Low Levels Of Political Trust Research Articles

Violent conflict and the demand for healthcare: How armed conflict reduces trust, instills fear, and increases child mortality

What are the health effects of violent conflict? It is well known that wars kill civilians away from the battlefield and long after the fighting has stopped. Yet why this happens remains only partially understood. While we have good evidence that factors such as the destruction of infrastructure, political neglect, and the out-migration of health workers – what may be called supply-side factors – negatively affect health outcomes, we know much less about how violence shapes the attitudes and behavior towards healthcare use among civilians exposed to violent conflict – what may be called demand-side factors. Here, I theorize that exposure to violence suppresses civilian demand for healthcare through two mediating channels – mistrust of government institutions and fear of future violence – with adverse consequences for health outcomes, particularly child health. To test this theory empirically, I combine information from over 80,000 interviews conducted in 22 conflict-affected countries in Africa with individual- and context-level measures of exposure to violent conflict. Exposure to violence is associated with significantly lower levels of political trust and increased fear of future violence, which in turn predict lower healthcare utilization, lower immunization rates, and higher infant and child mortality. To fully address the health consequences of armed conflict, it is essential that we better understand the attitudinal and behavioral correlates of exposure to violence.

Mitigating the legacy of violence: Can flood relief improve people’s trust in government in conflict-affected areas? Evidence from Pakistan

Climate change and violent conflict present two of the most substantial barriers to reaching the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. Many of the countries bearing the greatest impacts of a changing climate also grapple with protracted armed conflict. Despite this, we still have limited knowledge about how political and environmental insecurities affect trust in the institutions that are responsible for disaster management, security and conflict resolution. In this paper we explore whether being exposed to violent armed conflict is associated with low levels of political trust, and whether this can be mitigated by state action. Relying on a household survey covering some 2000 rural households in Pakistan, we investigate how state disaster response shaped trust in conflict-affected contexts in the years following the severe flooding of 2010. Our study suggest that negative implications of violence exposure on political trust can be offset by disaster relief efforts by the state, but only in instances when the government is not involved in the violent activities. Our findings contribute to our understanding of the joint impact of conflict and disasters on political trust, and importantly shows that in some instances, government interventions in a different political domain can reduce negative consequences of armed conflict on trust. Understanding the interplay of compound risks in contexts where multiple risks are occurring simultaneously is crucial because without adequate, coordinated government action, it will be impossible to protect the lives, health and livelihoods of affected people in Pakistan and beyond.

The Impact of Government Participation on the Political Trust of Populist Party Supporters

AbstractCitizens are more trustful of politics if their preferred party is an electoral winner and becomes part of the government. However, there remains the question of whether this positive effect of joining the government also holds for supporters of populist parties. Populists show low levels of political trust, as they strongly criticize the political elite. This study argues that voters of populist parties perceive the political system as more responsive to their concerns when their preferred party becomes part of the government and so they become more trustful of politics. Drawing on the case of Austria, the analyses demonstrate that political trust among populist party voters is higher when their party is in government. In contrast, non-populist voters' level of political trust is more stable, even when their party is not in government.

Income Inequality and Political Trust: Do Fairness Perceptions Matter?

Political trust—in terms of trust in political institutions—is an important precondition for the functioning and stability of democracy. One widely studied determinant of political trust is income inequality. While the empirical finding that societies with lower levels of income inequality have higher levels of trust is well established, the exact ways in which income inequality affects political trust remain unclear. Past research has shown that individuals oftentimes have biased perceptions of inequality. Considering potentially biased inequality perceptions, I argue that individuals compare their perceptions of inequality to their preference for inequality. If they identify a gap between what they perceive and what they prefer (= fairness gap), they consider their attitudes towards inequality unrepresented. This, in turn, reduces trust in political institutions. Using three waves of the ESS and the ISSP in a cross-country perspective, I find that (1) perceiving a larger fairness gap is associated with lower levels of political trust; (2) the fairness gap mediates the link between actual inequality and political trust; and (3) disaggregating the fairness gap measure, political trust is more strongly linked to variation in inequality perceptions than to variation in inequality preferences. This indicates that inequality perceptions are an important factor shaping trust into political institutions.

