Managerial Hegemony Research Articles

The nature of working in the hospitality industry: Evidence from 3S tourism in Turkiye

The main purpose of the study is to reveal the nature of working in the field of hospitality by examining employment forms and working conditions. For this purpose, the phenomenology approach was used and interviews were conducted with 32 hotel employees. According to the findings, it has been seen that temporary and precarious forms of employment are common in tourism. It is seen that the employees are kept under strict control for efficiency and productivity and the managerial hegemony is at a significant level. In addition, it has been determined that due to standardization and simplification in hotel businesses with an all-inclusive system, employees are deprived of their qualifications and become unqualified.

The Story of Rising Corruption Post-Village Government Reform - A View of Three Theories: Fraud, Managerial Hegemony, and Culture

Research aims: This study investigates how corruption increased in the Indonesian village governments following village governance reform by ratifying the New Village Law of 2014. Also, the current research identifies gaps that trigger corruption.Design/Methodology/Approach: Three theories, i.e., fraud hexagon, managerial hegemony, and cultural dimensions, were employed as points of view. Due to investigation purposes, a qualitative approach is considered the most suitable method for this study. Hence, the interview was employed as data collection. The data were then analyzed using a deductive thematic analysis approach.Research findings: The results showcased that aside from personal interests, corruption occurred to crowd campaign financing for the head village election by the incumbent. The corruption types could be the embezzlement of village funds and village-owned enterprise funds and the establishment of ghost (fictitious) villages. The results also identified some factors triggering graft corruption scandals, namely poor governance practices, including accountability, transparency, and valid administration; the excessive authority of actors (village heads) in holding and managing village money; lack of participation mechanism.Practical and Theoretical contribution/Originality: To tackle corruption in the village government, strengthening proper good governance practices must be tightened, not merely as ritual or ceremonial. In addition, discussions of three theoretical perspectives, fraud, managerial hegemony, and culture, are presented in this paper.

Voluntary Adoption of Audit Committee: Managerial Hegemony Perspective

[Purpose]The purpose of this study is to investigate whether firms establish an audit committee to appoint favorable auditors instead of a full－time auditor or an auditor required by law. Under Korea Commercial Code, the voting rights of majority shareholders are effective up to 3% including specially related persons for inside members of an audit commit but not for outside members of an audit committee. [Methodology]Based on the managerial hegemony theory that perceives audit committee as one of managerial tools to achieve strategic objectives, all non－financial firms from 2012 to 2018 are selected with audit committee, agenda at the shareholders meetings, and total assets. [Findings]I find that firms are more likely to adopt audit committee instead of an full－time auditor or an auditor. I also find that firms whose total assets are slightly below two trillion won increase their total assets, and thereby make an audit committee for granted and avoid the criticism of investors. [Implications]My results suggests that outside members as well as inside members of an audit committee should be elected with grand 3% rule at the time of elections of directors of the shareholder meeting. Also, my results suggests that managerial hegemony theory along with agency theory helps to understand the opportunistic behavior of managers.

Family Firms and Earnings Management: Empirical Evidence From India

This study investigates the earnings management among family firms in India after taking into account the moderating the effect of board independence. Discretionary accruals have been used to measure the magnitude of earning management, which has been estimated using the Modified Jones model (1995). The proportion of independent directors in the board and CEO duality have been used as proxies of board independence. Based on a sample of 2074 companies listed in Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) of India, spanning over 13 years from 2005 to 2017, we find that family firms are less likely to be engaged in earning management in comparison to their non-family counterparts after controlling for firm-specific variables such as firm size, financial leverage, sales growth, and operating performance. Family firms’ lower engagement in earning manipulation consistent with the notion of alignment effect rather than the entrenchment effect; there is greater alignment of interest between majority and minority shareholders in family firms due to their long-term focus. The findings also suggest that corporate governance is ineffective in India to control the financial irregularities due to a domination of management in controlling in the board, which jeopardizes the capability of independent directors to fulfill their monitoring role, consistent with managerial hegemony theory (Abdullah, 2004). In family firms, the board members have implicit ties with the dominant family, which results in a lack of substantial independence. The positions of CEO and chairman in family firms are mostly held by the family members themselves; therefore, holding these positions by the same person or two different persons, do not impact the earning management significantly. In particular, we find that family ownership limits the earnings management, which in turn, could affect their quality of financial reporting.

