Majority Of Creditors Research Articles

The legal nature of pre-insolvency proceedings under Russian and European law

The article provides a critical analysis of bankruptcy prevention procedures in the context of interactions between the principle of self-regulation (interaction between free legal will of creditors and the debtor) and the principle “cross-class cram-down” (the right of a court to prevail over the principle of self-regulation). The judicial authority, within the framework of European preventive restructuring law, has the absolute right to discretionally decide on any issue if it is approved by the debtor (freedom of entrepreneurial activity is guaranteed to every solvent debtor). Interference in the business of the solvent and insolvent debtor by judicial authority is not allowed in any other procedures including traditional insolvency court procedures (the majority of creditors are empowered to make decisions). In all legal orders, the traditional insolvency court procedures prioritize the principle of “majority of creditors” to the principle of self-regulation in contrast to European preventive restructuring procedures, where the principle of self-regulation dominates. Therefore, European preventive restructuring cannot be unambiguously attributed to either a civil law legal nature or a bankruptcy law legal nature. In Russia pre-insolvency procedures represent only the civil law legal nature during all procedure. The author introduces new pre-bankruptcy terms: “normative legal collectivity” — mandatory distribution of consequences to all parties, “actual collectivity” — the voluntary consent of all creditors in a particular case and “regulatory actual collectivity” — the requirements for voluntary consent of all creditors. The final result of the European preventive restructuring procedure is unknown until the very end (the same for traditional insolvency court procedures), while according to Art. 31 of the Bankruptcy Law Act of the Russian Federation, the result is fully known from the beginning where it works according to the principle: “either everything and immediately, or nothing”.

Institutionalization of the Approval Principle of Majority Creditors for Bankruptcy Decisions in Bankruptcy Act Reform Efforts

This study aims to determine the urgency of institutionalizing the principle of bankruptcy decisions that must be approved by the majority creditors with a test stone in the form of a bankruptcy decision Number: 04/Pdt.Sus-PKPU/2018/PN.Niaga.Jkt.Pst then also to analyze the opportunities for institutionalizing the principle. mentioned in Indonesian law. This research is a normative legal research with an approach in the form of a conceptual approach, and a statute approach and a case approach. The results show that the urgency of applying the principle of "Approval of Bankruptcy Decisions Must be approved by Majority Creditors" in Indonesia is based on the Bankruptcy Decision Number: 04/Pdt.Sus-PKPU/2018/PN.Niaga.Jkt.Pst, in addition to following the development of global bankruptcy law. , also in order to provide justice to fellow creditors so that no creditor feels aggrieved in any future bankruptcy decisions. The principle itself requires that each bankruptcy decision be approved by at least 50% of the majority of creditors according to the number of claims (receivables), not the majority according to the number of people. Even though, the application for a bankruptcy statement was made by the Debtor himself, the bankruptcy decision should not have been taken by the court without the approval of the creditors or the majority of creditors. Also, the opportunity to apply this principle in Indonesia is very possible considering that the principle is in accordance with the character of the nation which clearly makes consensus & deliberation as an alternative in every problem that exists within the Indonesian nation, it is not wrong if this is also applied in the concept of the Bankruptcy Law in the future (das sein).

The restructuring of the debtor as a means bankruptcy warnings under european law legislation

Directive on preventive restructuring 1023/2019 (hereinafter referred to as the Directive) guarantees the right of bona fide and prospective commercial entities (hereinafter‑debtors) to initiate a preventive restructuring procedure in the absence of signs of bankruptcy, subject to the mandatory consent of the debtor and the majority of creditors, while, if the disagreement of the majority of creditors is not economically justified, the procedure can be approved by the authorized body (hereinafter — the court). The purpose of the procedure is to prevent bankruptcy in advance. A significant common characteristic of preventive restructuring and bankruptcy proceedings is the collective extension of legal consequences to all creditors, including those who disagree, because a single legal will is economically necessary to achieve the goal. In addition, it prohibits any of the creditors, including those from the dissenting minority, from starting enforcement proceedings (bankruptcy proceedings or enforcement proceedings) at a certain period, even if there are grounds provided for by law, since the legal consequences apply to all creditors, which ensures the incentive and effectiveness of the measures taken and avoids a conflict of creditors due to different assessments of the economic situation and prospects of the debtor.

