Lower Value Functions Research Articles

Zero-sum stochastic differential games of impulse versus continuous control by FBSDEs

We consider a stochastic differential game in the context of forward-backward stochastic differential equations, where one player implements an impulse control while the opponent controls the system continuously. Utilizing the notion of “backward semigroups” we first prove the dynamic programming principle (DPP) for a truncated version of the problem in a straightforward manner. Relying on a uniform convergence argument then enables us to show the DPP for the general setting. Our approach avoids technical constraints imposed in previous works dealing with the same problem and, more importantly, allows us to consider impulse costs that depend on the present value of the state process in addition to unbounded coefficients. Using the dynamic programming principle we deduce that the upper and lower value functions are both solutions (in viscosity sense) to the same Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs obstacle problem. By showing uniqueness of solutions to this partial differential inequality we conclude that the game has a value.

Stochastic differential games with random coefficients and stochastic Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Isaacs equations

In this paper, we study a class of zero-sum two-player stochastic differential games with the controlled stochastic differential equations and the payoff/cost functionals of recursive type. As opposed to the pioneering work by Fleming and Souganidis [Indiana Univ. Math. J. 38 (1989) 293–314] and the seminal work by Buckdahn and Li [SIAM J. Control Optim. 47 (2008) 444–475], the involved coefficients may be random, going beyond the Markovian framework and leading to the random upper and lower value functions. We first prove the dynamic programming principle for the game, and then under the standard Lipschitz continuity assumptions on the coefficients, the upper and lower value functions are shown to be the viscosity solutions of the upper and the lower fully nonlinear stochastic Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Isaacs (HJBI) equations, respectively. A stability property of viscosity solutions is also proved. Under certain additional regularity assumptions on the diffusion coefficient, the uniqueness of the viscosity solution is addressed as well.

A BSDE Approach to Stochastic Differential Games with Regime Switching

In this paper, we study a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game with regime switching in the framework of forward-backward stochastic differential equations on a finite time horizon. By means of backward stochastic differential equation methods, in particular that of the notion from stochastic backward semigroups, we prove a dynamic programming principle for both the upper and the lower value functions of the game. Based on the dynamic programming principle, the upper and the lower value functions are shown to be the unique viscosity solutions of the associated upper and lower Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Isaacs equations.

Zero-sum stochastic differential games of generalized McKean–Vlasov type

We study zero-sum stochastic differential games where the state dynamics of the two players is governed by a generalized McKean–Vlasov (or mean-field) stochastic differential equation in which the distribution of both state and controls of each player appears in the drift and diffusion coefficients, as well as in the running and terminal payoff functions. We prove the dynamic programming principle (DPP) in this general setting, which also includes the control case with only one player, where it is the first time that DPP is proved for open-loop controls. We also show that the upper and lower value functions are viscosity solutions to a corresponding upper and lower Master Bellman–Isaacs equation. Our results extend the seminal work [15] of Fleming and Souganidis (1989) to the McKean–Vlasov setting.

Stochastic differential games with competing Brownian particles and related Isaacs' equations

SummaryIn this paper, we study zero‐sum two‐player stochastic differential games in which the state equations are competing Brownian particles and the cost functional is defined by generalized backward stochastic differential equations with more than one increasing process. After we study the regularity of competing Brownian particles, we establish the dynamic programming principle for the upper and lower value functions and show that these are the unique viscosity solution of the associated upper and lower Isaacs' equations, which are fully nonlinear parabolic partial differential equations with nonlinear Neumann boundary conditions.

Zero-sum and nonzero-sum differential games without Isaacs condition

In this paper we study the zero-sum and nonzero-sum differential games with not assuming Isaacs condition. Along with the partition $\pi$ of the time interval $[0,T]$, we choose the suitable random non-anticipative strategy with delay to study our differential games with asymmetric information. Using Fenchel transformation, we prove that the limits of the upper value function $W^\pi$ and lower value function $V^\pi$ coincide when the mesh of partition $\pi$ tends to 0. Moreover, we give a characterization for the Nash equilibrium payoff (NEP, for short) of our nonzero-sum differential games without Isaacs condition, then we prove the existence of the NEP of our games. Finally, by considering all the strategies along with all partitions, we give a new characterization for the value of our zero-sum differential game with asymmetric information under some equivalent Isaacs condition.

