Velmans Research Articles

The 'No-Supervenience' Theorem and its Implications for Theories of Consciousness

The 'no-supervenience' theorem (Reason, 2019; Reason and Shah, 2021) is a proof that no fully self-aware system can entirely supervene on any objectively observable system. I here present a simple, non-technical summary of the proof and demonstrate its implications for four separate theories of consciousness: the 'property dualism' theory of David Chalmers; the 'reflexive monism' of Max Velmans; Galen Strawson's 'realistic monism'; and the 'illusionism' of Keith Frankish. It is shown that all are ruled out in their current form by the no-supervenience theorem, except for Chalmers' theory, which I show requires humans to behave irrationally.

A Hitchhiker's Guide to Consciousness: Max Velmans at 80 Years of Age

A Hitchhiker's Guide to Consciousness: Max Velmans at 80 Years of Age

Max Velmans Interview: On Understanding Consciousness, Reflexive Monism, and the Future of Consciousness Studies

Max Velmans, Emeritus Professor of Psychology at Goldsmiths, University of London, is one of the leading theorists of consciousness studies — an interdisciplinary field of study that deals with questions about the nature of consciousness and how it relates to the physical world. In this interview, we look back at his life and work; in particular, his idea of reflexive monism, which is one of his landmark contributions to the field.

Four Problems of Mind and Body: Celebrating the 80th Birthday of Max Velmans

Inspired by the 'reflexive monism' of Max Velmans, this paper considers four problems of mind and body. (1) The traditional mind–body problem, including the 'easy' problem of identifying the neural correlates of consciousness, and the 'hard' problem of determining just how neural processes generate conscious states. (2) The distinction between automatic (unconscious) and controlled (conscious) processes, raising the question about the relative roles they play in experience, thought, and action, as well as the question of free will. (3) Psychosomatic effects, including the stress–disease connection, placebo effects, and hypnotic suggestion, in which beliefs appear to have consequences for bodily processes outside the nervous system. (4) Whether mind can exist in the absence of a bodily host, as exemplified by spiritualism and parapsychology. As challenging as the easy and hard problems are, psychology can advance as a science of mental life without ever solving them.

Neurobiological Underpinnings of the Projection of Conscious Contents

The projection of conscious content is a central feature of Max Velmans' theory of consciousness, implying that conscious experiences are built within a conversation of minds and worlds in which they form a 'reflexive' unity – as stated in his reflexive monism theory. What are the neurobiological structures and functions that underpin the experience of conscious contents being located in a spatio-temporal frame outside the nervous system that instantiates them? In this paper I offer informed speculation about these neurobiological structures on the basis of the concept of projection within the psychophysical 'egocentric space', having the central nervous system at the origin of coordinates and the interface with the environment as the horizon. The reasoning is based on the work of several neuroscientists on feedback signals from the motor to sensory neuron systems, building a picture of how they support the projective process. I also call attention to the integrative role of glial cells in the generation of localized sensations and other conscious contents.

Review of Understanding Consciousness by Max Velmans

Understanding Consciousness can almost be said to have a plot/narrative, or a dramatic structure similar to the ‘three-act structure’ model used by numerous screenwriters. In Part I—the Setup—Velmans surveys “mind-body theories and their problems”, in part II—the Confrontation—he reconstructs “a new analysis: how to marry science with experience”, and in part III—the Resolution—he shares with us “a new synthesis: reflexive monism” (v-vi). Velmans starts off in the first chapter with perhaps one of the most basic, nevertheless hard, questions in the field of consciousness studies: “what is consciousness?”

