Long-term Economic Decline Research Articles

Discontent, Populism, or the Revenge of the “Places That Don’t Matter”? Analysis of the Rise of the Far-Right in Portugal

This research delves into the territorial nuances of political populism, examining Portugal’s CHEGA party as a case study. Through a comprehensive analysis of survey data and correlational studies, this study reveals that discontent, manifesting in the rise of populist movements, is intricately linked to the economic decline and neglect of specific regions. The unexpected success of CHEGA is not merely a socio-economic phenomenon but a product of deeply rooted territorial dynamics. The findings underscore the importance of adopting place-sensitive development policies that address the unique challenges of overlooked territories, steering clear of traditional compensatory measures. The urgency to counteract long-term economic decline, industrial decay, and brain drain demands innovative strategies that tap into latent economic potential and provide tangible opportunities. As we confront the rise of anti-establishment voting threatening European unity, this research advocates for a paradigm shift towards place-sensitive policies to navigate the crossroads of discontent and foster a more resilient, inclusive future.

Protecting Poor Rural Households from Health Shocks: Poverty Alleviation Practices in Chongqing, China

In certain low- and middle-income countries, information asymmetry, human capital damage and long-term economic decline are longstanding problems in health-related poverty alleviation. Notably, China’s Targeted Poverty Alleviation program sheds new light on resolving these problems. Based on existing paradigms in the poverty research area, the purpose of this paper is to summarize and explore the roles of Chinese support policies in poor rural households coping with health shocks. Using a questionnaire survey of 4635 poor rural households in a municipality in Southwest China conducted from December 2018 to January 2019, this study examines the relationships between health shocks, human capital, support policies, and per capita household income. The results show that (1) apart from safety nets and cargo nets, monitoring nets are formed in China’s poverty alleviation practice, which could resolve the problem of information asymmetry. (2) Health shocks do not cause poor rural households to fall back into poverty. The reason for this is that safety net and cargo net policies are provided to relevant poor rural households by considering household human capital endowments and the information received from cargo nets. Through this method, patients can obtain effective support and caregivers can obtain off-farm employment opportunities. Thus, the ability of poor rural household human capital to resist health shocks is enhanced. (3) With the support of these policies, the negative effects of dependent family members and agricultural laborers on per capita household income are reversed. Thus, the long-term increase in poor rural household income is also ensured. These findings hold great value for other developing countries coping with health shocks and formulating anti-poverty policies.