Reform, Resistance and Managerial Clawback: The Evolution of ‘Reform Prisons’ in England

AbstractAbstract: In late modernity, prison policy and practice have been characterised as being structured by punitiveness and managerialism. Recent research on prison reform has focused on the pervasiveness of punitiveness, but the resilience of managerialism is equally important in understanding contemporary penality. The creation of ‘reform prisons’ in England, offered an attempt to reimagine managerialism, where prison managers would act with greater autonomy, freed up from centralised policy prescription and monitoring of compliance. The article explores how this reform developed in practice. Particular attention is paid to the retreat from the original intentions and the emergence of a counter‐reformation, reasserting the centralised, managerial hegemony. It is concluded that while attention has been paid to punitiveness, the existence of a carceral habitus, and the process of carceral clawback, managerialism also plays a central role in shaping contemporary penality, and it is important to draw attention to a managerial habitus and managerial clawback.

Teorie opisujące działanie rady nadzorczej

There are several theories describing board of directors roles. This are in particular: managerial hegemony theory, agency theory, resource dependence theory, institutional theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory, class hegemony theory. In the paper the position of board of directors in corporate governance system has been shown and the theories have been presented describing its roles. Some conclusions were also formulated concerning validity of presented theories in the current Polish corporate governance system.

From Market Despotism to Managerial Hegemony: The Rise of Indigenous Chinese Management

Through examining executive rationale on why firms exist, Redding and Witt's (2015) paper serves as a window through which we can view varieties of capitalism and management models in several societies. However, though rationales are the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, they are after all ideational factors. The economic action and organizational practices, as Redding and Witt acknowledge, are often the result of the interplay of the material and ideational forces in society. Meanwhile, as the studied five economies are all relatively mature economies, executive rationales are rather stable, which is not the case for China. This commentary thus examines the evolution of Chinese management along with the shift of political economic parameters.

Disentangling CEO compensation: A simultaneous examination of time, industry, and firm‐level effects

AbstractDespite decades of research, how CEO compensation is determined remains an enigma. Drawing on agency, managerial hegemony, and institutional theoretical perspectives, we use hierarchical linear modelling—a multilevel analytic technique—to examine how firm‐, industry‐, and time‐level effects drive CEO compensation in US corporations. Results show that while cash salary is mostly driven by firm‐specific factors, equity‐based compensation responds to time‐level effects with firm‐ and industry‐level effects playing a marginal role. We argue that such evidence is consistent with the institutionalization of the CEO compensation determination process through the widespread adoption of benchmark peer‐group comparisons. Such practices underlie economy‐wide changes in CEO compensation that are increasingly disconnected from other fundamental firm‐ or industry‐specific factors. Copyright © 2015 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Effect of corporate governance on the top management team compensation

This paper has explored the determinants of the top management team (TMT) compensation. Specifically, it has examined the influence of ownership structure and the board of directors’ effectiveness on the TMT compensation in a sample of 274 most admired American firms of fortune magazine. When panel data methodology was applied, the results have shown that TMT pay level has not been affected by the supervisory effectiveness of the board and the ownership concentration. These results have contradicted the classic suppositions of the agency theory and have supported the cognitive approach expectations. Furthermore, the results have indicated that the TMT compensation has been significantly influenced by the size, the performance of firms, the age and the tenure of the top managers. But, the size of the firm has been the most significant factor in determining the level of TMT compensation (managerial hegemony theory). It should be noted that this study has envisaged various components of compensation and different measures of performance to ensure the robustness of the results. Key words: Top management team (TMT), compensation, corporate governance, performance.

Form vs. Substance: The Implications for Auditing Practice and Research of Alternative Perspectives on Corporate Governance

The objective of this paper is to provide a more comprehensive view of corporate governance than that considered by the traditional agency literature predominately employed in auditing and accounting studies of governance. Specifically, we discuss three widely recognized additional theoretical perspectives: resource dependence, managerial hegemony, and institutional theory. Resource dependence is developed in the strategic management literature and focuses on the contribution of governance mechanisms as a vehicle to help a firm achieve or further its strategic objectives. In contrast with the agency and resource dependence perspectives which offer a functional view of governance, the managerial hegemony perspective views the board and its attendant committees as being under the control of management and hence could be potentially viewed as dysfunctional from a stockholder viewpoint. Finally, institutional theory, developed in the sociology of organizations and organizational behavior literatures, suggests that it is necessary to understand the substance of the interactions between different governance parties and how these parties use at times symbolic gestures and activities to maintain their form to all relevant parties. Although the value of using multiple theoretical perspectives with respect to governance has been well recognized in the economics and behavioral literatures, this is the first paper that we are aware of that examines the effect of using alternative theories of governance on accounting/auditing issues that are influenced by the governance structure of a firm. In addition, we examine how these theories provide a useful basis for reconciling conflicting findings in the existing agency-based audit-related governance literature. Finally, we provide examples of how these alternative theories provide important new insights to issues in auditing research and practice.