How to Restructure Argentine Debt

We propose that Argentina make an exchange offer that, if accepted by a majority of creditors, could (i) preclude potential holdouts from successfully suing Argentina over a violation of the pari passu clause, and (ii) force potential holdouts to litigate in Argentine courts. Also, we propose to amend the terms of the 2005 Indenture with the approval of holders of 67% of bond principal. This amendment would dissuade potential holdouts from resisting a restructuring. Finally, we propose that Argentina request a temporary stay on payment of interest until the resolution of the financial crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. This stay, we believe, may be granted by Argentine courts.

Zakonsko regulisanje prava dužnika da inicira postupak predstečajnog restrukturiranja komparativna analiza - Rusija i Evropa

In the situation when before insolvency due time there are already signs of economic crisis and if there is consent of the majority of creditors, debtors are bona fide and economical viable, debtors have legal possibility to initiate preventive restructuring procedure, the consequences of which will be extended to dissenting creditors . When the possibility of restructure is announced there would be differences among creditors according to various estimates of the economic position of the debtor. So the will,decision of those who have the majority of debt should be obligatory to all. It Will be the only way to get common legal will of all creditors and the debtor, However, the European legislation in exceptional cases presupposes the ability to approve the preventive restructuring procedure of the debtor by the courts in the absence of consent of the majority of creditors. At the same time, without the consent of the debtor (on the initiative of the majority of creditors) preventive rehabilitation cannot be started.

Enkele Opmerkings oor Bankrot Munisipaliteite

The insolvency of municipalities is no longer a rare incident; it is a reality. It is interesting to note that even in the United States of America the insolvency of municipalities is currently an equally serious concern. In South Africa there is much speculation regarding the causes of the insolvency of municipalities, and possible solutions are often discussed. This investigation is an attempt to provide answers. Importantly, however, constructive contributions are needed to begin to address the problem of insolvent municipalities. But to address a problem accurately, necessarily means that one should also refer to the possible causes. The working method applied in the USA with regard to the reorganization of bankrupt municipalities and the requirements set, are explained because it is important to establish what the effect and consequences are of this type of "sequestration" in the American law of insolvency and what the role of the insolvency courts is in managing the whole procedure. In the American law the purpose of the Chapter 9 reorganisation is to provide for a plan acceptable to the majority of creditors and binding on the dissenting minority. Consequently the purpose of this article is to indicate how Chapter 9 functions in practice and which solutions may possibly be applied in South Africa to ensure an effective procedure.

External Debt Accumulation and Its Impact on Economic Growth in Pakistan

The accumulation of external debt is common phenomenon of the developing countries and it has become a common feature of the fiscal sectors of most of the economies. A country with lower saving rate needs to borrow more to finance the given rate of economic growth. So external debt is obtained to sustain the growth rate of the economy, which is otherwise not feasible with the given domestic resources. Pakistan is one of the developing countries and faces serious debt problems, according to World Bank Report 2000-2001, Pakistan is among the Highly Indebted Countries (HICs); because Pakistan’s present and future debt situation is very grim. According to the World Bank total external debt may be defined as debt owed to non-resident repayable in terms of foreign currency, goods or services. External debt is the composition of long term debt (public and publicly guaranteed debt plus private non guaranteed debt), short term commercial debt and International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans. Prior to early 1970s the external debt of developing countries was primarily small and official phenomenon, the majority of creditors being foreign governments and international financial institutions offer loan for development project [Todaro (1988)]. At the same time current account deficit was common which increased the external indebtedness of the developing countries, until when Mexico, despite an oil exporter, declared in august, 1992 that it could not services its debt ever since, the issue of external debt and its servicing has assumed critical importance and introduced the debt crises debate [Were (2001)].

Chicago Made: Factory Networks in the Industrial Metropolis (review)

