Managerial Risk-taking Incentives Research Articles

Principles based accounting standards, audit fees and going concern: evidence using advanced machine learning

PurposeThe current study uses an advanced machine learning method and aims to investigate whether auditors perceive financial statements that are principles-based as less risky. More specifically, this study aims to explore the association between principles-based accounting standards and audit pricing and between principles-based accounting standards and the likelihood of receiving a going concern opinion.Design/methodology/approachThe study uses an advanced machine-learning method to understand the role of principles-based accounting standards in predicting audit fees and going concern opinion. The study also uses multiple regression models defining audit fees and the probability of receiving going concern opinion. The analyses are complemented by additional tests such as economic significance, firm fixed effects, propensity score matching, entropy balancing, change analysis, yearly regression results and controlling for managerial risk-taking incentives and governance variables.FindingsThe paper provides empirical evidence that auditors charge less audit fees to clients whose financial statements are more principles-based. The finding suggests that auditors perceive financial statements that are principles-based less risky. The study also provides evidence that the probability of receiving a going-concern opinion reduces as firms rely more on principles-based standards. The finding further suggests that auditors discount the financial numbers supplied by the managers using rules-based standards. The study also reveals that the degree of reliance by a US firm on principles-based accounting standards has a negative impact on accounting conservatism, the risk of financial statement misstatement, accruals and the difficulty in predicting future earnings. This suggests potential mechanisms through which principles-based accounting standards influence auditors’ risk assessments.Research limitations/implicationsThe authors recognize the limitation of this study regarding the sample period. Prior studies compare rules vs principles-based standards by focusing on the differences between US generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and international financial reporting standards (IFRS) or pre- and post-IFRS adoption, which raises questions about differences in cross-country settings and institutional environment and other confounding factors such as transition costs. This study addresses these issues by comparing rules vs principles-based standards within the US GAAP setting. However, this limits the sample period to the year 2006 because the measure of the relative extent to which a US firm is reliant upon principles-based standards is available until 2006.Practical implicationsThe study has major public policy suggestions as it responds to the call by Jay Clayton and Mary Jo White, the former Chairs of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), to pursue high-quality, globally accepted accounting standards to ensure that investors continue to receive clear and reliable financial information globally. The study also recognizes the notable public policy implications, particularly in light of the current Chair of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) Andreas Barckow’s recent public statement, which emphasizes the importance of principles-based standards and their ability to address sustainability concerns, including emerging risks such as climate change.Originality/valueThe study has major public policy suggestions because it demonstrates the value of principles-based standards. The study responds to the call by Jay Clayton and Mary Jo White, the former Chairs of the US SEC, to pursue high-quality, globally accepted accounting standards to ensure that investors continue to receive clear and reliable financial information as business transactions and investor needs continue to evolve globally. The study also recognizes the notable public policy implications, particularly in light of the current Chair of the IASB Andreas Barckow’s recent public statement, which emphasizes the importance of principles-based standards and their ability to address sustainability concerns, including emerging risks like climate change. The study fills the gap in the literature that auditors perceive principles-based financial statements as less risky and further expands the literature by providing empirical evidence that the likelihood of receiving a going concern opinion is increasing in the degree of rules-based standards.

Managerial risk-taking incentives and debt diversity: Evidence from FAS 123R

We investigate how managerial risk-taking incentives affect corporate borrowing diversity using the adoption of FAS 123R as a quasi-natural experiment. We find that a reduction of managerial risk-taking incentives induced by FAS 123R leads to greater borrowing diversity. We also observe reduced capitalized leases and convertible debt issuance following FAS 123R. Overall, our findings suggest that CEOs are less likely to promote a diversified debt structure in the presence of greater compensation risk-taking incentives (vega).

Rivals risk-taking incentives and firm corporate policy

This study contributes to the literature on the sensitivity of executives' compensation to risk, or vega, by examining the impact of rivals’ compensation on the firm's vega and its associated risk-taking corporate policies. Using firms from Compustat, I find that the vega of executive compensation is significantly and positively influenced by two determinants: rivals’ vega and competition intensity. The vega explained by these two determinants leads to lower return idiosyncratic risk, relatively more investment in research and development (R&D), and less investment in capital expenditures than the components of vega that are orthogonal to these determinants. I show that the explained vega, along with R&D, increases cash holdings and reduces the extent of corporate diversification. To validate a causal effect of rivals' managerial risk-taking incentives on firm risk and investment, I exploit vega changes incited by the FAS 123 R accounting regulation in 2005 that mandated stock option expensing at fair values. The findings remain consistent with earlier tests.

