Marginal Abatement Cost Functions Research Articles

An experimental investigation of bilateral oligopoly in emissions trading markets

Market power in emissions trading has been extensively investigated because emerging markets for tradable emissions permits, such as the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), can be dominated by relatively few large sellers or buyers. Previous studies on market power in emissions trading have assumed the existence of a subset of competitive players. However, a key feature of emissions trading markets is that emissions permits are often traded by a small number of large sellers and buyers. Using a laboratory experiment, our objective in this paper is to test the performance of an emissions trading market utilizing a double auction in a bilateral oligopoly. Our results suggest that the theoretical bilateral oligopoly models can better describe market outcomes of emissions trading. The effects of the slope of the marginal abatement cost function on market power in laboratory experiments are found to be consistent with those predicted by the theoretical bilateral oligopoly model. How market power is exercised depends on the curvature of the abatement cost function. If the marginal abatement cost function of buyers (sellers) is less steep than that of sellers (buyers), the price of permits is lower (higher) than that under perfect competition. This is because the market power of buyers (sellers) exceeds that of sellers (buyers). The price of permits is close to the perfect competitive price when all traders have the sameslope of the marginal abatement cost function.

Cost function approach to water protection in forestry

Abstract The European Water Framework Directive (WFD) strongly emphasizes that all water polluting sectors must enhance the protection of water bodies in a cost-effective way. River Basin Management Plans need to be made to achieve a good environmental status for all water bodies by 2027 at the latest. This article examines three principal water protection measures used in forestry: buffer zones, overland flow fields and sedimentation ponds. We analytically develop marginal abatement cost functions for each of these measures and apply them numerically for the Finnish forestry. We find that the marginal abatement costs of nutrients using buffer zones in clear-cut mineral soil forests are very high, as they entail leaving financially mature and uncut trees. In contrast, the marginal costs of using overland flow fields in conjunction with ditch cleaning and clear-cutting in peatlands are very low. Furthermore, for sediments using overland flow fields as a water protection measure entails significantly lower abatement costs than does using sedimentation ponds in conjunction with ditch cleaning in peatland forests. A cost-effective solution in a river basin entails that the highest nutrient reductions are made in agriculture but that forestry also does its share. A cost-effective allocation of abatement measures entails that the proportions of the overall nutrient reduction are 3% (1%) in forestry and 97% (99%) in agriculture when the reduction target is set as 10% (30%).

Allocating provincial CO2 quotas for the Chinese national carbon program

In order to improve the efficiency of climate change initiatives China launched its national carbon market in December 2017. Initial CO2 quota allocations are a matter of significant concern. How should we allocate CO2 emissions reduction responsibilities among Chinese provinces, assuming that provinces will not or cannot trade these responsibilities among themselves? In this paper, we allocate CO2 quota from the perspective of cost minimisation. First, we estimate the national CO2 marginal abatement cost (MAC) function and deduce the interprovincial MAC functions. Second, we build an allocation model with nonlinear programming for cost minimisation. Finally, we obtain the allocation results under the emissions reduction target by 2030. The results are as follows. (i) The national MAC was 134.3 Yuan/t (at the constant price of 1978) in 2011, with an overall upward trend from 1990 to 2011. (ii) The interprovincial MACs differ significantly and decline gradually from east to west. Hebei has the largest emissions reduction quota, and Shandong has the largest emissions quota by 2030. (iii) Compared with other criteria of per capita, gross domestic product (GDP), grandfathering and carbon intensity, the proposed approach is the most cost‐effective in achieving the reduction target, with cost savings of 37.7, 34.5, 47.9 and 33.87 per cent, respectively.

Accounting for loss of variety and factor reallocations in the welfare cost of regulations

This paper develops a multi-sector general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms to account for both the direct cost of regulations on regulated firms as well as the indirect cost associated with loss of variety and factor reallocations. The model derives an analytical marginal abatement cost function, dividing the cost according to these direct and indirect effects, and explores the implications for optimal environmental policy. The model is numerically simulated using parameters for the U.S. manufacturing sector for criteria air pollutants, demonstrating that the direct cost of regulations understates the true cost. Moreover, because marginal abatement costs vary across industries, reallocating pollution across industries to achieve cost-effectiveness can generate modest cost savings.

