Lumpy Investments Research Articles

(Joint) Bank Savings, Female Empowerment, and Child Labor in Rural Ethiopia

Abstract This study examines whether the random allocation of single and joint savings accounts to cash crop farmers in rural Ethiopia is associated with increased savings and changes in decision-making authority and control over resources that could ultimately affect child labor and schooling resource allocations. Consistent with posited channels of intrahousehold bargaining models, women from households assigned to the joint saving treatment group show significant gains in autonomy and control of savings resources, broader financial empowerment, and increased labor participation. Positive effects on school participation and attendance are reported for girls, although point estimates are measured imprecisely. In a setting where schooling and child labor are not mutually exclusive, children work more when joint deposit accounts are available. In the absence of impacts on household income, this increase in child labor is explained by complementarities between adult farm labor and child labor in the household production function, which is reinforced by lumpy investments in labor-intensive agricultural inputs that likely increased the opportunity costs of children's time.

Fallacies in the Design of Climate Change Policies: A Response to Richard Epstein

This Essay criticizes Professor Richard Epstein’s approach to climate change regulation, which he characterizes as one involving taking modest steps at first, observing the results of these steps, and then using the lessons learned to inform the next steps. Epstein’s approach depends critically on a particular class of damage function determining how greenhouse gas emissions cause harm—specifically, damage functions that lack discontinuities. And it also depends on the ability to observe in real time how the function occurs. Neither of these conditions are met with respect to climate change. The Essay also shows that Epstein’s approach is further undermined by the structure of energy markets, in which investments are large and lumpy as opposed to small and continuous. For example, Epstein’s “small steps” approach might lead to significant current investments in natural gas facilities, like natural gas pipelines, instead of a bolder move to renewables. These lumpy investments cannot be easily undone when it then turns out that our approach to climate change regulation was too cautious, both for economic and public choice reasons.

Striking While the Iron is Cold: Fragility after a Surge of Lumpy Investments

Striking While the Iron is Cold: Fragility after a Surge of Lumpy Investments

How stimulative are low real interest rates for intangible capital?

We study theoretically and empirically how the increase in the intensity of intangible capital in production in recent decades affects the sensitivity of investment to interest rates. In contrast to tangible capital, intangible capital has low collateral value and must be financed in a larger part with accumulated corporate savings, especially in more financially constrained firms and for more lumpy investments. High-intangibles firms are, therefore, more likely to be net savers in equilibrium, and for such firms low interest rates are not as stimulative as for high-tangibles firms. We show in a realistically calibrated model that the rise of intangible capital substantially dampens the positive effects of low interest rates on investment because of this mechanism, increasing the misallocation of resources. We find strong empirical support for this effect by studying the investment decisions of U.S. firms.

Correction to: Forward-looking distribution network charges considering lumpy investments

Correction to: Forward-looking distribution network charges considering lumpy investments

Forward-looking distribution network charges considering lumpy investments

Many regulators are pushing for more cost-reflective distribution network charges to inform end users of the grid infrastructure costs their behavior causes. Since future investment costs can be avoided by reducing simultaneous peak loads, forward-looking, coincident peak charges are often proposed. Under the assumption of convex network costs, it has been shown that optimal charges signal long-run marginal network costs, triggering an optimal trade-off between network expansion and peak load reduction. In practice, however, network investments are lumpy, requiring engineering methods to estimate ill-defined marginal costs based on long-term peak demand forecasts. In this paper, we derive the optimal forward-looking network charge set by a social welfare maximizing regulator, endogenously considering investment lumpiness and uncertain consumer demand. While the optimal tariff still equals marginal network costs in essence, it now depends on a multitude of network- and demand-related parameters. Our results demonstrate that forward-looking network charges require accurate information on willingness to pay for peak demand, which currently is typically unknown to regulators.

