Life Cycle Model Of Labor Supply Research Articles

Universal Full-Day Kindergarten and Maternal Labor Supply: A Life-Cycle Analysis.

We estimate the effect of state-level policies enacting universal free full-day kindergarten on mothers' labor supply using a life-cycle analysis. Similar to previous research on childcare and labor supply, we find that free full-day kindergarten increases labor force participation rates for mothers whose youngest child is kindergarten-aged by 4.3 to 7.1 percentage points. We find that for mothers whose youngest child is an infant, labor force participation increases by 7.2 to 9.8 percentage points, and for women whose youngest child is 3 to 4 years old labor force participation increases by 5.9 to 7.9 percentage points. The fact that the policies impact the labor supply for mothers of younger-than-kindergarten-age children by even more than for mothers of kindergarten-aged children is important for understanding the full effect of subsidized childcare. This is consistent with a life-cycle model of labor supply where wages and prices in future periods impact mothers' labor force attachment.

Delay the Pension Age or Adjust the Pension Benefit? Implications for Labor Supply and Individual Welfare in China

We develop and calibrate a life-cycle model of labor supply and consumption to quantify the implications of alternative pension reforms on labor supply, individual welfare, and government budget for Chinas basic old-age insurance program. We distinguish low-skilled and high-skilled individuals, who differ in their preferences, health and labor income dynamics, and medical expense processes. We use the calibrated model to evaluate three potential pension reforms: (i) increasing the pension eligibility age from 60 to 65, but keeping the current pension benefit formula unchanged; (ii) keeping the pension eligibility age at 60, but proportionally lowering pension benefits so that the pension program’s budget is the same as under Reform (i); and (iii) increasing the pension eligibility age to 65 and simultaneously increasing the pension benefits so that individuals of both skill types attain the same individual welfare levels as in the status quo. We find that relative to the baseline, both Reforms (i) and (ii) can substantially improve the budgets of the pension system, but at the cost of substantial individual welfare loss for both skill types. In contrast, we find that Reform (iii) can modestly improve the budget of the pension system while ensuring that both skill types are as well off as in the status quo. We find that Reforms (i) and (ii) slightly increase, but Reform (iii) slightly decreases, the overall labor supply.

Bounded rationality and optimal retirement age

This paper explores a lifecycle model of labor supply and endogenous retirement behavior for households whose planning window is truncated and who will reoptimize as extra information on productivity is revealed over time. This short horizon model internalizes the restriction on temporal resource allocation, and the labor supply is closely dependent on the degree of productivity changes in view. With the model, the retirement timing—the moment at which the marginal value from the expected resources drops below a threshold—evolves according to the planning window. Using a discrete time overlapping generations framework with leisure substitutability, in which the constraint on time is explicitly added, I demonstrate that the calibrated model economy reasonably replicates the salient facts regarding lifecycle labor supply and retirement behaviors without a borrowing constraint commonly found in models of leisure-consumption substitutability. Furthermore, this result is robust to sensitivity check. With the extended environment of mortality risks and bequests, this paper explicitly quantifies the relationship among retirement age, planning horizon, equilibrium bequests and other lifecycle characteristics from the calibrated general equilibrium.

Minimum wages, retirement timing, and labor supply

We find that minimum wage increases lead to increased employment for low-wage, retirement-age individuals using survey data linked to several decades of individual-level IRS and SSA data. Own-wage elasticity estimates of the employment effect are larger than normal for the minimum wage literature but are consistent with recent evidence on labor supply effects of minimum wages and life-cycle models of labor supply. We also find evidence of delayed permanent employment exit and delayed retirement benefit claiming. The delay in benefit claiming appears to be driven by an interaction between minimum wages and the Social Security earnings test. These results suggest that retirement-age individuals are very responsive to changes in labor market opportunities and that minimum wages may complement Social Security incentives that encourage more work and delayed benefit claiming.

Are Marriage-Related Taxes and Social Security Benefits Holding Back Female Labour Supply?