Multi-instrument Pollution Abatement from Multiple Sources: The Case of Nitrogen Pollution in Groundwater

Managing pollution in accordance with marginal abatement costs is optimal only if based on both direct (end-of-pipe) and indirect (input substitution and limitation) controls. Using the example of nitrogen pollution in groundwater, we show that the marginal abatement cost function for any given pollution source can be directly derived from a social-welfare maximization problem, wherein both direct controls and inputs to pollution-generating production of a good or service are included. The solution to the optimization model reveals that abatement instruments for each source should be used according to least-marginal-abatement-cost-first, and the sources should in turn abate in order of least cost. The least-cost result remains optimal, even when the abatement target is exogenously determined.

Sectoral and regional expansion of emissions trading

We consider an international emissions trading scheme with partial sectoral and regional coverage. Sectoral and regional expansion of the trading scheme is beneficial in aggregate, but not necessarily for individual countries. We simulate international CO2 emission quota markets using marginal abatement cost functions and the Copenhagen 2020 climate policy targets for selected countries that strategically allocate emissions in a bid to manipulate the quota price. Quota exporters and importers generally have conflicting interests about admitting more countries to the trading coalition, and our results indicate that some countries may lose substantially when the coalition expands in terms of new countries. For a given coalition, expanding sectoral coverage makes most countries better off, but some countries (notably the USA and Russia) may lose out due to loss of strategic advantages. In general, exporters tend to have stronger strategic power than importers.

Nutrient Abatement Potential and Abatement Costs of Waste Water Treatment Plants in the Baltic Sea Region

We assess the physical potential to reduce nutrient loads from waste water treatment plants in the Baltic Sea region and determine the costs of abating nutrients based on the estimated potential. We take a sample of waste water treatment plants of different size classes and generalize its properties to the whole population of waste water treatment plants. Based on a detailed investment and operational cost data on actual plants, we develop the total and marginal abatement cost functions for both nutrients. To our knowledge, our study is the first of its kind; there is no other study on this issue which would take advantage of detailed data on waste water treatment plants at this extent. We demonstrate that the reduction potential of nutrients is huge in waste water treatment plants. Increasing the abatement in waste water treatment plants can result in 70 % of the Baltic Sea Action Plan nitrogen reduction target and 80 % of the Baltic Sea Action Plan phosphorus reduction target. Another good finding is that the costs of reducing both nutrients are much lower than previously thought. The large reduction of nitrogen would cost 670 million euros and of phosphorus 150 million euros. We show that especially for phosphorus the abatement costs in agriculture would be much higher than in waste water treatment plants.

ClimatePolicy, Uncertainty,and theRole ofTechnologicalInnovation

AbstractWe study how uncertainty about climate change severity affects the relative benefits of early abatement and a portfolio of research and development (R&D) in lowering future abatement costs. Optimal early abatement depends on the curvature of the marginal benefit and marginal abatement cost (MAC) functions and how the uncertain parameter affects marginal benefits. R&D in a particular technology depends on whether uncertainty increases early abatement; whether investment lowersmarginalcosts for that technology; whether R&D lowers theslopeof that technology's MAC function; and the shape of that technology's MAC function. We illustrate, focusing on the role of backstop technologies.

Using an Allowance Reserve to Manage Uncertain Costs in a Cap-and-Trade Program for Greenhouse Gases

This paper investigates the design and performance of an allowance reserve in the context of a cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gases. We use a Monte Carlo approach in which the parameters of the marginal abatement cost function, and the supply of offsets, are drawn from specified distributions. Our framework focuses on the potential impact of “medium-run shocks” to abatement cost and offset supply, as opposed to either short-run volatility or permanent shifts in the cost curve. Our model suggests that under reasonable (and even fairly conservative) assumptions about abatement cost and offset supply, an allowance reserve broadly similar to recent proposals for US climate legislation can be effective in containing allowance prices. In our core policy scenario, with a trigger price equal to US $32 in 2015, we estimate that the probability of drawing on the allowance reserve is <25% and the probability of requiring more than 7 GT of reserve tons over 20 years is <5%. We also use the model to explore the trade-off among three features of the reserve that are most relevant to policy makers: the total size of the reserve, the trigger price, and the degree of confidence that the reserve will be large enough to limit allowance prices to the target level. Our essential result is that a lower trigger price, or a higher degree of confidence, requires a larger reserve.

