Lower-level Explanations Research Articles

'Puppy Dog Eyes' Are Associated With Eye Movements, Not Communication.

The inner brow raiser is a muscle movement that increases the size of the orbital cavity, leading to the appearance of so-called ‘puppy dog eyes’. In domestic dogs, this expression was suggested to be enhanced by artificial selection and to play an important role in the dog-human relationship. Production of the inner brow raiser has been shown to be sensitive to the attentive stance of a human, suggesting a possible communicative function. However, it has not yet been examined whether it is sensitive to human presence. In the current study, we aimed to test whether the inner brow raiser differs depending on the presence or absence of an observer. We used two versions of a paradigm in an equivalent experimental setting in which dogs were trained to expect a reward; however, the presence/absence of a person in the test apparatus was varied. In the social context, a human facing the dog delivered the reward; in the non-social context, reward delivery was automatized. If the inner brow raiser has a communicative function and dogs adjust its expression to an audience, we expect it to be shown more frequently in the social context (when facing a person in the apparatus) than in the non-social context (when facing the apparatus without a person inside). The frequency of the inner brow raiser differed between the two contexts, but contrary to the prediction, it was shown more frequently in the non-social context. We further demonstrate that the inner brow raiser is strongly associated with eye movements and occurs independently in only 6% of cases. This result challenges the hypothesis that the inner brow raiser has a communicative function in dog-human interactions and suggests a lower-level explanation for its production, namely an association with eye movements.

Should Explanations Omit the Details?

There is a widely shared belief that the higher level sciences can provide better explanations than lower level sciences. But there is little agreement about exactly why this is so. It is often suggested that higher level explanations are better because they omit details. I will argue instead that the preference for higher level explanations is just a special case of our general preference for informative, logically strong, beliefs. I argue that our preference for informative beliefs entirely accounts for why higher level explanations are sometimes better – and sometimes worse – than lower level explanations. The result is a step in the direction of the unity of science hypothesis.

Foundations of infants' social group evaluations.

Previous research has suggested that infants exhibit a preference for familiar over unfamiliar social groups (e.g., preferring individuals from their own language group over individuals from a foreign language group). However, because past studies often employ forced-choice procedures, it is not clear whether infants' intergroup preferences are driven by positivity toward members of familiar groups, negativity toward members of unfamiliar groups, or both. Across six experiments, we implemented a habituation procedure to independently measure infants' positive and negative evaluations of speakers of familiar and unfamiliar languages. We report that by 1 year of age, infants positively evaluate individuals who speak a familiar language, but do not negatively evaluate individuals who speak an unfamiliar language (Experiments 1 and 2). Several experiments rule out lower-level explanations (Experiments 3-6). Together these data suggest that children's early social group preferences may be shaped by positive evaluations of familiar group(s), rather than negative evaluations of unfamiliar groups.

Explanations of exceptions in biology: corrective asymmetry versus autonomy

It is often argued that biological generalizations have a distinctive and special status by comparison with the generalizations of other natural sciences, such as that biological generalizations are riddled with exceptions defying systematic and simple treatment. This special status of biology is used as a premise in arguments that posit a deprived explanatory, nomological, or methodological status in the biological sciences. I will discuss the traditional and still almost universally held idea that the biological sciences cannot deal with exceptions and application conditions of their generalizations with their own distinctive and proprietary explanantia, but need the help of lower-level sciences to carry out this task. The idea of lower-level explanations of exceptions is connected to the idea that the biological sciences need lower-level sciences to better themselves and to the idea that biological sciences cannot provide reliable and extrapolatable results or explanations by themselves. I present counterexamples to the idea of lower-level explanations of exceptions in biology. I also discuss and refute more general arguments why the idea of lower-level explanations of exceptions has been held to hold in the special sciences, such as the screening-off and openness arguments. This suggest that there might be nothing special about the biological sciences vis-a-vis the more fundamental natural sciences, such as physics insofar as explanations of exceptions are concerned, and that the biological sciences can provide reliable and extrapolatable results or explanations by themselves.

