Almost all of the world’s legal systems assume that criminal responsibility can-not be established if the defendant was not capable to appreciate the wrongful-ness of his/her actions ( 1). Furthermore, most Western Penal Codes assume that the defendant cannot be convicted if he/she is considered unable to evaluate the circumstances surrounding the anti-juridical fact, and/or if he/she is unable to control his/her urges, impulses, or responses. If a subject lacked these abili-ties, then courts may use statements such as “not guilty by reason of insan-ity,” “incapacitated person,” or “(partial) mental insanity” (2). Recent develop-ments of neuroscience in clinical practice have lead to consider the potential role of neuroscience data for assessing crimi-nal responsibility in forensic psychiatric examination (FPE) ( 3). In the literature, opportunities, threats, and limitations of the introduction of neuroscience in FPE have been widely debated (4, 5). It has been proposed that the use of neurosci-ence data in FPE may, at least in some circumstances, support the detection of such disabilities. Conversely, it has been also stressed the potential misleading role of neuroscience data in courts.Traditionally, the debate focused on four major issues:(a)renowned judgments involving the reference to neuroscience data in FPE (6–8)(b)the relationship between brain abnor-malities and violent behaviors leading to criminal acts: * in conduct disorders (e.g., antisocial personality disorder, psychopathy, 9–11) * following traumatic brain injury (12–14) * in sleep/awareness disorders (15–17)(c) opportunities and limitations of neu-roimaging techniques (e.g., Magnetic Resonance Imaging, MRI; functio-nal MRI, fMRI; Positron Emission Tomography, PET) (18, 19), behavioral genetics (20), and lie-detection techni-ques (21)(d)Heterogeneity in admissibility criteria of neuroscience data through different legal systems (22, 23). Let’s consider US legal system: the rules governing expert testimony usually refer to “Frye” or “Daubert” approach ( 24). Furthermore, the crucial but controversial role of Federal Rules of Evidence (notably FRE 401, FRE 403, and FRE 702) in US legal system is a vexing issue in the literature [for a detailed description, (18)]. In many legal system, e.g., in Italy, there is not something like Federal Rules of Evidence and the judge has to evaluate – case by case – evidences presented by experts (e.g., psychiatrist, psychologist, or neurologist). If the interpretation of FRE may sometimes be hard and misle-ading, no specific criteria for admissibi-lity (except for judge’s decision) may be also extremely dangerous.Our aim is to highlight the critical issues about the conditions that support – in spe-cific circumstances – the introduction of neuroscience data in FPE. In other words, before advocating or refusing the use of neuroscience data in FPE, we have to clarify the role that these data can have in FPE (i.e., a probative value for forensic assessment).Firstly, we shortly hint at classical cognitive paradigms and their limitations. Secondly, we show that most of the Western Penal Codes are shaped assuming a sort of dualist model of human cognition. Finally, we describe potential misleading implica-tions of neuroscience data endorsed in a dualist legal framework. Even if no neuro-science data can definitively discriminate neither between crime nor a mental defect, and neither between culpability nor inno-cence, we suggest that the introduction of neuroscience in FPE may be – in specific circumstances – useful and compelling.