Lower Probability Of Default Research Articles

Why does the microcredit borrowing rate differ across countries? A cross‐country study

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to study the socio‐economic variables that influence the number of micro‐credit projects worldwide. The paper also intends to study the socio‐economic variables that lead to a higher default rate. In order to do this study, the authors use a database from MIX and include some more variables.Design/methodology/approachThe paper intends to explore why the number of debtors/lenders is higher or lower depending on each country, and what variables influence this behavior. This will allow regions to be distinguished where there is more microcredit and on what basis and why, in some cases, it is found to have a higher incidence of default.FindingsThe results showed that green cases (characterized by a lower probability of default) are increased when more collateral value is required and the case is not in Africa. Higher levels of population under the poverty line, higher levels of the Gini Index, and being an African country lead to higher levels of yellow cases. It was observed that the percentage of red cases (characterized by a higher probability of default) tends to rise if there is a smaller value of firms using banks to finance investments, if there is a reduced expression of small firms, and if there are smaller values of collateral needed for a loan.Originality/valueThis is the first scientific paper on this field (heterogeneity of microcredit borrowing rates).

Estimating Sovereign Default Risk

This paper uses Bayesian methods to estimate the sovereign default probability for Greece and Italy in the post-EMU period. We build a real business cycle model that allows for interactions among fiscal policy instruments, sovereign default risk, and a “fiscal limit,” which measures the maximum level of debt the government is willing to finance. We estimate the full nonlinear model using likelihood inference methods. Although we find that Greece historically had a lower default probability than Italy for a given debt level, our estimates suggest that the Italian government is more willing to service debt than the Greek government.

OWNERSHIP AND FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY OF GERMAN ACUTE CARE HOSPITALS

This paper considers the role of ownership form for the financial sustainability of German acute care hospitals over time. We measure financial sustainability by a hospital-specific yearly probability of default (PD) trying to mirror the ability of hospitals to survive in the market in the long run. The results show that private ownership is associated with significantly lower PDs than public ownership. Moreover, path dependence in the PD is substantial but far from 100%, indicating a large number of improvements and deteriorations in financial sustainability over time. Yet, the general public hospitals have the highest path dependence. Overall, this indicates that public hospitals, which are in a poor financial standing, remain in that state or even deteriorate over time, which may be conflicting with financial sustainability.

Securitization is Not that Evil after All

According to many, the financial crisis started in 2007 highlighted the perverse effects of the Originate-to-Distribute model. This interpretation is corroborated by a growing number of papers which, however, almost exclusively look at the subprime market for the US, a very small segment of the overall securitization market. We investigate the larger part of the market for securitized assets, i.e. “prime mortgages”, in a country such as Italy with a different institutional and regulatory framework similar to what is prevalent in the European Union. The richness of our dataset, containing more than one million of individual household mortgages originated by 50 Italian banks in the ten years prior to the financial crisis, allows us to control for a wide set of relevant characteristics, not available in existing studies: loan-level variables, characteristics of the originating bank and, most importantly, contractual features of the securitization deal including, in particular, the seniority structure of the securities issued by the Special Purpose Vehicle and the amount retained by the originator. Another distinguishing feature of our paper is the methodology: as the market for securitization can be seen an insurance market (it exists to transfer risk across agents in the economy), we borrow from the empirical contract theory literature (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000) a robust way to test for the effects of asymmetric information. These are the main findings. i) Securitized loans have a lower probability of default, for given observable characteristics and taking into account the endogeneity of the securitization decision with respect to risk. ii) The structure of the securitization deal (in particular the proportion of the equity tranche retained) signals the quality of the mortgages. iii) Banks, particularly at the early stage of the securitization market life, are strongly committed to build up a reputation for not selling lemons. These results contrast with those highlighted for the sub-prime market but are in line with those obtained in the literature on loan syndication (another form of credit-risk-transfer) and are consistent with the observation that the regulatory context is important in determining how securitization affects lending standards.

Diversification in Firm Valuation: A Multivariate Copula Approach

We introduce a new discounted cash flow model which integrates the diversification effect of multi-business firms. We face two challenges. One is examining how different degrees of diversification can affect firm value due to risk reduction, and the other is modeling segment-specific cash flows and discount rates to reflect the differences in risk and growth characteristics across the different business sectors in which a firm operates. Since the co-movement of business segments depends on the state of the economy, we use a multivariate copula approach, taking the state-varying dependence of business segments explicitly into account. A high level of corporate diversification caused by a low dependence between the firm's business segments yields a lower default probability, which results in a higher firm value through reduced bankruptcy costs. We demonstrate this effect by comparing the values of three U.S. firms in modeling independence, dependence with copulas, and perfect dependence between businesses.

