Local Telecommunications Network Research Articles

Intervention fidelity and factors affecting the process of implementing a mobile phone text messaging intervention among adolescents living with HIV: a convergent mixed-methods study in southern Ethiopia

ObjectiveTo assess the intervention fidelity and explore contextual factors affecting the process of implementing a mobile phone text messaging intervention in improving adherence to and retention in care among adolescents...

Assessing the Possibility of Implementing Distributed Diagnostic Systems for Hydrogen Fuel Cells Using Local and Global Telecommunication Networks

The development of effective methods and means for diagnosing hydrogen fuel cells during their operation is an urgent task, since their implementation will improve the energy characteristics and stability of operation by detecting incorrect operating modes and malfunctions at the early stages of development. This problem can be solved by using various approaches based on the analysis of impedance, relaxation or fluctuation-noise characteristics. All of these methods require the implementation of rather complex computational procedures and the accumulation of fairly large amount of statistical data, which makes it difficult to implement diagnostic devices on inexpensive embedded microprocessor tools. To overcome this drawback, this work proposes the use of distributed diagnostic systems with high-performance server devices connected to local modules via global or local telecommunication networks. Such an implementation will significantly simplify the requirements for local diagnostic modules and reduce their cost, but this raises the question of the efficiency of making diagnostic decisions by such systems.The work carried out, is a study of delays in making diagnostic and control decisions when using remote server devices for signal processing. It has been shown that the use of such systems makes it possible to achieve delays of less than one second even when using intercontinental communication lines. It should be noted that in applications critical to time delays, the distance between the client and server systems should be reduced. The advantages of the proposed implementation of a diagnostic system for electrochemical energy sources are the possibility of simplifying local measurement systems installed on individual sources, the possibility of accelerating signal processing through the use of more productive computing tools and the accumulation of statistical data.

Delivering an mHealth Adherence Support Intervention for Patients With HIV: Mixed Methods Process Evaluation of the Philippines Connect for Life Study.

BackgroundThe Philippines HIV epidemic is one of the fastest growing epidemics globally, and infections among men who have sex with men are increasing at an alarming rate. Connect for Life Philippines is a mobile health (mHealth) intervention that supports antiretroviral therapy (ART) adherence in this key population through individualized voice calls and SMS text messages.ObjectiveThe objective of this process evaluation is to assess the intervention reach, dose delivered and received, fidelity, and acceptability and to describe contextual factors affecting the implementation of an mHealth adherence support intervention for patients on ART in a clinic in Metro Manila, Philippines.MethodsA mixed methods process evaluation approach was used in an observational cohort study. Quantitative data sources for the process evaluation were call and SMS text message logs obtained from the mHealth platform and questionnaires collected at 12-, 24-, and 48-week study visits. Qualitative data were collected from process reports and through a series of focus group discussions conducted with a subset of participants during the intervention development phase, after an initial 8-week pilot phase, and at the end of the study.ResultsThe 462 study participants received 31,095 interactive voice calls and 8234 SMS text messages during the study. Owing to technical issues, intervention fidelity was low, with only 22.1% (102/462) of the participants receiving reminders via voice calls and others (360/462, 77.9%) receiving only SMS text messages during the intervention. After 48 weeks in the study, 63.5% (293/462) of the participants reported that they would be quite likely or very likely to recommend the program to a friend, and 53.8% (249/462) of the participants reported that they benefited quite a bit or very much from the intervention. Participants who were on ART for <6 months at the beginning of the study and those who received the daily or weekly pill reminders were more likely to report that they benefited from the intervention (P=.02 and P=.01, respectively).ConclusionsThe Connect for Life intervention had high participant satisfaction and acceptability, especially among those who received high dose of the intervention. However, poor reliability of local telecommunication networks had a large impact on the intervention’s usability, fidelity, and dose received.

Sustainable Synergy of Government and Community Internet Development Effort Based Community on Batik Industrial 4.0

The research is aimed at Policies in Motivation for Sustainable Synergy between Government and Society for Internet Development Based on Community-Based SME Batik Industry 4.0 in Sragen Regency. The Government and Community Synergy Policy regarding telecommunications based on Law Number 36 of 1999 concerning Telecommunications, focuses on villages that are categorized as remote areas, underdeveloped areas, pioneering regions, hinterlands, suburbs, or economically disadvantaged areas. Article 16 paragraph 1 of Law Number 36 Year 1999 states that USO is an obligation for local telecommunications network providers. Village Internet to provide telematics access in rural areas and is a continuation of the village internet. For the government, the availability of one access in one village to meet communal needs at affordable prices is considered adequate. The digital transformation of business processes is seen as an asset based on modernization technology that affects the organizational structure, strategy and business processes of the concept of smart city development in Indonesia must begin with the development of adequate infrastructure. This is because the existence of this infrastructure will become a community need for Sustainable Entrepreneurship efforts. Internet development in rural areas, despite various obstacles and problems that villages do not have internet access, at least there is an effort to provide access to Information and Communication Technology to remote areas to minimize information gaps in all fields and connect the community, government, businessmen, and various parties that can be useful for village development.

