Civil War Mediation Research Articles

Civil war mediation in the shadow of IGOs: The path to comprehensive peace agreements

Recent research shows that comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs) are effective in ending civil wars and improving post-conflict conditions, but CPAs emerge in only a fraction of civil wars. This study provides systematic evidence about the origins of CPAs and the role of international actors in facilitating their signing. We argue that mediation is more likely to be successful and that CPAs are more likely to emerge in those civil war countries that are members in a higher number of IGOs with high economic leverage. Using their financial and institutional leverage, these IGOs can help the combatants overcome the credible commitment problems associated with entering into mediation, and with making sufficient concessions and compromises to reach and sign a CPA. Analyzing all intrastate armed conflicts from 1989 to 2011, we find that a conflict country’s memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage increase the odds of (1) mediation occurring and (2) mediation subsequently leading to the signing of CPAs. This finding is robust to common sources of spurious relationships between international institutions and the behavior of conflict parties. Participating in IGOs with high economic leverage carries important positive consequences for civil war management and enhances the impact of mediation on getting conflict parties to sign CPAs.

Civil War Mediation and the Conflict Environment: Does Regional Instability Influence the Onset of Mediation?

Abstract Hostile regional environments can spur civil war at home. Do they also affect mediation in a state’s ongoing civil war? We hypothesize they do, but in ways that produce competing effects: Third parties hesitate to offer mediation in a conflictual environment, but hostile environments also make disputants more amenable to mediation. We test these diverging expectations using a measure of conflict environments that aggregates spatially and temporally proximate civil war in a state’s neighborhood. Our empirical analyses reveal that third parties are significantly less likely to offer mediation as exogenous factors mount, a finding that holds even for third parties who have historic or security linkages to the civil war state. However, we find limited evidence that disputants’ decisions to accept mediation are driven by regional security concerns. Instead, local conflict conditions present more pressing concerns that drive disputants to accept offers to mediate. Taken together, the findings suggest potential mediators should pay attention to both a civil war state’s regional environment and local conditions, lest they underestimate disputants’ willingness to come to the table. Our work newly underscores the costs and risks associated with conflict hot spots and the risk for certain conflicts to be bypassed by peace brokers.

Bias and balance in civil war mediation

This article identifies a mechanism through which multiparty mediation – mediation with multiple active third parties – has positive effects on civil war resolution. Balanced mediation efforts – those providing third parties biased toward both sides of the dispute – have unique advantages in generating peaceful outcomes. In particular, balanced efforts alleviate the commitment concerns faced by both the rebel group and the government, improving the prospects for peace. In this article, I develop a measure, Mediation balance, which aggregates the mediators’ biases when multiple third parties are present. I also consider, both theoretically and empirically, how the number of mediators interacts with mediation balance to shape outcomes. I test my theory on civil war mediation attempts between 1989 and 2005, finding that balanced mediation efforts improve the probability of reaching an agreement. Furthermore, the strength of this effect is influenced by the number of mediators involved. Mediation balance also influences the probability the agreement halts the violence, albeit in unexpected ways.

War-Making and Mediation in Civil Wars: Three Ideal Types of Third Parties and Ripeness Concepts

ABSTRACT Despite the accumulation of a sizable scholarship on mediation of civil war by third-party states, little effort has been made to formulate a conceptual framework geared toward explaining how the prior or ongoing modes of their engagements in war-making affect their possible conduct of mediation. The present article is an attempt to fill this lacuna by presenting a threefold typology of third-party states: war-making patrons, war-supporting friends, and war-observing bystanders. The article explores how these three kinds are distinct from one another as a mediator, in terms of such crucial aspects as motives and timing, readiness, bias and commitment, and leverage. This inquiry is pursued through extending to the level of third parties Zartman’s seminal notions of a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’, a ‘way out’, and a ‘mutually enticing opportunity’ that have hitherto been discussed mainly at the level of primary parties. The article is intended as the presentation of an analytical framework and initial propositions rather than full-scale research results.

Third-party knowledge and success in civil war mediation

Within this article, we explore how third-party knowledge of ongoing conflicts shapes the ability of mediators to successfully end conflicts through negotiated settlements. Since the primary role of mediators is to share information, and combatants have incentives to misrepresent information, contextual knowledge about the conflict and actors is critical. We argue that experienced diplomats with greater knowledge of the civil war state, close knowledge of the combatants, and connections with civil society are less vulnerable and more effective in mediation efforts. We propose that third parties seeking a diplomatic solution to ongoing conflicts may be more successful when they maintain strong diplomatic knowledge of the disputants as well as knowledge of the processes by which previous mediation efforts have attempted to resolve the dispute. Using a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model on peace agreements from 1989 to 2005, we find strong support that diplomatic knowledge matters significantly.

