Liberal Eugenics Research Articles

Подходы к нравственному биоулучшению в классической и либеральной евгенике

Background:The general trendtowards the moralization of society, associated both with attempts to overcome the state of social and political crises, and determined by the general tendency to accept the Other, determines the need to address issues of mor-al improvement of moral agents. At first glance, biological improvement seems more reliable, because in the future it is more stable and predictable. In this regard, it seems extremely important to turn to the tradition of eugenic discussions. Aim: To analyze approaches to improving amoral agent using biological methods in domestic and world science.Materials and methods: To achievethe goal of the work, materials from the Galton School of Eugenics, policy articles of the Russian Eugenics Society by N.K. were analyzed. Koltsov and the modern discourse of liberal eugenics.Results: On the one hand, the biological improvement of a moral agent seems to be more predictable (in the case of relevant re-search) and more sustainable. On the other hand, history shows us the risks of this approach. The failure of classical eugenics, which degenerated in Europe into Nazi practices, and political decisions close to them in the USA seems obvious. Modern «liberal eugenics», in attempts to solve these problems, runs into the risks of discrimination. Conclusion: For more than a century, moral bioenhancement scholars have failed to offer specific criteria for a moral agent. Based on the analysis of eugenic discourse, the article raises ethical questions, the answers to which must be given to the scientific community before conducting practical experiments

The Project of Liberal Eugenics and A Political-Theological Response

The Project of Liberal Eugenics and A Political-Theological Response

Liberal eugenics, coercion and social pressure

When discussing genetic prenatal enhancement, we often encounter objections related to “eugenics.” Those who want to defend prenatal enhancement either try to avoid using the term “eugenics” or talk about “liberal eugenics”, implying that what was wrong with the old eugenics was its coercive character, and claiming that while old eugenics went against reproductive freedom, the new liberal eugenics promotes freedom. In this paper we first explore the objection that genetic enhancement is a form of eugenics that limits parental freedom. We then show how the same objection appears in other bioethical debates. Finally, we answer the objection, showing that genetic enhancement does not limit reproductive freedom in any important sense.

Eugenic Continuities: Youth, Sex, Disability, and the Rise of Liberal Eugenics in the Late Twentieth Century

Abstract: This article places the landmark 1986 Supreme Court of Canada decision E. (Mrs.) v. Eve within its avowedly anti-eugenic context. Then it compares the trial record and appellate documents of Eve to the notorious 1927 American case Buck v. Bell . It outlines the legal reasoning of the Eve decision, its reception, and the different trajectories of law in the US, the UK, and Australia. These multiple points of historical comparison expose a series of unresolved eugenic continuities in the politics of youth, sex, and disability. The interpretation challenges more conventional definitions, periodization, and understandings of eugenics, drawing attention to the formation of "liberal" eugenics in the late twentieth century.

Revisiting the Liberal Case against Liberal Eugenics

In his book The Future of Human Nature, Habermas argues against the moral and legal permissibility of any future practices of genetic human enhancement as well as against current practices such as embryonic research or preimplantation genetic diagnosis. After analyzing the core of Habermas’s argument against positive eugenics, I argue that his attempt to derive a principle of abstention under uncertainty from the principle of counterfactual consent assumes that non-interference is the proper default norm in the absence of consent. Yet, this cannot be a plausible default norm for parental relationships. Moreover, since Habermas agrees that the no-harm principle justifies negative eugenics, once technical possibilities of genetic manipulation become available, non-interference becomes as much in need of normative justification as interference. I conclude that if our normative innocence regarding positive eugenics must be lost for the sake of negative eugenics, then it is an innocence well lost.

Exploring animal breeding through the lenses of authoritarian and liberal eugenics: why some breeding practices are wrong and what could be new ethical standards?

Animal breeding is a mainstay of our relationship with domesticated species. However, it is sometimes leading to serious health and welfare issues, such as canine brachycephaly or double-muscling phenotype in Belgian Blue cattle. How then can we re-think our breeding system in animals? In this paper, I discuss the ethics of domestic animal breeding and new ways to achieve it. In doing so, I focus primarily on the concept of eugenics and its two major accounts: authoritarian and liberal eugenics. Indeed, the debates surrounding eugenics in humans is a quite prolific framework to question how we can justify animal breeding and has the merits to clarify the conditions needed to consider some practices as morally wrong (e.g. in the case of authoritarian eugenics). I argue that pure-bred breeding is comparable in many ways with authoritarian eugenics primarily because it does not consider the benefits for the animals but external factors such as beauty, productivity or certain behaviors. But arguing so raises the question whether this renders all types of animal breeding unethical. I refute this conclusion and give some arguments to support an active use of more ethical kinds of breeding systems. Specifically, I explore the concept of liberal eugenics and its limitations to defend a breeding practice that is both liberal and responsible. Such new standards can warrant a focus on animal welfare and put forward the central role of breeders in this process.