Editor's Introduction

Like Appalachian coal mining, the Northwest logging industry has not gone down without a fight. Again, somewhat akin to the politics of mineworking communities in West Virginia, the protagonists in ensuing bitter fights over jobs versus environmental protectionism have skewed traditional class alliances and threatened long-standing regional progressive traditions. As Steven Beda makes clear in his assessment of a still-smoldering controversy that upended ambitious cap-and-trade legislation to stem logging in 2020, environmental regulation combined with a more long-term sectoral economic decline have fueled a decidedly right-wing version of populism across the region since the early 1970s. In this thoughtful assessment of Oregon's internally conflicted Timber Unity rank and file—a movement based on marginal, independent timber contractor-producers and small sawmill operators who draw variously on old-Wobbly and antiregulatory rhetoric redirected at “elitist” protectors of the spotted owl and a recreation-oriented middle class—Beda discovers a microcosm of a larger rural shift away from radical working-class identities (see A. Brooke Boulton's accompanying Common Verse poem) toward the defensiveness of populist backlash.Francis Ryan tracks an important but little-noticed component of the post–World War II labor force: school crossing guards. Born of the Baby Boom expansion of school-age children combined with a population of mothers eager for rewarding part-time work, official, uniformed crossing guards—taking the place of otherwise overworked police officers—became a fixture at urban intersections beginning in the early 1950s. Although initially linked in the public mind to the “voluntary” sector associated with “PTA women” and others, Ryan convincingly connects them to a labor feminist tradition centered on an emergent public sector workforce. By the 1960s, the guards’ economic demands encompassed both benefits and wages, and their formalized associations began to affiliate with established unions like AFSCME and the SEIU. Not surprisingly, the urban fiscal crises of the 1970s also directly touched the interracial guard associations, who fought back against massive job cuts. Yet the real threat—and seeming denouement—to this once-classic urban occupation, suggests Ryan, came with a decline of collective, public protection of street corners by the guards, replaced by the hyper-individualized vigilance over children by their own parents.In the course of a larger biographical study of civil rights and labor icon, A. Philip Randolph, Eric Arnesen pauses here to zero in on Randolph's relation to what might be considered the ultimate expression of late 1930s Popular Front radicalism: the National Negro Congress. With a spirited assault on both racial and economic exploitation—critiquing the inadequacies of the New Deal, supporting interracial trade unionism, combating segregation , and opposing fascism—the NNC temporarily repaired a breach between Communist Party–linked militants led by Ben Davis Jr. and the heretofore vociferously anticommunist socialist, Randolph. Just how responsible (despite their public attempts to submerge their identity) was the party cadre for the NNC's direction and initial strategic success defines a sustained research quest. Against the “reassessment” of many recent historians in the service of a more broad-based, “grassroots” understanding of Popular Front initiatives like the NNC, Arnesen insists that the centrality of the party's role must be reckoned with.As is frequently the case, the books under review cover the labor map, touching down on a rich historical mix of geography and chronology. Subjects covered include at least three that our readers are not likely to have encountered before: turtle harvesters in the Caribbean, women working in the production of British cinema, and Mozambican migrants passing across the “night trains” to and from apartheid South Africa. Among generally positive and respectful treatment of their charges, Elizabeth Tandy Shermer tweaks Michael Kazin's history of Democratic Party successes for forgetting that given the flawed structure of American democracy, the party itself is “not enough to win and govern.” Similarly, Benjamin Goldfrank faults John French's otherwise “excellent” biography of Brazilian leader Lula for underplaying its hero's collaboration with a culture of “clientelism” that (at least temporarily) reversed his and his movement's fortunes. Less positive yet is Joseph Viteritti's treatment of Benjamin Holtzman's study of neoliberalism and New York City's fiscal crisis: curious readers will likely want to consult the original before making up their own minds.

Исследование миграционных предпочтений молодежи старопромышленного региона (на примере Волгоградской области)

Currently, most of old industrial regions in Russia are faced with the problem of the outflow of the working population, including young people. The outflow of human capital threatens not only with a long-term economic decline in economic development, but also with an increase in social tension within the “shrinking” old industrial region. The problem of the outflow of the working population and shrinkage of the working space is also typical of Volgograd region. The main purpose of this study is to analyze the migration preferences of young people (generation of centennials) in the Volgograd region, to identify stimulating and restraining factors for the migration from the region. The article attempts to prove, on the basis of statistical data that the Volgograd region is an old industrial region and analyze, based on a survey of young people how it shrinks due to their migration. Empirical data were obtained in the course of a survey of young people from 17 to 27 years old in Volgograd region. The survey was conducted in the form of an online questionnaire on the Google Forms from March 14th to April 2nd 2022. The study involved 976 students from 8 educational institutions of Volgograd. Comparison of the results obtained with the statistical data analyzed by the authors of the article made it possible to record the reluctance of young people to stay in Volgograd region due to economic factors and development problems. The key reasons for unwillingness to stay in Volgograd region are: low wages, problems with employment and lack of career growth. There is a huge lag in the needs of young people in terms of wages and real opportunities of employers due to the slowdown in economic growth in Volgograd region, which is forcing young people to leave for more developed regions of the country. Employers in the region cannot offer high wages to young workers, and young people are not ready to work under such conditions. The only factor that keeps the majority from moving is the presence of relatives and friends whom young people cannot leave. If new jobs were created in the region, the level of well-being of citizens increased, social infrastructure developed, and then the loss of the young population of the city could be stopped. The results of this study can be useful to officials responsible for regional development at both the regional and federal levels.