Heuristics for multi-period capacity expansion in local telecommunications networks

In this paper, different heuristics are devised to solve a multi-period capacity expansion problem for a local access telecommunications network with a tree topology. This expansion is done by installing concentrators at the nodes and cables on the links of the network. The goal is to find a least cost capacity expansion strategy over a number of periods to satisfy the demand. A local search heuristic is first proposed to improve previously reported results on problem instances based on different cost and demand structures. This heuristic is then integrated into a genetic algorithm to obtain further improvements.

Protecting local access telecommunications networks: Toward a minimum-cost solution

The problem of designing fibre-optic networks for local-access telecommunications generates (at least) three non-trivial subproblems. In the first of these subproblems one must determine how many fibre-optic cables (fibres) are required at either end of a street. In the next subproblem a minimum-cost network must be designed to support the fibres. The network must also provide distinct paths from either end of the street to the central exchange(s). Finally, the fibre-optic cables must be placed in protective covers. These covers are available in a number of different sizes, allowing some flexibility when covering each section of the network. In this paper we describe a dynamic programming (DP) formulation for finding a minimum-cost (protective) covering for the network (the third of the subproblems). This problem is a generalised set covering problem with side constraints and is further complicated by the introduction of fixed and variable welding costs. The DP formulation selects covers along each arc (in the network), but cannot exactly model the fixed costs and so does not guarantee optimality. We also describe an integer programming (IP) formulation for assessing the quality of the DP solutions. The cost of the networks constructed by the IP model is less than those designed using the DP model, but the saving is not significant for the problems examined (less than 0.1%). This indicates that the DP model will generally give very good solutions. Furthermore, as the problem dimensions grow, DP gives significantly better solution times than IP.

Hit and Miss: Leverage, Sacrifice, and Refusal to Deal in the Supreme Court Decision in Trinko

Under the rules of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, incumbent local exchange carriers, including Verizon, were obligated to lease parts of their local telecommunications network to any firm at cost plus a profit prices which could combine them at will, add retailing services and sell local telecommunication service as a rival to the incumbent. AT&T, an entrant in local telecommunications, leased parts of Verizon's network. Trinko, a local telecommunications services customer of AT&T, sued Verizon alleging various anti-competitive actions of Verizon against AT&T, including that Verizon raised the costs of AT&T, its downstream retail rival. The Supreme Court held that Trinko's complaint failed to state a claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and dismissed the complaint. I argue that Verizon had two monopolies in local telecommunications: a monopoly of the local telecommunications network, as well as a monopoly in retail services. The 1996 Act allowed for competition in retail services and also imposed cost-based pricing on leases of Verizon's network. Verizon, unable to increase the lease price on its network, reverted to raising-rivals-costs strategies against its retail competitors. Thus, Verizon used its monopoly of the network infrastructure to disadvantage entrants in retail. In doing so, Verizon lost short term profits that it would have earned from leasing its network to entrants, since the 1996 Act had set the lease price at cost plus reasonable profit. Thus, Verizon is liable if the principle is applied. According to the sacrifice principle, a defendant is liable if its conduct involves a sacrifice of short-term profits or goodwill that makes sense only insofar as it helps the defendant maintain or obtain monopoly power.

Vertical Leverage and the Sacrifice Principle: Why the Supreme Court Got Trinko Wrong

