Madhyamaka Research Articles

Against Infinite Nothingness: Ultimate Ground vs Metaphysical Nihilism in Indian Philosophy

Abstract The Idea of a unified foundation of all reality has long been core to many attempts at a fundamental ontology, as well as many arguments for the divine. In medieval India a cluster of arguments for metaphysical inheritance, causal entanglement, the impossibility of fundamental relations and more, were advanced together to show there must be an ultimate and unified ground. But foundationalism has been under attack in both recent metaphysics, and Buddhist philosophy. This article unpacks Vedānta’s defense of divine foundationalism against Madhyamaka Buddhism’s metaphysical nihilism. Firstly, we look at how inheritance arguments for ultimate ground aimed to circumvent the possibility of infinite regress. Secondly, we assess three arguments that this ground is a unified modal anchor, with entangled causal power, providing a connective medium for all phenomena. We address some caveats and limitations, but go on to argue that if they are right, they circumvent the Buddhists’ ‘dualistic’ assumption that if the empirical world is mere imagined convention, it needs no explanation. Monists and nihilists are allies against excessively realist ontologies, but these arguments make a compelling case for some unified fundamental nature from which, as the Upaniṣads put it, all things emerge like sparks from a fire.

Propositional logic, paradox, and Indian dialectics – towards a deeper ontological approach in paradox theory

AbstractThe article responds to the call of organizational paradox theorists to explore the added value of eastern principles of thought as a basis for a better understanding of the treatment of contradictory opposites in organisations. Drawing on prior work in systems theory, it presents a logical analysis of paradox based on the Catuṣkoṭi or Tetralemma discussed in Madhyamika Buddhism. Unlike its predecessors, the article reads the Tetralemma as an expression of a gradual process of detachment from the subject matter in question, resulting from a change of perspective. On this basis, the article is able to distinguish two different accounts of paradox in organisations, one resulting from excess determinacy and the other resulting from a lack of determinacy. For organisational practice, this means that the perception of and attitude towards values, routines, strategy or identity needs more attention in the study of paradox, which Indian dialectics might facilitate.

Буддийско-даосский синкретизм в школе «парного сокровенного» и медитация «чистоты и покоя»

The papers are dedicated to the concepts, main ideas, texts, and forms of practice of the syncretic Taoist movement Chongxuan-pai – “Twofold mystery”, which was developed in the 7–10th centuries. This school borrowed a number of logical constructions of Madhyamika Buddhism, including the system of four-level dialectical negation, as well as the idea of absolute “emptying of consciousness” for overcoming attachments both to mundane life and to any mental concepts. In part, these ideas are reflected in the Taoist-Buddhist practice of attaining “purity and quietness, a specific tradition of meditation, with its most important text “Canon of Purity and Quietness” (Qingjing jing) (given in this article in the author’s translation). Despite its traditional structure, thematic allusions with “Dao De Jing” and precepts attributed to Lao-jun, this Canon pays special attention to the technique of “inner contemplation” (nei guan), which also gravitates to the Buddhist practice of vipasyana and is called to eliminate binary opposition (pure-polluted, movement-rest) in the practitioner’s consciousness. The “Canon of purity and Quietness” is still highly revered in central China’s Taoist schools today. The basis of the meditative practice according to this Canon is the gradual ascending from “looking inward”, “looking outward” and “looking away” to “contemplation of emptiness”. The highest stage of “emptying the emptiness” leads to the complete deactualization of the ego and the breaking of all ties with the world. In this way, the exegetical idea of the “Twofold mystery” is realized as a form of Taoist practice influenced by Buddhist ideas.