Understanding Credit Risk: A Classroom Experiment

This classroom experiment introduces students to the notion of credit risk and expected return, by allowing them to trade on comparable corporate bond issues from two types of markets: investment-grade and high-yield markets. Investment-grade issues have a lower probability of default than high-yield issues and thus provide a lower yield. Participants can earn money in three ways: from coupon payments, from the face value of the bond, and by capital gains. While participating in an experiment, students learn about the notion of risk and return, how credit risk affects bond prices, the movement of bond prices through time, and other general characteristics of the bond markets.

Dysfunctional Finance: Positive Shocks and Negative Outcomes

This paper shows how badly a market economy may respond to a positive productivity shock in an environment with asymmetric information about project quality: some, all, or even more than all the benefits from the increase in productivity may be dissipated. In the model, based on Bernanke and Gertler (1990), entrepreneurs with a low default probability are charged the same interest rate as entrepreneurs with a high default probability. The implicit subsidy from good types to bad means that the marginal entrant will have a negative-value project. An example is presented in which, after a positive productivity shock, the presence of enough bad type's forces the interest rate so high that it drives all entrepreneurs out of the market. This happens in an industry in which there are good projects that are productive. The problem is that they are contaminated in the capital market by bad projects because of the banks inability to distinguish good projects from bad. One possible explanation for the lack of development in some countries is that screening institutions are sufficiently weak that impersonal financial markets cannot function. If industrialization entails learning spillovers concentrated within national boundaries, and if initially informational asymmetries are sufficiently great that the capital market does not emerge, then neither industrialization nor the learning that it would foster will occur.

Negative default dependence in supplier networks

The financial defaults of suppliers in a supplier network are significant risks and causes of uncertainty for buying firms. Hitherto, it has been largely neglected that default probabilities of suppliers in supplier networks are not independent of each other. We aim to overcome this shortcoming by studying negative supplier default dependencies: situations where a surviving supplier may benefit from the default of another supplier, resulting in a lower default probability. We use empirical data from the automotive supplier industry and copula functions, a method of representing joint distribution functions with particular marginals, to capture the default dependency between automotive suppliers and simulate various scenarios with negative default dependency. We also conduct a comparative static analysis illustrating the significant impact of negative default dependence. Our findings should spur managers to analyze their supplier networks with respect to default dependencies, and to take this phenomenon into consideration when making sourcing decisions.

Regulations, competition and bank risk-taking in transition countries

This study investigates whether regulations have an independent effect on bank risk-taking or whether their effect is channeled through the market power possessed by banks. Given a well-established set of theoretical priors, the regulations considered are capital requirements, restrictions on bank activities and official supervisory power. We use data from the Central and Eastern European banking sectors over the period 1998–2005. The empirical results suggest that banks with market power tend to take on lower credit risk and have a lower probability of default. Capital requirements reduce risk in general, but for banks with market power this effect significantly weakens or can even be reversed. Higher activity restrictions in combination with more market power reduce both credit risk and the risk of default, while official supervisory power has only a direct impact on bank risk.

