Material Weaknesses In Internal Control Research Articles

Lead Independent Directors and Internal Information Environment

ABSTRACTResearch Question/IssueThis study explores the relationship between the presence of a lead independent director (LID) and firms' internal information environment. LIDs are elected independent members of the board who perform key duties for the independent directors and the board, including reviewing and approving board meeting agendas, chairing non‐executive board meetings, and acting as a liaison between the CEO and other independent directors. We hypothesize that LID presence lowers information barriers between the CEO and the rest of the board members, enabling more rapid information acquisition and integration and enhancing the internal information environment of the firm.Research Findings/InsightsUsing a sample of US publicly listed companies from 2001 to 2019, we document that LID presence on the board is positively associated with proxies of internal information quality that reflect better information acquisition and information integration: accuracy and precision of management earnings forecasts, speed of earnings announcement, and absence of material weaknesses in internal controls. These results are robust to alternative model specifications, including entropy balancing, Heckman two‐step correction for self‐selection bias, firm fixed effects, and placebo tests. Further analyses suggest that LIDs with financial expertise and audit committee memberships are more effective in positively influencing internal information quality. We also show that LID presence is positively associated with several proxies of external information quality.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsWe build on agency theory to argue that LIDs improve internal information quality by reinforcing the information quality benefits of unified leadership while mitigating potential compromises in information quality arising from entrenchment. Similarly, we use arguments emanating from the novel strategic leadership systems theory to posit that a LID appointment facilitates the tasks of the CEO and the board, enhancing the effectiveness of both groups in their respective roles: the CEO in making operating and investment decisions and the board in strengthening oversight while bringing cohesion in their shared role of strategy visioning and implementation.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsOur findings suggest that there is scope for shareholders to consider LID appointments as an addition to their firms' corporate governance structures to enhance the internal information environment and decision‐making efficiency. Policymakers can also encourage LID appointments on the board when promoting best practices in corporate governance through regulatory guidelines.

Group Audit Risk and Component Auditor Use: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis

SUMMARY This study examines the association between group audit risk and component auditor use. The audit risk model defines audit risk as a function of the risk of material misstatement and detection risk. We use the revelation of an internal control material weakness (ICMW) as an event that increases the risk of material misstatement. Since higher risk of material misstatement requires the lead auditor to reduce detection risk, component auditor use could change after an ICMW. We find that the likelihood of starting component auditor use significantly increases after an ICMW. We also find an increase in the number of large component auditors used after an ICMW and such increase is concentrated in more pervasive entity-level ICMWs and higher-quality component auditors. Our evidence indicates that lead auditors perceive component auditor use as decreasing group audit risk. Our findings should inform the debate on the costs and benefits of component auditor use.

Cybersecurity data breaches and internal control

The present study provides novel evidence of the effects of data breaches on firms' subsequent internal control. We find data breaches to be negatively associated with subsequent disclosure of internal control material weakness (i.e., improved internal control), and CEO dismissal to be an effective mechanism for improving internal control. We further find that data breaches can magnify the accounting expertise effect and attenuate the complexity effect on subsequent internal control, and that firms are less likely to file “Big R” restatements and face litigation subsequent to making improvements in internal control.

Do Shareholders Care about “Surprise” Internal Control Weakness Disclosures?

SUMMARY Prior research shows that many of the companies that disclose material weaknesses in internal control (MWs) do not disclose such weaknesses in earlier quarterly 10-Q filings for the same year—i.e., the year-end MW disclosures are “surprise” disclosures. We find that shareholders at accelerated filers with surprise MW disclosures are more likely to vote against auditor ratification (by a factor of about 1.4 times) than at companies with “no-surprise” MW disclosures. These findings suggest that shareholders may at least partly blame auditors and hold them responsible for the surprise MW disclosures. Internal control disclosures necessarily involve professional judgment, but the results indicate that for shareholders, earlier disclosure of such problems is preferable to waiting until the year-end (and perhaps hoping that the problems will be resolved).