Managerial Risk-Taking Incentives and Bank Earnings Management: Evidence from FAS 123R

We study the effect of CEOs’ risk-taking incentives (vega), derived from their stock options, on earnings management (EMGT) by banks. Prior research finds an inconsistent relationship between vega and EMGT in non-financial firms. In the banking industry, the effect of vega on EMGT is further complicated by the strict regulatory environment. To establish causality, we exploit the exogenous reduction in vega resulting from Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R in 2005 that mandates a fair-value-based method to expense stock options and increases costs of granting option compensation. Using the difference-in-differences approach, we find that banks with a larger drop in CEO vega due to FAS 123R significantly reduce EMGT. The findings suggest that CEO vega has a positive and causal effect on bank EMGT. Our results are robust enough to employ in different research designs and specifications. Furthermore, we find that the negative effect of FAS 123R on EMGT is weaker in banks subject to a higher possibility of regulatory intervention.

Does social capital influence executive risk-taking incentives?

We examine the impact of social capital at the US county level on managerial risk-taking incentives. We hypothesize that corporate executives in counties with higher social capital would accept lower equity-based compensation then faithfully behave in terms of efforts and risks following the shareholder trust or restrain themselves from rent-seeking which may harm shareholders. Our main test results with firm fixed effects are consistent with our hypothesis. Additional robustness checks—propensity score matching, instrumental variable, and difference-in-differences analyses—corroborate our main findings. Thus, it is highly likely that social capital has a curbing effect on executive risk-taking incentives.

CEO incentives and bank risk over the business cycle

We examine whether the relationship between managerial risk-taking incentives and bank risk is sensitive to the underlying macroeconomic conditions. We find that risk-taking incentives provided to bank executives are associated with higher bank riskiness during economic downturns. We attribute this finding to the increase in moral hazard during macroeconomic downturns when the perceived probability of future bailouts and government guarantees rises. This association is particularly strong for larger banks, banks that maintain lower capital ratios and banks that are managed by more powerful Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). Our findings highlight the importance of the interaction between managerial incentives and the macroeconomic environment. Boards and regulators may find it useful to consider the countercyclical nature of the relationship between risk-taking incentives and bank riskiness when designing managerial compensation.

Managerial risk-taking incentives and cash holding in U.S. firms: Evidence from FAS 123R

Employing FAS 123R, which mandated option expensing, as a quasi-natural experiment, we investigate the causal effects of CEO risk incentives (vega) on cash policies of U.S. firms. Employing a difference-in-differences framework with propensity-score matching, we find no association between changes in CEO portfolio vega and corporate cash holdings, including the marginal value of cash. Our finding applies to both firms most and least affected by the regulatory change. Thus, our evidence challenges the view that stock options are a first-order determinant of corporate cash policy, implying that any previously documented relation may reflect endogeneity rather than a causal influence.

The effect of shareholder-debtholder conflicts on corporate tax aggressiveness: Evidence from dual holders

We investigate the effect of agency conflicts between shareholders and debtholders on aggressive tax avoidance using a unique setting of dual holders who simultaneously hold equity and debt of the same firms. We find robust evidence that firms with dual holders exhibit more aggressive tax behavior even after controlling for endogeneity, suggesting that shareholder-debtholder conflicts induce firms to underinvest in tax aggressiveness. In addition, there exists a concave relation between tax aggressiveness and dual owners’ debt exposure relative to their overall debt and equity exposures to the investee firms. Further tests show that the effect of dual ownership on tax aggressiveness is more pronounced among firms with higher risk-shifting tendencies and higher managerial risk-taking incentives. Finally, our bond borrowing cost test shows that dual holdings mitigate the increased cost of borrowing due to aggressive tax avoidance.

Applications of Fixed Effect Models to Managerial Risk-taking Incentives

Applications of Fixed Effect Models to Managerial Risk-taking Incentives

The Effect of Managerial Share Pledges on the Cost of Debt

We examines whether share pledges by controlling shareholders influence a firm’s cost of debt. We also investigate whether the relationship between share pledges and the cost of debt stems from the managerial risk-taking incentives or pursuing the private benefits of controlling shareholders. We make three major findings. First, we find the cost of debt is higher in firms with share pledges than in firms without share pledges. Furthermore, we identify a positive relationship between the cost of debt and the level of share pledges. Second, we find that there is no increased corporate financial leverage or investment activities in firms with share pledges. Finally, our empirical evidence demonstrates that the positive relationship between share pledges and cost of debt is more pronounced for lower foreign institutional investor stakes or higher controlling shareholders ownership. Overall, the results indicate that share pledges by controlling shareholders negatively affect the cost of debt. However, the effect of share pledges on the cost of debt is differently influenced by a firm’s ownership structure. Our findings suggest that share pledges induce stockholder-bondholder conflict, and the bondholder requires more risk premium due to the decrease of firm value.