Trinko, a local telecommunications services customer of AT&T, sued Verizon for anti-competitively raising the costs of AT&T, its rival in the market for local telecommunications services who, pursuant to the rules of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was leasing parts of the local telecommunications network (unbundled network elements, UNEs) from Verizon at cost plus reasonable profit prices. The Supreme Court held that Trinko's complaint failed to state a claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and dismissed the complaint. I argue that the Court drew incorrect inferences from its Aspen Skiing decision. The Court also missed a key vertical leveraging issue in Trinko. Verizon leveraged its monopoly of local telecommunications network infrastructure by raising the costs of rivals in retailing services who leased unbundled network elements from it as well as decreasing the quality of their services so that such rivals were disadvantaged. Verizon used such actions that raised the costs and/or decreased the quality of rivals in retailing services aiming to preserve its traditional monopoly in the local telecommunications services market which was challenged by the opening of competition mandated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. In doing so, Verizon caused a lower number of leases of unbundled network elements from itself to retailing rivals, and thus incurred a revenue sacrifice. Therefore the actions of Verizon in raising the costs of retailing telecommunications services rivals are an indication of liability according to the proposed in the Government's brief in Trinko, according to which a defendant is liable if its conduct involves a sacrifice of short-term profits or goodwill that makes sense only insofar as it helps the defendant maintain or obtain monopoly power, even though the sacrifice principle defines a stringent condition for a finding of liability.

Innovation, Investment and Unbundling

In this Article, we examine the neglected tradeoff between innovation and mandatory unbundling of telecommunications networks. Our analysis is prompted by the Supreme Court's 1999 decision in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board and by the Federal Communications Commission's Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking released later the same year, which address which network elements in the local telecommunications network shall be subject to compulsory sharing among competitors at regulated cost-based rates. Economic analysis indicates that mandatory unbundling at prices computed on the basis of the total element long-run incremental cost of the various network elements belonging to an incumbent local exchange carrier will adversely affect the ILEC's incentives not only to upgrade or maintain existing facilities, but also to invest in new facilities. Mandatory unbundling at TELRIC prices will also encourage competitive local exchange carriers to deviate from the socially optimal level of investment and entry. Finally, the confluence of mandatory unbundling and other FCC policies aggravates the distortion of investment decisions.

Network Competition and Access Charge Rules

This paper presents a model of two competing local telecommunications networks which are mandated to interconnect. After negotiating the access charges, the companies engage in price competition. Given the prices, each consumer selects a network and determines the consumption of phone calls. Using a discrete/continuous consumer choice model, it is shown that a pure strategy equilibrium exists quite generally and satisfies desirable properties. This equilibrium can be implemented by a simple rule that sets the access charges at a common discount from the retail prices. It requires no information and the discount factor is chosen by the companies through negotiations. Finally, if the networks are highly substitute, the retail prices obtained by imposing this rule will approximate the efficient prices.

A General Framework for Competitive Analysis in Wireless Telecommunications

A General Framework for Competitive Analysis in Wireless Telecommunications

The cost of the local telecommunication network: a comparison of minimum spanning trees and the HAI model

Under the Telecommunications Act, estimates of local distribution costs may be used to help quantify the subsidy for specified local services whose costs exceed their tariffed rates and as a guide for the pricing of unbundled network elements. The most widely circulated model for estimating these costs, the HAI model, uses a particular procedure to calculate the distribution network and cable length that is required to serve a cluster of customers. We compare the HAI procedure with the minimum spanning tree (MST), which gives the shortest distance for connecting a set of locations. For each cluster in Minnesota we calculated the distribution length with the HAI procedure and the length of the MST. We find that the HAI length is shorter than the MST length in 77% of the main clusters. In low-density areas, the HAI length is less than the MST length for 81% of the main clusters. The too-short cable lengths mean that the HAI model underestimates network costs; this underestimation extends beyond the cost of the cables themselves since many cost components are tied to cable length, such as support structures, maintenance, and associated power and back-up equipment. The use of underestimated costs in determining subsidies and network prices would discourage the provision of services in subsidized areas and encourage inefficient entry that utilizes unbundled network elements.

Real Options and the Costs of the Local Telecommunications Network

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 invites entry in the local telecommunications networks whereby entrants will lease parts of the network (unbundled network elements) from incumbents at cost plus reasonable profit. A crucial question in the implementation of the Act is the appropriate measure of cost. This paper examines the economic principles on which the cost calculation should be based. I conclude that the appropriate measure of cost (maximizing allocative, productive, and dynamic efficiency) is forward-looking economic cost and not the historical, accounting, or embedded cost of the incumbent's network. In calculating costs, demand and supply uncertainty, as well as the asymmetric position of incumbents and entrants should be taken into account. Close examination of the issue of uncertainty in the local telecommunications network reveals that (i) for most unbundled network elements, there is little demand uncertainty; and (ii) that those elements that face significant uncertainty, do not have sunk value. Thus, the incumbent does not face higher expected cost by investing. Moreover, the rewards of the incumbent can be higher because buyers prefer to buy services from the owner of the network. Finally, strategic considerations in oligopolistic interaction are likely to dominate any uncertainty considerations and will increase the incentive of incumbents to invest.