Altruism Displays a Harmonic Signature in Structured Societies

Several parameters combine to govern the nature of agent interactions in evolutionary social simulations. Previous work has suggested that these parameters may have complex interplay that is obscured when they are not analyzed separately. Here we focus specifically on how three population-level parameters, which govern agent interactions, affect levels of altruism in a population. Specifically we vary how frequently agents interact in a generation, how far along a network they may interact, and the size of the population. We show that the frequency with which an agent interacts with its neighbors during a generation has a strong effect on levels of evolved altruism – provided that those pairings are stochastic. When agents interact equally with all of their neighbors, regardless of how often, minimal levels of altruism evolve. We further report a curious harmonic signature in the level of altruism resulting from the interplay of the benefit-cost ratio of an altruistic act and the number of agent interactions per generation. While the level of altruism is generally an increasing function of the number of pairings per generation, at each instance where pairings equals a multiple of the benefit-cost ratio a sharp discontinuity occurs, precipitating a drop onto a lower-value function. We explore the nature of these discontinuities by examining the temporal dynamics and spatial configuration of agents. Finally, we show that rules for the evolution of cooperation that are based on network density may be inadvertently missing effects that are due to the frequency of interactions and whether those interactions are symmetrical among neighbors.

Stochastic Differential Games for Fully Coupled FBSDEs with Jumps

This paper is concerned with stochastic differential games (SDGs) defined through fully coupled forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) which are governed by Brownian motion and Poisson random measure. For SDGs, the upper and the lower value functions are defined by the controlled fully coupled FBSDEs with jumps. Using a new transformation introduced in [6], we prove that the upper and the lower value functions are deterministic. Then, after establishing the dynamic programming principle for the upper and the lower value functions of this SDGs, we prove that the upper and the lower value functions are the viscosity solutions to the associated upper and the lower Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs (HJBI) equations, respectively. Furthermore, for a special case (when $\sigma,\ h$ do not depend on $y,\ z,\ k$), under the Isaacs' condition, we get the existence of the value of the game.

Hamilton–Jacobi equations and two-person zero-sum differential games with unbounded controls

A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under proper coercivity conditions, the upper and lower value functions are characterized as the unique viscosity solutions to the corresponding upper and lower Hamilton–Jacobi–Isaacs equations, respectively. Consequently, when the Isaacs’ condition is satisfied, the upper and lower value functions coincide, leading to the existence of the value function of the differential game. Due to the unboundedness of the controls, the corresponding upper and lower Hamiltonians grow super linearly in the gradient of the upper and lower value functions, respectively. A uniqueness theorem of viscosity solution to Hamilton–Jacobi equations involving such kind of Hamiltonian is proved, without relying on the convexity/concavity of the Hamiltonian. Also, it is shown that the assumed coercivity conditions guaranteeing the finiteness of the upper and lower value functions are sharp in some sense.

The Dynamic Programming Method of Stochastic Differential Game for Functional Forward-Backward Stochastic System

This paper is devoted to a stochastic differential game (SDG) of decoupled functional forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE). For our SDG, the associated upper and lower value functions of the SDG are defined through the solution of controlled functional backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs). Applying the Girsanov transformation method introduced by Buckdahn and Li (2008), the upper and the lower value functions are shown to be deterministic. We also generalize the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs (HJBI) equations to the path-dependent ones. By establishing the dynamic programming principal (DPP), we derive that the upper and the lower value functions are the viscosity solutions of the corresponding upper and the lower path-dependent HJBI equations, respectively.

Stochastic representation for solutions of Isaacs’ type integral–partial differential equations

In this paper we study the integral–partial differential equations of Isaacs’ type by zero-sum two-player stochastic differential games (SDGs) with jump-diffusion. The results of Fleming and Souganidis (1989) [9] and those of Biswas (2009) [3] are extended, we investigate a controlled stochastic system with a Brownian motion and a Poisson random measure, and with nonlinear cost functionals defined by controlled backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs). Furthermore, unlike the two papers cited above the admissible control processes of the two players are allowed to rely on all events from the past. This quite natural generalization permits the players to consider those earlier information, and it makes more convenient to get the dynamic programming principle (DPP). However, the cost functionals are not deterministic anymore and hence also the upper and the lower value functions become a priori random fields. We use a new method to prove that, indeed, the upper and the lower value functions are deterministic. On the other hand, thanks to BSDE methods (Peng, 1997) [18] we can directly prove a DPP for the upper and the lower value functions, and also that both these functions are the unique viscosity solutions of the upper and the lower integral–partial differential equations of Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Isaacs’ type, respectively. Moreover, the existence of the value of the game is got in this more general setting under Isaacs’ condition.

Robust Optimal Stopping-Time Control for Nonlinear Systems

Abstract. We formulate a robust optimal stopping-time problem for a state-space system and give the connection between various notions of lower value function for the associated games (and storage function for the associated dissipative system) with solutions of the appropriate variational inequality (VI) (the analogue of the Hamilton—Jacobi—Bellman—Isaacs equation for this setting). We show that the stopping-time rule can be obtained by solving the VI in the viscosity sense and a positive definite supersolution of the VI can be used for stability analysis.