Negotiation and Mediation in the Hard(est) Cases

Abstract In seeking a fuller understanding of the provision and effectiveness of negotiation and mediation, salient lessons can be gleaned from instances in which these processes seem unlikely to succeed or unlikely to be tried at all. Contributions to this special issue of International Negotiation purposefully avoid mining examples of success stories for correlates. The contributors have instead consciously identified and examined applications of negotiation and mediation in the hard(est) cases, with the objective of teasing out what shortcomings and even failures can tell us about the prospects of negotiation and mediation as practices of conflict management and resolution. Using the criteria discussed in this introductory article, this collection examines negotiation and mediation in international crises, intractable conflicts, civil wars, and other cases defined by complex contextual environments, actor configurations, and disputes – with the goal of revealing insights that can improve the effectiveness of negotiation and mediation in application.

Causal mechanisms in civil war mediation: Evidence from Syria

Studies of conflict management by international organizations have demonstrated correlations between institutional characteristics and outcomes, but questions remain as to whether these correlations have causal properties. To examine how institutional characteristics condition the nature of international organization interventions, I examine mediation and ceasefire monitoring by the Arab League and the United Nations during the first phase of the Syrian civil war (2011–2012). Using micro-evidence sourced from unique interview material, day-to-day fatality statistics, and international organization documentation, I detail causal pathways from organizational characteristics, via intervention strategies, to intervention outcomes. I find that both international organizations relied on comparable intervention strategies. While mediating, they counseled on the costs of conflict, provided coordination points, and managed the bargaining context so as to sideline spoilers and generate leverage. While monitoring, they verified violent events, engaged in reassurance patrols, and brokered local truces. The execution of these strategies was conditioned on organizational capabilities and member state preferences in ways that help explain both variation in short-term conflict abatement and the long-term failure of both international organizations. In contrast to the Arab League, the United Nations intervention, supported by more expansive resources and expertise, temporarily shifted conflict parties away from a violent equilibrium. Both organizations ultimately failed as disunity among international organization member state principals cut interventions short and reduced the credibility of international organization mediators.

The Importance of Being Earnest (in Mediation): Rebel Group Structure, Leadership Turnover, and Success in Civil War Mediation

Abstract Within the study of mediation, a common argument is that mediators are often successful because they provide credible information to combatants thereby reducing asymmetries of information. Unfortunately, there are a number of reasons to assume that rebel groups are providing misinformation to mediators as well as to the government. Equally, mediators must also deal with an incumbent government that may not be negotiating in good faith. This study suggests that rebel group structure may assist with this problem. Rebel groups that operate parallel political wings often inadvertently signal their reservation points in an effort to mobilize support. Mediators also seek signals that the government is willing to credibly commit to a settlement. Leadership turnover may be one such signal, as new leaders are not beholden to old vested interests. To evaluate these propositions, a statistical test of mediation efforts in civil wars is conducted from 1989 to 2005.

Reputation and the occurrence and success of mediation in civil wars

In this article, we argue that because governments fear that accepting mediation and reaching agreements with opponents may signal weakness to other potential challengers, civil war governments tend to resist mediation as a means of demonstrating their resolve. Building on current theories of reputation in civil war, we argue that the threat of future challenges from other groups is likely to be particularly acute in states with multiple ethnic groups, especially states with high levels of ethnic exclusion. We therefore expect that civil wars in these states will be less likely to see mediation and to produce agreements when they do. By examining all instances of mediation in intrastate conflict from 1990 to 2008, we test this argument empirically and find that mediation is more likely to emerge in civil wars where there are a large number of ethnic groups, but is less likely to occur when many of those ethnic groups are excluded from the political process. Once mediation is underway, however, it is less likely to yield a negotiated settlement when there are a large number of ethnic groups, but more likely to end in a negotiated settlement when many of the ethnic groups are excluded from the political process.

Talking to the Shameless?: Sexual Violence and Mediation in Intrastate Conflicts

To what extent, does sexual violence influence the likelihood of conflict management in intrastate conflicts? Despite a growing body of research that explores conflict-related sexual violence, the literature presents little insight on its effects on conflict resolution. Extending feminist international relations (IR) theory to intrastate conflicts and applying a gender lens to the power to hurt argument, I argue that when rebel sexual violence is public knowledge, the likelihood of conflict management increases because the state perceives it as a threat to its masculinity. I systematically test this argument on all intrastate conflict years from 1990 to 2009 using the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict and the Civil War Mediation data set. The results provide robust support for the argument. This presents an important refinement of traditional rationalist conflict bargaining theories and opens new avenues for the research and practice of conflict management.

