Main Bank Relationship Research Articles

The moderating effect of private information on the relation between financial reporting quality and corporate dividend efficiency

AbstractWe examine the effect of private information on the linkage between financial reporting quality and dividends. While prior studies show that better reporting quality mitigates agency problems regarding dividends, this effect can depend on capital suppliers' private information sources. In a sample of Japanese firms, we measure dividend efficiency regarding over‐ and underpayments and use unique main bank relationships as a proxy for private information. Reporting quality enhances dividend efficiency, and this linkage is observed only for firms without main bank relationships. The results suggest that high‐quality reporting streamlines dividends, particularly when capital suppliers do not have private information sources.

Main bank impairment and corporate cash holdings during the global financial crisis

This paper examines how the impairment of main banks’ balance sheets affects corporate cash-holding behavior during the 2008 financial crisis using a firm–bank matched panel dataset of 2,520 firms in Japan. The major findings of this paper are as follows. First, the impairment of main banks increases firms’ cash holdings during this financial crisis. Second, this tendency is more pronounced among firms with limited financing sources and those with unstable main bank relationships. Third, holding large amounts of cash increases the value of firms with main bank impairment during the 2008 financial crisis.

Does Geographical Proximity Matter in Small Business Lending? Evidence from Changes in Main Bank Relationships*

AbstractWe examine the causal link between the geographical distance between firms and their main bank and the termination of main bank relationships, using the exogenous change in firm–main bank distances brought about by bank branch consolidations in Japan. Our findings are threefold. First, an increase in lending distance increases the likelihood that firms switch their main bank. Second, the average lending distance for firms that switched to a new main bank decreased after the switch. Third, the lending distance of new firm–main bank relationships after the switch had a positive impact on the probability of default of small firms.

Operating Leases and Credit Assessments: The Role of Main Banks in Japan

ABSTRACTThis study examines how Japanese banks evaluate off-balance sheet operating leases in their credit assessments. Using a sample of 6,985 firm-year observations in Japan over the period 2001 to 2017, we find that banks in Japan evaluate off-balance sheet operating leases in certain circumstances. First, we find that banks evaluate such leases when firms have a strong relationship with a main bank. Second, banks assess firms' credit risk by evaluating operating leases if there is a strong main bank relationship especially when estimation reliability is low. We uncover robust results by controlling for the systematic characteristics of a strong main bank relationship. Our study thus suggests that the main bank relationship plays the important role of conveying the off-balance sheet operating leases in loan contracts in Japan.

Accounting Frauds and Main-Bank Monitoring in Japanese Corporations

This study examines whether the delegated monitoring of main banks effectively decreases severe agency problems. For example, this includes accounting fraud in bank-dominated corporate governance. In this context, the fraud triangle specifies the three main factors of opportunity, incentive, and rationalization. Main banks may reduce the factor of opportunity through actions such as monitoring, which plays a moderating role by reducing the potential for managerial misconduct, whereas, the incentive factor may be enhanced through the subsequent pressure that influences managers to force turnover when they do not repay debts. The potential influence that the main banks have on the fraud rationalization factor may be stronger in firms that are more dependent on main-bank borrowing. This study analyzed data from publicly listed firms in Japan for the period between 2008 and 2016 to determine how main-bank relationships affected accounting fraud, thus allowing an assessment of delegated monitoring practices. Findings showed that main-bank relationships were helpful for reducing accounting fraud, suggesting its overall effectiveness in delegated monitoring. Results also showed that large audit firms did not necessarily prevent accounting fraud, which implies that main banks can employ their own monitoring as a substitute for the roles typically played by these firms. Here, the main policy implication is that main-bank relationships may strengthen business ethics in the context of bank-dominated corporate governance. In conclusion, the continued analysis of bank monitoring may benefit stakeholders while strengthening business ethics in bank-centered economies.

The effect of bank relationships on bond spreads: Additional evidence from Japan

This study investigates the impact of bank relationships on bond spreads using data on Japanese bond-issuing firms. In doing so, it extends the existing literature, which found that bank relationships decrease bond spreads, consistent with the view that bond investors benefit from bank monitoring, but this is not the case for investment-grade bonds in the US. This study provides evidence that the influence on the yields of investment-grade bonds varies with the type of bank relationship. In this research, a main bank is defined as a bank that is not merely the top lender to a firm but also one of the ten largest shareholders, while firms that borrow money from banks but have no ties with main banks are considered to have support bank relationships. The regression results show that although main bank relationships are not systematically associated with the yields of investment-grade bonds, support bank relationships are positively associated with them. It is suggested that, even for a sample of investment-grade bonds, a specific type of bank relationship affects bond spreads and the association between them is consistent with the view that bond investors are concerned about the hold-up problem posed by banks.

