Mandatory Audit Partner Rotation Research Articles

Accounting reporting complexity, audit engagement partner mandatory rotation, and audit quality

AbstractThis paper investigates the influence of a firm's accounting reporting complexity (ARC) on financial statement audit quality. We predict and find that there is a non‐linear relationship between a firm's ARC and audit quality. Specifically, a more complex accounting environment—measured by ARC—leads to higher quality audits, but this effect diminishes when ARC continues to increase. Further analyses reveal that the effect is more salient among client firms that do not purchase non‐audit services (NAS). We also examine whether ARC affects audit quality in the circumstance of mandatory audit partner rotation. Empirical results show a moderating effect of ARC on the negative influence of audit partner rotation on audit quality. Our study extends the literature by illustrating how a firm's ARC influences audit quality in a special manner.

MANDATORY AUDIT FIRM ROTATION: EVIDENCE FROM TURKISH AUDITORS’ PERCEPTIONS

The purpose of this paper is to investigate auditors' perceptions of mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR) in Turkey. Using the survey method, the opinions of 45 audit partners, directors, and managers from the audit firms were determined. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first MAFR survey study conducted in Turkey. The findings show that auditors both support and oppose MAFR. Majority of the respondents believe that MAFR will increase independent and objective, higher quality audit, fresh look will be provided, and the risk of audit failure will be decreased as a result of familiarity with client management. Furthermore, respondents stated that the benefits of MAFR cannot exceed the benefits of mandatory audit partner rotation (MAPR). They also highlights that the benefits of MAFR outweigh the costs of enforcing such a requirement. The vast majority of respondents believe that the risk of audit failure (audit risk) is higher in the early years of an audit tenure period. This is, in fact, a result against the MAFR. From the standpoint of IFAC, it is necessary to examine the activities from numerous perspectives. Therefore, it is critical that a country develops a rule based on its own circumstances rather than copying and applying a rule from another country. Regarding audit quality, the MAFR regime in Turkey is not deemed necessary, but the MAPR regime will probably be sufficient.

Effect of an Audit Partner’ Industry Auditing Tenure on Audit Quality Under the Mandatory Audit Partner Rotation System in Taiwan

Abstract This study explores the effect of audit partner specialist tenure on audit quality and the complementary effect of audit partner industry tenure and audit tenure. This study first examines audit partners’ effect on audit quality in the early period of their tenure, and we expect to see inferior audit quality during this period. Next, we investigate the moderating effect of audit partner specialist tenure on audit quality; that is, we inspect whether audit partner specialist tenure can compensate for audit partners’ insufficient professional knowledge in the early period of their tenure. This study discovers that since the second modification of the Taiwanese audit partner rotation system in 2009, audit partners’ first audit still generates negative effects on audit quality; however, after audit partners accumulate experience in the industry, they can effectively ameliorate the negative effect generated during their first audit. JEL classification numbers: M42. Keywords: Audit partner specialist tenure, Complementary effect, Audit partner tenure, Audit quality.

Does mandatory audit rotation affect insider trading? Evidence from China

PurposeThis study aims to investigate the impact of mandatory audit partner rotation (MAPR) on Chinese listed firms’ insider trading, as well as the moderating effects of firm characteristics on this impact. The economic mechanism behind this impact is also explored.Design/methodology/approachThis study conducts a regression analysis on firms associated with mandatory and voluntary audit partner rotation based on 2009–2019 firm data and examines whether corporate insiders of these two types of firms increase their share sales within 12 months before their financial statements are submitted to a new rotated auditor.FindingsClient firms’ corporate insiders increase their share sales within 12 months before their financial statements are submitted to a new mandatory rotated auditor. In addition, such an association is less pronounced for client firms that changed from Big 4 auditors to those with higher financial constraints. This is more pronounced for client firms with higher information asymmetry. The economic mechanism of the finding is that is the MAPR implementation reduces earnings management activities from client firms. Moreover, client firms’ buy-and-hold stock returns decline in the first year after MAPR.Research limitations/implicationsThis study should assist investors, corporate shareholders and Chinese policymakers. Investors can be well protected through the adoption of MAPR because upcoming auditors enhance the audit quality of clients by restraining managers’ manipulation of reported earnings and declining firms’ insider trading afterwards. Investors, Chinese policymakers and corporate shareholders should pay more attention to firms’ financial report quality, auditor selection, financial situation, corporate governance and the information environment. Explicitly, firms with less transparent financial report quality, non-big 4 auditors and fewer financial constraints are more likely to be involved in insider trading.Originality/valueTo the best of the authors’ knowledge, none of the extant studies have examined the impact of MAPR on insider sales. This study extends the research on the effect of the audit process on firm market performance by investigating the impact of audit partner rotation policy on insider trading behaviors.