The Impact of Board of Directors and Islamic Shariah on Company Internal Control: Evidence from Jordan


 The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of corporate governance and compliance with Shariah on internal controls over financial reporting. It also examines the moderating role of Shariah compliance on the relationship between corporate governance structures and internal reporting controls. Ordinary least square (OLS) models are applied to 94 listed Jordanian companies on Amman Stock Exchange over the period 2015-2021. The empirical evidence shows board size, board meetings, Shariah compliance, and auditor type have a negative impact on material weaknesses in internal controls (MWIC). Second, unitary leadership, where the same individual is both the chair and CEO, is positively correlated to MWIC. Third, Shariah compliance strengthens the effect of board meetings, suggesting that Shariah compliance and good corporate governance mechanisms reinforce each other to ensure higher-quality internal financial reporting controls.

CEO Network Connections and the Timeliness of Financial Reporting

SYNOPSIS We investigate the effects of CEO networks on the timeliness of financial reporting. Using a sample of over 2,000 firms for the period 2004–2017, we find that firms led by well-connected CEOs have lower earnings announcement lag, audit lag, and filing (10-K) lag. This timeliness is not at the expense of financial reporting quality and accuracy. These effects are stronger when firms have strong corporate governance and no material internal control weaknesses. Interestingly, the effect of CEO connectedness on timeliness is significant regardless of the intensity of demand for information from institutional investors and analysts but is stronger when information demand is lower. Overall, these findings suggest that improved information environment around well-connected CEOs leads to timely dissemination of high-quality information to the market. JEL Classifications: D85; M42.

The impact of material internal control weaknesses, institutional ownership and managerial ownership on future-oriented disclosure: evidence from Islamic economy

Purpose This study aims to assess the effect of material internal control weaknesses (MICW) on the relationship between ownership structures and future-oriented disclosure. Design/methodology/approach A total number of 197 firms were assessed in this study during 2014–2021. Two measures were used for MICW. First, the number of existing MICW was assessed in independent auditors’ reports. In Iran, the maximum number of weaknesses is 13. Second, the scoring (0 or 1) method was used as a dummy variable, 1 for a firm with MICW and otherwise 0. Moreover, the scoring (0 or 1) method was used to measure the level of future-oriented disclosure of 13 indicators. Findings The findings showed that institutional ownership and managerial ownership have a significant positive effect on future-oriented disclosure, whereas the MICW have a significant negative effect on future-oriented disclosure. In addition, MICW played a moderator role in the relationship between ownership structures and future-oriented disclosure. The robustness checks confirmed the results. Originality/value As the studies conducted on future-oriented disclosure and the contributing factors are limited, and also the effect of MICW on future-oriented disclosure is not explored, the present findings can show the importance of the study, and fill the gap in this field. This study offers theoretical and practical implications to drive policymakers and managers to the effectiveness of internal control and future-oriented transparency.

Corporate Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Performance and the Internal Control Environment

SYNOPSIS We consider how corporate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance relates to the strength of the internal control environment. The transparent reporting hypothesis predicts that high ESG performance signals ethical decision making and/or strong financial performance, both of which manifest in a stronger internal control environment and, therefore, fewer material weaknesses in internal controls. We find that ESG performance is negatively related to the likelihood of general internal control weaknesses, consistent with transparent reporting. We also find that ESG performance is negatively related to company-level internal control weaknesses, which are considered relatively severe. Further, we find that ESG performance is negatively associated with specific internal control weaknesses that indicate a lack of ethical tone at the top. We find support for both ethical and performance explanations behind the transparent reporting hypothesis. Overall, our results suggest that ESG performance is positively associated with the strength of the internal control environment. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M14; M40; M42.