Main bank relationships and risk taking in Japanese listed firms

ABSTRACT Bank–firm relationships play a role in the degree of corporate risk taking that guides financing decisions. As such, we study whether the magnitude of corporate risk taking is associated with close bank–firm ties in Japan. To this end, we use data on publicly listed firms from 2007 to 2016 following the bank mergers that occurred in the wake of Japanese financial deregulation, and select risk variables such as idiosyncratic and total risk as proxies for corporate risk taking. The empirical evidence suggests that close bank ties can drive firms to take fewer risks. The results remain unchanged even after controlling for endogeneity. Finally, we observe that smaller firms with higher growth opportunities tend to reduce the degree of corporate risk taking when they form close bank ties.

Institutional and foreign ownership vis-à-vis default risk: Evidence from Japanese firms

Using a sample of 2902 listed non-financial firms over the period 2004 to 2017 and recently available Nikkei NEEDS CGES database, this study provides the first comprehensive and robust evidence on the association between ownership structure and default risk in the Japanese setting. Consistent with the wealth redistribution hypothesis, results show a positive relationship of institutional and foreign shareholdings with default risk. These findings are robust to an alternative proxy of default risk, and to endogeneity bias. Additionally, we provide evidence that the positive association of institutional and foreign ownership on default risk is driven by the main bank relationship, ownership instability, stock illiquidity, cross-shareholdings and non-ADRs. Our findings are generalizable to the wider economy and have practical implications for risk management.

Main bank relationship and accounting conservatism: evidence from Japan

In a market-oriented economy like the USA, the process of monitoring through lending mitigates lenders’ demand for accounting conservatism. Japanese corporate governance is characterized as a bank-dominated or relationship-oriented system. Under bank-dominated systems, main banks are expected to be effective monitors. In our model, main banks play the role of reducing the lenders’ demand for accounting conservatism by reducing information asymmetry. We find that main banks can reduce the demand for accounting conservatism. Our findings help understand accounting conservatism vis-a-vis agency problems. We provide empirical evidence to contribute to literature on banking, specifically to fields such as relationship banking.

Effects of main bank switching on new business bankruptcy

ABSTRACTThis paper examines the effects of main bank switching on the probability of bankruptcy of new small businesses using a propensity score matching estimation approach. We use a unique firm-level dataset of approximately 1,000 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) incorporated in Japan; these SMEs are young and unlisted just after incorporation. We find that switching main bank relationships increases the probability of firm bankruptcy. In addition, the result holds only when the relationship between the firm and its main bank is terminated. Specifically, the probability of bankruptcy increases when firms switch their main banks to financial institutions with which they have not previously transacted, and when the ex-post main banks are not affiliated financial institutions of their ex-ante main banks. These results may be because such switching worsens the financial condition of client firms, and thus, it leads to bankruptcy.

The evolving nature of Japanese corporate governance: Guaranteed bonds vs. rated bonds

We investigate a large set of yen-denominated Japanese corporate bonds composed of bank-guaranteed vs. unguaranteed bonds and find evidence of the demise of main bank relationships and transformation to market-based corporate governance since the 2008 financial crisis. We find that issuers with unrated and bank-guaranteed bonds have more information asymmetry and possess poorer firm quality. Japanese banks provide credit guarantees to the bonds issued by small or opaque firms with weaker financial profiles, thus reducing the risk of issuer default, as well as saving on bond rating fees and the costs of a public offering. The bank guarantee for private and unrated bonds serves as valuable (but costly) protection for investors who invest in these riskier issuers’ bonds. Most importantly, after the U.S. financial crisis, the impact of bank guarantees on yield spreads becomes much less significant as bond issuers have begun to rely more on credit ratings as a potentially cheaper and more effective monitoring/corporate governance mechanism.

Listing and financial constraints

We confirm, with a twist, that listing to a stock exchange can mitigate financial constraints of firms, using Japanese firm-level data of 20 years, 1995–2014, controlling for the main-bank relationship and majority owner influence. Compared to a similar unlisted firm, a listed firm has a lower marginal product of capital on average and more new borrowings during recessions. Theoretically, we argue that these are the key pieces of evidence that indicate less tight financial constraints for the listed firms than the unlisted firms. However, the listed firms do not borrow more on average over time. They rather maintain a lower leverage so that they can mitigate the borrowing constraints. We also find that the listed firms do not face lower interest rates.

Political Connections, Local Corruption, and Firm's Bank Pool Structures: Empirical Evidence from Vietnam

This paper investigates the effects of political connections and local corruption on the structures of firms’ bank pools. Using a manually collected data set of 389 listed Vietnamese companies in 2013, it finds that politically connected firms tend to establish their main bank relationships with connected banks. It also finds that connected firms reduce their numbers of banks and their diversity of bank ownership types in their bank pools when they achieve main bank relationships with connected banks; such firms maintain these bank pool structures when corruption is prevalent in their home provinces. Results demonstrate that local corruption is associated positively with number of banks and diversification of bank ownership types.