Dimensions of Pandering Perceptions Among Hispanic Americans and Their Effect on Political Trust

ABSTRACT When non-Hispanic candidates make an appeal in Spanish they are typically labeled as “Hispandering.” Some evidence has shown, however, that Hispanics have higher evaluations of candidates who make Spanish appeals, regardless of ethnicity. This paper explores how perceptions of pandering are formed among Hispanics. I expand the expectations gap literature by arguing that trait ownership and expectations are relevant for race. Given the expectation for a candidate’s ability to perform a certain appeal, perceptions of pandering will be conditioned on the candidate’s ability to exceed or fall short of those expectations. I test this idea with Spanish language appeals. I run an experiment where I randomly assign Hispanics to hear a message given by an Anglo or Hispanic candidate where the message is either in English or Spanish. I find support for the expectations gap theory. Anglo candidates, who are not expected to be able to speak Spanish can increase their perceived sincerity by speaking in grammatically correct Spanish. Meanwhile, Hispanic candidates who speak non-native-sounding Spanish have lower evaluations compared to their native-like or English-speaking counterparts. Given the low levels of political trust among Hispanics, I test the implications of perceived pandering on political trust. I run another experiment where I test whether perceiving that one politician panders has spillover effects for other candidates. I find that perceiving pandering decreases trust in that candidate but otherwise pandering had no spillover effect on other candidates’ political trust. These studies help illuminate the important dimensions of pandering perceptions.

The Association between Subjective Well-being and Regime Type across 78 countries: the moderating role of Political Trust

This study investigates the association between regime type, political trust, and subjective well-being (SWB) in 78 countries. Differently from previous works, democracy was conceptualized in terms of a multidimensional model (i.e., regime type), rather than a bipolar continuum ranging from authoritarian regimes to full democracies. The first question was raised as to whether regime characteristics would be nonlinearly related to SWB. A second question was examined as to whether political trust could moderate the relationship between regime type and well-being, such that under conditions of high or low trust in the government the differences in well-being across the type of regimes would be reduced. Data from the European Values Study as well as from the World Value Survey were used. Moreover, regime types were defined according to the Varieties of Democracy as well as the Economist Intelligence Unit. Multilevel analyses revealed that life satisfaction scores were lower for electoral autocracy compared to closed autocracy and liberal democracy. Moreover, happiness scores were significantly higher for full democracies compared to authoritarian regimes and flawed democracies. Finally, political trust moderated the association between regime type and SWB. Specifically, at higher or lower levels of political trust, the relationship between regime type and well-being tended to decrease. Overall, the findings support the conclusion that the relationship between democracy and subjective well‐being is nonlinear, and that the role of political trust is as important as the role of democracy.

The affective model of far‐right vote in Europe: Anger, political trust, and immigration

AbstractObjectiveThis study demonstrates that voting for the far right has a central affective dimension within the domain of immigration, the effect of which relies on the level of trust one has toward political institutions and equally colors one's estimation of threat.MethodsWe use representative data from two studies across three countries (Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) at two time points (2015 and 2019).ResultsWe first show that anger, rather than fear, constitutes the emotional mechanism underpinning the relationship between anti‐immigration attitudes and support for the far right. Second, anger is associated more strongly with far‐right voting among those with lower levels of political trust. Third, anger affects how individuals seek out and process information about immigration, resulting in the overestimation of the perceived threat.ConclusionThese findings shed light on a key puzzle of electoral behavior: Why do some citizens with anti‐immigrant attitudes opt for radical politics, whereas others do not.

The consequences of repeatedly losing on legitimacy beliefs

AbstractModern democracies are dependent on regular elections and citizens’ legitimacy beliefs. Studies have shown that repeated electoral defeats are associated with lower levels of satisfaction with democracy and political trust. However, previous studies have only considered one type of legitimacy belief at a time, never in comparison. What is more, all previous work is based on observational studies and has not been able to identify any causal effects of losing repeatedly. Building on previous work and classic theories of political legitimacy beliefs, we argue that repeatedly losing in elections represents a form of long‐term exclusion from democratic power that has additional negative effects on people's legitimacy beliefs because they lose faith in the system and start questioning its evenhandedness. We support our predictions using six‐wave panel data and test our hypothesis a total of 16 times within the same context. The findings show that repeated losers are never less satisfied with democracy but that an additional electoral loss leads to lower levels of political trust. The findings have important implications for the meaning of different indicators of legitimacy beliefs but also for electoral research and the underpinnings of stable democracies.

Broken Trust. Confidence Gaps and Distrust in Latin America

Latin American societies show lower levels of political trust when compared to other regions of the world. The lack of trust in institutions can led to ineffective management of public affairs, social crises, lack of transparency, economic problems and even difficulties in countering pandemics. The objective of this work is to build an index (LADI) that provides a measure of the level of perceived distrust in the institutions of the different Latin American countries and its variations over the period from 2008 to 2018. The data used for this analysis are of a subjective nature and come from the series of surveys provided by Latinobarómetro. To develop the analysis, we have used a quantitative approach of a partially non-compensatory aggregative type, known as Adjusted Mazziotta and Pareto Index. The results show a generalized increase of distrust in the years 2017 and 2018 for several Latin American countries. On the other hand, in countries where the rule of law is more consolidated, a best perception of the functioning of democracy emerges.