Access costs and entry in the local telecommunications network: a case for de-averaged rates

The telecommunications bill passed by Congress in February 1996 means that the present method of covering the cost of customer access to the local telecommunications network through non-cost based access charges cannot be sustained over the long run. However, there is a belief that cost-based rates at the local level would be prohibitively high and would threaten universal service objectives. Major tasks facing the Federal Communications Commission and state regulators will be determining what the terms and charges for interconnection should be, and who will bear the costs associated with universal service. This work estimates a generalized translog cost function of access costs at the local level in order to address these issues. The results of this study are that there are economies of scale in the provision of access to the local network and that these costs differ by geographical location. One of the important findings of this study is that, contrary to popular belief, cost-based rates at the local level would not be prohibitively high and would not threaten universal service objectives. However, given the existence of economies of scale, pro-competitive regulatory controls will be required that will restrain dominant carriers from abusing their market power and network owners from squeezing out new entrants.

The Tragedy of the Telecommons: Government Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements under the Telecommunications Act of 1996

Until 1996, local telephone markets had been treated as natural monopolies and thus subject to regulation. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the Act) seeks to introduce competition into these markets. One method the Act adopts to stimulate such competition is to mandate that incumbent local exchange carriers (LECs) provide access to their unbundled network, such as loops and switches. In August of 1996, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued its First Report and Order, which established a pricing rule for UNEs. The FCC's pricing rule sets the price for a UNE at its total element long-run incremental cost (TELRIC) plus a reasonable share of the incumbent LEC's forward-looking common costs. We propose a pricing methodology to implement that rule based on a combination of what we call the market-determined efficient component-pricing rule (M-ECPR) and competitively neutral end-user charges. We assert that using the M-ECPR to price UNE access is more faithful to the language and intent of the Act than is the approach adopted by the FCC. We also maintain that the FCC misunderstood the efficient component-pricing rule when the agency rejected it as a basis of pricing UNEs. After outlining our proposal for pricing UNEs, we argue that the FCC's pricing rule is problematic because it prevents the incumbent LEC from recovering its total costs by denying any recovery of the LEC's historical costs and ensuring that it will not fully recover its forward-looking costs. We then respond to criticisms of the M-ECPR by various economists and refute the assertions that the principal authors of the original efficient component-pricing rule rejected the M-ECPR in favor of TELRIC pricing for UNEs. We conclude by warning that the FCC's pricing rule would discourage investment in local telecommunications networks and may eventually drive LECs into bankruptcy.

Competition in the local loop: Towards an anticyclical competition policy in telecommunications

This paper investigates which governmental policies are most suitable for creating an innovative telecommunications market at the local level, focusing on the relation between the local telecommunications network and local CATV networks. Regulatory policies must put more emphasis on competition instead of stimulating specific technological innovations. There is a need for an anticyclical competition policy which will enhance competition if the telecommunications market is insufficiently innovative and restrict competition if the market becomes extremely detrimental to innovation. The regulatory model to be applied to the local loop should not be the common carrier model, but rather the press model of regulation, providing free entry for all network operators and information suppliers to the telecommunications market.

Signaling System No.7 local exchange deployment

The author examines the deployment of Signaling System No.7 (SS7) from the viewpoint of the local exchange carrier. The three phases of local exchange deployment-service planning and design, local exchange network design, and interconnection design-are discussed in sequence. SS7 is a fundamental change to the infrastructure of the local exchange telecommunications network. The author describes how the backbone network, centered on the signaling transfer points (STPs), is installed first, followed by the local exchange network, and then interconnection to interchange and other networks. >

Third Vacation School on the Evolving Local Telecommunications Network, to be held at Aston University, Birmingham, UK, 7th-12th September 1986

Third Vacation School on the Evolving Local Telecommunications Network, to be held at Aston University, Birmingham, UK, 7th-12th September 1986

Comparison of mean distance in superposed networks

In this paper, we consider the problem of the superposition of two networks in the structure of local telecommunication networks: the physical one, determined by the ways of the means of communication, and the interconnection one. We compare the mean-distance of the graphs associated to these two networks.

BIGFON: Preparation for the Use of Optical Fiber Technology in the Local Network of the Deutsche Bundespost

The Deutsche Bundespost will be starting its tests with various prototypes of BIGFON, a broad-band integrated optical fiber local telecommunications network, at the end of 1983. The different systems proposed will create the basis for deciding on a general model, the realization of which is envisaged for 1985 or 1986. Current perspectives have made the development of inexpensive, highly integrated electronic systems particularly important.