Main banks’ influence on financial reporting quality in Japan

ABSTRACTThis study investigated main banks’ influence on the quality of accounting firms’ audits and corporate firms’ earnings, focusing on companies on Japan’s Nikkei 500 index. We posed three questions in this research study about main banks’ influence on corporate clients’ earnings management. First, does a weakened main bank relationship influence corporate clients’ financial reporting quality? Second, does Japan’s firewall deregulation influence firms’ earnings quality? Finally, does the relationship between accounting firms and main banks affect client firms’ earnings quality? Our main findings were that main banks are not related to client firms’ earnings management; however, main banks mitigate client firms’ earnings management after firewall deregulation. On the other hand, firewall deregulation does motivate firms to manipulate their earnings management. Finally, using Pong and Kita’s (2006) study as a framework, we found that main banks and client firms using the same accounting firms had no influence on earnings management. Based on these evidences presented, our findings suggest that the quality of corporate clients’ financial reporting changes before and after firewall deregulation.

The role of bank relationships when firms are financially distressed

Banks are better suited than other financing partners to process information in order to make efficient liquidations. But their ability depends on bank characteristics and incentives. In addition, the strength of the main bank relationship influences the bank’s ability to make efficient liquidations. I study the effect of bank characteristics and bank relationships in situations where firms are financially distressed. Do the chances of a financially distressed firm to improve or to close depend on the bank? Does the survival of a financially distressed firm depend on its main bank relationship? Using German data from 2000–2013, I analyze the effect of a bank’s organizational complexity, non-performing customers, and the strength of main bank relationships at the bank and firm level. I find that high shares of non-performing clients provide negative incentives. Banks can make more efficient liquidations if they are regionally active and have close relationships with the firm.

Bank Relationships and Cash Holdings: Evidence from Emerging Firms in Japan

This study investigates how firm-bank relationships affect corporate cash holdings behavior. Using bank relationships and financial statement data for emerging firms in Japan, we find that firms with a concentrated bank loan structure and with long-term main bank relationships hold more cash and show a higher propensity to save cash than those with competitive bank relationships. The effect of bank relationships on cash holdings is not evident for firms with a lower intangible assets ratio and is weakened in those with access to bond markets. Our findings suggest that heterogeneous firm-bank relationships and informational asymmetries are important determinants of corporate cash holdings.

Do small businesses still prefer community banks?

We formulate and test hypotheses about the role of bank type – small versus large, single-market versus multimarket, and local versus nonlocal banks – in banking relationships. The conventional paradigm suggests that “community banks” – small, single-market, local institutions – are better able to form strong relationships with informationally opaque small businesses, while “megabanks” – large, multimarket, nonlocal institutions – tend to serve more transparent firms. Using the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF), we conduct two sets of tests. First, we test for the type of bank serving as the “main” relationship bank for small businesses with different firm and owner characteristics. Second, we test for the strength of these main relationships by examining the probability of an exclusive relationship and main bank relationship length as functions of main bank type and financial fragility, as well as firm and owner characteristics. The results are often not consistent with the conventional paradigm, perhaps because of changes in lending technologies and deregulation of the banking industry.

Main bank relationships and underwriter choice

We examine why independent securities companies and bank subsidiary securities companies can coexist as underwriters in the Japanese corporate bond market in a period when the main bank system is very important in the Japanese financial system. While it has already been found that lending and shareholding relationships between main banks and issuers are not important determinants of underwriting commissions or yield spreads, they are found to be important determinants of lead underwriter choices. The findings about the impact of main bank relationships on underwriter choices suggest that an issuer with a strong main bank shareholding relationship chooses the main bank subsidiary securities company as the lead underwriter, and is unlikely to choose an independent securities company. An issuer with a larger sized bond issue tends to choose an independent securities company as the lead underwriter for its marketing ability. The findings from four different models consistently support the idea that independen...

Market liquidity and bank-dominated corporate governance: Evidence from Japan

This paper investigates the relationship between market liquidity and bank-dominated corporate governance structure of Japanese listed firms, represented as main bank relationships and cross shareholdings. We find that (i) main bank lending relationships increase market liquidity and reduce asymmetric information in the Tokyo Stock Exchange and (ii) foreign shareholdings are positively related to market liquidity and negatively correlated with asymmetric information. This suggests that the bank monitoring mechanisms would take a substitute information production role for block holder monitoring role in the market-oriented corporate governance countries like the US.

Corporate Main Bank Decision

Do firms select their main bank relationship according to their risk or risk preferences? Relationship banking is attractive for high risk firms since it improves their access to finance and provides liquidity insurance. Low risk firms instead may not want to bear the additional costs. I employ a nested logit model to study the determinants of the main bank relationship decision by newly established German firms. I find that firms that ask for bank support in case of financial distress are more likely to choose a relationship-oriented bank, such as a public or cooperative bank. Cost sensitive firms are more likely to choose a private bank. But I find no evidence that firms select a bank according to ex ante risk. Transaction oriented banks are not able to attract low risk firms.