Low-intensity Conflict Research Articles

Imperialism, Revolution, and the Ecological Crisis of Central America

The ecological crisis created by capitalist development in Central America has been the subject of considerable research, but most of this work has failed to systematically examine the causes, manifestations, and impacts of ecological destruction from a Marxist or socialist perspective. Instead, most explanations of the crisis have been based on a Malthusian notion of overpopulation (Daugherty, 1969), irrational and inefficient environmental planning (Leonard, 1987), and/or the idea of excessive demand in the First World for environmentally destructive commodities (such as beef) from the Third (Nations and Komer, 1983). In contrast, I offer an ecological Marxist critique (see Faber, 1988; O'Connor, 1988). 1 examine the role of U.S. imperialism in creating the ecological, communal, and human conditions of production for capitalist export agriculture and industry in Central America and argue that social and ecological marginalization of the peasant subsistence sector has been a functional component of this process, providing the necessary supplies of highly exploitable semiproletarian workers for the capitalist export sector. I explore the thesis that the survival strategies adopted by the peasantry in response to its impoverishment have resulted in the widespread degradation and collapse of the ecological conditions necessary for the reproduction of semiproletarian labor-power. I go on to point to the contribution of the ecological crisis, aggravated by U.S. policies of low-intensity conflict and ecocide, to the development of powerful reformist and revolutionary movements for social and ecological justice and conclude that Marxist and socialist theory should place the ecological crisis at the center of any analysis of revolution and imperialism in Central America.

The Low-Intensity Conflict Environment of the 1990s

The term “low-intensity conflict” (LIC) first appeared in the lexicon of the U.S. national security community in the latter half of the 1970s. During the 1980s, the Reagan administration and the Congress undertook several initiatives to prepare the United States to respond to various LIC challenges. Following a brief commentary on these developments, the author addresses three interrelated subjects. First, the conceptual debate surrounding LIC and its relationship to the American approach to strategy is examined. Second, the primary kinds of LIC that will occur in the 1990s are described. Finally, the implications and requirements for U.S. national security policy are outlined.

THE GHOSTS OF OMDURMAN

Abstract : The Army's force structure continues to be a hotly contentious issue. The Gulf War of 1990-1991, featuring the spectacularly successful performance of our armored units, has lent added gravity to the question of how much we can afford to reduce the heavy force in favor of units adapted especially for low-intensity conflict. In this article, Major Daniel P. Bolger argues that in the sands of Iraq the great traditional armored sweep enjoyed its last hurrah. Operationally, the Desert Storm ground campaign turned out to be a very comfortable war for the U.S. Army. Expert professionals made the most of years of training, force modernization, and doctrinal development. Yet, in the final accounting, so what? Like the cavalry charge at Omdurman, the ground action in Kuwait and Iraq turned out to be an intriguing but essentially meaningless sequel to a fight already won. The ground maneuvers that ended the Gulf War remind one of the Allied sweeps through Germany in the spring of !945 -- deadly, impressive, swift, and somewhat redundant. These exploitation and pursuit operations, while executed to the highest standards, should not be oversold. They offer few conclusions about American operational prowess in mid-intensity warfare against a first-rate opponent and none whatsoever concerning U.S. capabilities in the far more likely low-intensity struggles. The war against the vaunted Iraqi Army was not won primarily on the ground. Victory came in Foggy Bottom, out on the Gulf, and in the air. The Bush Administration fashioned a coalition embargo that choked off Iraq's spare parts supply months before the first U.S. M1A1 Abrams tanks clanked across the border. The U.S. Navy enforced the sea blockade. The massively intensive aerial interdiction campaign completed the process. U.S. Generals waited long enough to let spare parts deprivation and air interdiction rot out the hulk of Iraq's army. Then, and only then, came the ground blitzkrieg. It was Air, then Land, Battle.

US Military and Economic Intervention in an International Context of Low-Intensity Conflict

Recent major shifts in US military thinking, creating a new low-intensity conflict (LIC) doctrine, have resulted already in significant changes in organization, mission definition, force structure and budgetary allocation. These changes have come about because American leadership recognizes that the process of deindustrialization has produced a vulnerable, highly integrated and interdependent global economic system. This system of economic rationalization is susceptible to anti-western disruptions because of the instability produced by rapid social change, a consequence of the competition from the newly industrialized nations. LIC capability is viewed as a necessary means for dealing with disruptions.

Medical Evacuation in a Low Intensity Conflict Environment

Medical evacuation is one of the major missions of the Medical Element, Joint Task Force-Bravo (ME-JTF-B) in Honduras, which operates in a low intensity conflict environment. ME-JTF-B conducted 10 missions during the primary author's deployment. Critical examination of these missions led to several performance improvements. The most important is that of deploying on all missions an emergency medical evaluation team with TACSAT (a field portable transmitter-receiver which can communicate via satellite over long distances). The second most important is that of close command and control of every mission by the hospital commander and the chief administrator. Other performance improvements are listed below.