Close auditor-client relationships: adverse effects and the potential mitigating role of partner rotation

PurposeThis paper aims to investigate whether close auditor-client relationships affect audit quality over the tenure of the audit partner and the potential role of partner rotation in mitigating this effect.Design/methodology/approachUsing the Chinese mandatory audit partner rotation setting, the authors identify the existence of a close auditor-client relationship if the audit partner tenure with a client is larger than the audit firm tenure with that client. The sample period (1998–2009) is divided into voluntary and mandatory rotation periods when examining the effects of audit partner tenure on audit quality for the normal and close auditor-client relationship subsamples, respectively. The authors also conduct a propensity score matching analysis to address a selection issue.FindingsThe paper finds that under the voluntary partner rotation regime, audit quality decreases with audit partner tenure for the subsample with close auditor-client relationships, whereas this effect is not shown in the normal relationship subsample. However, audit quality no longer declines with audit partner tenure under the mandatory partner rotation regime.Originality/valueThis is the first study that directly examines the effect of audit partner tenure on audit quality associated with close auditor-client relationships under the voluntary and mandatory partner rotation regimes.

Relative Influences of Review and Engagement Auditor Rotation on Audit Quality: Evidence from China

Manuscript type: Research paper Research aims: This study focuses on the effects of audit partner rotation on audit quality (AQ) in China. In particular, we examine the effects of review auditors (RAs) and engagement auditors (EAs) on AQ when they voluntarily and mandatorily rotate. Design/Methodology/Approach: The data in this study are retrieved from the Chinese Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. We develop an OLS regression model and logit model respectively to test the hypotheses developed. Finally, we have 13,856 firm-year observations collected for the first regression model, and 16,893 firm-year observations gathered for the second logit model from 2003 to 2015. Research findings: Findings show that RAs are more likely to behave opportunistically to retain clients by weighing up the benefits and costs of compromising audit quality in the first year after a rotation. The results imply that RAs may have an incentive to acquiesce the clients’ accounting irregularities in their first year of audit engagement when they are mandatorily rotated. However, we do not find this trend in terms of EAs’ rotation, suggesting that EAs are less affected by the auditor-client relationship compared to RAs. In addition, we find that RAs are less likely to issue modified audit opinions (MOPI) as the magnitude of negative discretionary accruals (DA) increases when they are voluntarily rotated. Theoretical contribution/Originality: Previous studies have investigated the relationship between mandatory audit partner rotation and audit quality. The results are mixed and inconclusive. Our study contributes to the extant literature by considering RAs’ opportunistic behaviour after mandatory rotation, which has not been explored in previous studies. In China, only a few studies have examined the relationship between mandatory audit partner rotation and audit quality. Our study is one of the first study focusing on the RA’s influence on AQ. Practitioner/Policy implication: The findings of our study can help Chinese authorities, listed firms and academics gain more understanding on whether mandatory audit partner rotation improves audit quality in practice. Since RAs have greater incentive to retain the existing client, we propose that RAs should bear more responsibility for the audit work, instead of the equally shared responsibility with EAs. Research limitation/Implications: Our study is subject to some limitations. First, our study adopts the performance-adjusted discretionary accruals as a proxy for audit quality. However, there can be a measurement error in estimating discretionary accruals. Second, we focus on the auditor rotation and exclude the case of audit firm rotation. Since the AQ can be affected by various factors, audit firm rotation can also affect AQ. Third, although we test the relative effects of RAs and EAs in audit work, we do not examine the effect of RAs’ characteristics such as their professional experience, educational background, and years of service. AQ can be affected by RAs’ characteristics.

Does Mandatory Audit Partner Rotation Influence Auditor Selection Strategies?