Smoke and mirrors: Testing the scope of chimpanzees’ appearance–reality understanding

The ability to make appearance–reality (AR) discriminations is an important higher-order cognitive adaptation in humans but is still poorly understood in our closest primate relatives. Previous research showed that chimpanzees are capable of AR discrimination when choosing between food items that appear, due to the effects of distorting lenses, to be smaller or larger than they actually are (Krachun, Call, & Tomasello, 2009). In the current study, we investigated the scope and flexibility of chimpanzees’ AR discrimination abilities by presenting them with a wider range of illusory stimuli. In addition to using lenses to change the apparent size of food items (Experiment 1), we used a mirror to change the apparent number of items (Experiment 2), and tinted filters to change their apparent color (Experiment 3). In all three experiments, some chimpanzees were able to maximize their food rewards by making a choice based on the real properties of the stimuli in contrast to their manifest apparent properties. These results replicate the earlier findings for size illusions and extend them to additional situations involving illusory number and color. Control tests, together with findings from previous studies, ruled out lower-level explanations for the chimpanzees’ performance. The findings thus support the hypothesis that chimpanzees are capable of making AR discriminations with a range of illusory stimuli.

A framework for inter-level explanations: Outlines for a new explanatory pluralism

According to explanatory pluralism, the appropriate explanatory level is determined by pragmatic factors, and there are no general exclusion or preference rules concerning higher- or lower-level explanations. While I agree with the latter claim, I will argue that the former is in need of revision. In particular, I will argue that by distinguishing cases of two explanations being descriptions of one underlying causal process, and two explanations being descriptions of two distinct causal processes, it becomes clear that the grain size of an explanation is in fact determined by the interplay of various pragmatic and non-pragmatic factors. Within these constraints, positive guidelines can be developed to direct us to the appropriate explanatory level. This gives us the outlines for a general framework for classifying various types of relations between explanations on different levels. After making a comparison between this new framework and standard explanatory pluralism, I end by suggesting some ways in which the framework could be further developed.

Investigating lower-level explanations for the angry schematic-face search advantage

Investigating lower-level explanations for the angry schematic-face search advantage

Do children think that duplicating the body also duplicates the mind?

Philosophers use hypothetical duplication scenarios to explore intuitions about personal identity. Here we examined 5- to 6-year-olds’ intuitions about the physical properties and memories of a live hamster that is apparently duplicated by a machine. In Study 1, children thought that more of the original’s physical properties than episodic memories were present in the duplicate hamster. In Study 2, children thought that episodic memories of the hamster were less likely to duplicate than events captured by a digital camera. Studies 3 and 4 ruled out lower-level explanations of these effects. Study 5 showed that naming the original hamster further reduced the inferred duplication of memories in the second hamster. Taken together, these studies are consistent with the view that young children think that some mental properties are distinct from physical ones.

Indispensability Arguments in Favour of Reductive Explanations

Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to address some epistemic interest answering a specific explanation-seeking question in the most accurate, adequate and efficient way. Just like explanatory pluralists often advocate the indispensability of higher levels of explanation pointing at the pragmatic value of the explanatory information obtained on these higher levels, we argue that explanatory reduction—traditionally understood as the contender of pluralism—can be defended in a similar way. The pragmatic value reductionist, lower level explanations might have in the biomedical sciences and the social sciences is illustrated by some case studies.

The Explanatory Role of Irreducible Properties

I aim to reconcile two apparently conflicting theses: 1. Everything that can be explained, can be explained in purely physical terms, that is, using the machinery of fundamental physics, and 2. Some properties that play an explanatory role in the higher-level sciences are irreducible in the strong sense that they are physically undefinable: their nature cannot be described using the vocabulary of physics. I investigate the contribution that physically undefinable properties typically make to explanations in the high-level sciences, and I show that when they are explanatorily relevant, it is in virtue of their extension (or something close) alone. They are irreducible because physics cannot capture their nature; this is no obstacle, however, to physics’ more or less capturing their extension, which is all that it need do to duplicate their explanatory power. In the course of the argument, I sketch the outlines of an account of the explanation of physically contingent regularities, such as the regularities found in most branches of biological inquiry, at the center of which is an account of the nature of contingent, empirical “bridge principles”. Science and philosophy are fighting a battle over reduction, or so it seems. On the one hand, for any “high-level” phenomenon—chemical, biological, psychological, economic—science claims to be able to provide, in the long term if not quite yet, a lower-level explanation, and ultimately a physicallevel explanation. The enormous progress that has been made towards this goal can hardly be ignored. On the other hand, philosophers have recently claimed with increasing confidence that many explanatory properties cited by higher-level sciences—being water, being a gene, being a species, being a belief, being currency—are irreducible. The aim of this paper is to show that both sides may be correct. I will characterize very strong versions of both the scientific and the philosophical claims—strong versions of explanatory physicalism and explanatory irreducibility—and I will argue that there exists an explanatory relevance relation, a conception of the explanatory role played by irreducible properties, that allows the two to coexist. I will provide no arguments for either explanatory physicalism or explanatory irreducibility; I will rather simply suppose that both doctrines are correct and attempt a reconciliation. Further, in contrast with much of the recent literature on reductionism, this paper will not be especially concerned with functionally defined or multiply realizable higher-level properties; the explanatory role I find for irreducible properties can be played by functional and non-functional properties, by multiply and singly realizable properties, alike. 1. Explanatory Physicalism Everything that can be explained, can be explained physically; that is the doctrine of explanatory physicalism. More fancifully, if there were a race that only spoke and thought in the language of fundamental physics, and so could not conceive of non-physical properties, they could understand the world as