Humanitarian Civic Action in Honduras, 1988

This article describes Humanitarian Civic Action (HCA) activities performed by the Medical Element (MED EL) of Joint Task Force-Bravo in Honduras during 1988. The effort was designed to assist Honduras in nation building, to provide a maximal training experience for U.S. personnel, and enhance the image of the U.S. While security episodes occurred during 1988, no warfare in Honduras involved the MED EL. HCA and low-intensity conflict activities will therefore be discussed as one topic, as they were inextricably intertwined.

The United States Army Medical Department in Low-Intensity Conflict

For 30 years, in rural Texas, rural Kentucky, and in the Army, I have observed a variety of efforts aimed at changing people's health. Recently I participated in one large effort (USNS MERCY), commanded a second (MED EL, JTF-Bravo, Honduras), was "neighbor" and visitor to a third (Medical Assistance Team in El Salvador), and had staff level interface with others (Ahuas Tara 88, Fuertes Caminos 88, and Special Operating Forces Humanitarian Assistance Team, all in Honduras). This article speaks to the philosophies which I believe drive, or should drive, these initiatives. Other articles will explore individual iterations.

The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945-1947 (review)

Volume 9, No.1 Fall1990 101 become a network of single-purpose and multi-purpose "authorities" to do the business of the Jewish people as a whole in such a way that threatened neither the political sovereignty of the State of Israel nor the local loyalties of diaspora Jewish citizens of other states, but that is a story for the next volume . In the contemporary world, new diasporas are sprouting as a result of the recent revolutions in transportation and communication. The Jewish people is playing a pioneering role in the generation of appropriate forms of state-diaspora relations. Not the least of that role is in the development of institutional frameworks for such relations, of which JAFI is the prime example . We owe Dr. Stock a debt of gratitude for having so well advanced the exploration of this phenomenon. Daniel 1. Elazar Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and Bar-Ilan University The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945-1947, by David A. Charters, foreword by General Sir Nigel Bagnall. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. 287 pp. $45.00. This book dates back to the era of "counter-insurgency studies," that is, the 1960s and early 1970s. In fact, it originated in the first military history seminar offered at the University of New Brunswick in 1970-71 and was originally submitted as a doctoral dissertation in the War Studies Department , King's College, London, in 1980. It takes as its major theme Clausewitz 's famous dictum that "the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesmen and commanders have to make is to establish ... the kind ofwar on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." With this focus, the author tries to discover how well the British army adapted to the new challenges of what he calls the "Palestine campaign," specifically the period between May 1945 and the British government's decision to withdraw from Palestine in September 1947. If campaign it was, and at its highpoint the British army, including the militarized Palestine Police and "imperial forces" such as the Transjordian Frontier Force, deployed over 100,000 men, not including naval elements blockading the coast, it was a campaign the British lost. In his conclusion, the author quotes Maurice Tugwell, a "Palestine Veteran" and later a historian , that "the Jews had the highest quality of terrorists the British army faced in the post-war period" (p. 176). If one removes the objectionable term 102 SHOFAR "terrorist" and includes these operations under the Israeli heading as the opening stages of the War of Liberation in which all the three resistance groups involved, the Haganah, the Irgun Zvai Leumi, and the Lochmei Heruth Israel, participated as fighters, it becomes the first victorious operation conducted by the Israel Defence Forces, as they came to be known after May 1948. Still, this study is only marginally concerned with the insurgent groups, and among them more with the smaller, if more deadly, Irgun and the Lochmei Heruth Israel. Above all it focuses on actions taken and lessons learned on the British side, especially those that had applicability to later counter-insurgency operations in Malaya, Kenya, Aden, and the many other places from which the British retreated in the decades following World War II. Specifically the volume sets out to address two issues. The first is whether, and to what degree, the British army adapted to the problems created by the Jewish insurgency, and the second issue is how much the military operations contributed, in conjunction with the other security forces and governmental policies, including propaganda and intelligence activities, to the eventual outcome of this conflict. The questions and issues are discussed in six chapters. The first looks at the nature of insurgency, low-intensity conflict in the current military jargon, and its military and political implications. In the second chapter the political setting of the campaign is discussed, touching briefly on the place of Palestine in British Middle East policy, the history of the conflict between Jewish and Arab aspirations, and the desire of the British government to maintain a base...

