Moreover, a computational program and experimental studies have strongly supported the all given principles and predictions.

Kuram Odaklı Analizlerde Soru Listesi Geliştirme: Dört Çerçeve Modeli ve İlişkili Kuramlar

The aim of this research is to develop a checklist of questions that can be used in the analysis of institutional functioning or problems by relating each framework in the four-framework model developed by Bolman and Deal with different theories. Graduate education institutions were selected as the unit of analysis and the questions were developed taking into account the functioning and problems in the institutions. The method of document analysis was used in the research based on qualitative research. Graduate theses in Google Scholar and YÖK thesis database, articles, papers and books published in refereed journals and indexed in international and national indexes were used as data sources. In selecting the theories, the overlap between the content of the Four Frame Model and the assumptions of the theories was taken into account. The selected theories are limited to the accessed theories and the consensus among the researchers regarding the content of the Four Fram Model and the overlap of the assumptions of these theories. In the process of data collection and analysis, an algorithm was created by the researchers and description, sampling and association were used in the analysis. According to the results of the research, a checklist of questions was developed, taking into account that the structural frame dimension of the model can be used with Bureaucracy Theory and Organisational Ecology Theory; the human resource frame dimension with Motivation Theory and Mental Models Theory; the political framework with Organisational Cohesion Theory and Actor Network Theory; and the symbolic frame with Symbolic Interaction Theory. In a further study, the checklist can be extended with different theories, the functionality of the question checklist can be tested with experimental studies, and software for theory-oriented decision support systems can be developed. Keywords: Four-Frame Model Theory based analysis, postgraduate education,

REMINISCENCE THEORY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL: SOME MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS IN PLATO’S PHAEDO

This paper focuses on a particular discussion Plato describes in Phaedo. That is the discussion between Socrates and Cebes about the preexistence and immortality of the soul. The paper does not try to clarify or better understand the discussion. It is only intended to show that the mental representations underlying the arguments both Socrates and Cebes give are consistent with the possibilities the theory of mental models attributes to human reasoning. In this way, the present paper attempts to support the basic theses of that theory.