Internal governance and internal control material weaknesses

AbstractResearch Question/IssueThe objective of this study is to examine whether the effectiveness of internal governance is associated with internal control material weaknesses. We employ the concept of internal governance as the checks‐and‐balances mechanism that subordinate executives apply to the chief executive officer (CEO). We predict that with long horizons and long‐term interests aligned with firms' long‐term growth, subordinate executives may have the incentive to support a high‐quality internal control system, which is an important factor contributing to firms' long‐term success.Research Findings/InsightsUsing data on CEOs' and other highest paid executives' age and compensation to measure the effectiveness of internal governance, we empirically find consistent evidence that internal governance effectiveness is associated with higher internal control quality. In particular, we find that effective internal governance is related to a lower likelihood of firms reporting internal control material weaknesses, fewer material weaknesses in internal control (ICMWs), a lower chance of firms disclosing internal control weaknesses for multiple years, and a lower probability of firms reporting entity‐level and/or account‐level material weaknesses in internal control. We also show that among the two factors forming the internal governance measure, only subordinate executives' horizon is associated with the probability of firms disclosing ICMWs. Our further analysis reveals that the probability of reporting ICMWs is lower for growth firms with effective internal governance.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsOur findings contribute to the literature on internal governance and internal control quality. The impact of the checks‐and‐balances mechanism inherent in internal governance on firms' investment in the internal control system and thus the probability of disclosing ICMWs has not received sufficient attention from accounting researchers. While prior studies focus on individual members of the management team, our finding implies that the quality of the internal control system is a result of the joint effort of the whole management team. Unlike the extant literature that captures only certain aspects of reporting quality and information disclosures, our study emphasizes the role of the horizon dimension of internal governance in enhancing the reliability of financial reporting (measured as the quality of the internal control system).Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsOur results shed light on the important role of subordinate executives in monitoring CEOs' short‐term interests.

Internal Control and the Insider versus Outsider CEO Choice

ABSTRACT We examine whether the quality of a firm’s internal controls affects a board’s decision to hire an insider as CEO. We find that the board is less likely to select an insider as CEO following an internal control material weakness (ICMW) disclosure. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the adverse effect of weak internal controls on the likelihood of hiring an insider CEO is attenuated for firms that restate past misstatements and is pronounced when boards are more independent. We also find that audit fees are lower for ICMW firms when an outsider CEO is appointed, indicating that external auditors perceive lower audit risk. Taken together, our findings suggest that in the presence of a weak internal control environment, the board prefers an outsider CEO over an insider who may have been a part of the internal control issues, notwithstanding the fact that evaluating the outsider CEO can be challenging.

The role of adverse outcomes in municipal debt costs

This study investigates whether municipal bond prices reflect adverse outcomes (i.e., material noncompliance with laws and regulations and questioned costs) and the interactive effect of adverse outcomes and internal control weaknesses. Using hand-collected data from 866 official registration statements, our results suggest that adverse outcomes are an important determinant of initial bond yields and help explain the underlying relationship between weaknesses in internal control and initial bond yields. Specifically, the municipal bond market penalizes governments with adverse outcomes, with a greater penalty if an adverse outcome is accompanied by a material weakness in internal control.

Financial statement fraud litigation, material weaknesses, and board characteristics

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to investigate whether the likelihood that a firm will face financial statement fraud litigation is affected by the disclosure of internal control material weaknesses (MW) and the “busyness” of a firm’s board of directors.Design/methodology/approachThe results are derived from logistic regression models and data are collected from the Audit Analytics database augmented by data from CompuStat, the Stanford Law School website and the SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases. The authors also test for endogeneity with a propensity score matching procedure.FindingsThe authors find that an MW report is strongly associated with the likelihood of subsequent financial statement fraud litigation, and that the influence of entity-level MW on litigation likelihood is stronger than that of account-level MW. Moreover, the number of outside board directorships significantly increases the influence of entity-level MW on the likelihood of litigation, indicating that board of directors’ busyness significantly increases the risk of litigation.Originality/valuePrevious research notes that board members holding multiple directorships cannot effectively oversee the financial reporting process and, thus, are associated with poorer governance. The authors extend this implication of board busyness to the association between disclosure of MW type and the filing of subsequent litigation alleging financial statement fraud. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no other research has done so.