Infrastructure Investment in India: Squaring Theory, Data and Common Sense

The study makes a novel attempt to estimate the quantum of funds channelised in the physical infrastructure sector, by the private–public split as well as per project parameters. The study finds a downward trend in the private investment in infrastructure post 2009–2010. This needs to be understood in correspondence with the rise in the number of stalled/shelved projects under private ownership post 2008–2009. This rise in the locked-in finances could explain the disincentive in making fresh investments by the private sector. However, what this data also reveals is that the average per stalled/shelved project cost is higher under public ownership even though the number of such projects isfound higher under private ownership. Lumpy project investments are locked in public projects that can be viewed as a real cost. Fiscal prudence leaves little scope for further extension of finances from the government’s kitty in this domain. Moreover, commercial banks cannot be relied on due to the staggering share of non-performing assets emanating from the over exposure to this sector. A market for long-term debt could be a panacea for the perils facing the sector as well as the stressed banking sector. JEL Codes: E01, E22, E69, G31

Aggregate Dynamics in Lumpy Economies

How does an economy's capital respond to aggregate productivity shocks when firms make lumpy investments? We show that capital's transitional dynamics are structurally linked to two steady‐state moments: the dispersion of capital to productivity ratios—an indicator of capital misallocation—and the covariance of capital to productivity ratios with the time elapsed since their last adjustment—an indicator of asymmetric costs of upsizing and downsizing the capital stock. We compute these two sufficient statistics using data on the size and frequency of investment of Chilean plants. The empirical values indicate significant effects of aggregate productivity shocks and favor investment models with a strong downsizing rigidity and random opportunities for free adjustments.

Ex-ante dynamic network tariffs for transmission cost recovery

This paper proposes a novel tariff scheme and a new optimization framework in order to address the recovery of fixed investment costs in transmission network planning, particularly against rising demand elasticity. At the moment, ex-post network tariffs are utilized in addition to congestion revenues to fully recover network costs, which often leads to over/under fixed cost recovery, thus increasing the investment risk. Furthermore, in the case of agents with elastic market curves, ex-post tariffs can cause several inefficiencies, such as mistrustful bidding to exploit ex-post schemes, imperfect information in applied costs and cleared quantities, and negative surplus for marginal generators and consumers. These problems are exacerbated by the increasing price-elasticity of demand, caused for example by the diffusion of demand response technologies. To address these issues, we design a dynamic ex-ante tariff scheme that explicitly accounts for the effect of tariffs in the long-term network planning problem and in the underlying market clearing process. Using linearization techniques and a novel reformulation of the congestion rent, the long-term network planning problem is reformulated as a single mixed-integer linear problem which returns the combined optimal values of network expansion and associated tariffs, while accounting for price-elastic agents and lumpy investments. The advantages of the proposed approach in terms of cost recovery, market equilibrium and increased social welfare are discussed qualitatively and are validated in numerical case studies.

The Green Paradox, A Hotelling Cul de Sac

The green paradox is an effect by which an increasing tax per unit on oil production, aimed at tracking damages from CO2 emissions, induces an increase in world production and a decrease in price in the near term. The increase is a rational response in a Hotelling exhaustible-resource model. We simulate the decisions of a price-taking producer in response to a tax of various shapes. In contrast to a Hotelling model, our extraction technology involves irreversible, lumpy investments in exploration and development. In addition, we assume output from a developed reserve is subject to natural decline at a rate that is determined by the sunk development investment and the geology of the reserve. Decisions are far more complicated, and results far subtler, than in the Hotelling framework. Given a price path, we show that almost any form of tax causes a reduction in the level of development and initial production, thereby contradicting the hypothesis of the green paradox.

Manufacturing and Services Growth in Developing Economies: ‘Too Little’ Finance?

This article explores the relationship between financial development and growth in manufacturing and service sectors in 77 developing economies over the period 1984–2013. Specifically, we examine whether the size of the financial sector matters and if it does, whether the size of the financial sector in these countries is of a sufficient scale for credit and liquidity expansion to benefit the economy. Using the two-step system generalized method of moments, we find a u-shaped relationship between either manufacturing or services growth and financial size, indicating that a critical level of financial scale has to be achieved for financial expansion to positively affect the growth. For some 50%–90 per cent of the economies in the sample, there is a robustly long-run adverse effect of financial expansion on both manufacturing and services growth, indicating a case of ‘too little’ finance, likely explained by a combination of weak institutions, market failures and the existence of large and lumpy investments that require sufficient financial scale.