A Promising Place-Based Collaborative Impact Investing Fund Strengthens Community and Informs Philanthropic Practice

A recent evaluation of the Western New York Impact Investment Fund adds to the proof-of-concept literature regarding “doing good and doing well” while pointing to experience-based best practices in philanthropic impact investing. Born of a collaboration between regional and national philanthropies, the fund brings together corporate, individual, and philanthropic investors to deliver an inclusive impact investment mechanism. Founded in 2017, the fund evolved from concept to operating entity, focusing on mitigating capital gaps, longterm economic decline, and wealth divides.

Golfing with Trump. Social capital, decline, inequality, and the rise of populism in the US

Abstract In 2000, Robert Putnam forecast that United States (US) democracy was at risk from the twin challenges of declining civic engagement and rising interpersonal inequality. Sixteen years later, his predictions were vindicated by the election of Donald Trump as president of the US. This paper analyses the extent to which the 2016 election of Donald Trump—and his failed re-election bid in 2020—have been related to levels of social capital and interpersonal inequalities. We posit an alternative: that the rise in votes for Trump has been the result of long-term economic and population decline in areas with strong social capital. This hypothesis is confirmed by the econometric analysis conducted for US counties. Long-term declines in employment and population—rather than in earnings, salaries, or wages—in places with relatively strong social capital propelled Donald Trump to the presidency and almost secured his re-election. By contrast, low social capital and high interpersonal inequality were not connected to a surge in support for Trump. These results are robust to the introduction of control variables and different inequality measures. The analysis also shows that the discontent at the base of the Trump margin is not just a consequence of the 2008 crisis but had been brewing for a long time. Places in the US that remained cohesive but witnessed an enduring decline are no longer bowling alone, they have golfed with Trump and will, in all likelihood, continue to golf with Trumpism or other forms of populism.

Perceptions of Diseases of Despair by Members of Rural and Urban High-Prevalence Communities

<h3>Importance</h3> Diseases of despair (ie, mortality or morbidity from suicidality, drug abuse, and alcoholism) were first characterized as increasing in rural White working-class populations in midlife with low educational attainment and associated with long-term economic decline. Excess mortality now appears to be associated with working-class citizens across demographic and geographic boundaries, but no known qualitative studies have engaged residents of rural and urban locales with high prevalence of diseases of despair to learn their perspectives. <h3>Objective</h3> To explore perceptions about despair-related illness and potential intervention strategies among diverse community members residing in discrete rural and urban hotspots. <h3>Design, Setting, and Participants</h3> In this qualitative study, high-prevalence hotspots for diseases of despair were identified from health insurance claims data in Central Pennsylvania. Four focus groups were conducted with 60 community members in organizations and coalitions from 3 census block group hotspot clusters in the health system between September 2019 and January 2020. Focus groups explored awareness and beliefs about causation and potential intervention strategies. <h3>Main Outcomes and Measures</h3> A descriptive phenomenological approach was applied to thematic analysis, and a preliminary conceptual model was constructed to describe how various factors may be associated with perpetuating despair and with public health. <h3>Results</h3> In total, 60 adult community members participated in 4 focus groups (44 women, 16 men; 40 White non-Hispanic, 17 Black, and 3 Hispanic/Latino members). Three focus groups with 43 members were held in rural areas with high prevalence of diseases of despair, and 1 focus group with 17 members in a high-prevalence urban area. Four themes emerged with respect to awareness and believed causation of despair-related illness, and participants identified common associated factors, including financial distress, lack of critical infrastructure and social services, deteriorating sense of community, and family fragmentation. Intervention strategies focused around 2 themes: (1) building resilience to despair through better community and organizational coordination and peer support at the local level and (2) encouraging broader state investments in social services and infrastructure to mitigate despair-related illness. <h3>Conclusions and Relevance</h3> In this qualitative study, rural and urban community members identified common factors associated with diseases of despair, highlighting the association between long-term political and economic decline and public health and a need for both community- and state-level solutions to address despair. Health care systems participating in addressing community health needs may improve processes to screen for despair (eg, social history taking) and codesign primary, secondary, and tertiary interventions aimed at addressing factors associated with distress. Such actions have taken on greater urgency with the COVID-19 pandemic.

