Loose Talk Research Articles

Absolute gradable adjectives and loose talk

Kennedy (Linguist Philos 30:1–45, 2007) forcefully proposes what is now a widely assumed semantics for absolute gradable adjectives. On this semantics, maximum standard adjectives like “straight” and “dry” ascribe a maximal degree of the underlying quantity. Meanwhile, minimum standard adjectives like “bent” and “wet” merely ascribe a non-zero, non-minimal degree of the underlying quantity. This theory clashes with the ordinary intuition that sentences like “The stick is straight” are frequently true while sentences like “The stick is bent” are frequently informative, and fans of the indicated theory of absolute gradable adjectives appeal to loose talk in response. One goal of this paper is to show that all extant theories of loose talk are inconsistent with this response strategy. Another goal is to offer a revised version of Hoek’s (Philos Rev 127:151–196, 2018, in: Proceedings of the 22nd Amsterdam Colloquium, 2019) recent theory of loose talk that accommodates absolute gradable adjectives after all, while being defensible against a range of important concerns.

Really Knowing: A Collocational Argument for an Infallibilist Sense of ‘Know’

AbstractCollocations are recurrent combinations of words where one lexical item occurs near another lexical item with a frequency far greater than chance. Collocations can be used to study meaning. I argue that the collocational phrase ‘really know’, in conjunction with some reasonable interpretive conclusions, provides us with evidence that the verb ‘know’ has an infallibilist sense. I make my case, first, by arguing that ‘really’ when part of the phrase ‘really know’ is best understood as synonymous with ‘truly’. I then argue that there are two plausible interpretations of the function that ‘really’ plays in the phrase ‘really know’. On the first interpretation, ‘really’ helps distinguish claims about genuine infallibilist knowing from loose talk about ‘knowing’. On the second interpretation, ‘really’ is often used to disambiguate an infallibilist sense of ‘know’ from a fallibilist sense of ‘know’. On either interpretation, there is an infallibilist sense of ‘know’.

Nizarorustu: A Textual Analysis of the Battle of Niså

Nizarorustu: A Textual Analysis of the Battle of Niså

Interval-based dynamics of loose talk

Interval-based dynamics of loose talk

Taking truth seriously: the case of generics

By discussing a large number of different examples, this paper argues that the class of so-called generic statements is much more heterogeneous that is usually recognized in the contemporary debate. It is claimed that the theoretical tendency towards overgeneralization or homogenization makes it impossible to adequately understand how generic statements function in language and to handle the dangers involved in generics that express and promote social stereotypes and prejudices. It is also argued that such overgeneralization involves what J. L. Austin described as the “fetishizing” of the true/false distinction. Several influential theories are criticized, including Sterken’s error theory, Leslie’s conception of weak generics, and the idea that generics involve loose talk.

From a bit of processed cheese to a bit of a car accident and a little bit of “oh really” — The journey of Australian English a bit (of)

This is a corpus-based study of the behaviour of a bit (of) in modern Australian English, as spoken by mainstream Anglo-Australian speakers; examples are drawn from the UWA Corpus of English in Australia (Rodríguez Louro, 2011–2020). We start by briefly tracking the phrase as it makes its way along the well-trodden road from propositional to expressive meaning: a bit of milk (propositional) > a bit cold (propositional) > a bit of a babe yeah (textual) > a bit of a car accident (expressive). We also describe the recent appearance of a quite different function, that of a quotative (as in a bit of “oh really”). This use we argue (like Fleischman and Yaguello, 2004 for like) is the natural extension of both the focus and hedging functions.The grammaticalization processes we outline here take place in the context of regional, social, and cultural factors, and current Australian English a bit (of), like other discourse-pragmatic markers, is a powerful expression of cultural values and ideas. Our examination of the texts reveals that the hedging uses are by far the most frequent and these we place, together with quotative a bit (of), under the general umbrella of “loose talk” (Andersen, 1998). Like other vague expressions, it performs a number of in-group solidarity functions, including informality and politeness (underplaying ill-health, softening complaints and criticisms, indicating tentativeness in requests and questions, and minimizing distance between speakers). The corpus also has many examples of tongue-in-cheek a bit, reflecting the self-deprecating humour and laconic understatement so often described for Australians (Manns, 2020).