The Impact of Domain-Specific Internal Audit Education on Financial Reporting Quality and External Audit Efficiency

SYNOPSIS We investigate how the geographic distribution of domain-specific internal audit education impacts financial reporting quality and audit efficiency in the U.S. Using universities with Centers for Internal Auditing Excellence as proxies for robust internal audit education, we find that companies headquartered in close proximity to these programs have fewer material weaknesses in internal controls over financial reporting, fewer financial statement misstatements, and shorter audit lags, and sometimes pay lower audit fees compared with a matched sample of companies not in close proximity to these programs. These findings have implications for practitioners responsible for the staffing and quality of their internal audit functions, the Institute of Internal Auditors in its education-collaboration initiatives, and higher-learning institutions responsible for educating future audit practitioners. These findings also contribute to the academic debate on the value of internal audit and determinants of internal audit function quality. Data Availability: Data are available from sources cited in the text.

Stressed about Money: The Effect of Employee Financial Pressure on Financial Reporting Outcomes

SUMMARYThis study investigates the effect of employee financial stress on financial reporting outcomes. Anxiety related to stress results in emotional exhaustion and reduced job performance. The conservation of resources theory predicts that anxiety caused by financial stress decreases employees’ work quality because anxiety drains individuals’ physical, cognitive, and psychological resources. Motivated by the conservation of resources theory, we expect and find that employee financial stress negatively affects financial reporting outcomes. Consistent with this prediction, we determine that employee financial stress is positively associated with material internal control weaknesses and restatements. The results are statistically and economically significant, and the results continue to hold after using alternative measures of employee financial stress and financial reporting quality. We conduct additional analyses to address endogeneity issues, and the inferences remain the same.Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.JEL Classifications: M40; M41; M49

Internal control weakness and corporate employment decisions: evidence from SOX Section 404 disclosures

ABSTRACT This study investigates the impact of material internal control weaknesses on corporate employment decisions. We find that, on average, ineffective internal control is significantly related to lower efficiency in employment decisions. We also find that firms with material internal control weaknesses are associated with both over-investment and under-investment in labour. Further analysis suggests that the negative impact of internal control weaknesses on employment decisions is predominantly driven by more severe types of weakness that have a pervasive effect on internal reporting and those related to core accounts. Moreover, our change analysis shows that the remediation of material weaknesses contributes to an improvement in labour investment efficiency. Finally, consistent with the effective monitoring role of high-skilled employees, our subsample analysis indicates that the negative impact of internal control weaknesses on labour investment efficiency is mitigated in firms with high reliance on human capital. Our findings are robust to various sensitivity checks including propensity score matching, entropy balancing, removal of observations during the financial crisis, various measures for the efficiency of investment in labour, and the adjustment for employing residuals as outcome variables. Overall, our study contributes to the ongoing debate on the net benefits of SOX 404 by highlighting the significant value of internal control systems to efficient human capital investment and provides timely implications for managers and regulators.

Does Venture Capital Backing Improve Disclosure Controls and Procedures? Evidence from Management’s Post-IPO Disclosures

Firm managers make ethical decisions regarding the form and quality of disclosure. Disclosure can have long-term implications for performance, earnings manipulation, and even fraud. We investigate the impact of venture capital (VC) backing on the quality and informativeness of disclosure controls and procedures for newly public companies. We find that these controls and procedures are stronger, as evidenced by fewer material weaknesses in internal control under Section 302 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, when companies are VC-backed. Moreover, these disclosures are informative and are more likely to be followed by subsequent financial statement restatements than are disclosures made by non-VC-backed IPO companies.

Are voluntary internal control weakness disclosures in initial public offerings associated with managerial ability and subsequent financial reporting quality?