Explanatory relevance across disciplinary boundaries: the case of neuroeconomics

Many of the arguments for neuroeconomics rely on mistaken assumptions about criteria of explanatory relevance across disciplinary boundaries and fail to distinguish between evidential and explanatory relevance. Building on recent philosophical work on mechanistic research programmes and the contrastive counterfactual theory of explanation, we argue that explaining an explanatory presupposition or providing a lower-level explanation does not necessarily constitute explanatory improvement. Neuroscientific findings have explanatory relevance only when they inform a causal and explanatory account of the psychology of human decision-making.

Reductionism versus emergentism: A framework for understanding conceptions of giftedness

In this article, I propose that various conceptions and theoretical models of giftedness can be understood along a continuum from the most reductionist to the most emergentist. Along with this continuum, I specify four levels of analysis based on the human functional hierarchy: the biological, operational (computational), intentional, and activity levels. I illustrate how reductionist and emergentist approaches provide contrasting views of intelligence and giftedness, with the former seeking basic elements and lower level explanations and the latter stressing complexity and higher level organization. I suggest that clearly articulating levels of analysis and principles for efforts of the reductionist or emergentist nature will enhance conceptual clarity and methodological rigor. Whether giftedness is understood in the reductionist or emergentist frameworks has many practical and policy implications for gifted education.

Cultural Evolution, Reductionism in the Social Sciences, and Explanatory Pluralism

This article argues that it is possible to bring the social sciences into evolutionary focus without being committed to a thesis the author calls ontological reductionism, which is a widespread predilection for lower-level explanations. After showing why we should reject ontological reductionism, the author argues that there is a way to construe cultural evolution that does justice to the autonomy of social science explanations. This paves the way for a liberal approach to explanation the author calls explanatory pluralism, which allows for the possibility of explaining cultural phenomena in terms of different evolutionary processes.

Is the reduction of mental phenomena an attainable goal?

In science, whenever a lower level explanation is sufficient, it becomes paramount. This paper addresses the proposition that the same will happen for human behaviour. The author considers differen...

Is the reduction of mental phenomena an attainable goal?

In science, whenever a lower level explanation is sufficient, it becomes paramount. This paper addresses the proposition that the same will happen for human behaviour. The author considers differen...

Teleology and reduction in biology

The main claim in this paper is that because organisms have teleological constitutions, the reduction of biology to physical science is not possible. It is argued that the teleology of organisms is intrinsic and not merely projected onto them. Many organic phenomena are end-oriented and reference to ends is necessary for explaining them. Accounts in terms of functions or goals are appropriate to organic parts and processes. siis is because ends as systemic requirements for survival and health have explanatory significance with respect to the processes that contribute to and constitute them. Reductionism cannot accommodate this sort of higher-level to lower-level explanation and so cannot account for why lower-level phenomena are as they are. Reductionism, it is claimed, is ultimately descriptive and not explanatory because it cannot regard teleological requirements as themselves basic. In seeking to explain them away it forfeits explanatory power.

Pans and a Grain of Salt: Mississippian Specialization Revisited

Yerkes's comments fail to place my article in its context of other research on the lower Ohio Valley. He reacts more to what he thinks I believe than to what I actually wrote. Yerkes seems to want to identify Mississippian specialization on the basis of artifact traits rather than on the basis of actual organization of production. Moreover, he does not present any additional significant evidence to support the idea that true specialization was present in Mississippian society, in the American Bottom or elsewhere. The need to reject lower-level explanations of data before proposing higher-level explanations is not sufficiently appreciated. Finally, there is not sufficient appreciation of the degree of importance of the concept of specialization to the investigation of the social evolution of hierarchical systems.