Master Rule Research Articles

“Scrumbear” framework for solving traditional scrum model problems

Software engineering is a discipline that is little understood by people. It defines how software is developed and maintained to meet the clients’ requirements. Software engineers follow certain systems and standards in their work to meet the clients’ desires. It is on this background that engineers follow specific models in coming up with the final product. One of the models highly used is scrum, which is one of the agile methodologies. However, despite being highly used, it has inherent flaws that need to be corrected. Those flaws are product owner continues changing; do not accept changes in working scrum, sprint’s release time limitation, finally wasting team time within each sprint. This paper presents a new framework, which is an updated version of the current Scrum, to overcome the scum models mentioned issues. In this study, a new framework is presented in a way that is understandable and needed by software developer’s team upon the collected qualitative and quantitative data. The implementation was by making some changes to the current scrum model leading to the “Scrumbear”, certain flaws can be corrected. One of the presented changes involve adding the control master rule to ensure controlling the requirements changing.

‘Not Slavery, but Salvation’

This paper argues that Aristotle challenges the view of Athenian democrats that all rule is master rule – the imposition of the will of the powerful on the powerless – by arguing that the politeuma, or government, should be identical with the politeia, understood both as the constitution and the collectivity of citizens. I examine Aristotle’s analysis and response to democrats’ skepticism of the law that the constitution embodies. Aristotle argues that democrats think law limits license even when the source of law is the people themselves. The view of citizens as the source of law coupled with the view of the law as a commitment to collective determinations regarding the end makes law salvation rather than slavery.

Treatment of Iron Deficiency Anaemia in Patients with Inflammatory Bowel Disease

In spite of the fact that anemia is the most widely recognized systemic sign of inflammatory bowel disease (IBD), among the expansive range of extraintestinal malady complexities experienced in IBD, including joint inflammation and osteopathy, it has for the most part gotten little thought. In any case, as far as recurrence, as well as to its potential impact on hospitalization rates and on the personal satisfaction and work, sickliness is, in fact, a huge and expensive intricacy of IBD. Frailty is multifactorial in nature, the most predominant etiological structures being iron deficiency anemia (IDA) and anemia of a chronic disease. In a condition related to irritation, for example, IBD, the assurance of iron status utilizing normal biochemical parameters alone is insufficient. A more exact evaluation might be achieved utilizing new iron lists including reticulocyte hemoglobin content, the rate of hypochromic red cells or zinc protoporphyrin. While oral iron supplementation has generally been a backbone of IDA treatment, it has likewise been connected to a broad gastrointestinal reactions and conceivable infection compounding. Be that as it may, numerous doctors are as yet hesitant to administer iron intravenously, in spite of the wide accessibility of an assortment of new IV arrangements with enhanced safety profiles, and in spite of the proposals of worldwide master rules. We present a review of the pathophysiologic mechanisms of IDA in IBD, improved diagnostic and therapeutic strategies, efficacy, and safety of iron replacement in IBD.

Improving Rule 1: A Master Rule for the Federal Rules

This essay is a contribution to a symposium on civil justice reform published in the University of Denver Law Review. Each contributor was asked to choose a specific Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and explain how it should be changed. My essay focuses on Rule 1, which sets out a principle for interpreting all the other Federal Rules: they “should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” Rule 1 is vital to the overall rule scheme. Many of the Federal Rules are drafted with general and open-ended language in order to leave broad discretion in the hands of trial judges, and Rule 1 is meant to guide that discretion. I argue that while Rule 1’s interpretive principle made sense in 1938, when the Federal Rules were first adopted, it offers little guidance today. Part I of the essay summarizes the history of Rule 1. It explains what the phrase “just, speedy, and inexpensive” meant to the original rule drafters and describes the various ways courts have applied it between 1938 and the present. Part II proposes an amendment to Rule 1 that better frames what the purpose of the Federal Rules ought to be. My hope is that an amended Rule 1 will encourage more explicit and careful deliberation about procedural design choices in light of the values and factors that ought to shape the procedures of civil adjudication.

Beyond the real/apparent world: From signs to imaging in Nietzsche

While partaking of nature’s nourishing play of light and shadows, an imaging comes to Nietzsche. It is not imagined, not a mere product of fancy, but comes as an imaging in the liberating space -time of light’s aimless play. With the imaging, Nietzsche’s solitary identity is altered-‘he’ becomes two. There are two sides to good and evil. On one side, there is authority, obedience, and the domination of established significations. Here the struggle that established the significations no longer images between signifier and signified. There is everywhere, on this side of good and evil, a terrible and swift violence maintaining the normalcy of signification. On the other side, there is the innocence of becoming. Two sides, without dialectical mediation-which is to say that the violence maintaining the normalcy of authority and obedience is powerless to appropriate the innocence of becoming. But within its dominion, the image of authority rules as the graven image of mastery. The good and the just reflect the graven image of mastery; they do the Lord’s work. They also make sure that the case of Nietzsche-Zarathrustra is understood as imaginative-schizophrenic, artistic fancy, or both. They work to insure that it is understood as Nietzsche’s Zarathrustra but never NietzscheZarathrustra. Normalization subjectifies, imposing its reflected image of mastery on all ‘things’. The master rules his subjects, who, as the good and the just, reflect and project this rule universally. Nietzsche-Zarathrustra normalized is Nietzsche the author of all ‘his’ voices. But even this imposition of authority does not effectively prevent the ‘author’s’ voices from becoming real beings:

Dworkin on the Rule of Recognition

In the Model of Rules I, Ronald Dworkin criticizes legal positivism, especially as articulated in the work of H. L. A. Hart, and suggests an alternative approach to legal theory that is neither a purely positivist nor a purely natural law position. 1 In doing so, he rejects two fundamental tenets of positivism. The first is the idea that, in every developed legal system, there is a master rule, or of recognition, that is, a social rule or complex set of rules that provides a test for identifying which rules are law and which are not. This test has to do not with the content of rules, but with their pedigree, or the way in which they were adopted. The second tenet is the doctrine of judicial discretion. This is the thesis that, in deciding cases to which no law clearly applies, the judge has no duty to find in favor of one litigant rather than another, but may use his or her discretion to generate new laws or modify old ones.

The Master's Rule Again

The Master's Rule Again