Abstract In the US, both taxes and old-age social security benefits depend on one’s marital status and tend to reduce the labour supply of the secondary earner. To what extent are these provisions holding back the female labour supply? We estimate a rich dynamic life-cycle model of labour supply and savings for couples and singles using the Method of Simulated Moments for the 1945 and 1955 birth cohorts. Our model matches well the life-cycle profiles of labour market participation, hours, and savings for married and single people, and generates plausible elasticities of labour supply. It implies that eliminating these marriage-related provisions would drastically increase the participation of married women over their entire life cycle, reduce the participation of married men after age 60, and increase savings. If the resulting government surplus were used to lower income taxation, there would be large welfare gains for the vast majority of the population. These results hold for both cohorts, including the later one, which has participation similar to that of more recent generations.

Delay the Pension Age or Adjust the Pension Benefit? Implications for Labor Supply and Individual Welfare in China

We develop and calibrate a life-cycle model of labor supply and consumption to quantify the implications of alternative pension reforms on labor supply, individual welfare, and government budget for China’s basic old-age insurance program. We focus on urban males and distinguish low-skilled and high-skilled individuals, who differ in their preferences, health and labor income dynamics, and medical expense processes. We use the calibrated model to evaluate three potential pension reforms: (i) increasing the pension eligibility age from 60 to 65, but keeping the current pension benefit rule unchanged; (ii) keeping the pension eligibility age at 60, but proportionally lowering pension benefits so that the pension program’s budget is the same as under Reform (i); and (iii) increasing the pension eligibility age to 65 and simultaneously increasing the pension benefits so that individuals of both skill types attain the same individual welfare levels as in the status quo. We find that relative to the baseline, both Reforms (i) and (ii) can substantially improve the budgets of the pension system, but at the cost of substantial individual welfare loss for both skill types. In contrast, we find that Reform (iii) can modestly improve the budget of the pension system while ensuring that both skill types are as well off as in the status quo. We find that Reforms (i) and (ii) slightly increases, but Reform (iii) slightly decreases, the overall labor supply. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Delay the Pension Age or Adjust the Pension Benefit? Implications for Labor Supply and Individual Welfare in China

We develop and calibrate a life-cycle model of labor supply and consumption to quantify the implications of alternative pension reforms on labor supply, individual welfare, and government budget for China’s basic old-age insurance program. We focus on urban males and distinguish low-skilled and high-skilled individuals, who differ in their preferences, health and labor income dynamics, and medical expense processes. We use the calibrated model to evaluate three potential pension reforms: (i) increasing the pension eligibility age from 60 to 65, but keeping the current pension benefit rule unchanged; (ii) keeping the pension eligibility age at 60, but proportionally lowering pension benefits so that the pension program’s budget is the same as under Reform (i); and (iii) increasing the pension eligibility age to 65 and simultaneously increasing the pension benefits so that individuals of both skill types attain the same individual welfare levels as in the status quo. We find that relative to the baseline, both Reforms (i) and (ii) can substantially improve the budgets of the pension system, but at the cost of substantial individual welfare loss for both skill types. In contrast, we find that Reform (iii) can modestly improve the budget of the pension system while ensuring that both skill types are as well off as in the status quo. We find that Reforms (i) and (ii) slightly increases, but Reform (iii) slightly decreases, the overall labor supply.

The effects of collecting income taxes on Social Security benefits

Since 1983, Social Security benefits have been subject to income taxation, a provision that can significantly increase the marginal income tax rate for older individuals. To assess the impact of this tax, we construct and calibrate a detailed life-cycle model of labor supply, saving, and Social Security claiming. We find that in a long-run stationary environment, replacing the taxation of Social Security benefits with a revenue-equivalent change in the payroll tax would increase labor supply, consumption, and welfare. From an ex-ante perspective an equally desirable reform would be to make the portion of benefits subject to income taxes completely independent of other income.

Health Shocks and the Evolution of Consumption and Income over the Life-Cycle

We study the contribution of health shocks to earnings inequality and uncertainty in labor market outcomes. We calibrate a life-cycle model of labor supply and savings that incorporates health and health shocks. Our model features endogenous wage formation via human capital accumulation, employer sponsored health insurance, and means-tested social insurance. We find a substantial part of the impact of health shocks on earnings arises via reduced human capital accumulation. Health shocks account for 15% of lifetime earnings inequality for U.S. males, with two-thirds of this due to behavioral responses. In particular, it is optimal for low-skill workers – who often lack employer sponsored insurance – to curtail labor supply to maintain eligibility for means-tested transfers that protect them from high health care costs. This causes low-skill workers to invest less in human capital. Provision of public health insurance can alleviate this problem and enhance labor supply and human capital accumulation.