Reviewed by: Chicago Made: Factory Networks in the Industrial Metropolis Damon Yarnell (bio) Chicago Made: Factory Networks in the Industrial Metropolis. By Robert Lewis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008. Pp. xii+351. $40. In 1929, Campbell Soup completed a new 800,000-square-foot plant in an industrial development on the outskirts of Chicago. Each day, the facility took in tons of tomatoes from nearby farms in Illinois and Indiana and shipped out 3.6 million cans of soup to retailers across the Midwest. The factory’s most interesting trading partner, however, may have been just next door. The Continental Can Company not only built a factory on a neighboring lot, it delivered its cans via a conveyor belt that stretched between the two sites. In the simplest possible form, the relationship between Campbell and Continental encapsulates the two major themes of this important new work by one of North America’s leading urban geographers. First, Campbell and Continental chose industrial sites outside Chicago’s old industrial core. The new location altered existing social and economic patterns, and, by luring workers and other industrial firms to the urban fringe, helped fuel a process of industrial “decentralization.” Second, the two companies forged a commercial link that—because similar links multiplied at every point along the production chain—formed part of an industrial network. To make his case, Robert Lewis uses the tools of economic geography. In the first half of his book he documents changing patterns of industrial location between 1860 and 1940, offering both useful conceptual tools and a wealth of quantitative analysis. The industrial metropolis is best understood as a “localized production system” (p. 13). Industrialists don’t simply [End Page 932] build factories; they cultivate and exploit unique combinations of infrastructures, institutions, and practices that Lewis dubs “locational assets” (p. 15). Drawing on census records, business directories, and a variety of trade literature, he tracks variables such as firm size, product specialization, factory additions, and company relocations. The result is both nuanced and comprehensive. Most industrial growth occurred on the fringe, but certain industries tended to remain in the core, and different industries manifested different “location quotients,” or degrees of geographic concentration. Throughout, Lewis garnishes his empirical findings with lively anecdotes about individual firms, leading industrialists, and urban boosters. In the second half of Chicago Made, Lewis shifts his attention from factory to network. He uses an extraordinary database of bankrupt firms (97 businesses selected from four historical periods yielded 7,196 creditors) to trace flows of money and material. Here again, Lewis’s deft analysis offers both breadth and detail. The majority of creditors were manufacturers, for example, but financial institutions lent the most capital. Firms borrowed from both local and non-local creditors, but non-local manufacturers outnumbered other non-local sources nearly two to one: in certain circumstances, goods proved more mobile than bank loans or other services. Lewis makes clear that the vital importance of supply networks would not have been news to his actors. In chapters 6 and 7, he follows industrial boosters and developers as they used spatial proximity to promote and plan industrial districts such as Calumet, Pullman, and the Central Manufacturing District, America’s “first operating planned industrial district” (p. 167). Subsequent chapters probe the implications of networked space in broader terms, emphasizing not only geographic and economic consequences, but also deep, class-based social repercussions. Industrial networks reinforced particular social formations and alliances, and decisions about the built environment always carry a high degree of path dependency. Make room on your shelves. This is a major work by a leader in his field about processes of interest to many T&C readers. That the book will fit nicely in a variety of places is evidence of Lewis’s achievement. Urbanists may want to tuck it next to Bill Cronon’s Nature’s Metropolis (1991, because it complements agricultural flows from the hinterland with industrial flows in the city) or alongside Sam Warner’s Streetcar Suburbs (1962, because it contributes to the ongoing revision of the history of suburbanization). Scholars of “regional advantage” and “high technology” may choose to place it between AnnaLee Saxenian’s Regional Advantage: Culture and...

Bankruptcy and Reorganization: A Survey of Changes. III

IN THE United States, prior to the recent changes in the Bankruptcy Act, an arrangement could be consummated through one of three methods: a voluntary adjustment, bankruptcy, or an equity receivership. There were in addition special statutes dealing with the liquidation and reorganization of banks, insurance companies, and building and loan associations. State corporation acts also contained provisions under which reorganization might be effected, but these provisions were usually directed towards winding-up rather than reorganization. The chief characteristic of the voluntary adjustment was that creditors who did not agree to the readjustment could insist upon the complete use of the corporation's property for the payment of their debts. Bankruptcy reorganization was seldom resorted to because of the drastic nature of the remedy, the impatience of the bankruptcy court, and the inability to affect secured claims through the composition section of the bankruptcy act. While the equity receivership was not by any means a perfect forum for reorganization, it was nevertheless the most feasible and therefore the most popular. A voluntary arrangement is one whereby creditors or owners attempt to effect a change in their rights without court action. The arrangement might take the form of an assignment for the benefit of creditors, making use of the facilities of trade associations.98a The defect of the voluntary arrangement insofar as it applied to creditors was, that with few exceptions, a majority of creditors could not force other creditors to agree to a like change in their claims. This result might be arrived at, however, through indirect coercion, the granting of special rights to creditors who consented, or the threat that the management might take its skill and the