The shadow of the Pithead: Understanding social and political attitudes in former coal mining communities in the UK

The economic plight and consequent social and political attitudes of ‘left behind’ communities have become subjects of intense focus across a world impacted by inequality, social unrest, and political populism. We examine whether particular types of local long-term economic decline affect how residents in different places view the world; here in former mining communities of the UK which remain economically peripheral, and are home to community narratives that emphasise the shared economic, political and cultural heritages that are often fundamental to those places' very existence. We use data from the UK Household Longitudinal Study to contrast political views and social attitudes in communities that were (in 1981) economically dependent on coal mining with other communities that are similarly economically peripheral in contexts and challenges, but without a shared history of economic decline. We find that residents of former coalmining communities are highly politically disengaged, with low levels of trust and political efficacy, and low involvement in the political process. Moreover, our analysis shows an increase in political engagement over the EU referendum campaign period, which directly addressed some of the grievances felt by these communities. We conclude that community narratives of economic peripherality are strongly inter-linked with trust in government and political engagement.

Populism in Place: The Economic Geography of the Globalization Backlash

AbstractA populist backlash to globalization has ushered in nationalist governments and challenged core features of the Liberal International Order. Although startling in scope and urgency, the populist wave has been developing in declining regions of wealthy countries for some time. Trade, offshoring, and automation have steadily reduced the number of available jobs and the wages of industrial workers since at least the 1970s. The decline in manufacturing employment initiated the deterioration of social and economic conditions in affected communities, exacerbating inequalities between depressed rural areas and small cities and towns, on the one hand, and thriving cities, on the other. The global financial crisis of 2008 catalyzed these divisions, as communities already in decline suffered deeper and longer economic downturns than metropolitan areas, where superstar knowledge, technology, and service-oriented firms agglomerate. We document many of these trends across the United States and Europe, and demonstrate that populist support is strongest in communities that experienced long-term economic and social decline. Institutional differences in labor markets and electoral rules across developed democracies may explain some of the variation in populists’ electoral success. Renewed support for the Liberal International Order may require a rejuvenation of distressed communities and a reduction of stark regional inequalities.

The Rise of Populism and the Revenge of the Places That Don’t Matter

Populism is on the rise, especially in the developed world. It has gone from being a force to be reckoned with to becoming one of the main challenges for society today. But the causes behind its rise remain hotly debated. Many of the economic analyses of the ascent of populism have focused on growing inequalities – both from an interpersonal and territorial dimension. In this essay, I argue that the rise of the vote for anti-system parties is far more related to the long-term economic decline of places that have seen far better times and have been disadvantaged by processes that have rendered them exposed and somewhat ‘expendable’ than to increases inequality. Fixing this type of ‘places that don’t matter’ is possibly one of the best ways to tackle anti-system voting. This will imply the implementation of well-targeted place-sensitive polices, going beyond the traditional wealthy and less developed places that have attracted the bulk of investment and considering long-term economic trajectories.

Populism in Place: The Economic Geography of the Globalization Backlash

A populist backlash to globalization has ushered in nationalist governments and challenged core features of the liberal international order. Although startling in scope and urgency, the populist wave has been developing in declining regions of wealthy countries for some time. Trade, offshoring, and automation have steadily reduced the jobs and wages of industrial workers since at least the 1970s. The decline in manufacturing employment initiated the deterioration of social and economic conditions in affected communities, exacerbating inequalities between depressed rural areas and small cities and towns, on the one hand, and thriving cities, on the other. The global financial crisis of 2008 catalyzed these divisions as communities already in decline suffered deeper and longer economic downturns than metropolitan areas where superstar knowledge, technology, and service-oriented firms agglomerate. We document many of these trends across the US and Europe, and demonstrate that populist support is strongest in communities that experienced long-term economic and social decline. Institutional differences in labor markets and electoral rules across developed democracies may explain some of the variation in populists’ electoral success. Renewed support for the liberal international order may require a rejuvenation of distressed communities and a reduction of stark regional inequalities.