Reactionary Fictionalism

AbstractFictionalism is the view that the claims of a target discourse are best seen as being fictional in some way, as being expressed in some pretense manner, or as not being about the traditional posits of the discourse. The contemporary taxonomy of fictionalist views is quite elaborate. Yet, there is a version of fictionalism that has failed to develop and which corresponds to the earliest form of the view found in the history of philosophy, East and West. I call this view “reactionary fictionalism.” I argue that traces of reactionary fictionalism can be found in Classical Daoism, Madhyamaka Buddhism, and Pyrrhonian Skepticism. Reactionary fictionalism is a kind of fictionalism that differs from both the hermeneutic and revolutionary kinds discussed today. Hermeneutic fictionalism says we already treat the claims of a target discourse in a fictional manner. Revolutionary fictionalism recommends we all start treating the claims of a target discourse in a fictional manner for reasons mostly of social utility. Reactionary fictionalism recommends, by contrast, that only those concerned with obtaining maximal therapeutic release from the pathology of literally asserting genuine beliefs in the claims of a target discourse should react in a pretense manner to inescapable contexts demanding the use of the claims of that discourse. I aim to show that reactionary fictionalism was a technique utilized in premodern skeptical traditions as a means for enduring one's condemnation to near‐permanent sociality. I recommend slotting reactionary fictionalism into our present taxonomy once we note that employing fictionalism can have a primarily therapeutic motivation and not merely a semantic, epistemic, or metaphysical one.

Ontic Indeterminacy: Chinese Madhyamaka in the Contemporary Context

ABSTRACT A number of analytical philosophers have recently endorsed the view that the world itself is indeterminate in some respect. Intriguingly, ideas similar to the view are expressed by thinkers from Chinese Madhyamaka Buddhism, which may shed light on the current discussion of worldly indeterminacy. Using as a basis Chinese Madhyamaka thought, together with Jessica Wilson’s account of indeterminacy, I develop an ontological conception of indeterminacy, termed ontic indeterminacy (OI), which centres on two complementary ideas—conclusive indeterminability and provisional determinability. I show that OI is well-equipped to tackle several issues of worldly indeterminacy. My overarching aim is to present a viable and sustainable perspective on the subject of indeterminacy to enrich analytical philosophers’ insights into the intricate nature of reality.

Theory of Three Times in Nyāya: In Connection with Mādhyamika and Sarvāstivāda

Theory of Three Times in Nyāya: In Connection with Mādhyamika and Sarvāstivāda

Language in the Middle Way: T. S. Eliot’s Engagement with Madhyamaka Buddhism in Four Quartets

Language in the Middle Way: T. S. Eliot’s Engagement with Madhyamaka Buddhism in Four Quartets

Madhyamaka and Yogācāra: Allies or Rivals? eds. by Jay L. Garfield and Jan Westerhoff

Madhyamaka and Yogācāra: Allies or Rivals? eds. by Jay L. Garfield and Jan Westerhoff

Life without Belief: A Madhyamaka Defense of the Livability of Pyrrhonism

Despite the striking similarities between Pyrrhonian skepticism and Madhyamaka Buddhism, few lessons have been drawn from the parallels between the two traditions. Here, it is argued that Madhyamaka Buddhism verifies the livability of Pyrrhonian skepticism. After establishing that Pyrrhonism and Madhyamaka can be understood as undertaking the same project, it is shown that Madhyamaka philosophy is able to refute objections to the viability of Pyrrhonism. Finally, it is demonstrated that Madhyamaka is still a lived practice in Tibetan Buddhism, and it is argued that this constitutes empirical support for the livability of Pyrrhonian skepticism.