The Political Integration of Immigrants: How Pre- and Postmigration Contexts Matter

This study examines the political integration of immigrants in Germany and asks whether immigrants and their descendants show similar rates of political participation and expression of political attitudes as the population without an immigrant background. Furthermore, the study focusses on the pre- and postmigration context of immigrants and analyses whether immigrants differ in their level of political integration depending on (1) whether they come from more or less authoritarian regimes and (2) whether they have experienced discrimination in the receiving context. Using data from CILS4EU-DE, with a large representative sample of (children of) immigrants and non-immigrants in Germany, we observe differences in the political integration between immigrants and non-immigrants only on the attitudinal level, with immigrants showing lower levels of political trust but also slightly higher levels of satisfaction with the democratic system in Germany. When focussing on the effects of the pre- and the postmigration context, we observe differential results for the behavioural and attitudinal dimension: when immigrants stem from more authoritarian countries as well as when they have experienced more discrimination in the receiving context, this seems to mobilise respondents with respect to their political behaviour; however, it results in lower levels of political integration on the attitudinal dimension.

Migrant Attitudes Towards Democracy in Australia: Excluded or Allegiant Citizens?

How do migrants evaluate democracy in Australia? While prior studies have examined migrant support for democracy in Australia, less is known about how migrants evaluate the performance of democracy, as captured by indicators on political trust and satisfaction with democracy. Would migrants have lower levels of political trust and satisfaction with democracy as a result of political exclusion, including under‐representation in parliament? Or would migrants from less democratic countries, socialised in regimes where critical attitudes towards political authorities are discouraged, be more allegiant citizens with relatively positive evaluations of democracy? Using data from the 2010 to 2019 Australian Election Study surveys, combined with Freedom House regime classifications of migrant origin countries, we examine migrant attitudes towards Australian democracy. The results show that while migrants to Australia from other democratic countries have similar attitudes to those born in Australia, those from less democratic countries have higher levels of political trust and satisfaction with democracy. This suggests that despite political exclusion, migrants from less democratic countries are more allegiant citizens than those born in Australia or another democracy.

CORRUPTION AND PERCEIVED FAIRNESS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES

AbstractCorruption can erode political trust and a well-functioning democratic system, but it is unclear whether perceptions of corruption are significantly associated with citizens’ perceptions about the fairness of income distribution. This study thus examines the role of political trust in shaping the relationship between perceptions of corruption and perceived fairness of income distribution for East Asian countries. The findings show that perceived corruption has strong detrimental effects on political trust, and that those who have lower levels of political trust are more likely to perceive the income distribution as unfair in their countries. Causal mediation analysis results indicate that political trust plays an important role in mediating the negative effect of perceived corruption on perceived fairness of income distribution. Moreover, the results from examining the mutual causality linking corruption, political trust, and perceived fairness suggest that the reciprocal causal effects are also significant and robust.

Political Values and Political Trust in the Digital Era: How Media Engagement Divides Chinese Netizens

China’s rapid modernization has generated a vibrant online community over the past 20 years. While there is an established body of work on the impact of traditional media on political opinion in China, the patterns and political impact of media engagement among tens of millions of Chinese ‘netizens’ remain under-researched. Using data from the 2015 Chinese Netizens Attitudes Survey, this paper attempts to ameliorate this issue. The results of latent class analysis suggested that most Chinese netizens tend to be active followers of social media and to display low levels of interest in state media. We found that respondents in the online survey were overall much more critical of political institutions on different levels comparing to existing findings based on offline surveys. Those netizens who were strongly attached to social media appeared to be significantly less likely to advocate authoritarian, collectivist, and nationalistic values and to display much lower levels of political trust, whereas the opposite was true of those who were strongly attached to state media. These findings suggest that social media serves as an incubator for critical political reviews and liberal values in China’s online communities, challenging the influence of traditional state-sanctioned media.

How Political and Social Trust Can Impact Social Distancing Practices During COVID-19 in Unexpected Ways.

In times of the coronavirus, complying with public health policies is essential to save lives. Understanding the factors that influence compliance with social distancing measures is therefore an urgent issue. The present research investigated the role of political and social trust for social distancing using a variety of methods. In Study 1 (N = 301), conducted with a sample from the United Kingdom in the midst of the virus outbreak (i.e., the first wave), neither political nor social trust had main associations with self-reported social distancing tendencies. However, both factors interacted such that social trust was associated with lower social distancing tendencies among participants with low levels of political trust. In Study 2, using an experimental longitudinal design and again conducted with a sample collected from the UK (N = 268) during the first wave of the pandemic, social distancing practices increased over time, independent of an experimental manipulation of political trust. Moreover, while the interaction between political and social trust from the first study could not be conceptually replicated, social trust was positively related to social distancing intentions. Moving from the individual to the country level and assessing actual behavior at both the first and second wave of the pandemic, in Study 3 (N = 65 countries), country-level political trust was related to less social distancing during the first wave. Social trust was related to a higher growth rate of infections. Against the background of these inconsistent findings, we discuss the potential positive and unexpected negative effects of social trust for social distancing.