Does board gender diversity weaken or strengthen executive risk-taking incentives?

We investigate the effect of board gender diversity on managerial risk-taking incentives. Our results demonstrate that companies with stronger board gender diversity provide more powerful executive risk-taking incentives. It appears that female directors’ risk aversion exacerbates managers’ risk aversion, resulting in a sub-optimal level of risk-taking. To offset this tendency for too little risk, companies are induced to provide stronger risk-taking incentives. Specifically, an increase in board gender diversity by one standard deviation raises vega by 10.3%. Further analysis corroborates the results, including propensity score matching, entropy balancing, and an instrumental-variable analysis. Endogeneity appears to be unlikely, suggesting that female directors are not merely associated with, but probably bring about stronger risk-taking incentives.

Does customer-base structure influence managerial risk-taking incentives?

We find strong evidence that when a firm's customer base is more concentrated, the firm's CEO receives more risk-taking incentives in her compensation package. This finding is robust to numerous alternative measures, alternative specifications, alternative subsamples, and different attempts that mitigate endogeneity concerns. Further, the positive effect of customer concentration on CEO risk-taking incentive provision is more prominent when the CEO is more reluctant to take risks, when the firm has more investment opportunities, and when the firm is more prone to the costs of losing large customers. These findings are consistent with the notion that boards provide additional risk-taking incentives to offset the CEO's aversion to the risk of non-diversified revenue streams, thereby preventing excessive managerial conservatism at the expense of value maximization.

Options trading and the cost of debt

Equity option markets can have a dual effect on firms' cost of debt. On the one hand, options attract more informed investors, which increases price informativeness and reduces information asymmetries in the market, facilitating firm financing. On the other, by attracting more informed investors who provide reassurance regarding managerial career concerns, options can increase the potential for risk shifting in firms. We explore these two channels via different tests on corporate bond yields and use different econometric specifications including quasi-natural experiments to mitigate endogeneity concerns. We find evidence consistent with the preeminence of the risk-shifting channel when private managerial risk-taking incentives are sufficiently high and debtholders are more exposed to expropriation.

Does board gender diversity weaken or strengthen executive risk-taking incentives?

We investigate the effect of board gender diversity on managerial risk-taking incentives. Our results demonstrate that companies with stronger board gender diversity provide more powerful executive risk-taking incentives. It appears that female directors’ risk aversion exacerbates managers’ risk aversion, resulting in a sub-optimal level of risk-taking. To offset this tendency for too little risk, companies are induced to provide stronger risk-taking incentives. Specifically, an increase in board gender diversity by one standard deviation raises vega by 10.3%. Further analysis corroborates the results, including propensity score matching, entropy balancing, and an instrumental-variable analysis. Endogeneity appears to be unlikely, suggesting that female directors are not merely associated with, but probably bring about stronger risk-taking incentives.

Does the market for corporate control influence executive risk-taking incentives? Evidence from takeover vulnerability

PurposeThis study aims to investigate the role of the market for corporate control as an external governance mechanism and its effect on executive risk-taking incentives. Managers tend to be risk-averse as they are more exposed to idiosyncratic risk, resulting in sub-optimal risk-taking that does not maximize shareholders’ wealth. The takeover market alleviates this problem, inducing managers to take more risk. Therefore, risk-taking incentives inside the firm are less powerful when the outside takeover market is more active.Design/methodology/approachExploiting a novel measure of takeover vulnerability recently constructed by Cain et al. (2017), the authors explore how takeover vulnerability influences executive risk-taking incentives. Using a large sample of US firms, the authors use fixed-effects regressions, propensity score matching and instrumental variable analysis.FindingsConsistent with this study’s hypothesis, a more active takeover market results in less powerful risk-taking incentives. Specifically, a rise in takeover vulnerability by one standard deviation diminishes executive risk-taking incentives by 22.39%, which is an economically meaningful magnitude.Originality/valueTo the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to explore the effect of the takeover market on managerial risk-taking incentives, using a novel measure of takeover susceptibility. The authors’ measure of takeover vulnerability is considerably less susceptible to endogeneity, enabling the authors to draw causal inferences with more confidence.