The Future of Human Nature in a Post-human World: Habermas in Dialogue with Jonas' Philosophical Biology

In two lectures given at the beginning of the 2000s, Habermas focuses on the ethical problems linked to biotechnologies, notably to genetic engineering techniques. In an attempt to warn of the dangers inherent in liberal eugenics, Habermas proposes a definition of human nature with a metaphysical basis. In this paper, I argue that Habermas' analysis of the potential effect of biotechnology on human beings represents the theoretical outcome of a close dialogue with Hans Jonas' biological philosophy. The deconstruction of Habermas and Jonas' arguments not only provides the opportunity to reflect on the internal contradictions of an essentialist conception of human beings—still widespread today and directly or indirectly present in various critiques of post- and trans-humanist dystopias—but also allows for an exploration of some tendencies of 20th century German thought, which seeks to distance itself from the philosophical consequences of Darwinian evolutionism.

Eugenesia liberal y la crítica de Jürgen Habermas

This paper aims to analyze Jürgen Habermas’s critique of liberal eugenics and why it should be stopped. For this purpose, the concept of liberal eugenics, its features and goals, postmetaphysics in Habermas’s philosophy, will be exposed, as well as the notions of Körper and Leib, which are three key elements that the philosopher presents to articulate his critique. Next, the importance of the naturalness of birth and reciprocal relations between individuals, and how they can be affected by genetic modifications, will be explored to finally expose the measurements that Habermas proposes against the effects and consequences of genetic engineering.

A Nietzschean critique of liberal eugenics

Ethical debates about liberal eugenics frequently focus on the supposed unnaturalness of its means and possible harm to autonomy. I present a Nietzsche-inspired critique focusing on intention rather than means...

The Human Rights System Facing Challenges of Biotechnological Improvement of the Human Nature

The opening possibilities of turning the mankind’s biological evolution into controlled technological process are inevitable result of development of the anthropocentric technogenic civilization in the direction of transforming the nature and subordinating it to a man. If the biological risks of this scenario can be reduced to acceptable level in the foreseeable future according to expert opinion, then the social risks, associated with the possibility of splitting the human community into “improved” elite and masses of “commoner”will only increase. At the same time, it is becoming more and more obvious that law, which is the main element of the cultural matrix of technogenic civilization, carries its main risks: law as a normative form of individual freedom is not able to withstand properly the threats to all mankind, which are caused by the social practices of liberal eugenics. The attempt of the Oviedo Convention to solve this problem by establishing prohibition of genetic editing of the human embryo line created preconditions for discrimination against a certain group of people based on their genetic status, as well as for disproportionate restrictions on the scientific freedom in this area of research. This clearly demonstrated the unlawful nature of such a prohibition. The desire to disguise that this type of regulation goes beyond the law framework by including it in the system of the rights of future generations without proper legalizing this concept doesn’t withstand criticism. Recently the biomedical community has been moving from the idea of unequivocal prohibition of inherited editing of the human genome towards the establishing legal restrictions, that take into account the positions of all stakeholders, and monitoring their compliance. Particular importance is attached to the organization of public discussions and the preparing society to take a responsible and conscious solution to the problem. The success of this risky but perhaps the only possible strategy will mainly depend on the social context in which it can be implemented.

The future of humanity

Abstract With the recent advancements in scientific comprehension of genetics and the decipherment of complex techniques for editing human genomes, liberal eugenics—eugenic ideal premised on the liberal values of autonomy and pluralism that leaves reproductive choices to parents rather than anachronistic statist authoritarian interventions—has inevitably become a polarising conundrum in contemporary liberal societies as to its utility and destructiveness. Focusing on one species of liberal eugenics—namely, genome editing interventions—I contend that liberal eugenics could be harmful—harm herein construed as that which undermines the salient liberal values of equality, autonomy, and pluralism—since it is itself antithetical to the bases of the liberal society. This contention is based upon three premises: first, that individuals are rather seldom rational decision-makers such that leaving all reproductive choices to the whims of individual parents would be immensely counterproductive to future offspring’s right to open future; second, that liberal eugenics—much like its authoritarian antecedent—could intersect with myriad identities, including race, class, sex, disability, and sexual orientation in ways that might exacerbate social divisions, marginalise different groups, and engender homogeneity; and third, that it undermines individual autonomy of the future person as a member of the liberal community, particularly if their capacities and abilities are tailored to fit parents’ specific life projects and putatively reasonable conceptions of the good. The underscored potential malaises of liberal eugenics should, I argue, be discursively negotiated between parents and the state via the development of robust general laws that regulate heritable genome editing interventions to ensure that the welfare of the future persons is prioritised and that the liberal commitment to autonomy is immune to antiliberal perversions.

How liberal is liberal eugenics?

How liberal is liberal eugenics?

An ambiguity in Habermas's argument against liberal eugenics.

In his book The future of human nature, Jürgen Habermas argues against a scenario of liberal eugenics, in which parents are free to prenatally manipulate their children's genetic constitution via germline interventions. In this paper, I draw attention to the fact that his species-ethical line of argument is pervaded by a substantial ambiguity between an argument from actual intervention (AAI) and an argument from mere controllability (AMC). Whereas the first argument focuses on threats for the autonomy and equality of prenatally modified persons, the second argument takes all human beings, whether they have been modified or not, into account. Hence, when invoking Habermas in these debates, bioethicists need to consider carefully which argument they are referring to.