The Economics of Bank Restructuring: Understanding the Options

Based on a simple framework, this note clarifies the economics behind bank restructuring and evaluates various restructuring options for systemically important banks. The note assumes that the government aims to reduce the probability of a bank's default and keep the burden on taxpayers at a minimum. The note also acknowledges that the design of any restructuring needs to take into consideration the payoffs and incentives for the various key stakeholders (i.e., shareholders, debt holders, and government). If debt contracts can be renegotiated easily, the probability of default can be reduced without any government involvement by a debt-for-equity swap. Such a swap, if appropriately designed, would not make equity holders or debt holders worse off. However, such restructurings are hard to pull off in practice because of the difficulty of coordinating among many stakeholders, the need for speed, and the concerns of the potential systemic impact of rewriting debt contracts. When debt contracts cannot be changed, transfers from the taxpayer are necessary. Debt holders benefit from a lower default probability. Absent government transfers, their gains imply a decrease in equity value. Shareholders will therefore oppose the restructuring unless they receive transfers from taxpayers. The required transfer amounts vary across restructuring plans. Asset sales are more costly for taxpayers than asset guarantees or recapitalizations. This is because sales are not specifically targeted to reduce the probability of default. Guarantees or recapitalizations affect default risk more directly. Transfers can also be reduced if the proceeds of new issues are used to buy back debt. Depending on the options chosen, restructuring may generate economic gains. These gains should be maximized. Separating out bad assets can help managers focus on typical bank management issues and thereby increases productivity. Because government often lacks the necessary expertise to run a bank or manage assets, it should utilize private sector expertise. Low up-front transfers can help prevent misuse of taxpayer money. Moreover, the design of bank managers' compensation should provide incentives to maximize future profits. If participation is voluntary, a restructuring plan needs to appeal to banks. Bank managers often know the quality of their assets better than the market does. This means banks looking for new financing will be perceived by the market to have more toxic assets and, as a result, face higher financing costs. Banks will therefore be reluctant to participate in a restructuring plan and demand more taxpayer transfers. A restructuring that uses hybrid instruments - such as convertible bonds or preferred shares - mitigates this problem because it does not signal that the bank is in a dire situation. In addition, asset guarantees that are well designed can be more advantageous to taxpayers than equity recapitalizations. A compulsory program, if feasible, would obviously eliminate any signaling concerns. Information problems can also be mitigated if the government gathers and publicizes accurate information on banks' assets. In summary, systemic bank restructuring should combine several elements to address multiple concerns and trade-offs on a case-by-case basis. In any plan, the costs to taxpayers and the final beneficiaries of the subsidies should be transparent. To forestall future financial crises, managers and shareholders should be held accountable and face punitive consequences. In the long run, various frictions should be reduced to make systemic bank restructuring quicker, less complex, and less costly.

Ownership Links, Leverage and Credit Risk

This paper explores the relationship between optimal leverage and credit risk under ownership links. It develops a structural model of a parent and a subsidiary, which issues debt in its own name under a guarantee by the parent. We find that zero leverage can be optimal for the guarantor, while leverage close to one can be optimal for the guaranteed company, as this optimally exploits the tax shield of debt while minimizing default costs. As far as credit risk is considered, their joint default probability is lower than that of stand alone units, despite their higher debt capacity. Higher group optimal leverage and lower default probability increase value with respect to conglomerate mergers and stand alone arrangements. Default probability, spreads and loss given default of the subsidiary are higher than for a stand alone with similar size and volatility.We also study the situation when the subsidiary is constrained to a debt equal to the optimal stand alone level. Only in this case group credit risk depends on the ownership share.Consistently with intuition, our unconstrained model rationalizes the capital structure typical of private equity; the constrained model instead is able to explain observed features of public business groups and more regulated environments.

Understanding Credit Risk: A Classroom Experiment

This classroom experiment introduces students to the notion of credit risk and expected return, by allowing them to trade on comparable corporate bond issues from two types of markets - investment-grade and high-yield. Investment-grade issues have a lower probability of default than high-yield issues, and thus provide a lower yield. There are three ways in which participants can earn money - from coupon payments, the face value of the bond, and by capital gains. While participating in an experiment, students learn about the notion of risk and return, how credit risk affects bond prices, the movement of bond prices through time, as well as other general characteristics of the bond markets.

COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS, DEBT MANAGEMENT AND INVESTMENT INCENTIVES WITH A LOW DEFAULT PROBABILITY

This paper analyzes the hedging decisions of an emerging economy which is exposed to market risks and whose debt contract is subject to collateral constraints. Within a sovereign debt model with default risk and endogenous collateral, the hedging policy is studied in a market where both futures and non-linear derivatives are available. In developing this model, the paper looks at the cost of sovereign default, financial constraints after default and hedging as an optimal debt managment tool. Finally, the paper presents a contract framework which provides a lower default probability.

Pricing commercial mortgage‐backed securities

This paper presents the first known non‐proprietary empirical examination of the relationship between Commercial Mortgage Backed Security (CMBS) pricing. CMBS prices are examined as a function of the “moneyness” of the default option, the age of the security, the interest rate, interest rate volatility, property price volatility, amortization features and yield curve slope utilizing a proprietary data set of monthly prices on 40 CMBS securities. We find that though the senior tranche CMBS in the sample are effectively immune from default loss per se, they are not immune from early return of principal and resulting duration shift implied by increasing default probabilities. Thus, they behave very much like residential mortgage backed securities in that discount security prices are positively related to explanatory variables associated with potential shifts in duration. As a result, senior tranche CMBS prices increase with explanatoryd factors that raise the likelihood of default such as property volatility and loan to value ratio whereas CMBS prices decrease with variables that lower default probability such as amortization. These empirical results fit well with existing theoretical models of multi‐tranche CMBS pricing and models of commercial mortgage default and suggest that senior tranche CMBS may embody elements of risk that justify their seemingly rich spreads to similar duration corporate securities.