Maximum Differential Probability Research Articles

Differential Trail Search in Cryptographic Primitives with Big-Circle Chi:

Proving upper bounds for the expected differential probability (DP) of differential trails is a standard requirement when proposing a new symmetric primitive. In the case of cryptographic primitives with a bit-oriented round function, such as Keccak, Xoodoo and Subterranean, computer assistance is required in order to prove strong upper bounds on the probability of differential trails. The techniques described in the literature make use of the fact that the non-linear step of the round function is an S-box layer. In the case of Keccak and Xoodoo, the S-boxes are instances of the chi mapping operating on l-bit circles with l equal to 5 and 3 respectively. In that case the differential propagation properties of the non-linear layer can be evaluated efficiently by the use of pre-computed difference distribution tables.Subterranean 2.0 is a recently proposed cipher suite that has exceptionally good energy-efficiency when implemented in hardware (ASIC and FPGA). The non-linear step of its round function is also based on the chi mapping, but operating on an l = 257-bit circle, comprising all the state bits. This making the brute-force approach proposed and used for Keccak and Xoodoo infeasible to apply. Difference propagation through the chi mapping from input to output can be treated using linear algebra thanks to the fact that chi has algebraic degree 2. However, difference propagation from output to input is problematic for big-circle chi. In this paper, we tackle this problem, and present new techniques for the analysis of difference propagation for big-circle chi.We implemented these techniques in a dedicated program to perform differential trail search in Subterranean. Thanks to this, we confirm the maximum DP of 3-round trails found by the designers, we determine the maximum DP of 4-round trails and we improve the upper bounds for the DP of trails over 5, 6, 7 and 8 rounds.

Designing a secure round function based on chaos

A round function based on chaos is designed combining Feistel structure's pseudo-randomness, chaotic system's parameter sensitivity and image data characteristics. The round function composes of two parts—data transformation based on Feistel (abbreviated as FST) and sampling output based on chaos (abbreviated as SMP). FST bases on Feistel structure and several efficient operations including bitwise xor, permutation and circulating shift. SMP is a chaos based pseudo-random sampling algorithm. It is from theoretical analysis that the round function is a pseudo-random function. The upper bounds of the average maximum differential probability and average maximum linear probability are p2 and q2 respectively. Finally, the good pseudo-randomness of the round function is examined with the NIST random test. The design of this round function provides an important cryptographic component for the design of chaotic image encryption algorithm.

Further Observations on SIMON and SPECK Block Cipher Families

SIMON and SPECK families of block ciphers are well-known lightweight ciphers designed by the NSA. In this note, based on the previous investigations on SIMON, a closed formula for the squared correlations and differential probabilities of the mapping ϕ ( x ) = x ⊙ S 1 ( x ) on F 2 n is given. From the aspects of linear and differential cryptanalysis, this mapping is equivalent to the core quadratic mapping of SIMON via rearrangement of coordinates and EA -equivalence. Based on the proposed explicit formula, a full description of DDT and LAT of ϕ is provided. In the case of SPECK, as the only nonlinear operation in this family of ciphers is addition mod 2 n , after reformulating the formula for linear and differential probabilities of addition mod 2 n , straightforward algorithms for finding the output masks with maximum squared correlation, given the input masks, as well as the output differences with maximum differential probability, given the input differences, are presented. By the aid of the tools given in this paper, the process of the search for linear and differential characteristics of SIMON and SPECK families of block ciphers could be sped up, and the complexity of linear and differential attacks against these ciphers could be reduced.

A Chaos-Based Substitution Box (S-Box) Design with Improved Differential Approximation Probability (DP)

Substitution box is a vital and the only nonlinear component of modern encryption algorithm. S-box is introduced as a confusion component to resist against differential cryptanalysis. Chaos-based encryption is well liked because it exhibits similarity like cryptography. However, chaotic S-boxes possess high maximum differential approximation probability, measured using difference distribution table (DDT) for differential cryptanalysis. Therefore, this paper reports a systematic design methodology to generate chaotic S-box utilizing DDT and that can be used in multimedia encryption algorithms. DDT within the design loop is used to optimize differential approximation probability. The proposed S-box shows very low differential approximation probability as compared to other chaos-based S-box designed recently, while maintaining good cryptographic properties and high value of linear approximation probability. The strength of the proposed cryptographically strong S-box is vetted in the practical implementation of multimedia encryption.