LOGISTICS IN GRENADA: SUPPORTING NO-PLAN WARS

Abstract : This article analyzes the logistics of Operation Urgent Fury, the 1983 American-led military intervention in Grenada. The article is not written for logisticians but for senior national security leaders such as the warfighting commanders-in-chief. These are the personnel who will make the essential multidimensional logistic decisions, either by design or omission. Logistics is as essential to the successful accomplishment of no-plan low-intensity conflicts as it is to any other military operation. No-plan operations are those in which a contingency plan may not exist or where the exigency of the situation, coupled with a requirement for stringent operational security and a prompt response, precludes actions to refine general war plans into detailed operations orders. The quick response may be necessary to meet operational needs as well as to appease domestic political pressures. In Operation Urgent Fury, U.S. forces successfully overcame tremendous operational and logistic challenges. Urgent Fury, however, illustrates a best-case rather than a worst-case example. Grenada is relatively close to the United States. There were no significant enemy air or sea forces, and enemy ground forces were not well-trained regulars. The population was friendly and the environment forgiving. Even so, U.S. forces struggled to provide adequate logistic support, and in many instances inadequate logistic preparation was overcome only by extraordinary efforts of American soldiers. Our armed forces demonstrated the capability of deploying, fighting, and winning on short notice, but whether we are capable of repeating this success in a future no-plan operation under less favorable conditions is dubious. The lessons of Grenada suggest we are not thus capable, and that our warfighting commanders underestimated the critical importance of logistics in planning and conducting the operation.

MILITARY POLICE IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS: OFTEN THE FORCE OF CHOICE

Abstract : Within the last decade, the Military Police Corps has often been selected as the preferred force in responding to contingency situations. Military police are uniquely qualified to carry out a variety of peacekeeping and peacetime contingency missions in low-intensity conflict operations. This article explores the unique qualifications of MPs to undertake such roles and discusses the analytical process for determining the contingency situations most appropriate for their use. The capability to field combat-ready forces in response to worldwide contingencies is one of the Army's primary strategic roles for the 1990s and beyond. The process of tailoring force packages that sufficiently demonstrate U.S. resolve and protect national interests while preventing or de-escalating open military conflict is an essential component of strategic contingency planning. Today's volatile and politically charged international environment challenges strategic planners to design force packages capable of responding to specific contingency scenarios in a wide range of environments. The last decade has seen a number of contingency situations where the Military Police Corps became the obvious choice. The Dominican Republic, Grenada, Honduras, St. Croix, and Panama have demonstrated the necessity of a guiding concept in the force-selection process -- one that factors in the political imperatives and carefully correlates the type of military unit employed with the type of threat to be encountered and the type of military task to be performed. Analysis based upon such a guiding concept will show that U.S. interests are often best served not by the trumpeted forced entry of a U.S. expeditionary force bristling with big guns and seconded by the full panoply of war, but rather by the unobtrusive introduction of constabulary soldiers trained to satisfy those basic needs of any society: law, order, security, and civil assistance.

On the Legal Control of Low-Intensity Conflict

On the Legal Control of Low-Intensity Conflict

Medical Responses to Terrorist Incidents

Terrorism can be considered a form of low-intensity conflict. It results from extreme reactions to sociopolitical conditions. These reactions, through a variety of intellectual and emotional processes, are manifest as overt acts of violence. Terrorism includes acts by individuals or organizations which seek to change political or social conditions, make political or ideological statements, or obtain funds for sustaining ongoing terrorist or revolutionary campaigns. Terrorist incidents are increasingly prevalent. Often, they involve loss of lives and mass casualties and have special medical dimensions. As such, the role of EMS in terrorist incidents needs to be defined clearly.

Light Infantry as Peacekeepers in the Sinai

What kinds of soldiers and units are most appropriate for peacekeeping duty? This article compares the adaptation of light infantrymen-trained primarily as part of a rapid deployment force for low-intensity combat missions-with that of soldiers from an elite airborne division who served earlier with the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers. The study tracked over time an infantry company that was part of a battalion task force deployed in spring 1987, using surveys and several waves of extensive individual and group interviews and field observations during the deployment. Our analysis led to four fundamental conclusions: deployments and return from deployments have clear and systematic effects on soldiers' attitudes; training for the peacekeeping mission had measurable effects on the attitudes of soldiers; such low-intensity conflict training lowered soldiers' estimates of the likelihood of high-intensity conflict; and all infantry divisions are not the same in their collective views of the world and their role in it.