Under mandatory rotation, the switching cost may be the most influential factor to be considered for experienced mandatory audit rotations. This study attempts to explore the impacts of the mandatory rotation mechanism on company information disclosure and signaling strategies by examining the audit partner and audit firm switching activities of the mandatory rotation company. Are companies that experience mandatory audit rotation more likely to engage industry specialist auditors with better industry-specific knowledge and reputations to minimize the costs of mandatory rotations? Furthermore, in the case of being required to rotate audit partners, do companies rotate only audit partners, rather than changing both audit partners and audit firms at the same time, to minimize switching costs? To explore these problems, this study examined auditor rotations of listed companies in Taiwan from 2004 to 2016; and expected that, to minimize switching costs, mandatory rotation companies are more likely to select industry specialist auditors to be their successor auditors, and are less likely to rotate audit partners and audit firms at the same time. For the audit partner rotations, we find that, compared to voluntarily rotated companies, a higher percentage of companies choose industry specialist auditors to be their successor audit partners under mandatory rotation. Furthermore, the empirical results support our expectations that companies that experience mandatory audit partner rotation are significantly more likely to engage industry specialists to be their successor audit partners and are more likely to rotate only audit partners rather than rotating both audit partners and audit firms around mandatory audit rotation periods.

Mandatory partner rotation, audit timeliness and audit pricing

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to provide further evidence on the ongoing debate on the costs and benefits of mandatory audit partner rotation (MPR). Specifically, this study examines how MPR simultaneously affects audit reporting lag (ARL) and audit fees (AFs).Design/methodology/approachA simultaneous approach was adopted to further shed light on the findings currently documented by this line of research.FindingsUsing Australian data, it was found that MPRs increase AFs but do not affect ARL simultaneously in the year of MPRs. It was also found that the departing audit partners do not charge higher fees or delay the completion of the audits in the final year before their departure and that neither AFs nor ARL changes significantly for the second round of MPRs.Originality/valueTo the best of the authors’ knowledge, no prior study on MPR has examined the issue using a simultaneous approach although failure to consider the simultaneous effect of interrelated variables may lead to estimation biases and problems of parameter identification. The results herein provide further evidence that the clients do not bear both costs of paying higher AFs and having the delayed audits and that the costs associated with MPRs do not occur earlier and the costs associated with MPRs may dissipate over time.

Mandatory audit partner's rotation and corporate tax avoidance: Early evidence from form AP disclosure

AbstractThis study examines the impact of mandatory audit partner's rotation on corporate tax avoidance. Using audit partners’ information disclosed in Form AP, we find that companies generally increase their effective tax rates (ETRs) after audit partner's mandatory rotation, and the increase is specifically driven by companies hiring non‐Big four auditors. This implies that incoming auditors, especially those from non‐Big four accounting firms, are more conservative in tax issues. Further analysis suggests that companies engaging in less tax avoidance before and simultaneously purchasing tax services from their auditors have less increase in ETRs after an audit partner's rotation. The findings of this study assist both audit practitioners and tax regulators to better understand the impact of audit partner rotation on firm's tax behaviors.

Audit partner rotation and negative information hoarding: evidence from China

AbstractWe analyse the impact of mandatory audit partner rotation (MAPR) on negative information hoarding about audit clients using a sample of Chinese firms. Our findings suggest that the outgoing audit partners hoard negative information in pre‐MAPR, as revealed by a decrease in crash risk, while the incoming audit partners disclose negative information in post‐MAPR. Additional analysis suggests that the results are more pronounced among reviewing partners than engaging partners. We also find that when the outgoing audit partner has strong professional abilities or weak personal network with the client or incoming partner, there is less negative information hoarding around MAPR.

On the Economics of Mandatory Audit Partner Rotation and Tenure: Evidence from PCAOB Data

ABSTRACTWe analyze the effects of partner tenure and mandatory rotation on audit quality, pricing, and production for a large cross-section of U.S. public firms during 2008–2014. On average, we find no evidence that audit quality declines over the tenure cycle and little support for “fresh-look” benefits provided by the new audit partner. Audit fees decline and audit hours increase after mandatory rotation, but then reverse over the tenure cycle. We also find evidence that audit firms use “shadowing” in preparation for a lead partner turnover. These effects differ by competitiveness of the local audit market, client size, and partner experience. When multiple members of the audit team commence work at a new client, the transition appears to be more disruptive and more likely to exhibit audit quality effects. Our findings point to costly efforts by the audit firms to minimize disruptions and audit failures around mandatory rotations.JEL Classifications: J01; J44; L84; M21; M42.

