Locus Of Explanation Research Articles

Society, Her or Me? An Explanatory Model of Intimate Femicide Among Male Perpetrators in Buenos Aires, Argentina

Intimate femicide perpetrators are rarely studied despite their important role as drivers of violence. This paper analyzes the explanatory narratives of men who intentionally killed their female intimate partners in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Twenty-four interviews were conducted with 12 participants. Data were analyzed using Atlas.Ti and an inductive thematic coding strategy. Two dimensions—frequency of physical violence in the relationship and locus of explanation—were used to identify four narrative archetypes: victim, redemption, extraordinary, and outburst. Greater attention should be paid to perpetrator life trajectories and narratives including the gender and violence discourses that shape explanations for perpetration.

Commentary: The embodied brain: towards a radical embodied cognitive neuroscience.

Recently, a new paradigm has emerged in mind and brain sciences. Radical embodied neuroscience (REN) aims to respond to the problems of mapping particular cognitive functions to narrowly defined brain regions. Accordingly, the proponents of this approach call for research to move beyond heuristics of localization and decomposition (Bechtel and Richardson, 1993). In this commentary, we focus solely on the functional connectivist blend of REN. Supporters of this position (see e.g., Kiverstein and Miller, 2015 for an interesting analysis of recent works on emotions and cognition) build their argument on the supposed failure of the project to divide the brain into functionally distinct areas responsible for particular cognitive processes. Drawing upon the work on functional connectivism (Anderson, 2010, 2014), they suggest a paradigm shift in brain research from neuroscience focusing on how the brain implements narrowly defined cognitive functions, to one in which the locus of explanation is determined by the dynamic interactions between the brain and the non-neural body embedded in the organism's ecological niche. We aim to point to two core challenges facing the line of argumentation adopted by the functional connectivist supporters of REN. Firstly, the “how” challenge concerns the lack of guidelines regarding how embodied cognitive neuroscience should proceed and build its explanations without reference to localizable neural underpinnings. This challenge is obviously directed at the more general proposal of a shift toward an embodied understanding of neuroscience. Secondly, the “why” challenge is concerned with the motivation for abandoning (or considering whether to abandon) localization and decomposition, given that current neuroscientific methods of analysis (e.g., network analysis) have meaningfully repurposed these heuristics by drawing on the insights of functional connectivity (Klein, 2012). Finally, we propose that both of these challenges are dissolved by the application of a mechanistic explanation of these phenomena, which not only provides a naturalistically plausible framework (e.g., Milkowski, 2013; Matyja, 2015) for embodied cognitive neuroscience, but does justice to the work of Anderson (2014) and the opponents of the strong modularity thesis (e.g., Mundale, 2002; Price and Friston, 2005).

The Answer is in the Question: The Effect of Verb Causality on Locus of Explanation

Two studies investigated how verb causality in question formulation affects the locus of causal origin for answers. It was hypothesized that questions formulated with action verbs (join, help, cheat) cue the logical subject of a question sentence as the causal origin for answers. The reverse tendency was expected for answers to questions formulated with state verbs (like, hate, abhor), where the logical object of the question was expected to be the causal origin. The experiments provide support for the hypothesis and also show that choice of verb type in question formulation affects respondents' answers in a way that modfies the expected differences between actors' and observers' viewpoints. The influence of the causality implicit in interpersonal verbs on methodological issues in applied and theoretical settings is discussed.

Attributions in the Advice Columns

Two hundred explanatory statements were obtained from a sample of 61 letters and replies published in newspaper advice columns. These items were categorized according to Referent Subject (selflactor, otherlobserver, both), Referent Mode (descriptive, prescriptive), Locus of Explanation (internal, external, both), and Cause versus Reason. Reasons outnumbered causes 135 to 65. For descriptive attributions (n = 161), which describe a behavior and then give an explanation, the actor-observer divergence, as modified by theorists interested in the cause/reason distinction, emerged as predicted: Explanations from actors were most often situational (external) reasons; observers' attributions favored internal causes. Prescriptive attributions (n= 39), which state what a person should do or should have done and then explain why, were always reasons and were generally given by observers who cited the advisee's circumstances as justifying the prescription. Findings for descriptive attributions raise questions about the adequacy of a strictly causal attribution theory and the range of applicability of the internal external locus dimension.

The rise and fall of FBI domestic intelligence operations

In recent years there has been a growing body of literature which has carefully documented the abuses of the US intelligence agencies [1]. For the most part, these works have been concerned with disclosure, and occasionally reform, but not generally theoretical knowledge. At the same time, there has emerged in the study of crime an "organizational perspective" which attempts to account for the crimes of large organizations by applying organizational theory [2]. In large part, this organizational perspective has been preoccupied with definitional and conceptual problems and has not successfully generated a comprehensive theory of organizational crime. Sherman alludes to this in his recent article: "Very little of the existing work on organizational deviance has attempted to explain why some organizations and not others engage in deviant conduct, or why some commit more deviant acts than others" [3]. The current state of affairs appears to be characterized by a plethora of case studies which are insulated from organizational theory, at least in any systematic way. There is a further problem with the organizational perspective as it has emerged in the literature. The organization is not consistently understood as part of a larger environmental context, particularly the political economy. Barnett's work on corporate crime and corporate capitalism is an important exception to this [4]. In this article I shall attempt to correct some of these problems with the organizational perspective by examining the relationship between organizational behavior, organizational structure, and aspects of the political economic environment of the organization. The specific organizational behavior of concern here is the political surveillance (i.e. domestic or political intelligence) of US residents by the federal government, most particularly by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. While the legality of domestic intelligence has varied over time, it has often led to illegal governmental operations. By examining this one type of organizational behavior, I shall attempt in a preliminary way to show how the primary locus of explanation for organiza-

The Nature and Scope of Integration: A Proposal

A model for the total integration of psychology and theology based on seven common areas is outlined. The common areas are: Theology Proper-Science of Psychology, Anthropology-Personality, Hamartiology-Pathology, Christology-Counselor, Soteriology-Growth, Ecclesiology-Social Psychology, Eschatology-Hope, and Expectation and Purpose. The difference between psychology and theology in terms of level of explanation, locus of explanation and epistomology is discussed. The methodology used in constructing the model is also described.