Exploring the cross-national variation in public support for climate policies in Europe: The role of quality of government and trust

To reach ambitious climate change mitigation targets and steer actors toward more climate friendly behaviors, governments will have to implement climate policy measures. Imposing certain policy instruments may be challenging since gaining public support for climate policies may be difficult in some countries, especially given the low levels of political trust we see in Europe and elsewhere in the world today. We argue that contextual factors, specifically, institutional quality matters. Using data from the European Social Survey (2016), we explore whether cross-national variation in public support for climate policies is associated with levels of quality of government (QoG) and trust in political institutions and people in general, and if such associations vary across different types of climate policies, including taxes, subsidies, and bans. We find that QoG and generalized trust are positively linked to support for taxes, but not to support for subsidies and bans. Moreover, we find that political trust is more strongly linked to support for taxes than to support for subsidies and bans. These results hold using alternative model specifications.

When Is It Democratic to Postpone an Election? Elections During Natural Disasters, COVID-19, and Emergency Situations

Holding regular elections is an essential feature of democratic practices. The case for postponing elections is often made during emergency situations, however. Despite the critical nature of the i...

When Should the People Decide? Public Support for Direct Democracy in Australia

Abstract This article examines the strength of support for direct democracy among Australian citizens, both in general and, in a world-first, across different specific topics. Analysing data from the Australian Constitutional Values Survey, we investigate whether that support is higher among people who are more educated and politically interested (in line with a ‘cognitive mobilisation’ hypothesis) or those who are dissatisfied with politics, with low levels of political trust (‘political disaffection’). The article finds that Australians widely support the use of direct democracy, but especially with respect to constitutional issues and matters of principle that they feel they can readily engage with, whereas parliaments are still seen as best placed to decide more technical matters. The article also finds that support for direct democracy is strongest among politically disaffected citizens, in ways that suggest greater use of direct democracy may have a role to play in addressing decline in political trust in Australia.

The social impact of natural hazards: a multi-level analysis of disasters and forms of trust in mainland China.

This study aimed to assess the multi-level effects of natural hazards on trust in Chinese society. Drawing on the Chinese General Social Survey conducted in 2012 and provincial disaster damage records, it examined the association between individuals' past experiences of disasters and province-level damage (measured by the number of affected people, deaths, and economic loss) and various forms of trust: in-group; out-group; generalised; and political. The findings indicate that Chinese individuals with experience of disasters have higher levels of out-group trust but lower levels of political trust. Similarly, at the province level, damage owing to disasters over the past three years (2009-11) positively impacted on residents' out-group trust while negatively affecting their political trust. However, when provincial damage was aggregated for disasters over the past five years (2007-11), which included the devastating Sichuan earthquake on 12 May 2008, only total deaths had a positive effect on generalised trust.

Centrist anti-establishment parties and their protest voters: more than a superficial romance?

AbstractNew centrist anti-establishment parties (CAPs) are successful competitors in Central and Eastern Europe. Due to their emphasis on anti-establishment rhetoric and a moderate ideological platform, their breakthrough is usually explained by voters’ dissatisfaction with existing parties. However, little is known about the ideological component of their support. Expectations on the impact of ideology on vote choice in the protest voting literature range from ‘pure protest voting’, which denies any impact of ideology, to a more moderate approach, which combines protest and ideological considerations. Using survey data, I confirm that CAPs attract voters with lower levels of political trust, but ideology also matters. The degree of ideological sorting, however, varies. While some CAPs mainly attract voters from one side of the political spectrum, others attract voters from the left to the right more equally. The differences in the initial composition of their electorates have implications for the parties’ future.

Relationships of Horizontalism and Hierarchy: Exploring Divergent Forms of Sociopolitical Trust

ObjectivePropose a conceptualization of trust that acknowledges varying levels of power between trusting partners. The weak, positive statistical correlation between social and political trust conceals very different experiences of trust. While many people possess either high or low levels of both forms of trust, others have divergent levels of the two forms of trust. Present a simple typology of sociopolitical trust that categorizes individuals as trusters, distrusters, hierarchicalists, and horizontalists.MethodsExploratory analysis of United States using the World Values Survey. Multivariate analysis of sociopolitical trust's effect upon protest and voting.ResultsAmericans have low levels of political trust and higher levels of social trust. Protesters possess social trust and political distrust, and voters are both social and political trusters.ConclusionThe combination of social trust and political trust impacts public participation preferences. Protesters embody a libertarian‐socialist orientation toward sociopolitical trust, while voters possess a social‐democrat orientation.