Marriage, Labor Supply and the Dynamics of the Social Safety Net

The 1996 US welfare reform introduced limits on years of welfare receipt. We show that this reduced program participation, raised employment for single mothers, and reduced divorce. A limited commitment, lifecycle model of labor supply, marriage and divorce, estimated on pre-reform data, replicates these effects. A large part of the responses occur in anticipation of benefit exhaustion, impacting primarily women with low potential earnings. The reform reduces lifetime utility of women, even allowing for the government savings, but has negligible effects on men. The expectation of marriage attenuates the losses for women and an increased probability of single-motherhood raises them.

Self-Employment, Workplace Flexibility, and Maternal Labor Supply: A Life-Cycle Model

While American women's employment rates fall in the years after they have a child, their self-employment rates do not. These contrasting patterns may be explained by the fact that self-employed women often have more control over their work schedule, hours, and location than wage and salary employed women. This paper quantifies the value of self-employment as a flexible work alternative for married mothers with young children and estimates the impact of the additional flexibility on women's employment and fertility decisions. Using data from the NLSY79, I incorporate self-employment into a life-cycle model of labor supply and fertility. I find that mothers with preschool-aged children value the flexible amenities self-employment offers at $7,400 annually, which represents around 25% of their average wage and salary earnings. A partial equilibrium counterfactual exercise suggests that self-employment flexibility increases fertility and self-employment, but decreases women's median lifetime earnings by 1.2%. Overall, my findings offer evidence that mothers value workplace flexibility and employment decisions.

The Effects of Collecting Income Taxes on Social Security Benefits

Since 1983, Social Security benefits have been subject to income taxation, a provision that can significantly increase the marginal income tax rate for older individuals. To assess the impact of this tax, we construct and calibrate a detailed life-cycle model of labor supply, saving, and Social Security claiming. We find that in a long-run stationary environment, replacing the taxation of Social Security benefits with a revenue-equivalent increase in the payroll tax would significantly increase labor supply, consumption and welfare. From an ex-ante perspective an even more desirable reform would be to make the portion of benefits subject to income taxes completely independent of other income.

Reference dependent preferences and labor supply in historical perspective

To evaluate voluntary labor supply decisions under transitory monthly piece-rate schedules, we draw from a novel dataset on workers who originated from self-sufficient farms in New Hampshire, Vermont, and Massachusetts, and were recruited into textile mills in eastern Massachusetts in the early 19th century. Where life-cycle models of labor supply predict a positive relationship between labor supply and transitory changes in wages, we instead find negative wage-labor supply elasticities consistent with reference-dependent income targeting. Our findings contribute to the contemporary debate over the empirical validity of competing labor supply models. They also bring into question common modeling conventions in economic history that are used in the construction of historical narratives.

The Effects of Collecting Income Taxes on Social Security Benefits

Since 1983, Social Security benefits have been subject to income taxation, a provision that can significantly increase the marginal income tax rate for older individuals. To assess the impact of this tax, we construct and calibrate a detailed life-cycle model of labor supply, saving, and Social Security claiming. We find that in a long-run stationary environment, replacing the taxation of Social Security benefits with a revenue-equivalent increase in the payroll tax would significantly increase labor supply, consumption and welfare. From an ex-ante perspective an even more desirable reform would be to make the portion of benefits subject to income taxes completely independent of other income.

Uniform Asymptotic Risk of Averaging GMM Estimator Robust to Misspecification, Second Version

This paper studies the averaging generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator that combines a conservative GMM estimator based on valid moment conditions and an aggressive GMM estimator based on both valid and possibly misspecified moment conditions, where the weight is the sample analog of an infeasible optimal weight. It is an alternative to pre-test estimators that switch between the conservative and aggressive estimators based on model specification tests. This averaging estimator is robust in the sense that it uniformly dominates the conservative estimator by reducing the risk under any degree of misspecification, whereas the pre-test estimators reduce the risk in parts of the parameter space and increase it in other parts. To establish uniform dominance of one estimator over another, we establish asymptotic theories on uniform approximations of the finite-sample risk differences between two estimators. These asymptotic results are developed along drifting sequences of data generating processes (DGPs) that model various degrees of local misspecification as well as global misspecification. Extending seminal results on the James-Stein estimator, the uniform dominance is established in non-Gaussian semiparametric nonlinear models. The proposed averaging estimator is applied to estimate the human capital production function in a life-cycle labor supply model.

