The use of limited-access privilege programs (LAPP’s) in fi sheries management offers an incentive for collaborative management while also addressing economic incentives. This paper provides an overview of the development and use of limited access privilege programs by looking at a review of potential benefi ts and the arguments against them. It focuses on examining Introduction A catch share program is a generic term associated with fi shery management strategies that allocate a specifi c percentage of the fi shery catch to individuals, cooperatives, communities, or other entities. It includes more specifi c programs such as Limited Access Privilege Programs (LAPP’s). The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (later renamed Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act and then Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act) created a new national program for the conservation and management of marine fi shery resources. Fishery Management Plans (FMP’s) were to be developed by eight regional fi shery management councils and implemented by NMFS. In 2006, Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act (hereafter referred to as the Reauthorization Act), urged regional councils to use more LAPP’s in federal fi sheries management (NMFS, 2007). LAPP’s had also been specifi ed as a priority in the U.S. Ocean Action Plan1 and Executive Order 12866, signed by President William J. Clinton in 1993, which established the guiding principles agencies must follow when developing regulations. In 2005, under President George W. Bush, NMFS pledged to double the number of fi sheries managed under LAPP’s (from 8 to 16) by 2010. In 2010, the Obama administration solidifi ed its commitment to catch shares by issuing a Catch Share Policy (NOAA, 2010) to provide guidance and support on the design, implementation, and monitoring of catch share programs. This policy provides a foundation for facilitating the widespread consideration of catch share fi shery management plans (FMP’s) while enabling local fi shermen and communities to be part of the process. This article explains what LAPP’s are, how they work, and what benefi ts and costs can be expected from their implementation. First, a brief history of fi sheries management helps explain how LAPP’s evolved. This is followed by an explanation of the economic incentives behind LAPP’s, in the context of two fi sheries in the U.S. Mid-At1The plan, subtitled The Bush Administration’s Response to the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, is available online at http://www.cmts. gov/downloads/US_ocean_action_plan.pdf. lantic Region—the Atlantic surfclam/ ocean quahog, Spisula solidissima/ Arctica islandica, fi shery and the tilefi sh (also known as the golden tilefi sh), Lopholatilus chamaeleonticeps, fi shery. Limited-Access Privilege Programs Prior to 1976, U.S. marine fi sheries were managed in a completely openaccess environment, with few restrictions placed on foreign or domestic fi shermen or their activities. Competition among fi shermen under open-access conditions creates incentives for the industry to expand, over-exploit, and eventually deplete the resource (as described by the popular phrase “tragedy of the commons”), resulting in overcapacity and overfi shing (Anderson and Holliday, 2007). With the passage of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, fi sheries management began to evolve, using various combinations of input and output controls. Input controls were put in place to restrict vessel activity in various manners, by regulating the type and/or amount of gear, or by restricting fi shing areas or fi shing times. Output controls were also established that aimed to limit the amount of catch or harvest in a fi shery, such as limits on a total allowable catch (TAC) or individual trip catch. These too had a downside. A hard TAC (a predetermined catch level that is paired with a within-season closure provision) implemented for a fi shery as a whole often leads to heightened competition to catch as much fi sh as possible before the annual limit is reached; a “derby fi shery” in which there is a “race to fi sh.” Gear restrictions and trip limits the historical context of two specifi c applications in the Mid-Atlantic—the Atlantic surfclam, Spisula solidissima, and ocean quahog, Arctica islandica, fi shery, and the tilefi sh, Lopholatilus chamaeleonticeps, fi shery. Structural components of these programs are presented along with a description of notable changes in these two fi sheries since the implementation of LAPP’s.
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