Long-Term Economic Distress, Cultural Backlash, and Support for Brexit

Economic and cultural factors are often presented as alternative explanations of Brexit. Most studies have failed to recognize the interplay between contextual economic factors and individual attitudes such as nativism and Euroscepticism. We argue that both economic and cultural factors matter to explain the outcome of the referendum. Economic factors are critical because they shape cultural attitudes. British citizens who live in economically depressed and declining districts are more likely to develop anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic views. These cultural grievances, in turn, explain support for Brexit. Using both aggregate economic and electoral data at the local level (380 districts) and data from the 7th wave of the British Election Study 2014-2017 panel, we find strong support for our argument that cultural grievances mediate the effect of long-term economic decline on support for Brexit. Our results have important policy implications, and suggest targeted economic policies are necessary to protect the “losers of globalization.”

A world turned upside down: the rise of China and the relative economic decline of the West

ABSTRACTThe last 30 years have seen a dramatic reshaping of the geography of the world economy. China and the Asia-Pacific region have witnessed rapid economic growth. Drawing on Wallerstein’s and Hobson’s work on the changing structure of the world economy and focusing on a number of economic changes that have taken over the last 30 years, including a analysis of changes in gross domestic product (GDP) manufacturing output, exports, foreign trade balances and GDP per capita, this paper concludes that, on most measures, the West is clearly in long-term relative economic decline and that the rate of change has increased since the 2008 global financial crisis. The centre of gravity of the world economy has undeniably shifted from West to East.

Why Nothing Can Really Be Done about North Korea’s Nuclear Program

Why Nothing Can Really Be Done about North Korea’s Nuclear Program Andrei Lankov (bio) If one were asked to describe the worldview of the North Korean political elites, it could be done in a single word: they are “hyperrealists.” Their idea of how international relations are structured agrees extremely well with the prescriptions of the realist school (of whose existence most of them seem blissfully unaware), and in many cases they take this school’s ideas to its logical extremes. This has been the case for well over half a century. This hyperrealism is how a small group of North Korean hereditary elites have managed to stay in power against seemingly impossible odds since the late 1950s. In that time, North Korea has survived the Sino-Soviet quarrel of the 1960–80s, long-term economic decline, the meteoric rise of South Korea (its major geopolitical rival), the collapse of the Soviet Union (its major aid provider), and famine and the near-complete disintegration of its economy in the 1990s. Any one of these events would probably be enough to wipe out the majority of the world’s regimes. But the Kim family regime is alive and kicking. How did it manage this? How is it still surviving? The regime largely persists because the Kim family is the best bunch of Machiavellians currently in operation. The major goal of the North Korean regime is, above all, survival. Its elites can hardly be expected to have read John Mearsheimer’s works, but the regime’s approach appears to mimic the major assumptions of the realist school.1 These people do not make compromises on issues that they, rightly or wrongly, believe concern not merely the survival of their regime but also the survival of their state as an entity and, above all, their own political survival. This essay first considers the Kim regime’s prioritization of survival and the implications of this orientation for North Korean foreign policy. It then assesses the prospects for the international sanctions regime to successfully pressure Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons program. [End Page 104] The Kim Regime’s Prioritization of Survival North Korea is part of a divided nation and faces the far more powerful South Korea. Once an agrarian backwater, lagging well behind the then industrial North until the 1960s, South Korea has become one of the powerhouses of the world economy. The per capita income ratio between North and South Korea (1 to 22 if you believe the Bank of Korea’s most recent estimates) now represents the world’s largest such gap between two countries that share a land border.2 This would be a great contrast anywhere, but in this case the two states are populated by people who speak the same language, claim a common national identity, and often present eventual unification as their supreme goal. The existence of such a neighbor means that any serious political crisis inside North Korea could easily lead to regime collapse, followed by South Korea’s absorption of the impoverished North. In a sense, we are talking about a much-exaggerated version of the German reunification scenario.3 If such an outcome transpires, the North Korean elites expect no quarter. Unlike the East German leaders, they indeed have engaged in massive violations of human rights for decades. The ratio of prisoners to the total population in North Korea is roughly equal to that of Stalin’s Russia in the early 1950s: the incarceration of political opponents’ entire immediate families remained mandatory until the early 2000s, and the regime conducted terrorist attacks and civilian abductions in earlier stages of North Korean history.4 Thus, the country’s elites have good reason to believe that if their state collapses as a result of a foreign attack or internal popular revolution, they not only will lose their power and (rather modest) affluence but also are likely to be held responsible for past abuses. To prevent such an outcome, North Korean decision-makers are not only remarkably careful but also remarkably ruthless in their political planning. They care about regime survival above all, treating all other considerations as secondary. This is applicable to economic growth, which in...