Mandatory Audit Partner Rotations and Audit Quality in the United States

SUMMARYThis study uses a sample of mandatory partner rotation events hand collected from SEC filings to investigate the relation between mandatory audit partner rotation and audit quality in the United States. Across a variety of control groups and audit quality proxies, we do not find evidence consistent with rotation materially improving audit quality (i.e., “fresh look”). Although somewhat limited, the only statistically significant evidence we document suggests that audited financial statements may be more likely to contain a material misstatement (i.e., subsequently be restated) following a mandatory audit partner rotation, particularly when the audit firm tenure is short. We also provide evidence from client disclosures that mandatory rotation rules trigger auditor-client realignment. Together, our results provide important evidence on the merits of mandatory partner rotation rules in the United States.JEL Classifications: M40; M41; M42.Data Availability: Data are publicly available from sources identified in the article.

Auditor Switching: New Evidence from Indonesia

The purpose of this research is to determine the direct influence of KAP size, company size, audit delay, audit tenure, previous year’s audit opinion, opinion shopping, financial distress, audit fee, company growth on auditor switching as well as through going concern audit opinion as a mediating variable. The data used in this research are secondary data involving 104 manufacturing company listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2013-2017. The data used in this study were analyzed using partial least square and carried out with the help of sotfware WarpPLS 5.0. The results show that KAP size, company size, audit delay, audit tenure, financial distress has a negative effect on auditor switching. Previous year’s audit opinion, opinion shopping, audit fee, company growth, going concern audit opinion has a positive effect on auditor switching. KAP size, company size, audit delay, audit tenure, previous year’s audit opinion, audit fee has a negative effect on going concern audit opinion. Opinion shopping, financial distress, company growth has a positive effect on going concern audit opinion. The result also show partial mediation of going concern audit opinion on impact KAP size, company size, audit delay, audit tenure, opinion shopping, financial distress, audit fee, company growth on auditor switching. Full mediation of going concern audit opinion on impact of previous year’s audit opinion on auditor switching. Our findings provide new empirical evidence supporting the profession's arguments that mandatory audit partner rotation is costly to multiple stakeholders, including clients, auditors, and investors.

An Analysis of Mandatory Auditor Rotation Requirements in South Africa in light of International Legislative Trends

An independent and objective external audit of companies is an integral element of sound corporate governance and of functional financial markets. The issues relating to auditor independence and objectivity have attracted considerable regulatory and public scrutiny in many leading jurisdictions. This is partly due to a general decrease in audit quality over the years as evidenced by high-profile accounting scandals and audit failures, both locally and internationally, as well as the vital role that an external audit is expected to play in ensuring transparency, accuracy and efficiency in the financial markets. In an attempt to restore confidence in the audit profession and to strengthen the independence of the external audit function for companies, legislatures in some leading jurisdictions have introduced a variety of regulatory strategies, including mandatory rotation of auditors in the form of mandatory audit partner rotation (MAPR) and/or mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR). In this article, the author examines the adequacy of the current provisions of section 92 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 regarding MAPR and the recently promulgated rule of the Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors (IRBA) on MAFR (the MAFR rule) in addressing the issue of mandatory auditor rotation in South Africa. The author considers whether the provisions of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 regarding MAPR and the MAFR rule are adequate to promote an independent and objective external audit function for companies, as well as transparency, efficiency and accountability, while providing certainty for companies and auditors. The author first examines some of the key principles and policy considerations relating to the external audit of companies – namely, the significance of audits and auditors in the financial markets as well as the value of auditor independence and objectivity. This is followed by an examination of the provisions of section 92 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 regarding MAPR and the recently promulgated MAFR rule in light of legislative developments in the United States, Canada, the European Union, Australia and India regarding mandatory rotation of auditors and audit partners. Based on the lessons to be drawn from the experiences of the above jurisdictions, the author then makes recommendations for appropriate reforms for South Africa in this important area of company law. This is followed by some concluding remarks.

The Spillover Effects of Mandatory Audit Partner Rotation: Evidence from Audit Adjustments

We analyze whether and how mandatory audit partner rotation affects the audit adjustments for the rotated partner’s remaining clients. We argue mandatory audit partner rotation can affect audit production of remaining clients through two channels. First, it can cause audit partners to acquire unfamiliar new clients and thus shift their attention and effort away from existing ones. Second, it can destroy positive audit synergies by disrupting cross-audit information spillovers. Consistent with these conjectures, we find smaller income-decreasing audit adjustments for the rotated partner’s remaining clients after a mandatory rotation. The decrease in audit adjustments is more pronounced when new client acquisition driven by the rotation causes a large increase in the partner’s capacity demand and when the remaining client is in the same industry as the mandatorily dropped client. The evidence furthers understanding of audit production and underscores the interdependence among audits in an auditor’s client portfolio.

