Marital Investments Research Articles

New spouse, same chores? The division of household labor in consecutive unions

AbstractThis article investigates domestic sphere investments, that is, housework and childcare time, of spouses in two consecutive relationships and aims to identify potential sources of variation. Economic reasoning would predict a learning effect from one partnership to the next, and hence less specialization in the domestic sphere in the second relationship. Prevailing gender norms or institutions, on the contrary, may prevent such adjustments in the division of housework. In a fixed-effects regression analysis with the German Socio-Economic Panel, we compare time allocations of couples whose members experienced two consecutive partnerships from 1991 to 2012. Our results indicate that women’s and men’s successive matches differ from each other. Women and their new partners tend to reallocate time from housework to childcare while men’s individual domestic investment patterns remain similar across unions. Highly educated women conform most to the economic rationale by reducing their marital investments significantly in their next partnership.

Cleaning in the Shadow of the Law? Bargaining, Marital Investment, and the Impact of Divorce Law on Husbands’ Intrahousehold Work

AbstractPrevious literature has established that unilateral divorce laws may reduce women’s household work and overall marital investment. If unilateral divorce has differential costs by gender, it...

Cleaning in the Shadow of the Law? Bargaining, Marital Investment, and the Impact of Divorce Law on Husbands' Intra-Household Work

Previous literature has established that unilateral divorce laws may reduce female household work. As shown by Stevenson (2007), unilateral divorce laws may affect overall marital investment. In addition, if unilateral divorce has differential costs by gender, then unilateral divorce may impact household work by gender through bargaining channels. However, little research has examined how divorce laws may affect males' household production and the gender distribution of household work. To examine this issue, I use data on matched couples from the PSID and exploit variation over time in state divorce laws.This research indicates that unilateral divorce laws lead to a decrease in marital investment, as measured by both males and females' household work. The evidence also supports a bargaining response to divorce laws, as fathers in states without joint custody laws show a significantly higher share of household work with unilateral divorce than those in states with joint custody laws, consistent with a relatively higher cost of marital dissolution among fathers who stand to lose custody of their children.

Marital Investments and Community Involvement

It is customary to test Coser’s greedy marriage thesis by comparing marital status groups. We propose a new approach that uses the marital dyad as the unit of analysis and examine whether investments in the marital relationship discourage community involvement through formal volunteering. Data from a U.S. national sample of 1,368 married couples revealed mixed support for the proposed relationship. Consistent with the greedy marriage thesis, wives’ soulmate view of marriage was negatively associated with their own and their husbands’ reports of volunteering. Although these associations were attenuated by religious service attendance, wives’ soulmate view had a more dampening effect than husbands’ soulmate view on their own and their husbands’ volunteering. However, the time couples spend alone together was positively associated with husbands’ reports of volunteering, which counters the greedy marriage thesis. These findings suggest that the greedy nature of marriage is, in part, determined by its participants—how they define and manage their marriage.

Accounting for Time: A Relative-Interest Approach to the Division of Equity in Hybrid-Property Homes Upon Divorce

Even in these troubling economic times, homes are the most valuable asset many Americans own. In many instances, these homes were purchased prior to marriage, with later mortgage payments made after the homebuyer married. On divorce, courts must divide the value of such a “hybrid-property” home into “separate” and “marital” shares prior to distributing it between the divorcing spouses.Many courts have developed formulas for this purpose, with a goal of providing a “proportionate and fair return” on both the separate and marital investments in the home. Each of the formulas, though, ignores the timing of the investments, both in relation to other investments and relative to when the home’s changes in value occurred. As a result, the formulas fail to produce a division that is either proportionate or fair and, instead, systematically and invisibly transfer large amounts of wealth between divorcing spouses.This Article argues that current approaches to the allocation of equity in hybrid-property homes upon divorce represent a misalignment of legal rhetoric and legal reality which must be acknowledged and resolved. Based on the predominant approach to the division of hybrid-property defined-contribution retirement plan accounts, the Article develops a “relative-interest” approach to dividing the equity in hybrid-property homes and shows how the approach can be applied in practice. Of particular importance, the Article highlights how, as technology develops, existing rules must be reassessed to ensure that they remain properly structured to address the goals they profess to advance.

With or Without You: Hazard of Divorce and Intra-Household Allocation of Time

This paper investigates the relationship between the probability of divorce and marriage specific investments. As these investments in terms of childcare and household activities are likely to increase the marital surplus, they are consequently likely to decrease the risk of divorce. All such activities, however, are characterized by gender role bias through, for example, social norms. In periods in which married women enjoy greater outside options (e.g., by increasing their labor force participation), it is expected that households in which the husband takes on typically female chores are less likely to dissolve, while couples in which the wife takes on typically male chores are more likely to divorce. The paper tests this hypothesis using data from the National Longitudinal Survey NLS) of Mature Women, the NLS Young Women, and the NLSY79. The prediction is strongly supported by the data with respect to older cohorts while it loses empirical relevance when tested on younger individuals. Furthermore, asymmetric effects between genders gain importance over time. Finally, an explanation for the relationship between divorce and marital investments is offered in terms of increasing intra-household time consumption complementarities. To this end, data from the American Time Use Surveys from 1965 to 2005 are studied to illustrate how time spent together by partners in the same household has become increasingly crucial in the American family.