Lender Monitoring and the Efficacy of Managerial Risk-Taking Incentives

ABSTRACTFirms provide convexity in managers' compensation plans (vega) to induce risk-averse managers to pursue risky, positive net present value projects. The resulting alignment of managers' and shareholders' incentives creates conflicts with lenders, who face an increased risk of default when managers pursue risky investments. We hypothesize that lenders would respond by stepping up their monitoring and threatening foreclosure to inhibit managers from acting on their vega incentives. Strong lender monitoring should, thus, reduce the efficacy of vega incentives. We test this hypothesis in a unique setting, where lenders purchase credit insurance, reduce their exposure to downside risk, and lower their monitoring. Afterward, we find a stronger association between vega incentives and the firms' risky investments. We contribute to the literature by showing that strong lender monitoring reduces the effectiveness of vega incentives and, thus, of the compensation mechanisms that boards of directors put in place to resolve manager-shareholder conflicts.JEL Classifications: G32; G33; M41; M48.

Does the Market for Corporate Control Influence Executive Risk-Taking Incentives? Evidence From Takeover Vulnerability

Purpose: We investigate the role of the market for corporate control as an external governance mechanism and its effect on executive risk-taking incentives. Managers tend to be risk-averse as they are more exposed to idiosyncratic risk, resulting in sub-optimal risk-taking that does not maximize shareholders’ wealth. The takeover market alleviates this problem, inducing managers to take more risk. Therefore, risk-taking incentives inside the firm are less powerful when the outside takeover market is more active. Design/Methodology: Exploiting a novel measure of takeover vulnerability recently constructed by Cain, McKeown, and Solomon (2017), we explore how takeover vulnerability influences executive risk-taking incentives. Using a large sample of U.S. firms, we employ fixed-effects regressions, propensity score matching, and instrumental variable analysis Findings: Consistent with our hypothesis, a more active takeover market results in less powerful risk-taking incentives. Specifically, a rise in takeover vulnerability by one standard deviation diminishes executive risk-taking incentives by 22.39%, an economically meaningful magnitude. Originality/Value: Our study is the first to explore the effect of the takeover market on managerial risk-taking incentives, using a novel measure of takeover susceptibility. Our measure of takeover vulnerability is considerably less susceptible to endogeneity, enabling us to draw causal inferences with more confidence.

CEO Incentives and Bank Risk over the Business Cycle

We examine whether the relationship between managerial risk-taking incentives and bank risk is sensitive to the underlying macroeconomic conditions. We find that risk-taking incentives provided to bank executives are associated with higher bank riskiness during economic downturns. We attribute this finding to the increase in moral hazard during macroeconomic downturns when the perceived probability of future bailouts and government guarantees rises. This association is particularly strong for larger banks, banks that maintain lower capital ratios and banks that are managed by more powerful CEOs. Our findings highlight the importance of the interaction between managerial incentives and the macroeconomic environment. Boards and regulators may find it useful to consider the countercyclical nature of the relationship between risk-taking incentives and bank riskiness when designing managerial compensation.

Does economic policy uncertainty influence executive risk-taking incentives?

We explore the effect of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on managerial risk-taking incentives. Our analysis shows that EPU leads to more powerful risk-taking incentives. A rise in EPU by one standard deviation raises vega by 18.88%. Economic uncertainty, coupled with their own inherent risk aversion, motivates managers to be extra cautious during uncertain times, resulting in sub-optimal risk-taking. To offset this tendency for too little risk, firms provide more powerful risk-taking incentives to induce managers to be more aggressive. Further analysis confirms the results, including an instrumental-variable analysis, random-effects analysis, propensity score matching, and using two alternative measures of uncertainty.

Managerial compensation incentives and corporate debt maturity: Evidence from FAS 123R

This paper studies the effect of risk-taking incentives provided by option compensation on corporate debt maturity choices. The Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R is used as a quasi-natural experiment to establish causality. FAS 123R requires firms to expense stock options at fair value, which has resulted in a dramatic reduction in option compensation and managerial risk-taking incentives. We find that treated firms significantly increased debt maturity relative to control firms. Further tests identify that the alleviation of creditor-shareholder agency conflicts due to the adoption of FAS 123R is the underlying mechanism driving the result.