Loose talk, the context of assessment, and skeptical invariantism

ABSTRACT Russell ([2022]. “Fancy Loose Talk About Knowledge.” Inquiry 65: 789–820.) defends a novel form of skeptical invariantism, according to which knowledge ascriptions are hardly ever true because they are so demanding, but nonetheless are ordinarily used loosely to communicate truths, where the felicity of loose talk is relative to the context of assessment as well as the context of use. I argue that while there is very good reason to believe that ‘know’ is a demanding term commonly used loosely, we need not and should not conclude that loose use is assessment relative or that knowledge ascriptions are hardly ever true.

È stato un mezzo disastro… Fenomeni di convergenza tra approssimazione e intensificazione: uno studio contrastivo su italiano e russo

Based on the case-study of the Italian downtoner mezzo, ‘half of’, the present work aims to highlight, through a usage-based approach, interesting points of semantic and functional convergence between approximation and intensification, which are traditionally considered divergent meaningconstruction strategies. Mezzo functions both on the semantic level, by modulating the referential force of nouns, verbs, and adjectives, and on the pragmatic level, where it acts as a discourse marker, enabling the speaker to reduce the illocutionary force of their assertions and helping the receiver to make the inferences necessary to recognise the speaker’s communicative intentions in cases of “loose talk” (in Relevance Theory terms), such as understatement and overstatement. In the second part of the article, the results of a contrastive analysis with Russian are discussed, based on the assumption that the identification of functional equivalences between different languages is a valid heuristic method to explain the semantic and pragmatic multifunctionality of certain lexical elements, also from a cross-linguistic perspective.

“Real war ammunition:” Artists for Victory, the National War Poster Competition, and the Hostile Imagination on the United States World War II Home Front

“Real war ammunition:” Artists for Victory, the National War Poster Competition, and the Hostile Imagination on the United States World War II Home Front

The international currency system revisited

What does the international currency system really look like? Since World War II, the US dollar has prevailed as the international community’s one truly global money. The currency system could loosely be described as unipolar, practically a monopoly. Is that still true? Opinions are sharply divided. Close to a decade ago the authors sought to resolve the issue with a detailed empirical analysis stretching back over a quarter of a century. Their conclusion was that loose talk of an increasingly multipolar currency system was at best premature. In reality, they could find few signs of significant change in the competitive structure of the system over the years under review. While acknowledging that a future of multipolarity could yet arrive, they saw no evidence that anything like that had happened yet. The aim of this paper is to extend the authors’ previous analysis forward to encompass another decade. Their conclusion, overall, remains much the same as before. Despite some hints of minor erosion, the dollar remains as dominant as ever. A cluster of smaller currencies have begun to compete for attention, but multipolarity in any meaningful sense has still not arrived. The greenback still reigns supreme.

Fancy loose talk about knowledge

ABSTRACT This paper argues for a version of sceptical invariantism about knowledge on which the acceptability of knowledge-attributing sentences varies with the context of assessment.

Introduction to the Special Issue: putting the Capitol Breach in context

ABSTRACT I introduce the contributions to the Special Issue focused on the Capitol breach of 6 January 2021, and suggest that the breach can only be understood in the context of a long and escalating conflict between Right and Left activists in the U.S. A milestone in this conflict was the interaction between police and protesters at the inauguration of Donald Trump in January 2017. Review of this interaction leads to the recognition that Right activists such as Proud Boys and Oath Keepers are locked in conflict with antifa, which is more than loose talk about Marxism and anarchism.

Pristupi pojmovnoj metafori

This paper presents a set of possible contemporary approaches to the study of metaphor. Although undoubtedly most propulsive, Lakoff and Johnson’s conceptual (or cognitive) metaphor theory is only one of several metaphor models. Conceptual metaphor theory postulates that metaphor is a phenomenon of thought which is manifest in language. According to this approach, metaphor is understanding abstract conceptual domains (where domain is any coherent organization of human experience) in terms of more concrete source domains. In Fauconnier and Turner’s blending theory meaning is constructed through building of a number of mental spaces and establishment of mappings between them. Contrary to these two approaches, in Glucksberg’s class-inclusion model of metaphor, properties of the source category are attributed to the target category not by means of mappings but through class inclusion. Bowdle and Gentner’s ‘career of metaphor’ theory highlights the importance of metaphor conventionality. In Cameron’s ‘discourse dynamics’ approach metaphor is explored through analysis of discourse. It is perceived and used as a tool which helps uncover attitudes and values. Relevance theorists, on the other end of the spectrum, see metaphor as ‘loose talk’ understood via pragmatic inferential processes. Critical metaphor analysis explores how metaphors shape not only human thought and language, but also our beliefs, values and actions. The range of available approaches to metaphor suggests that no single approach can exhaustively capture this multifaceted phenomenon.

