Mandatory Arbitration Research Articles

Rough Justice: A Statistical Assessment of ICANN's Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy

Long-standing conflict between domain name registrants and trademark holders prompted the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to create a global, mandatory arbitration procedure known as the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP). The UDRP has been used in 2166 cases involving 3938 domain names as of 1 November 2000. The policy gives the initiator of a complaint, generally a trademark holder, the right to choose which ICANN-accredited dispute resolution service provider (RSP) will handle the case. During the preparation of the UDRP,some feared that complainant selection would lead to "forum shopping" that might bias the results. This article performs a statistical assessment of the forum-shopping thesis and finds support for it. There are statistically significant differences in the various RSPs' propensity to take away names from defendants; there are also major differences in the number of cases brought to each RSP. RSPs who take away names have the larger share of cases. The study examines other variables that might explain differences in market share, such as price, the plaintiff's nationality, or the time taken to decide a case. It finds that nationality and time also are correlated with market share. The study concludes that shopping for a favorable outcome is an important factor in the UDRP.

Mandatory arbitration: will it be the answer to managing risk of employee lawsuits?

Journal of Healthcare Risk ManagementVolume 21, Issue 3 p. 19-22 Article Mandatory arbitration: Will it be the answer to managing risk of employee lawsuits? John E. Lyncheski Esq., John E. Lyncheski Esq. Sr. Director jlyncheski@cohenlaw.com Labor & Employment Group Cohen & Grigsby, P.C. Pittsburgh, PASearch for more papers by this author John E. Lyncheski Esq., John E. Lyncheski Esq. Sr. Director jlyncheski@cohenlaw.com Labor & Employment Group Cohen & Grigsby, P.C. Pittsburgh, PASearch for more papers by this author First published: 23 July 2009 https://doi.org/10.1002/jhrm.5600210306AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume21, Issue3Summer 2001Pages 19-22 RelatedInformation

The effect of arbitration program characteristics on applicants' intentions toward potential employers.

The authors examined intentions toward prospective employers with different alternative dispute resolution (ADR) policies and no ADR policy. In Study 1, students (N = 124) were randomly assigned to 1 of 4 conditions in which 2 variables, arbitration policy presence or absence and firm desirability, were manipulated. The presence of a voluntary, nonbinding arbitration policy had no impact on intentions and did not interact with firm desirability. In Study 2, students (N = 273) were randomly assigned to 1 of 8 conditions (mandatory vs. voluntary arbitration, binding vs. nonbinding arbitration, and highly desirable vs. less desirable employer). Both mandatory and binding arbitration policies were related to less favorable intentions toward firms. Predictions regarding the interaction of ADR policy and firm desirability were partially supported. Some support was found for the interaction between ADR policy and ethnicity.

John Bates Clark's Defense of Mandatory Arbitration and Minimum Wage Legislation

The ideal of Political Economy is not unrestricted competition, but competition that is truly free, because controlled by justice and by law. The distinction between freedom and license needs to be preserved in this department of political philosophy. With that distinction clearly maintained, we may still retain, in economics as in politics, our beautiful watchword, liberty (John Bates Clark 1879, p. 167).John Bates Clark has had a formidable impact on the development of economic theory and the theory of income distribution. In addition, Clark's marginal product theory of distribution has often played an instrumental role in the defense oflaissez-fairepolicies. His theory has been used to criticize a wide variety of market interventions, including minimum wage legislation. As a result it is not surprising that Clark's theory of income distribution, and Clark himself, have drawn more than a few critics.

Mandatory Arbitration Provisions in Collective Bargaining Agreements: The Case against Barring Statutory Discrimination Claims from Federal Court Jurisdiction

Mandatory Arbitration Provisions in Collective Bargaining Agreements: The Case against Barring Statutory Discrimination Claims from Federal Court Jurisdiction

Key court cases: Supreme court sheds new light on mandatory arbitration of statutory antidiscrimination claims

Employment Relations TodayVolume 26, Issue 1 p. 127-135 Departments Key court cases: Supreme court sheds new light on mandatory arbitration of statutory antidiscrimination claims Arthur F. Silbergeld, Arthur F. Silbergeld afs@sonnenschein.com Arthur F. Silbergeld is a labor partner in the Los Angeles office of Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal.Search for more papers by this authorMelanie H. Berkowitz, Melanie H. Berkowitz Melanie H. Berkowitz is an employment law associate in the firm's Chicago office.Search for more papers by this author Arthur F. Silbergeld, Arthur F. Silbergeld afs@sonnenschein.com Arthur F. Silbergeld is a labor partner in the Los Angeles office of Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal.Search for more papers by this authorMelanie H. Berkowitz, Melanie H. Berkowitz Melanie H. Berkowitz is an employment law associate in the firm's Chicago office.Search for more papers by this author First published: 16 January 2007 https://doi.org/10.1002/ert.3910260112 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume26, Issue1Spring 1999Pages 127-135 RelatedInformation

The Effects of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Perceptions of Justice and Suggestions for Change

The ability of employers to require employees to submit claims of discrimination to final and binding arbitration in lieu of exercising their statutory rights represents a significant change in public policy. The methods traditionally used by enforcing agencies to investigate discrimination claims provide assistance and intervention that redress power asymmetries between employees and employers. Depriving employees of these enforcement mechanisms and requiring them to use arbitration may have adverse effects on perceptions of justice, both in procedural and distributive terms. We propose that mutuality, equality, and remediality are issues that must be addressed in situations of mandatory arbitration. We also suggest that mandatory arbitration may have other effects including expanding the scope of issues well beyond discrimination claims.

Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes

While there's no definitive answer as to whether mandatory-arbitration policies for employment disputes are universally enforceable, many courts have allowed such provisions to stand. To ensure enforceability, however, such a policy should meet certain standards of fairness. Specifically, an arbitration policy should provide that (1) the procedure for selecting arbitrators is fair and impartial; (2) evidence and documentation of the facts of the matter are permissible and sufficient; (3) the damages available to the complainant are in keeping with allowable statutory awards; (4) the outcome will be provided in writing; (5) the agreement is fully disclosed to employees such that it can be entered into knowingly and voluntarily by the employees; and (6) there is no confusion regarding what employment issues must be resolved through arbitration. Mandatory arbitration cannot, however, preclude employees from filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Some courts have also created confusion regarding whether unionized employees with a collective-bargaining agreement should be treated differently from non-union workers with respect to mandatory-arbitration policies. In general, unionized employees may bring suit in federal court despite the existence of a mandatory-arbitration policy whereas non-union workers may not, provided the mandatory-arbitration agreement is deemed to be enforceable.

Mandatory arbitration of employment disputes: Implications for policy and practice

In jurisdictions where mandatory-arbitration policies for employment disputes are enforceable, they can be a useful tool for employers and employees alike.

Arbitration Agreements in Health Care: Myths and Reality

This comment, offered by one well-positioned respondent to the study on which this article is based, reflects the widespread belief that alternative dispute resolution methods, particularly mandatory binding arbitration agreements, have become the rule in health care delivery.' This apparent trend has spurred vigorous debate about the merits of using such agreements. Our study is an effort to ascertain how widespread mandatory arbitration agreements between health plans and providers and their enrollees and patients really are, to assess how decisions regarding their use are made, and to evaluate the prospects of their future use. We found, contrary to popular belief, that arbitration agreements are not used widely in the medical setting, and, where they are used, it is typically because organizational policy explicitly directs their use.

Employment Dispute Resolution Systems: Experience Grows But Some Questions Persist

Brown & Root, a large private construction firm, has designed and implemented a dispute resolution system (DRS) that emphasizes early, informal handling of disputes. This article traces the development, implementation, and accomplishments of the system thus far. The author also describes the most controversial aspect of the system ‐ a pre‐dispute agreement to mandatory arbitration as a condition of employment.

Arbitration. Statutory Claims. Ninth Circuit Imposes Knowing Waiver Standard for Mandatory Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Claims. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), Cert. Denied, 116 S. Ct. 61 (1995)

Arbitration. Statutory Claims. Ninth Circuit Imposes Knowing Waiver Standard for Mandatory Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Claims. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), Cert. Denied, 116 S. Ct. 61 (1995)

Employment dispute resolution systems: Experience grows but some questions persist

Brown & Root, a large private construction firm, has designed and implemented a dispute resolution system (DRS) that emphasizes early, informal handling of disputes. This article traces the development, implementation, and accomplishments of the system thus far: The author also describes the most controversial aspect of the system — a pre-dispute agreement to mandatory arbitration as a condition of employment.

Briefs: EEOC opposes mandatory arbitration

Briefs: EEOC opposes mandatory arbitration

State rules on mandatory arbitration

State rules on mandatory arbitration

Mandatory Arbitration in Colorado: An Initial Look at a Privatized ADR Program

In May 1987, the Colorado legislature passed SB22, The Colorado Mandatory Arbitration Act, authorizing nonbinding arbitration of selected civil disputes. Shortly thereafter, the governor signed the bill into law as Colorado Revised Statutes, sec. 13-22-401. This public law provided a structure for the promulgation of detailed rules by the Colorado Supreme Court. Preliminary rules were announced in November 1987 and, after public hearing were finalized December 17, 1987. These rules (Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 109.1) implementing the statute became effective January 1, 1988.The Colorado mandatory arbitration program is experimental in two senses. First, it operates in a subset of jurisdictions within the state for a specific time period.1 Second, it differs in several important ways from existing mandatory arbitration programs in other states.In this preliminary report, we describe the enactment of this reform, outline the structure of the Colorado mandatory arbitration program, highlight some of the differences between this program and those existing elsewhere throughout the country and briefly report on the operation of the program to date. We conclude with several observations on the future of mandatory arbitration in Colorado.

The Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act: New Patent Venue, Mandatory Arbitration and More

The Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act: New Patent Venue, Mandatory Arbitration and More

Victims in the Shadow of the Law: A Critique of the Model of Legal Protection

The twentieth anniversary of the 1964 Civil Rights Act marked the end of an era of uncertain progress. Despite dramatic victories in constitutional litigation and the visibility of group-based struggles, civil rights strategies had limited success in initiating major economic and social change.' The limited progress has prompted a new sense of realism among groups who experience discrimination-a sense of how little the situation has changed even though overt prejudice may be less prevalent. The modest progress of the civil rights movement has not made "rights-focused" struggles unattractive, however; in fact, there is a proliferation of civil rights strategies

D.C. Courts start multi‐door program; weighing mandatory arbitration

Alternatives to the High Cost of LitigationVolume 3, Issue 1 p. 1-6 In the Court D.C. Courts start multi-door program; weighing mandatory arbitration First published: January 1985 https://doi.org/10.1002/alt.3810030103AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume3, Issue1January 1985Pages 1-6 RelatedInformation

Mandatory State Malpractice Arbitration Boards and the Erie Problem: Edelson v. Soricelli

Mandatory State Malpractice Arbitration Boards and the Erie Problem: Edelson v. Soricelli