Optimal mix of emissions taxes and cap-and-trade

In practice, different emitters of a particular pollutant are sometimes subjected to different control mechanisms. This paper focuses on the situation where a part of the economy is regulated by a cap-and-trade program, while the rest is subjected to an emissions tax. Using an extended version of Weitzman's ‘Prices vs. Quantities’ model [M.L. Weitzman, Prices vs. quantities, Revi. Econ. Stud. 41 (1974) 477–491], we analyze the conditions under which this is superior, from an efficiency point of view, to subjecting the whole economy to either of these control mechanisms. The paper addresses a crucial trade-off between two sources of efficiency loss, one due to cost-effectiveness issues and another due to emissions volume. This trade-off determines the optimal size of each sector. It is shown that the size of the taxed sector, at an optimum, increases with the relative steepness of the aggregate marginal abatement cost function.

Pollution Permit Markets with Intertemporal Trading and Asymmetric Information

We consider the problem of determining the permit discount rate in pollution permit markets in which permits may be traded over time and polluting firms have better information about their abatement costs than does the regulator. We show that the preferred permit discount rate may be greater than or less than the money discount rate. We also consider whether or not the regulator should allow intertemporal trading to take place. Allowing intertemporal trading lowers social costs when the slope of the marginal damage function is less than the slope of the aggregate marginal abatement cost function.

Sulfur Dioxide Control by Electric Utilities: What Are the Gains from Trade?

Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) established a market for transferable sulfur dioxide (SO2) emission allowances among electric utilities. This market offers firms facing high marginal abatement costs the opportunity to purchase the right to emit SO2 from firms with lower costs, and this is expected to yield cost savings compared to a command‐and‐control approach to environmental regulation. This paper uses econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost functions for power plants affected by Title IV of the CAAA to evaluate the performance of the SO2 allowance market. Specifically, we investigate whether the much‐heralded fall in the cost of abating SO2, compared to original estimates, can be attributed to allowance trading. We demonstrate that, for plants that use low‐sulfur coal to reduce SO2 emissions, technical change and the fall in prices of low‐sulfur coal have lowered marginal abatement cost curves by over 50 percent since 1985. The flexibility to take advantage of these changes is the main source of cost reductions, rather than trading per se. In the long run, allowance trading may achieve cost savings of $700–$800 million per year compared to an “enlightened” command‐and‐control program characterized by a uniform emission rate standard. The cost savings would be twice as great if the alternative to trading were forced scrubbing. However, a comparison of potential cost savings in 1995 and 1996 with modeled costs of actual emissions suggests that most trading gains were unrealized in the first two years of the program.

Cost-Minimizing Regulation of Sulfur Emissions: Regional Gains in Electric Power

Environmental regulations set maximum allowable rates for sulfur dioxide emissions from electric utilities. By ignoring firm differences in marginal abatement costs and preventing emissions trading, these standards do not minimize the cost of reducing einissions. This paper estimates marginal abatement cost functions for 56 utilities for 1973-79. Marginal costs vary substantially across firms due to differences in the price of low and high sulfur fuels and the intensity of regulation. The potential savings from a cost minimizing reallocation of abatement resources are estimated for five regions. Current expenditures are found to be 47% higher than cost minimizing levels. I MPLEMENTATION of the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments relies extensively on technology-based emission standards. Economists long have recognized that these standards can result in an inefficient allocation of pollution control resources.' Engineering-based restrictions ignore or oversimplify differences in abatement costs among polluters. Limited empirical research suggests that current standards result in substantially higher costs, as much as ten times higher, than a cost-minimizing regulatory scheme.2 These studies, however, are based on engineering estimates of marginal abatement costs. The models often assume that all polluters adopt control technologies that are required only for new plants and that have been largely unadopted by polluting firms.3 The impact of changing factor prices on marginal abatement costs typically is ignored. The difficulty is that the resulting estimates of the cost of regulation neither adequately reflect the range of control options available to polluters nor take into account how polluters actually have responded to environmen-