Optimal Differential Trails in SIMON-like Ciphers

In the present paper, we propose an automatic search algorithm for optimal differential trails in SIMON-like ciphers. First, we give a more accurate upper bound on the differential probability of SIMON-like round function. It is shown that when the Hamming weight of the input difference α , which is denoted by wt( α ), is less than one half of the input size, the corresponding maximum differential probability of SIMON-like round function is less than or equal to 2 −wt( α )−1 . Based on this, we adapt Matsui’s algorithm and propose an efficient algorithm for searching for optimal differential trails. With the proposed algorithm, we find the provably optimal differential trails for 12, 16, 19, 28 and 37 rounds of SIMON32/48/64/96/128. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that the provably optimal differential trails for SIMON64, SIMON96 and SIMON128 are reported. The provably optimal differential trails for 13, 19 and 25 rounds of SIMECK32/48/64 are also found respectively, which confirm the results given by Kolbl et al. [KR15]. Besides the optimal differential trails, we also find the 14, 17, 23, 31 and 41-round differentials for SIMON32/48/64/96/128, and 14, 21 and 27-round differentials for SIMECK32/48/64, respectively. As far as we know, these are the best differential distinguishers for SIMON and SIMECK so far. Compared with the approach based on SAT/SMT solvers used by K¨olbl et al., our algorithm is more efficient and more practical to evaluate the security against differential cryptanalysis in the design of SIMON-like ciphers.

Optimal Differential Trails in SIMON-like Ciphers

In the present paper, we propose an automatic search algorithm for optimal differential trails in SIMON-like ciphers. First, we give a more accurate upper bound on the differential probability of SIMON-like round function. It is shown that when the Hamming weight of the input difference α , which is denoted by wt(α), is less than one half of the input size, the corresponding maximum differential probability of SIMON-like round function is less than or equal to 2−wt(α)−1. Based on this, we adapt Matsui’s algorithm and propose an efficient algorithm for searching for optimal differential trails. With the proposed algorithm, we find the provably optimal differential trails for 12, 16, 19, 28 and 37 rounds of SIMON32/48/64/96/128. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that the provably optimal differential trails for SIMON64, SIMON96 and SIMON128 are reported. The provably optimal differential trails for 13, 19 and 25 rounds of SIMECK32/48/64 are also found respectively, which confirm the results given by Kölbl et al. [KR15]. Besides the optimal differential trails, we also find the 14, 17, 23, 31 and 41-round differentials for SIMON32/48/64/96/128, and 14, 21 and 27-round differentials for SIMECK32/48/64, respectively. As far as we know, these are the best differential distinguishers for SIMON and SIMECK so far. Compared with the approach based on SAT/SMT solvers used by K¨olbl et al., our algorithm is more efficient and more practical to evaluate the security against differential cryptanalysis in the design of SIMON-like ciphers.

Seven New Block Cipher Structures with Provable Security against Differential Cryptanalysis

The design and analysis of block ciphers is an established field of study which has seen significant progress since the early 1990s. Nevertheless, what remains on an interesting direction to explore in this area is to design block ciphers with provable security against powerful known attacks such as differential and linear cryptanalysis. In this paper we introduce seven new block cipher structures, named Feistel-variant A, B, CLEFIA and MISTY-FO-variant A, B, C, D structures, and show that these structures are provably resistant against differential cryptanalysis. The main results of this paper are that the average differential probabilities over at least 2 rounds of Feistel-variant A structure and 1 round of Feistel-variant B structure are both upperbounded by p2, while the average differential probabilities over at least 5 rounds of CLEFIA, MISTY-FO-variant A, B, C and D structures are upperbounded by p4 + 2p5, p4, p4, 2p4 and 2p4, respectively, if the maximum differential probability of a round F function is p. We also give provable security for the Feistel-variant A, B and CLEFIA structures against linear cryptanalysis. Our results are attained under the assumption that all of components in our proposed structures are bijective. We expect that our results are useful to design block ciphers with provable security against differential and linear cryptanalysis.

Discrete Lyapunov Exponent and Differential Cryptanalysis

Partly motivated by the developments in chaos-based block cipher design, a definition of the discrete Lyapunov exponent for an arbitrary permutation of a finite lattice was recently proposed. We explore the relation between the discrete Lyapunov exponent and the maximum differential probability of a bijective mapping (i.e., an S-box or the mapping defined by a block cipher). Our analysis shows that good encryption transformations have discrete Lyapunov exponents close to the discrete Lyapunov exponent of a mapping that has a perfect nonlinearity. The converse does not hold.

Differential and linear cryptanalysis for 2-round SPNs

In this paper, we examine the security of block ciphers referred to as substitution-permutation networks (SPNs). When the SPN has 2-round, we obtain an upper bound on the maximum differential probability. We also obtain an upper bound on the maximum linear hull probability. Our results extend and sharpen the known results for the 2-round SPNs.

Provable security for 13 round Skipjack-like structure

To prove a block cipher is secure against Differential Cryptanalysis one should show the maximum differential probability is a small enough value. We will prove that the maximum differential probability of a 13 round Skipjack-like structure is bounded by p 4, where p is the maximum differential probability of round function.