Child-custody reform, marital investment in children, and the labor supply of married mothers

Research on child custody primarily focuses on the well-being of children following divorce. We extend this literature by examining how the prospect of joint child custody affects within-marriage investment in children through changes in household bargaining power. Variation in the timing of joint-custody reforms across states provides a natural-experiment framework with which to examine within-marriage investment in children. The probability of children's private school attendance declines by 12% in states that adopt joint-custody laws. We also find evidence linking joint-custody reform to higher rates of labor force participation for married mothers, which may indicate less time devoted household production.

With or Without You: Divorce Rates and Intra-Household Allocation of Time

This paper investigates the relationship between the probability of divorce and marriage specific investments. As these investments in terms of childcare and household activities are likely to increase the marital surplus, they are consequently likely to decrease the risk of divorce. All such activities, however, are characterized by gender role bias through, for example, social norms. In periods in which married women enjoy greater outside options (e.g., by increasing their labor force participation), it is expected that households in which the husband takes on typically female chores are less likely to dissolve, while couples in which the wife takes on typically male chores are more likely to divorce. The paper tests this hypothesis using data from the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) of Mature Women, the NLS Young Women, and the NLSY79. The prediction is strongly supported by the data with respect to older cohorts while it loses empirical relevance when tested on younger individuals. Furthermore, asymmetric effects between genders gain importance over time. Finally, an explanation for the relationship between divorce and marital investments is offered in terms of increasing intra-household time consumption complementarities. To this end, data from the American Time Use Surveys from 1965 to 2005 are studied to illustrate how time spent together by partners in the same household has become increasingly crucial in the American family.

In Good Times and in Debt: The Evolution of Marital Agency and the Meaning of Marriage

A married person sometimes acts solely for herself and at other times on behalf of her spouse. If she incurs debt solely for herself, then only she is liable to the creditor. If, however, she incurs debt both for herself and on behalf of her spouse, both are liable - the debtor directly and the spouse indirectly by imputed liability. Before married women's property reform, imputed marital liability followed from marital status. As marriage changed to recognize the legal individuality of both spouses, so too did the scope of a spouse's imputed liability for the debts of the other spouse. Today, the scope of a spouse's imputed liability for the debts of an insolvent spouse defines an important and largely unexamined aspect of what it means to be married. Despite change in the terms of marriage between the parties, courts continue to view imputed marital liability with sensitivity to the historical privilege of marital investment and the unique social value of trust and dependency within marriage.

Why Divorce Laws Matter: Incentives for Noncontractible Marital Investments under Unilateral and Consent Divorce

The Coase Theorem suggests that married couples will divorce if and only if doing so increases their joint surplus, regardless of the legal rules governing divorce. This does not mean, however, that divorce laws only affect the distribution of rents. Because the distribution of rents affects each spouse's incentives for noncontractible investments, divorce laws can affect the joint welfare of the couple. This article analyzes the effects of the consent divorce regime and the unilateral divorce regime on incentives for selfish and cooperative marital investments. Using these results, the article demonstrates how endogenous choice of marriage with noncontractible investments can explain some recent empirical results concerning the effects of the shift from consent divorce to unilateral divorce. (JEL C78, D1, D23, J12, J18, K3, K36)

Marital investments, time consistency and emotions

A benchmark model of a married couple’s educational investment yields an inefficient outcome due to the possibility of opportunistic divorce. Motivated by findings in social psychology, I use psychological game theory to incorporate belief-dependent guilt feelings. Multiple equilibria become possible. Some marriages have inefficient under-investment. Some have efficient outcomes and preclude divorce. If guilt is sufficiently important, a life-long efficient marriage is implied because a spouse may signal a trust so strong as to force the partner to hold beliefs that make divorce unattractive.

Marriage and Opportunism

SPOUSE abuse is no longer a secret. It has become a thorn in America's conscience. Abuse even warranted a lengthy Supreme Court discussion in an opinion on abortion.2 It is certainly worth thinking about whether anything systemic caused the apparent outbreak of violence in the home. If there is a legal "fix" that would remove incentives to abuse, and therefore reduce the incidence of abuse at the margin, we should know about it.

Relationships Among Marital Investment, Marital Satisfaction, and Marital Commitment in Domestically Victimized and Nonvictimized Wives

The present investigation examined the association between marital investment, marital satisfaction, and commitment to marriage among physically abused women. We applied an investment model and a social learning model to understanding victimized wives' satisfaction and commitment to stay married. Thirty wives who reported physical abuse and 58 nonabused wives completed measures of marital stability, investment in marital problem solving, and dyadic adjustment. Investment in marital problem solving was assessed by having subjects indicate how much energy that they have put into solving 34 common marital problems and whether their efforts were successful or not successful. Consistent with a social learning model but counter to an investment perspective, correlational and multiple regression analyses for each group revealed that failed investment was significantly related to lower, not greater, commitment. Group differences also emerged. Whereas nonabused wives' commitment was related to their dyadic adjustment abused wives' commitment was related to their level of failed investment. Results are consistent with the notion that women may remain in abusive relationships because of psychological entrapment.