The Link Between Board Composition and Corporate Diversification in Australian Corporations

ABSTRACTManuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: This study investigates the association between the composition of the board of directors and corporate diversification, to explore the role of the board in corporate strategic choice.Research Findings/Results: Based on a sample of 101 Australian publicly listed firms in 2005, this study finds that there is no link between corporate decisions on product and/or geographic diversification and two aspects of board composition – board independence and institutional representation. However, there is a positive link between total diversification and a third aspect of board composition – the proportion of directors who have ties to boards of corporations in other industries.Theoretical Implications: The results provide support for the managerial hegemony and the resource dependency theories. Corporate strategic decisions regarding diversification are more likely to be made by management than boards of directors, and to be encouraged by interlocking directors with extra‐industry ties.Practical Implications: Contrary to the requirement or recommendation in many jurisdictions that boards be more independent, these results indicate that shareholders' interests, represented by lower levels of diversification, are not promoted under such circumstances. Interlocking directors appear to effectively link the corporation to the external business environment and to encourage diversification. Existing recommendations and regulations to align management with shareholders' interests through independent boards should be revised. Board composition should also consider directors' knowledge, relevant expertise, availability, and length of tenure.

Compensation transparency and managerial opportunism: a study of supplemental retirement plans

AbstractExisting research on managerial compensation is based primarily on optimal contracting and managerial hegemony theories. Under the optimal contracting theory, observed compensation contracts are optimally determined, aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. Under the managerial hegemony theory, observed compensation contracts deviate from the optimum because top managers with power over boards are able to influence their own pay. I argue that the impact of managerial power over boards on managerial pay, and hence the deviation of compensation contracts from the optimum, is contingent on the transparency of managerial compensation. Within this framework, I investigate the impact of supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs)— historically the least transparent compensation component— on opportunistic decision making. An empirical analysis based on a time series sample of CEOs of S&P/TSX60 firms provides support of the compensation transparency theory. I find that SERP benefits are primarily driven by variables proxying for CEO power over the board, whereas more transparent compensation components are primarily driven by economic factors. The results also suggest that CEOs whose SERPs are contingent on firm performance appear to reduce firm R&D expenditures as they approach retirement. Both findings provide important contributions to existing research on the impact of managerial compensation on opportunistic decisions. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Form versus Substance: The Implications for Auditing Practice and Research of Alternative Perspectives on Corporate Governance

SUMMARY: The objective of this paper is to provide a more comprehensive view of corporate governance than that considered by the traditional agency literature predominately employed in auditing and accounting studies of governance. Specifically, we discuss three widely recognized additional theoretical perspectives: resource dependence, managerial hegemony, and institutional theory. Resource dependence is developed in the strategic management literature and focuses on the contribution of governance mechanisms as a vehicle to help a firm achieve or further its strategic objectives. In contrast with the agency and resource dependence perspectives which offer a functional view of governance, the managerial hegemony perspective views the board and its attendant committees as being under the control of management and hence could be potentially viewed as dysfunctional from a stakeholder viewpoint. Finally, institutional theory, developed in the sociology of organizations and organizational behavior literatures, suggests that it is necessary to understand the substance of the interactions between different governance parties and how these parties use at times symbolic gestures and activities to maintain their form to all relevant parties. Although the value of using multiple theoretical perspectives with respect to governance has been well recognized in the economics and behavioral literatures, this is the first paper that we are aware of that examines the effect of using alternative theories of governance on auditing issues that are influenced by the governance structure of a firm. In addition, we examine how these theories provide a useful basis for reconciling conflicting findings in the existing agency-based audit-related governance literature. Finally, we provide examples of how these alternative theories provide important new insights to issues in auditing research and practice.

Uma proposta de framework em gerência estratégica de redes verticais

Este artigo tem como objetivo compreender por que gerentes de rede implementam estratégias cooperativas que contribuem para o desempenho de redes verticais. A literatura no âmbito de redes reproduz a hegemonia gerencial que se constituiu na área de gerência estratégica. Influenciada pelo conceito de vantagem competitiva, esta hegemonia ajudou a dissolver a fronteira entre os domínios da estratégia e da gerência nos âmbitos da grande empresa e das redes verticais. Este artigo demonstra a importância do re-estabelecimento da fronteira entre estratégia e gerência para esse tipo de investigação. Com base em extensa investigação empírica baseada na ontologia do realismo crítico, o autor propõe um framework cuja principal característica é o reconhecimento de dois níveis de redes: as supra-redes e as redes gerenciais. A proposta desafia o desprezo de pesquisadores pelo caráter político da estratégia e pelas interfaces de governo e empresa, e as disputas entre as principais escolas teóricas em gerência estratégica. No final, o autor sugere que o framework deve ser explorado no Brasil por pesquisadores e praticantes relacionados aos âmbitos privado e público.