Merchant power flow controllers

The transmission system in the U.S. is under stress, leading to high congestion costs. To address this issue, more efficient utilization of the existing network is a paramount alternative to building new transmission lines. Significant transfer capability enhancement can be readily achieved via a number of mature technologies that enable power flow control. Despite the promise of power flow controllers (PFC), their deployment has been very limited, due to a number of reasons, including heavy economic regulation. This has many drawbacks, including lengthy planning and approval time, lack of incentives for efficient planning and operation, and transfer of the investment risks to the ratepayers. This paper argues that PFCs pose characteristics that fit well within the framework of merchant transmission without its drawbacks, such as lumpy investments. This paper, thus, proposes to assign financial transmission rights (FTR) to merchant PFC owners based on the additional transfer capability that they offer to the system. The owners are expected to recover their investment costs through the revenues they collect from such FTRs. Unlike regulated rate of return payment, the proposed model provides the right incentive for efficient planning and operation of PFCs. The paper also proves FTR revenue adequacy in presence of the PFCs by developing a simultaneous feasibility test model. The performance of the method as well as its revenue adequacy are demonstrated, first, on a two-bus system, and then, on a three-bus system in presence of loop flows. The paper concludes that opening the electricity markets to merchant PFC projects would reveal profitable investment opportunities to improve the efficiency of the system.

Risky Income or Lumpy Investments? Evidence on Two Theories of Underspecialization

Why do the poor have so many economic activities? According to one theory the poor do not specialize because relying on one income source is risky. I test the theory by measuring the response of Thai rice farmers to conditional volatility in the international rice price. Households expecting a harvest take on 1 extra activity when the volatility rises by 21 percent. I confirm the decrease in specialization costs households foregone revenue. I find no evidence to back a second theory in which households under-specialize because they cannot afford lumpy business investments.

An Empirical Study of Interaction-Based Aggregate Investment Fluctuations

This paper argues that interactions of firms account for a sizable part of fluctuations in aggregate investments without exogenous aggregate shocks. We first establish empirically that the fraction of firms that engage in a lumpy investment follows a non-normal, two-sided exponential distribution across region-year with a panel data set of Italian firms. We then present a simple sectoral model that generates the two-sided exponential distribution that arises from the complementarity of the firms’ lumpy investments within a region. Calibrated by the firm-level estimate of complementarity, the model is capable of generating the two-sided exponential fluctuations observed at the aggregate level.

Methodologies for representing the road transport sector in energy system models

Energy system models are often used to assess the potential role of hydrogen and electric powertrains for reducing transport CO2 emissions in the future. In this paper, we review how different energy system models have represented both vehicles and fuel infrastructure in the past and we provide guidelines for their representation in the future. In particular, we identify three key modelling decisions: the degree of car market segmentation, the imposition of market share constraints and the use of lumpy investments to represent infrastructure. We examine each of these decisions in a case study using the UK MARKAL model. While disaggregating the car market principally affects only the transition rate to the optimum mix of technologies, market share constraints can greatly change the optimum mix so should be chosen carefully. In contrast, modelling infrastructure using lumpy investments has little impact on the model results. We identify the development of new methodologies to represent the impact of behavioural change on transport demand as a key challenge for improving energy system models in the future.