Independent and joint effects of audit partner tenure and non-audit fees on audit quality

We examine the individual and joint effects of auditors’ non-audit services (NAS)/abnormal NAS fees and length of audit partner tenure on audit quality. Our results raise questions about the ‘one size fits all’ approach imposed by the current audit partner rotation requirement in Australia as a result of (1) a learning differentiation that we observe between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors and (2) higher discretionary accruals associated with non-Big 4 auditors. We find abnormal NAS fees to have a positive association with both absolute and positive (income-increasing) values of discretionary accruals for firms with short audit partner tenure. NAS/abnormal NAS fees are also negatively associated with the issuance of going concern opinions to financially distressed firms when partner tenure is short. In terms of policy implications, regulators are able to gauge the efficacy of the CLERP 9 reforms which currently impose a five year mandatory audit partner rotation requirement.

Network Analysis of Audit Partner Rotation

Although mandatory audit partner rotation has become prevalent worldwide, prior empirical research seldom considers how the successor partners are identified and the economic consequences of different rotation strategies. We examine the importance of internal networks to the selection of successor partners and the underlying incentives in the selection process in China, which affords an opportune testing ground for analyzing our research questions. We find that candidate partners who are familiar with the incumbents—evident in prior teamwork experience—are more likely to be selected as successors. This phenomenon is more pronounced when the audit engagement is more complex, client-specific knowledge is not readily available to the succeeding partner, and the engagement is more attractive to the audit firm. These results are consistent with auditors’ incentive to facilitate information transfer and maintain client satisfaction after the transition. Reinforcing this interpretation, we find that successor–incumbent familiarity is associated with better post-rotation audit-reporting quality and less frequent client defections without undermining the quality of the audited financial statements. Enriching our understanding of the production of audit services in audit firms, our analysis contributes to the public policy discourse on partner rotation.

Conservative Reporting and the Incremental Effect of Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation Policy: A Comparative Analysis of Audit Partner Rotation vs Audit Firm Rotation in South Korea

AbstractIn this paper, we take advantage of Korea's unique experiment with mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR) and mandatory audit partner rotation (MAPR) to ascertain their influence on audit quality, proxied by conditional conservatism. Overall, we find that the implementation of MAFR did not have the desired effect. Firms that adopted MAFR demonstrate higher levels of conservatism in previous periods under MAPR (or compared to voluntary adopters). Furthermore, we find that audit tenure increases conservatism levels consistent with the auditor expertise hypothesis. However, whilst evidence suggests MAFR decreases audit quality on the whole, we find that firms that switch from non‐Big 4 to Big 4 auditors demonstrate higher conservatism because Big 4 auditors are more likely to demand conservative accounting practices, consistent with Big 4 audit firm knowledge superiority. Overall, the results suggest that MAFR's negative effect on audit quality can be mitigated by Big 4 auditor supervision.

The consequences of private relationship between audit partners and their clients

A private partner–client relation is revealed when sometimes signing audit partners and their clients switch to new audit firms but the audit partners continue to sign on audit reports for these clients in the new audit firms. In this study, we examine the economic consequences associated with such a private relation between audit partners and their clients. Using data from China, where the names of signing audit partners are identified in audit reports, we find that clients with private partner–client relationship tend to have higher costs of equity capital, lower firm values, and poorer future stock and accounting performances than their counterparts with no private partner–client relationship. Additional analyses show that the unfavorable consequences are not mitigated after the enforcement of mandatory audit partner rotation requirement in China. The findings imply that impaired independence at the audit partner level adversely affects clients and that more actions need to be taken to sever the private bond between audit partners and their clients.

The Effect of Previous Working Relationship between Rotating Partners on Mandatory Audit Partner Rotation

This study adds to the literature on mandatory rotation of audit partners in Chinese companies by examining the effect of the pre-rotation relationships between incoming and outgoing partners. We consider the rotating partners to have prior working relationship if they were cosigners of audit reports before the rotation. We find two different outcomes of having prior working relationship: (a) increasing the likelihood that outgoing partners rotate back after the cooling off period, and (b) lower audit quality improvement after rotation. These findings bring into question the extent to which rotating partners with prior working relationships are truly independent.