What do they Want? Rebels’ Objectives and Civil War Mediation

AbstractIn this paper, we focus on mediation in intrastate conflicts, specifically on the impact of rebel group goals on the prospects for mediation. We ask whether the goals for which rebel groups fight (i.e. secession, irredentism, autonomy, greater political rights, government overthrow) have an impact on the likelihood that these conflicts will be mediated. We test our hypotheses on a new data set of rebel groups in Africa 1962–2010.

Civil war mediation and integration into global value chains

ABSTRACTHow does the globalization of production affect interstate behavior? While scholars have paid significant attention to the effect of global value chains on trade and political economy, there has been substantially less focus on the interaction between globalized production and conflict behavior. However, the changing economic landscape has the potential to alter the decision calculus of leaders on a variety of issues, including conflict mediation. In this research note, I argue that when deciding how to allocate scarce mediation resources, major powers pay attention to the position of potential beneficiaries in the global production network. In particular, among states involved in intrastate conflicts, those that are more heavily involved in the production and sale of intermediate inputs are more likely to receive mediation from major powers. I test this argument using data on intermediate trade and civil war mediation between 1991 and 2011. The results of the analysis are consistent with the theory, suggesting that major powers are more likely to provide mediation for producers of intermediate goods, but not for consumers.

The motivation of European Union mediation in civil conflicts

ABSTRACTSince the EU has expanded its common security focus in the 1990s, this important regional organisation has become the most frequent mediator in low-level civil conflicts worldwide. Under what conditions is the European Union (EU) likely to become involved in mediation in civil conflicts? Is the participation in mediation only explained by the EU's bias toward its near abroad, or is the EU more strategic? Some scholars have suggested that the EU's regional bias for its near abroad is the key explanation for the onset of EU mediation, but we propose that the reality of EU mediation presents a more nuanced story. We posit three explanations based on mediator bias: regional bias, economic bias, and normative bias. Overall, we argue that the EU will mediate in civil conflicts that are in its near abroad, but also where the EU has economic bias and where the EU can exercise its normative power in highly intractable conflicts. We test our hypotheses using statistical analysis of the UCDP low-level civil conflicts data from 1993 to 2004 and Civil War Mediation data from 1974 to 2005. We find strong support for our hypotheses, determining key factors that reveal the EU's strategic onset of mediation.

The ‘blame game frame’: Ethical blame patterns and media framing upon negotiations failure in the Middle East

To understand the relationship between ethical basis of blame, framing and its impact on future negotiations in protracted conflicts, we examined the blame occurrences (n = 721) in written press coverage of the 2014 Israeli–Palestinian and the 2016 Syrian Civil War mediation efforts. Through quantitative and qualitative analyses, our study found that episodic framing is exclusively utilized when presenting action-based blame, which explicitly casts blame upon acts, while thematic framing can be utilized to present (1) action-based blame; (2) virtue-based blame, which casts blame on the personality traits of the actor; and (3) conflict-essence based blame, a meta-discourse critical of the assumption that rational, right action or virtue based on a universal ‘good’ have the potential to solve an intrinsically intractable conflict. Our data challenge the dichotomy of episodic framing/conflict escalation coverage versus thematic framing/conflict de-escalation. We illustrate that in the case of blame, thematically presented blame is more destructive for future relations and potential negotiations between the actors. These findings provide valuable insights for understanding the relationship between journalism, blame, and conflict resolution.

Oil, relative strength and civil war mediation

Civil conflicts within oil-rich states tend to last longer but are less likely to be mediated and end in a peace agreement. This implies that oil-funded conflict is less likely to end through a mediated settlement, despite offering a greater opportunity for peaceful resolution. This article builds on this puzzle, focusing on the following research question: to what extent does the presence of non-lootable natural resources impact on the onset and outcome of civil war mediation? I argue that oil wealth raises the relative capacity of the incumbent, making it more challenging for insurgents to force mediation and gain the guarantees against defection that are needed to resolve the problem of credible commitment. This theory is tested on 319 civil conflict episodes between 1946 and 2004. The results support the argument that non-lootable natural resources exert a strong negative effect on both the onset and outcome of mediation. The analysis also reveals that the negative effect of petroleum wealth increases relative to a state’s hydrocarbon revenue (per capita). This is an important contribution to conflict research focused on natural resources that has previously overlooked the relationship between resource wealth and civil conflict management efforts.