Sacrificing Local Interests: Water control policies of the Ming and Qing governments and the local economy of Huaibei, 1495–1949

AbstractFrom the end of the fifteenth century, the Ming state redirected the entire flow of the Yellow River into the course of the Huai River in order the facilitate the transport of tribute grain. This shifted the major problems of water control from the middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River to the Huaibei region. Huaibei was viewed as ‘a local interest’, as opposed to the ‘general interests’ represented by the central government, and was sacrificed for those general interests. These policies, which were continued under the Qing dynasty, created widespread and frequent flooding in the region, causing short-term famine and destruction and leading to long-term economic decline.

Recognising and Responding to Relative Decline: The Case of Post-War Britain

It became increasingly apparent in the 1950s that Britain was in long-term relative economic decline. However, during far-reaching reviews in 1959–1963 of future policy, the Foreign Office and the Treasury could not agree that timely strategic retrenchment would be an appropriate response. Ministers believed that Britain would remain a world Power; the British economy continued to be handicapped by higher levels of defence expenditure than those of other western European Powers; and it took an economic crisis to force a decision to withdraw from east of Suez.

A Slow Fuse: Italy and the EU Debt Crisis

Italy is firmly in the grip of an austerity programme mandated by the European Union institutions, and executed by an unelected technocrat. This state of affairs is at once the result of the acute and unexpected crisis of the financial and economic integration of the eurozone, and an expression of the failures of the Italian political class. Although the euro crisis has been mishandled by European elites, Italy's long-term economic decline, and the inability of Italian party politicians to generate a sustainable coalition to address Italy's economic problems, hinders an exit from the crisis.

The Shrinking Mining City: Urban Dynamics and Contested Territory

Shrinking mining cities — once prosperous settlements servicing a mining site or a system of mining sites — are characterized by long-term population and/or economic decline. Many of these towns experience periods of growth and shrinkage, mirroring the ebbs and flows of international mineral markets which determine the fortunes of the dominant mining corporation upon which each of these towns heavily depends. This dependence on one main industry produces a parallel development in the fluctuations of both workforce and population. Thus, the strategies of the main company in these towns can, to a great extent, determine future developments and have a great impact on urban management plans. Climate conditions, knowledge, education and health services, as well as transportation links, are important factors that have impacted on lifestyles in mining cities, but it is the parallel development with the private sector operators (often a single corporation) that constitutes the distinctive feature of these cities and that ultimately defines their shrinkage. This article discusses shrinking mining cities in capitalist economies, the factors underpinning their development, and some of the planning and community challenges faced by these cities in Australia, Canada, Japan and Mexico.