This study examines whether voluntary disclosure of internal control weaknesses (ICWs) in IPO registration statements is associated with managerial ability and subsequent SOX 404 adverse audit opinions. Using a sample of IPO registrants that voluntarily disclosed ICWs in their registration statements, we examine the relationship between ICW disclosure, managerial ability, and subsequent material weaknesses in internal control. We find that IPO registrants with higher managerial ability are more likely to disclose ICWs voluntarily than other registrants. Further, we find evidence that registrants that include voluntary ICW disclosures are more likely to subsequently receive an adverse SOX 404 audit opinion. Additionally, we find evidence that registrants are associated with negative cumulative abnormal returns when an auditor issues an adverse SOX 404 auditor opinion regardless of whether the ICWs were disclosed in the registration statement.

The effectiveness of the auditor’s opinion on the internal controls over financial reporting

PurposeRecent studies have concluded that auditors underreport existing internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) weaknesses. This study aims to assess how effective external auditors are, as independent third parties, at disclosing reliable opinions to the public on the ICFR.Design/methodology/approachUsing a logistic regression, the authors analyzed a sample of 106 US companies classified as large accelerated filers or accelerated filers consisting in 53 companies which restated their financial statements and a control group of 53 companies having “clean financial statements” at any given moment during the research period, between 2005 and 2018.FindingsThe results indicate that only 34% of companies with financial statements deemed unreliable have received an adverse ICFR opinion issued by the external auditor during the misrepresentation period or its prior year. The authors also notice that external auditors are somewhat effective in identifying and disclosing red flags to the public that certain companies have internal control (IC) material weaknesses. The results also indicate that the average presence of an adverse IC opinion issued by the external auditor during the misrepresentation period or its prior year for companies with unreliable financial statements is higher than for companies with financial statements deemed reliable.Practical implicationsThis study tests if an increase in efforts and disbursements with audit fees are justifiable by external auditors’ issuing effective, reliable opinions and reinforcing a more transparent and ethical capital markets environment, that is, an environment where accurate information is available for stakeholders. If external auditors are negligent in providing a qualitative and independent opinion to stakeholders, the increase of disbursements made with audit fees is less justifiable. Thus, the research has practical implication for auditors as well as standard setters.Originality/valueThis study extends the literature on ICFR by empirically testing whether the public can rely on external auditors’ opinions expressed on Sarbanes–Oxley Section 404 reports.

Internal control material weakness disclosure and misstatement duration

AbstractOnly a small proportion of companies that announce restatements disclose existing internal control material weaknesses (ICMWs) over financial reporting during misstatement periods. Using a sample of 1939 restatements related to misstatements between 2003 and 2015, we find that misstatement duration decreases with the disclosure of ICMWs during misstatement periods. Our results are robust to different samples and different measures of the dependent and test variables. We also find that the number of ICMWs disclosed is negatively related to misstatement duration. The disclosure of both entity‐level and process‐level ICMWs is associated with misstatements of shorter duration. Moreover, we find that the negative association between ICMW disclosure frequency and misstatement duration is more salient when restatements are intentional. Despite the negative consequences of reporting existing ICMWs found in prior studies, our results suggest that the disclosure of ICMWs can shorten the duration of misstatement periods, leading to more timely improvement in financial reporting. Hence, our evidence provides context and complements prior research suggesting that companies are penalized for disclosing ICMWs.

Early Warnings of SOX 404 Material Weaknesses in Internal Control

SUMMARYSOX Section 404(b) continues to be of interest to legislators and regulators. Prior studies show that in the initial implementation years of SOX 404, the majority of material weakness (MW) disclosures were “surprise” MWs—i.e., disclosed at year-end, but not in prior quarterly filings (Hermanson and Ye 2009; Munsif, Raghunandan, and Rama 2013). We show that during the years 2010–2019, 74 (72) percent of MW disclosures by accelerated (non-accelerated) filers were surprise disclosures. Additionally, surprise MWs are more likely to be associated with internal control issues that involve year-end adjustments and/or documentation, procedure, or policy issues. “Early-warning” MWs are more likely due to systemic internal control problems, like segregation of duties. Our findings suggest a role for auditors and substantive audit tests in the disclosure of certain types of MWs. Increased auditor emphasis on interim substantive tests may reduce the likelihood of surprise MWs.