Which type of international organizations can settle civil wars?

International organizations (IOs) take on an increasing share of civil war mediation around the world. The determinants of IO mediation effectiveness remain poorly understood, partly because prior research has not adequately captured the institutional heterogeneity of peace-brokering IOs. To explore how mediation effectiveness depends on institutional variation, I combine newly gathered data on the design of 13 peace-brokering IOs with existing data on 109 civil war mediation episodes in the 1975-2004 period. I find that IOs with institutionalized capabilities to deploy field missions, such as peacekeeping operations, outperform other IOs as mediators of civil wars, whereas information-gathering capacity does not yield a significant advantage. The results suggest that IO enforcement assistance has a forward-looking effect: the ability to credibly signal, ex ante, that peacekeeping or monitoring forces will be deployed to enforce an agreement, helps IOs shape negotiations long before forces are actually deployed. Reaffirming the credible commitment theory of conflict resolution, the study demonstrates that there is considerable variation among external guarantors, which explains why some IOs can shift civil war disputants away from violent bargaining strategies whereas other cannot.

Civil War Mediation and Rebel Use of Violence Against Civilians

Violence against civilians is portrayed as an antecedent of civil war, a cause, or both. Civil war creates opportune environments for planning and carrying out these acts that in turn can have detrimental effects on peace processes. Since not all civil war factions will see peace as beneficial, some actors may use violence to undermine the peace talks. The rebels may use indiscriminate violence to demonstrate their ability to exact costs on the government thus forcing the latter to negotiate. This article focuses upon acts of violence committed by rebel groups during mediated peace process. The central hypothesis is that violence against civilians increases the probability of mediation that in turn increases the prospects for violence. Using all civil war episodes from 1970 to 2008 as observations results from bivariate probit analysis endogenizing the choice of mediation bear out this theoretical argument.

Finding a Peace that Lasts

How does leverage vary across different mediators? What influence does this variation have on mediation outcomes? Extant literature has equated mediation leverage with material power. Leverage, however, is context dependent and comprised of two dimensions: capability and credibility. Capability leverage is a function of economic resources and power, while credibility leverage derives influence from historical and cultural ties that bolster a mediator’s contextual knowledge of a conflict. I hypothesize that mediators with capability leverage are more likely to achieve short-term success, whereas mediators with credibility leverage generate more durable settlements. I quantitatively test the hypotheses using civil war mediation attempts from 1989 to 2006. I find that capability leverage does indeed contribute to the achievement of short-term success; credibility leverage, however, generates a more durable peace. The results demonstrate the importance of understanding mediation leverage as a context-dependent concept and highlight the potential long-term benefits of softer forms of mediation.

Structural Conditions for Conflict Mediation in Civil Wars: The Role of Aid and Social Service Provision

Despite a considerable body of knowledge that examines the negative effects of aid and related social services during civil wars, the role these same services can contribute to conflict management and transformation is less well understood. This article describes findings from a research study undertaken by the author to examine this question through a comparison of experiences with respect to social service provision in three very different conflicts – Northern Ireland, Tajikistan and Sudan. It discusses the ways that aid and social service provision can change structural conditions, making mediation efforts more likely. It also considers the limitations of aid’s effectiveness in this regard.

To Prosecute or Not to Prosecute: Civil War Mediation and International Criminal Justice

The International Criminal Court (icc) came into force in July 2002 with the potential to drastically alter both the war fighting and peacemaking behavior of states. Theiccis designed to try and subsequently punish those found guilty of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Supporters of theicchave argued that its establishment will erode the norm of impunity that state and military leaders have historically enjoyed. Yet, another logic suggests that the initiation of aniccinvestigation or the issuance of an arrest warrant for individuals embroiled in an ongoing dispute may make matters worse. Such individuals may see little reason to stop fighting and reach a settlement if conflict resolution results in their detention in The Hague. Indeed, suspected war criminals and their patrons may wish to escalate their violence in order to avoid showing any sign of weakness or possibility of capitulation lest their enemies press the fight or their rivals seek to undermine their authority. In this article, we explore the potential impact of theiccon the likelihood of peace by examining the impact of actions by theicc– the initiation of investigations into conflict situations and the issuance of arrest warrants for those suspected of committing violations of international law – on the likelihood of mediation. Our findings suggest that whileiccarrest warrants can encourage mediation, the initiation of investigations by theicccan actually undermine the occurrence of mediation.