Xiong Shili on Why Reality Cannot be Sought Independent of Phenomena

In China, Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885–1968) is typically regarded as one of the most important Chinese philosophers of the twentieth century. The focus of this paper is Xiong’s monistic ontology and draws its findings principally from the 1932 literary edition of his New Treatise on Nothing but Consciousness (Xin weishi lun新唯識論). Xiong’s New Treatise is the first substantive attempt to respond to the modernist challenge of providing Chinese philosophy with ‘system,’ and he did this in the form of an ontology. The New Treatise consists of an interpretive summary and discussion of key Yogācāra teachings that feature in Cheng weishi lun; a sustained critique of views Xiong attributes to the sixth-century Yogācāra master Dharmapāla; and a synthesis of Yogācāra thought with ideas derived from Madhyamaka Buddhism, various Sinitic traditions of Buddhism, the Book of Change, Laozi and Zhuangzi, and from Chinese Neo-Confucian thinkers associated with the Lu-Wang wing of Neo-Confucian philosophy, as well as Zhu Xi. Xiong was very much a syncretist. I seek to explain why Xiong insisted that reality (shiti 實體; [*tattva]) cannot be sought independent of phenomena despite his also claiming that phenomena are not real. The first and major part of the paper introduces Xiong’s critique of Yogācāra accounts of consciousness. The second part introduces his understanding of the doctrine of emptiness. I also trace the connection between Xiong’s understanding and how the concept of emptiness was understood in Tathāgatagarbha school of Sinitic Buddhism. I do not address the Confucian elements in his thought—the Buddhist elements are complex enough.

The Context(s) of "Correct Seeing": Truth and Fiction in Tibetan Madhyamaka

The Context(s) of "Correct Seeing": Truth and Fiction in Tibetan Madhyamaka

십지경] "삼계유심"구에 대한 유가행파와 중관학파의 해석

십지경] "삼계유심"구에 대한 유가행파와 중관학파의 해석

This paper discuss the various definitions of Pudgala - Based on postmid - Mādhyamika texts

This paper discuss the various definitions of Pudgala - Based on postmid - Mādhyamika texts

Madhyamaka Buddhist Meta-ethics: The Justificatory Grounds of Moral Judgments

Whether the metaphysical commitments of Madhyamaka Buddhism afford a satisfactory justificatory ground for moral judgments is investigated here. Finnigan and Tanaka (2011) argue that they do not. Their argument has since been challenged by Tillemans (2010–2011), who alleges that both Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas can readily justify moral judgments by respective appeal to the doctrine of the two truths. This claim is contested here with respect to Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka. Several arguments are provided to show that Prāsaṅgika cannot satisfactorily justify their moral judgments by appeal to the notion of conventional truth.

コントゥルの『大中観他空説手引』について

コントゥルの『大中観他空説手引』について

Reconsidering the Soteriological Significance of Śūnyavāda

The doctrine of emptiness (śūnyavāda) is of significant soteriological importance for the Madhyamaka Buddhism. Therefore it is a reasonable prima facie demand that interpretations of emptiness must accord with this fact. This hermeneutic consideration has been taken to present particular problems for Mark Siderits' semantic interpretation of śūnyavāda. This paper examines Siderits' attempted reconciliation of his semantic interpretation of śūnyavāda with its purported soteriological aspects. I question whether Siderits can successfully respond to these problems in order to adequately incorporate the hermeneutic requirement. I argue that the semantic view is not immune to the problems that it was formulated to avoid. It too can be asserted. What is more, the semantic view can generate its own particular forms of attachment which can obscure soteriological goals. These conclusions lead me to question the general project of trying to develop a soteriologically efficacious interpretation of śūnyavāda in the first place.

The Religion of Yesterday, the Atheism of Today, and the Philosophy of the Future Ontological Anti-Realism, Lightweight Realism, and Buddhism as the Middle Path

Given the contemporary trend in favour of austerer ontological commitments, it would appear that Buddhism as a religion would have renewed relevance in the ontological debate concerning what exists. In what follows, I will argue that the ontological anti-realism of Madhyamaka Buddhism shares enough family resemblances with the lightweight realism of scientific naturalism to warrant a new look in, particularly in resolving ontological stalemates in the debate between the

The Debate of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka on Self-cognition

The Debate of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka on Self-cognition

Those Concepts Proliferate Everywhere: A Response to Constance Kassor

Kassor argues that Gorampa, through his account of the ultimate as inexpressible, provides a way to read Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka consistently, simply by refusing to assert anything about the ultimate. We reply that this simply lands Gorampa and Nāgārjuna back in the paradox of expressibility: we can say nothing about the ultimate, and we have just said it.

A study of the early Mādhyamika commentaries and the Twelve gate treatise

A study of the early Mādhyamika commentaries and the Twelve gate treatise