Optimal Social Assistance and Unemployment Insurance in a Life-Cycle Model of Family Labor Supply and Savings

We analyze empirically the optimal design of social insurance and assistance programs when families obtain insurance by making labor supply choices for both spouses. For this purpose, we specify a structural life-cycle model of the labor supply and savings decisions of singles and married couples. Partial insurance against wage and employment shocks is provided by social programs, savings and the labor supplies of all adult household members. The optimal policy mix focuses mainly on Social Assistance, which provides a permanent universal household income floor, with a minor role for temporary earnings-related Unemployment Insurance. Reflecting that married couples obtain intra-household insurance by making labor supply choices for both spouses, the optimal generosity of Social Assistance decreases in the proportion of married individuals in the population. The link between optimal program design and the family context is strongest in low-educated populations.

A life cycle model of health and retirement: The case of Swedish pension reform

Sweden is one of the few Western economies to have undertaken a large pension reform in recent years. This was done with great expectations, but little formal analysis. In this paper we develop a life cycle labor supply model to quantify the predicted labor supply implications of this reform. In our framework, individuals choose when to stop working and, given eligibility criteria, when/if to apply for disability and pension benefits. Agents are heterogeneous in skills and receive exogenous shocks to health throughout their life. We find that the new pension system creates large incentives for the continued employment of older workers. This is promising news for countries grappling with pension reform, and indicates that there are significant lessons to be learned from the Swedish case.

Labor Supply Elasticities: Can Micro Be Misleading for Macro?

In this paper we compare, in a fully consistent manner, micro and macro labor supply elasticities. The individual elasticity is obtained from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The aggregate, time-series, elasticity is estimated from the aggregation of individual units in the PSID for each year. We rely on exact aggregation of first-order conditions in a lifecycle labor supply model with home production. We find an individual elasticity of approximately 0.1, a low value that is in accordance with standard micro estimates. At the same time, we find an aggregate elasticity near 1. This result derives from a pure aggregation effect, with most of the difference due to the extensive margin. An implication of our result is that micro evidence is not always a reliable guide for calibrating aggregate macroeconomic parameters.

Early Retirement, Labor Supply, and Benefit Withholding: The Role of the Social Security Earnings Test

The labor supply and benefit claiming incentives provided by the early retirement rules of the Social Security Old Age benefits program are of growing importance as the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) increases to 67, the labor force participation of Older Americans rises, and a variety of reforms to the Social Security system are considered. Any reform needs to take into account the effects and rationale of the Social Security Earnings Test and the Actuarial Adjustment Factor. We describe these incentives, and analyze benefit withholding patterns using data from the Master Beneficiary Files of the Social Security Administration, and present descriptive and exploratory evidence on the determinants of benefit withholding using data from the Health and Retirement Survey. We then investigate the importance of the Earnings Test limits for work and claiming behavior using a dynamic life-cycle model of labor supply, benefit claiming, and withholding. We use the latter framework to compare the consequences of a number of changes to the Earnings Test provision for the labor supply behavior and earnings of older Americans.

The Effect of Taxation on Lifecycle Labor Supply: Results from a Quasi-Experiment

In predicting the magnitude of the labor supply response to taxation, the standard lifecycle labor supply model distinguishes between unanticipated and anticipated changes in the after-tax return to working. Exploiting age-eligibility rules for claiming a dependent on a tax return facilitates a comparison of the labor supply outcomes of households who are equivalent but for the tax schedule they face. I find that the quasi-random assignment to a tax schedule without an age-eligible dependent corresponds to a decrease in mothers' labor supply by about 40 hours per year and to no discernible effect for fathers. While having an age-ineligible dependent results in a 0.5 percentage point, or 0.3%, average decrease in a household's net-of-tax rate, further analysis of average tax rates suggests that the variation in marginal tax rates does not fully explain mothers' labor supply responses. This finding militates against interpreting this large response as an intertemporal elasticity and subsequently presents a puzzle for the lifecycle labor supply model.