The dynamics of loose talk

AbstractIn non‐literal uses of language, the content an utterance communicates differs from its literal truth conditions. Loose talk is one example of non‐literal language use (amongst many others). For example, what a loose utterance of (1) communicates differs from what it literally expresses: Lena arrived at 9 o'clock. Loose talk is interesting (or so I will argue). It has certain distinctive features which raise important questions about the connection between literal and non‐literal language use. This paper aims to (i.) introduce a range of novel data demonstrating certain overlooked features of loose talk, and (ii.) develop a new theory of the phenomenon which accounts for these data. In particular, this theory is motivated by the need to explain minimal pairs such as (): Lena arrived at 9 o'clock, but she did not arrive at 9 o'clock exactly. ?? Lena did not arrive at 9 o'clock exactly, but she arrived at 9 o'clock. () and () agree in their truth conditions. Yet they differ in felicity. As such, they constitute a problem for any account which hopes to predict the acceptability of the loose use of a sentence from its truth conditions and the context of utterance alone.Instead, it will be argued, to explain loose talk phenomena we must posit an additional layer of meaning outstripping truth conditions. This layer of meaning is shown to exhibit a range of properties, all of which point to its being semantically encoded. Thus, if correct, the theory provides a new example of how semantic meaning must extend beyond literal, truth‐conditional content.

LOOSE TALK

The Yale ReviewVolume 107, Issue 3 p. 97-97 POETRY LOOSE TALK KATIE DONOVAN, KATIE DONOVAN Irish poet living in Dalkey, a suburb of Dublin.Search for more papers by this author KATIE DONOVAN, KATIE DONOVAN Irish poet living in Dalkey, a suburb of Dublin.Search for more papers by this author First published: 05 July 2019 https://doi.org/10.1111/yrev.13532AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume107, Issue3July 2019Pages 97-97 RelatedInformation

LOOSE TALK

9 7 R L O O S E T A L K K A T I E D O N O V A N ‘‘The market for sex dolls is on the rise’’ – The Guardian, June 5th , 2018 Nag, prattle, palaver – he’s had enough of loudmouthed chatter – better to invest in a life-like version, a girly robot doll, great for sex and a button to press if he wants ‘‘talk.’’ The deluxe model will laugh at his jokes. Unless she entertains he prefers the dumb tongue. I’m with the old wives: it’s our tales that get told. Silence is false gold if it swallows up assault, incest, rape; medical mistakes. I’ll speak as I wish – roses or toads – with the audacious gossips: no secret safe between our lips. ...

From the "coding metaphor" to a theory of representation.

Brette highlights a conceptual problem in contemporary neuroscience: Loose talk of "coding" sometimes leads to a conflation of the distinction between representing and merely detecting a property. The solution is to replace casual talk of "coding" with an explicit, demanding set of conditions for neural representation. Various theories of this general type can be found in the philosophical literature.

Formal pragmatic account of Double Access

This paper argues that Double Access sentences in English (Smith, 1978) are akind of loose talk. When the meaning of a Double Access sentence is computed literally, theresult is infelicity. Double Access sentences can be used meaningfully only when rescued bypragmatics which intervenes to interpret the embedded clause loosely. A formal model forloose interpretation, building on Klecha (2018), is provided.Keywords: tense, embedding, Double Access, imprecision, defaults, embedded implicature.

Saying a bundle: meaning, intention, and underdetermination

People often speak loosely, uttering sentences that are plainly false on their most strict interpretation. In understanding such speakers, we face a problem of underdetermination: there is often no unique interpretation that captures what they meant. Focusing on the case of incomplete definite descriptions, this paper suggests that speakers often mean bundles of propositions. When a speaker means a bundle, their audience can know what they mean by deriving any one of its members. Rather than posing a problem for the interpretation of loose talk, the underdetermination of a uniquely correct interpretation allows for various ways in which the audience can grasp the speaker’s meaning.

Loose Talk Kills: What’s Worrying about Unity of Method

There is danger in stressing commonalities among methods because the differences matter in fixing the meaning of our claims. Different methods can, and often do, test the same claim. But it takes a strong network of theory and empirical results to ensure that. Failing that, we are likely to fall into inference by pun. We use one set of methods to establish a claim and then draw inferences licensed by a similar-sounding claim that calls for different methods of testing. Our inferences fail, and bridges we build (or policies we set) depending on them fall down.