Conservative Government, British Decline and Japanese Success, 1979–1990

It is well established that the policies adopted by Conservative governments led by Margaret Thatcher were strongly influenced by ideas of long-term national decline, with the work of Martin Wiener and Corelli Barnet often used to provide an historical rationale for change. What has not been much explored, however, is the way that Conservative policy was also often based on a complementary rationale based on the experience of contemporary Japan. There, it was argued, pro-business policies of the sort which had allegedly perished during Britain's long-term economic decline had resulted in outstanding economic success and provided the blueprint for restoring Britain's own economy to its former strength.

Conference report: Why Can't the Future Be More Like the Past? The 23rd AESOP Congress, Liverpool, 2009

The 2009 AESOP Congress held in Liverpool from 15 to 18 July celebrated two significant British planning centenaries. First was the University of Liverpool's Department of Civic Design, established in 1909 as the UK's first planning school. Second was the enactment of Britain's Housing, Town Planning, etc., Act 1909 (Booth and Huxley, 2009), variously described by planning historians as: 'no more than a halting advance, not a conclusive victory' (Ashworth, 1954, 190); 'a disappointment' (Cherry, 1974, 64); and 'modest and realistic' (Sutcliffe, 1988, 301). Hence, the congress theme, 'Why can't the future be more like the past?', took on a special meaning for delegates. The conference theme As highlighted by the organiser, the congress theme had been chosen to encourage participants to 'reflect on the history of planning, planning education and planning research ... to understand what lessons we can learn from the past and take forward in meeting the enormous challenges of the future' (Shaw, 2009). This theme was particularly relevant given the fall and rise again of Liverpool in the last century: its rather prolonged fall from glory as a global mercantile city in the latter part of the twentieth century and its designation as a European Capital of Culture in 2008 serve as a sober reminder for city builders and urban planners of the complicated and difficult task of sustaining the growth and development of cities in an increasingly inter-connected and competitive global environment. There is a Chinese saying: 'it takes ten years to grow a tree and a hundred years to nurture a man'. It probably takes a much longer time to build a city of culture, with a decent built environment operating according to the ideal of social justice and sustainable development. Plenary sessions Altogether more than 500 participants from over 30 countries met in Liverpool to discuss the congress theme in 18 tracks with 121 sessions and 393 papers. The congress was marked by an opening plenary session and a closing ceremony. The opening plenary session reviewed the past, present and future of the City Region of Liverpool. Nigel Lee, Head of Planning, Liverpool City Council, reflected on past regeneration efforts in Liverpool and offered lessons for the future. The city of Liverpool was established in 1207 and its mercantile quarter became a UNESCO-inscribed World Heritage Site in 2004. Badly bombed in 1940-41, the city started its long-term economic decline, which probably reached rock bottom in 1986, by which time its population had fallen from 850,000 to 400,000. However, the city has experienced a renaissance in the past decade, being at the core of an EU Objective 1 development region, receiving unprecedented private investment, rising housing supply, decreasing unemployment, increasing numbers of development applications, etc, which culminated in its award as a European Cultural Capital 2008. Liverpool has done a very good job in using its heritage to regenerate the city, to create places and to blend the old with its new developments. Through major efforts by both the public and private sectors, the city has regenerated its waterfront, with iconic new buildings sitting side by side with the magnificent Royal Liver insurance building (1911) at the Pier Head. In October 2008, the largest new retail space in Western Europe - 'Liverpool One' - opened in the city centre (see Littlefield, 2009). According to Nigel Lee, the project was a partnership between the City Council and the private sector, in which Grosvenor Estates had developed and organised finance for 1.5 m. sq. ft of retail space together with cinemas, hotels, apartments, car parking and open space. Unlike typical malls elsewhere, the space was designed by 26 architects and consists of 32 buildings, all knitted together in a street setting, blending new and old, as if it is a result of natural organic growth over recent years. Liverpool One was, he thought, the result of very good policy and master planning and delivery, with the key being attention to the design of the public realm and the production of a distinct sense of place. …