Low-intensity conflict: the pattern of warfare in the modern world

Low-intensity conflict: the pattern of warfare in the modern world

The Health Impact of "Low Intensity Conflict"

I 1 5 documented (1-3). Many of these conflicts are examples of what is termed, in military parlance, "low intensity conflict" (LIC) -a conflict short of conventional war, where it is not a nation's military structures that are targeted but "its clinics and classrooms, its power and transportation systems, its livelihood, and its possibilities... ." (4). Shortly before the recent elections, I visited Nicaragua, where counter-revolutionary or Contra forces have waged such a conflict against the government for almost a decade. In the aftermath of the recent electoral defeat of the Sandinista government, and the likely end to hostilities, it is worth reflecting on some of the health consequences specific to this type of conflict in Nicaragua. Perhaps the greatest tragedy of the escalation in Contra hostilities during the I98os was the gradual erosion of the remarkable early achievements of the Sandinista health care system. In 1979, the Sandinista revolutionary government inherited a legacy of health indices which were amongst the worst in Latin America. The Nicaraguan Ministry of Health (MINSA) promptly developed an ambitious and innovative national health programme, characterized by the provision of universal health coverage and an emphasis on community-based primary care, all within the context of regionalized health services and popular community participation in health activities. In 1977 the proportion of the government budget devoted to health was 7.5 % and by I 9 8 I had risen more than 50 percent (5). This commitment was reflected in some exceptional results. For example, infant mortality decreased by 30 percent overall, and by an even greater amount in the rural areas. Polio, previously endemic in Nicaragua, has not been reported since I98 2 despite intensive

The Latin American Military, Low Intensity Conflict, and Democracy

There can be no expression of a desire to return to political power when experience tells us that the result is totally negative for our country and fundamentally so for the armed forces (LAWR, 1986b).— Chief of Staff, Army of ArgentinaThe most remarkable development in Latin America during the economically “lost decade” of the 1980s is the regionwide process of redemocratization. Close to 90% of the people of the region are ruled by civilian governments. The flowering of democratic, pluralistic, and participatory systems is still a noble aspiration, but it is radically different from the bleak political landscape of the 1960s and 1970s, when military governments prevailed. Nor is the appurtenance of civilian government equal to democracy. There is a large variety of civilian-military coalitions possible in a democratic setting.

Press Relations of Terrorist Organizations

Terrorist groups engage in a wide variety of formal press relations activities thatmake it difficult to maintain that they engage in violence for its own sake. Many groups engaging in terrorism and low-intensity conflict are becoming increasingly adept at using publicity techniques and dealing with media. This article explores and illustrates the different types of press relations commonly undertaken by terrorist organizations. The author argues that large and small groups both engage in publicity efforts, but employ different patterns of press relations activities.

Armies in low-intensity conflict: a comparative analysis

Armies in low-intensity conflict: a comparative analysis

Intervention in the 1980s: U.S. foreign policy in the Third World

Part 1 Introduction: concepts, relevance, themes, and overview, Peter J.Schraeder. Part 2 Origins of intervention: evolution of the interventionist impulse, Lloyd C.Gardner low intensity conflict doctrine, Michael T.Klare the globalist-regionalist debate, Charles F.Doran. Part 3 Tools of intervention: economic and military aid, Doug Bandow economic sanctions, Kimberly A.Elliott covert intervention, Harry Howe Ransom paramilitary intervention, Peter J.Schraeder direct military intervention, Ted Galen Carpenter. Part 4 Constraints on intervention: the domestic environment, Jerel A.Rasati government and the military establishment, Stephen Daggett the structure of the international system, Harry Piotrowski international law, Christopher C.Joyner. Part 5 Case studies: Iran, Eric Hooglund the Philippines, Richard J.Kessler Nicaragua, Peter Kornbluh Grenada, Tony Thorndike South Africa, R.Hunt Davis Jr and Gwendolen M.Carter. Part 6 Conclusion: US intervention in perspective, Peter J.Schraeder.

Health effects of the war in two rural communities in Nicaragua. Nicaragua Health Study Collaborative at Harvard, CIES, and UNAN.

We report on a pilot study to assess the effects of low intensity war in Nicaragua on the health of the civilian population. The study compared data from two regions in Nicaragua, one in an area of intense conflict, the other further removed from the war's violence. Information was obtained from a questionnaire administered to female heads of randomly selected households; structured interviews with community leaders and health workers; group discussions with community residents; and a review of regional and municipal death records. Height and mid-upper arm circumference of children were measured, and immunization records reviewed. The war has had a serious negative effect on the lives of the civilian population in both the war zone and the non-war zone, with the effects most severe in the war zone. In both communities, over half of the respondents reported the death of a friend or relative. In the war zone community, over one-fourth of respondents reported attacks on family members in non-combat situations around their homes. Death by firearms was the leading cause of death in persons over age 6 in the war zone. Vaccination coverage, nutritional indices, and familial disruption were worse in the war zone community. The findings suggest that continued funding of the Nicaraguan contra forces by the United States may be harming the ostensible beneficiaries of that policy, and that use of such low intensity conflict as a foreign policy tool should be questioned.