Struggling over subjectivity: A discursive analysis of strategic development in an engineering group

We have seen growing interest in discursive perspectives on strategy. This perspective holds great promise for development of an understanding on how strategy discourse and subjectivity are intertwined. We wish to add to this existing research by outlining a discursive struggle approach to subjectivity. To understand the complex subjectification and empowering/disempowering effects of organizational strategy discourse, this approach focuses on organization-specific discourse mobilizations and various ways of resistance. Drawing on an analysis of the discourses and practices of ‘strategic development’ in an engineering and consulting group we provide an empirical illustration of such struggles over subjectivity. In particular, we report three examples of competing ways of making sense of and giving sense to strategic development, with specific subjectification tendencies. First, we show how corporate management can mobilize and appropriate a specific kind of strategy discourse to attempt to gain control of the organization, which tends to reproduce managerial hegemony, but also trigger discursive and other forms of resistance. Second, we illustrate how middle managers resist this hegemony by initiating a strategy discourse of their own to create room for manoeuvre in controversial situations. Third, we show how project engineers can distance themselves from management-initiated strategy discourses to maintain a viable identity despite all kinds of pressures. Although our examples are case-specific, we believe that similar discursive dynamics also characterize strategizing in other organizations.

Open Source, Anarchy, and the Utopian Impulse

Open Source, Anarchy, and the Utopian Impulse

The Adventures of Managerial Hegemony: Teamwork, Ideology, and Worker Resistance

New forms of work organization have spread throughout much of the corporate world. Critics warn that team systems may encourage workers to internalize managerial definitions of their work situations, and-as a result-strengthen management's hegemony over them. This article presents an ethnographic analysis of four manufacturing plants in which team initiatives have been introduced. The findings cast doubt on the hegemony thesis. Analyzing data bearing on the degree of managerial legitimacy, the salience of class boundaries, and instances of worker defiance in both traditionaland team-based production areas, I find only occasional evidence of increased worker integration or incorporation within a nascent managerial regime. Indeed, by drawing attention to the limited authority that workers were actually allowed, team systems tended to heighten worker suspicion and distrust and to foster patterns of solidarity that were difficult for managers to control. The most significant feature of the new production concepts may not be their siren-like appeal, but rather the tensions and contradictions they introduce into work organizations. In fact, such concepts provide workers with subtle yet strategic resources with which to renegotiate the boundaries of managerial authority.

Managerial hegemony, cultural change, and the transformation of infant care advice in the United States in the twentieth century.

Ordinary culture is penetrated by ideas, norms, and values about work and consumption that support particular modes of capitalist accumulation. This penetration, or "managerial hegemony," is an aspect of cultural hegemony that pervades not only work and consumption but also "private" spheres of life. This essay focuses on the penetration of managerial ideology into infant care advice. Since the late 19th century, infant care advice has changed with broader shifts in the dominant ideas, values, and norms that control work and consumption. Infant care advice is connected to this changing aspect of culture in four ways. (1) Infant care has been promoted as a means of socialization into the world of production and consumption; (2) infant care instruction has been shaped by notions of women's role in the "workforce" and in the home; (3) infant care has been described and interpreted through metaphors of production and consumption and their associated infrastructures; (4) infant care advice implicitly assumes a particular distribution of expert knowledge. This analysis examines the relation between three eras of infant care advice in the 20th century and the three eras in managerial cultural hegemony.

Against paternalism in Human Resource Management

The paper presents an evaluation of the paternalistic model of HRM. The analysis reveals that this conception of the employment relationship is deeply flawed and does not provide a morally acceptable approach towards responsible citizens in a democratic society. Moreover, where the employment relationship is based upon managerial hegemony and secrecy, the danger is that this can become institutionalized as a corporate morality that brings about the unintended consequences of moral indifference and unjust conduct towards employees and other stakeholders. The conclusion of this evaluation is that a wise management will try to open up its decision‐making processes and seek the participation of a wide range of stakeholders in the determination of the economic and social purpose of the company. There is another option: the employment relationship can be informed by a communitarian perspective, which aims to strike a balance between the economic interests of employers and employees, and the need for justice to foster mutual cooperation in the pursuit of a common purpose. This conception of the employment relationship will be outlined here as HRM in the ‘community of purpose’.

Perspectives on Corporate Control: Implications for CEO Compensation

This study examines the influence on CEO pay practices of four corporate control perspectives: managerial control, class hegemony, external control, and efficient market. The results indicate the influence of both market and extra-market controls on the determination of CEO pay levels and criteria. Implications for the governance of firms and the study of corporate control are drawn.