Mind Matters: A New Scientific Era

I am an optimist, the sort we call incorrigible. So for those who know me, should be no surprise at my title and theme. There is no question in my mind that what we do in our sometimes beleaguered bailiwick is research that provides insight into what we humans are. It is a difficult domain, so we don't have complete answers, but because of the difficulty, we are led to generate really good questions. They touch on the edges and frontiers of science (and we accept with good humor that some of our friends in academia prefer the term fringe). What is important is that as these challenging questions are answered, even tentatively, they will expand and extend scientific understanding far beyond the effect of mere filling in the blanks and refining details of the current picture. There are big open spaces in standard models, which are amazingly difficult for ordinary scientists to see. Where is consciousness and the mental realm we all experience? Mind has, surprisingly, been an unwanted stepchild in science over extended periods and has never been accorded a proper place in psychology or any other of the sciences, even the queen of sciences, physics. Why not? I think it is, simply put, too complicated, too difficult. We have not known how to place consciousness or mind in a sound theoretical model and so have tended to ignore the very experiences that allow us to do physics and explore psychology. Obviously the construction of a model of the world helps us to think about it more cogently, but somehow the construction and the thinking escape us--they are too basic, perhaps, too much like the water the fish never sees. But is the experience, and when we focus on it and try to stay with it, we generally agree that is a problem, perhaps even a hard problem, as David Chalmers says (1995). During the Winchester convention, we had an opportunity to listen to Max Velmans, who also sees how much we are missing. He is one of the few adventurous souls in mainstream psychology who wants to build bridges and foundations, and eventually to create an architecture for mind, linking philosophy and psychology and physics, and, yes, parapsychology in some measure (Velmans, 2000). And we will hear committed people who are career parapsychologists discuss their contributions to an ever growing and increasingly sophisticated corpus of excellent research on the subtle but important extended qualities of human consciousness. Perhaps it is not after all too optimistic to expect a new era in science, where the experiential and subjective, mind and consciousness take important roles in models that cover the territory with more generosity and accuracy. MAINSTREAM, WHY NOT? We find little recognition in the scientific mainstream for what we know internally is excellent work, high quality evidence that there is some there. Part of the reason is that we really are addressing hard problems, with much of their difficulty stemming from a deep subtlety. In parapsychology we are looking at the edges of phenomena in an ill-defined consciousness space, and thus at problems within problems--there is no theory of consciousness, much less one that can explain the extension of consciousness into realms that, while part of human experience, are so subtle that we are seldom quite sure what has happened. But for more than a century, competent people have been piling up evidence that is persuasive to any who will look at it with care and a serious, unbiased interest. The evidence from experimental parapsychology is convergent and consistent. It shows small effects and patterns that begin to look like pieces in a puzzle. When we take an overview, a general understanding looks tantalizingly near. In addition, we have some good though still metaphoric models. We can and should feel encouraged. Our science asks for a leap from the classical thinking that still pervades the views of most scientists even in a quantum era, but we aren't alone in that. …

Fizykalistyczny panpsychizm (przeł. Jacek Jarocki)

Rougly speaking, panpsychism is the view, that everything is mind or have consciousness. Although the view has a long and venerable tradition, and becomes more and more popular in the contemporary debate, it still has many opponents. The aim of this article is to prove that panpsychism is the best metaphysical account of the nature of the ultimate stuff of reality. At the same time, it is a kind of physicalism, according to which experience (experientiality) is the fundamental stuff of all concrete objects. Galen Strawson, „Physicalist Panpsychism”, in: The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness . Second Edition , ed. Susan Schneider i Max Velmans (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2017), 374–390. Information about Translator: Jacek Jarocki, MA—PhD student, Department of the History of Modern and Contemporary Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin; address for correspondence: Al. Raclawickie 14, PL 20–950 Lublin; e‑mail: jacekjarocki@kul.pl

Understanding Consciousness (2nd ed.). By Max Velmans

The Heythrop JournalVolume 52, Issue 2 p. 333-334 Understanding Consciousness (2nd ed.). By Max Velmans Patrick Madigan, Patrick Madigan Heythrop CollegeSearch for more papers by this author Patrick Madigan, Patrick Madigan Heythrop CollegeSearch for more papers by this author First published: 16 February 2011 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2265.2011.00646_32.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL No abstract is available for this article. Volume52, Issue2March 2011Pages 333-334 RelatedInformation

Reflexive monism versus complementarism: An analysis and criticism of the conceptual groundwork of Max Velmans’s reflexive model of consciousness

From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to (phenomenal) consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic ‘phenomenon’ in the Husserlian sense. Consequently, I replace Velmans’s reflexive model with a complementaristic approach in a strict sense which leaves no room for either monistic or dualistic views (including Velmans’s ontological monism and his dual-aspect interpretation of complementarity) and hence requires us to radically reinterpret the concept of psychophysical causation.

The problem of consciousness. Consciousness: creeping up on the hard problem. J. Gray. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004. No of pages 356. ISBN 0‐19‐852090‐5

Applied Cognitive PsychologyVolume 19, Issue 4 p. 529-530 Book Review The problem of consciousness. Consciousness: creeping up on the hard problem. J. Gray. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004. No of pages 356. ISBN 0-19-852090-5 Max Velmans, Corresponding Author Max Velmans University of London, UKUniversity of London, UKSearch for more papers by this author Max Velmans, Corresponding Author Max Velmans University of London, UKUniversity of London, UKSearch for more papers by this author First published: 22 April 2005 https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.1121Citations: 2AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article.Citing Literature Volume19, Issue4May 2005Pages 529-530 RelatedInformation

Errata

On p. 662 of the target article “Is Human Information Processing Conscious,” by Max Velmans, BBS (1991), 14(4):651–69, the phrase “electrical stimuli applied 500 msec later” (sect. 5.1, para. 3, 2nd sentence) should read “electrical stimuli applied 500 msec earlier.”

Velmans's overfocused perspective on consciousness

Velmans's overfocused perspective on consciousness