The economics of targeted mitigation in infrastructure

Once established, long-lived capital stock (LLKS) such as infrastructure can lock-in a stream of GHG emissions for extended periods of time. Historical examples from industrial countries suggest that investments in LLKS projects and networks are often lumpy and concentrated in time, and often generate significant indirect and induced emissions besides direct emissions. Urbanization and rapid economic growth suggest that similar investments in LLKS projects and networks are being or will soon be made in many developing countries. In their current form, carbon markets do not provide correct incentives for mitigation in LLKS because the constraint on emissions is limited to developed countries and extends only to 2012. Targeted mitigation programmes are thus necessary where LLKS is being built at a rapid rate to avoid getting locked into highly emissions-intensive LLKS. Even if carbon markets were extended geographically, sectorally, and over time, public intervention would still be required to ensure that indirect and induced emissions are accounted for, to facilitate LLKS project/network financing that bridges the gap between carbon revenues accruing over time and capital needed up front to finance lumpy investments, and to internalize other externalities (e.g. local pollution) and/or lift other barriers that penalize low-emissions alternatives relative to high-emissions ones.Policy relevanceLLKS is rapidly being built in developing countries and ‘renewed’/upgraded in developed ones. Investment in LLKS programmes/networks, not just in individual projects, tends to be concentrated in time, two-thirds of which typically takes place in the first quarter of the programme's operating life. Initial/prototype projects can lock in commitment to a particular technology for the whole programme, thus requiring they be evaluated as part of a programme, and not on a stand-alone basis. In addition, indirect and induced emissions of LLKS programmes can be significant. However, scarce empirical evidence affects the utility of cost–benefit analysis in selecting projects or programmes. Finally, addressing the carbon externality alone (whether by market prices, taxes, or regulations) is insufficient to create a level playing field between low- and high-emission LLKS. Removing non-price barriers requires identification of binding constraints, selection of instruments to address them, and mechanisms to learn from and share experiences amongst countries and regions.

Water Quality Trading with Lumpy Investments, Credit Stacking, and Ancillary Benefits

AbstractThis paper studies the economics of a water quality trading market in a predominantly agricultural watershed, and explores the effects of credit stacking in such a market when buyers and sellers of pollution credits can only reduce pollution with large, discrete investments that yield discontinuous supply and demand. The research simulates hypothetical water quality trading markets in the corn‐belt area of Illinois, where wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs) can pay farmers to reduce nutrients by installing wetlands and farmers may or may not be allowed to earn payments for multiple services from one wetland. We find that wetlands are a more cost‐effective way to mitigate nitrogen pollution than abatement by WWTPs. Stacking credits may improve social welfare while providing more ecosystem services if there is enough demand for the primary credit in the market (nitrogen) to cover most of the cost of installing the wetland but the supply of nitrogen credits is not exhausted. However, in the presence of lumpy pollution reduction activities, the effects of allowing stacked credit sales are idiosyncratic and not necessarily positive; stacked payments may or may not satisfy additionality. The results imply that credit trading for nitrogen is likely to make society better off, but the effects of allowing farmers to receive multiple payments from a single wetland depend on details of the situation.

Lumpy investments and capital adjustment patterns in the food manufacturing industry

This paper investigates investment patterns and the types of capital adjustment cost in the U.S. food manufacturing plants. The study first documents the lumpy nature of investment rates and shows that few investment incidents at plant-level contribute to a large portion of aggregate investment, indicating the importance of large investments in the food manufacturing industry. Further, the paper presents econometric evidence for the nature of capital adjustment costs by estimating an investment hazard model which determines both the probability of having an investment spike and the factors affecting lumpy investments. The results support the presence of both convex and non-convex components of capital adjustment costs. While the importance of lumpy investments at the plant-level support for a non-convex component of adjustment cost, the empirical estimation of hazard function shows downward-sloping shape (i.e., negative duration dependence) which demonstrates the existence of a convex component as well.

Risk and Economic Under-Specialization: Why the Pin-Maker Grows Cassava on the Side

Why do the poor have so many economic activities? According to one theory the poor do not specialize because relying on one income source is risky. I test the theory by measuring the response of Thai rice farmers to conditional volatility in the international rice price. Households expecting a harvest take on 1 extra activity when the volatility rises by 21 percent. I confirm the decrease in specialization costs households foregone revenue. I find no evidence to back a second theory in which households under-specialize because they cannot afford lumpy business investments.

Optimal Regulation of Lumpy Investments

When a monopolist has discretion over the timing of infrastructure investments, regulation of post-investment prices interferes with incentivizing socially optimal investment timing. In a model of regulated lumpy investment under uncertainty, we study regulation when the regulator can condition price caps on investment timing. We analyse optimal regulation when there is asymmetric information on investment costs and regulation has to respect a budget constraint. We show that optimal regulation involves a price cap that decreases as a function of the monopolist's chosen investment time.