Commentary: From Liberal Eugenics to Political Biology.

Commentary: From Liberal Eugenics to Political Biology.

Implications of CRISPR-Based Germline Engineering for Cancer Survivors.

Cancer survivors can carry germline mutations that will be transmitted to their progeny. Today, many of these mutations have been identified and can be tracked. With the recent development of genome-editing technologies and CRISPR (clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats), the possibility of genetically modifying the human germline-gametes and embryos-has never been closer. This perspective has sparked a controversy within the scientific community with reactions ranging from calls for a ban on germline modification to cautious approval of further research. This Editorial analyzes the possible adoption of CRISPR-based germline engineering to prevent the spread of cancer predispositions in the human population. We discuss whether the genomic edition of human sperm and eggs would contribute to rectifying or altering the heritable genome. We anticipate the emergence of a new form of liberal eugenics fueled by a logic of offer and demand from stakeholders such as cancer survivors and their relatives and offspring, but also from fertility clinics, biotech firms, insurers, and clinicians. From a regulatory perspective, validating the clinical safety and utility of CRISPR-based germline engineering is an essential step. However, with time, gradually perfecting the technology and assessing the economic benefits for stakeholders could soften society's resistance and align opinions in support of genomic decontamination of human germlines. This progressive shift would be justified in the name of cancer prevention as well as a moral obligation to facilitate the conception of cancer-free children at a cost that is acceptable to individuals and health systems.

An Existential Ecofeminism and a Renewed Critical Theory of Nature: An Imagined Dialogue between Simone de Beauvoir and Jürgen Habermas

Simone de Beauvoir has been commonly criticized for separating women from nature and attempting to make women “like men”, as beings that dominate nature. I defend Beauvoir’s existential concept of freedom as a non-sovereign relationship with nature. I then use the existential model constructed from my defense of Beauvoir as a framework with which to critique and engage Jürgen Habermas’ 2001 intervention against liberal eugenics. My critique of Habermas is important because I would like to explore a renewed critical theory of nature from the perspective gained by an existential ecofeminism.

Designing (artificial) people to serve – the other side of the coin

This paper addresses the issue of the ethical obligations of human beings towards the robots that will achieve the status of persons. In particular the text investigates the ethical status of designing such robot-persons as servants. The author disagrees with Steve Petersen – who claims that we can design robot-persons as servants without wronging them by implementing the desire to serve into them. Following Jürgen Habermas critique of positive liberal eugenics, the author argues that any kind of intentional designing inevitably wrongs the designed beings regarding their freedom, autonomy, equality and identity. Moreover, some unintended consequences of developing robot-person servants are discussed.

Евгенические стратегии будущего: качественная демография или либеральная евгеника?

Евгенические стратегии будущего: качественная демография или либеральная евгеника?

From biopolitics to bioeconomies: The ART of (re-)producing white futures in Mexico's surrogacy market

Reproduction has been the privileged site of post-colonial eugenic politics through which the future national body is regulated in racial terms. Nikolas Rose argues that new forms of liberal eugenics have replaced traditional state biopolitics. In the current bioeconomy, it is no longer the state but active consumers that make (racialized) reproductive choices. The market of assisted reproductive technologies (ART) in Mexico serves as an empirical case to argue that the liberal eugenics practiced in this market recasts rather than replaces traditional state biopolitics. This becomes evident in (1) the racialized access to surrogacy programs in Mexico and (2) in giving higher value to white sex cells, while (3) devaluing the genetic traits of non-white women through the selection and classification processes of reproductive laborers. Analyzing the transnational geographies of surrogacy markets in Mexico, the article investigates how future bodies are whitened through biomedical practices and consumer choices that are shaped by and simultaneously reinforce (post-)colonial imaginaries of white desirability.

From Nietzsche’s Overhuman to the Posthuman of Transhumanism: Transcultural Discourses

In his reflections on liberal eugenics, Habermas implicitly replies to suggestions put forward by Sloterdijk whereby he cites him without mentioning his name while at the same time identifying his thinking with a naturalist version of poshumanism as well as with all too German Nietzschean breeding fantasies. This example alone reveals the cultural impact of the question concerning the relationship between Nietzsche’s philosophy and transhumanist thinking. The article explains why this question should be of relevance to us today. Firstly, a detailed account of the Academic exchanges concerning the relationship between Nietzsche’s and transhumanist thinking is being presented. Secondly, central reflections why there are parallel structures between these two philosophies are being dealt with, so that selected implications of these reflections for contemporary discourses can be explained in part three of the article. Thereby, some radical consequences which these thoughts have for contemporary bioethical issues such as incest, hybridisation, three biological parenthood, and selection after in vitro fertilisation and preimplantation genetic diagnosis are being described. It becomes clear that by dealing with Nietzsche’s complex philosophical reflections and by confronting them with transhumanists positions concerning central technical issues, a further philosophical depth can get added to these contemporary reflections. This methodology, however, is only possible due to the similarity of the approaches put forward by Nietzsche and transhumanists.