Liberal Democratic Norms Research Articles

Liberal-democratic norms under contestation: Norm relations and their decoupling in the US Supreme Court’s decisions on abortion

Abstract This article studies the contestation of liberal-democratic norms from within the liberal international order (LIO), focusing on the case of abortion rights. The US Supreme Court’s decisions on abortion, central to both domestic and global debates, provide a compelling case study of how two opposing sides may invoke the same norms, rather than presenting a case of norm collision or co-optation. In contrast to the binary pro-choice versus anti-abortionist framing, this article shows that both sides invoke liberal-democratic norms, but differ in how they relate the norms to each other and how they interrupt established norm relations. Against this background, the article introduces the concept of norm decoupling, highlighting how norm entrepreneurs isolate certain norms from hitherto related norms. This process contributes to a more subtle backsliding of the LIO, particularly by decoupling majority votes from other democratic, substantial norms, and by decoupling liberal-democratic norms from their gendered dimensions. Norm decoupling thus explains diverging interpretations of shared norms within the same context. This advances our understanding of norm contestation and interpretation, shedding light on how liberal-democratic norms subtly erode from within the LIO.

Normative power at its unlikeliest: EU democratic norms and security service reform in Ukraine

This article traces the effects of European Union (EU) normative power on security sector reform in Ukraine. We argue that to get a better grasp of how normative power works in practice, we need to scrutinize more closely the domestic journey of EU norms. This local lens allows us to uncover the inherent contestation involved in the transnational travel of norms, emphasizing the importance of local agency and local conceptions of normativity. We reveal the internal struggle between liberal democratic norms and deeply ingrained attitudes, institutions and behaviours linked to the Soviet legacy. We show how EU democratic norms gradually empower domestic constituencies and overcome domestic structural resistance to change, leading to democratic advances in a sector least likely to reform.

Public support for the cordon sanitaire: Descriptive evidence from Spain

Reactions to the rise of far-right parties that advocate democratic backsliding, and the dilution of socially liberal democratic norms present a dilemma for existing political parties. How should existing political parties respond to this challenge? A commonly adopted strategy is to apply a cordon sanitaire which excludes radical right-wing challengers from the government-forming process. Do voters support this policy? Leveraging data from Spain – where the mainstream right has accommodated the radical right-wing party, VOX, via numerous governing coalitions – I rely on individual citizens’ views on how parties should respond to rise of the far-right party, to answer this question. Empirically, the results show very low-level support for the cordon sanitaire in Spain. Indeed, the modal position of the electorate, regardless of their ideological position, is to treat the party just like any other. These results are not conditioned by the propensity of individuals to identify VOX as indeed being a “radical right” party. These descriptive findings suggest that whilst radical right-wing parties may present an inimical threat to democratic norms, citizens do not necessarily view the means of squashing this threat to be one of strategic exclusion. This likely explains why the mainstream right has been able to institutionalise VOX as a political ally: where strategic exclusion is not expected, the mainstream right need not fear violating an expectation that does not exist.

The Guardian State: Strengthening the public service against democratic backsliding

AbstractLiberal democracy has become vulnerable to illiberal political movements and the gradual erosion of democratic institutions. To safeguard liberal democracy, we propose the concept of the Guardian State, which embraces liberal principles while acting as a defensive barrier against illiberal tendencies. We need strong administrative institutions that uphold liberal democratic norms and resist pressures from populist politicians. Institutionalizing guardianship as the key norm within the civil service fortifies democratic institutions against backsliding. The principle of neutrality alone cannot ensure that only liberal citizens come to power. Structural measures at the individual and organizational levels are essential to fortify the foundations of the Guardian State and protect liberal democracy against evolving threats. Proactive efforts are necessary to defend and strengthen the public service to ensure the long‐term viability of democratic governance. The Guardian State places the bureaucracy in a key role in preserving the core principles of democracy.

Suspending democratic (dis)belief: Nonliberal energy polities of solar power in Morocco and Tanzania

This paper develops follows recent efforts in this journal to critique the concept of energy democracy by highlighting conceptual challenges of incorporating the ‘bad behavior’ of the nonliberal Other, where the bastion of ‘bad behavior’ is thought to be found in “Africa”. This article highlights liberal democratic assumptions of energy democracy through a review of relevant literature emerging from political theory, postcolonial studies and indigenous studies to develop a critique of energy democracy. Doing so requires using different vocabularies for analyzing the plurality of democratic practice and experience around the world that exceed liberal democratic norms. The authors draw on two existing concepts, “sociotechnical imaginaries” (STIMs) and “credibility economies” to investigate the collective governance strategies of subaltern energy polities, which may include nonhuman beings, authoritarian politics, or corruption and violence. We develop this analysis by comparing two African nation-states–Morocco and Tanzania–to show how the states and subaltern groups do (or do not) develop STIMs related to solar power. While international governance organizations often portray Morocco as authoritarian and Tanzania as corrupt, each state differently experienced colonization and decolonization, and practices different relationships with domestic subaltern groups. Whereas low-income citizens and indigenous groups seek integration into the Moroccan state’s STIM, the Maasai in Tanzania chart their own STIM separate from the state and international development groups. The intent is not to promote democratic relativism but rather to ask scholars and international energy-access practitioners to suspend their democratic disbelief when studying energy matters in so-called nonliberal contexts.

Confronting Populism

The core populist claim is that ‘the people’ have been unjustly neglected by government. This core claim, while unexceptionable on its face, tends to be associated with claims that would corrode liberal democratic institutions. It is important that political and legal theorists identify the claims made by citizens who may be attracted by populist political forms, lest they manifest themselves in political forms toxic to (broadly understood) liberal democratic norms and institutions. They must address these claims, even as they also consider ways in which to confront these political forms. An example of how this work might proceed can be gleaned from some recent democratic theory and practice, which has ‘democratized’ membership in political parties as well as the process of selection of the party leader. This apparent democratization both disserves the cause of democratic deliberation, and opens the door to the risk of populist takeover of traditional parties.

Sovereignty and the National Interest

Sovereignty and the National Interest Erik Jones (bio) Much of the world today is torn between national populists and liberal democrats. The national populists put the nation first; the liberal democrats argue for something closer to multicultural multilateralism. In doing so, they offer distinct visions of how sovereignty and the national interest interact. For national populists, sovereignty is an expression of the national interest; whoever wields sovereign authority should ensure that the national interest is served. For liberal democrats, sovereignty is the responsibility to determine what is in the nation's best interests and then to reconcile competing claims and distribute scarce resources accordingly. The two groups also offer contrasting views of world order. The national populists focus on self-help and mutual respect. The liberal democrats emphasise integration, cooperation, and solidarity. Viewed side-by-side, the two worldviews present irreconcilable differences in the constitution of political authority and the structure of international relations. Hence it is tempting to argue that the interaction between national populists and liberal democrats should be limited, particularly when national populism threatens to descend into authoritarianism. But there is a narrow path along which interaction between national populists and liberal democrats can be beneficial, when national populists promise to reconnect members of society who have lost representation within liberal democratic politics. Reconnecting those who fall away from politics is essential to the stability of liberal democracy over the longer term. Indeed, the same point applies for populists from all parts of the political spectrum, and not just the nationalist right that is so prominent in Europe, Turkey, Brazil, India, and the United States today. The question is whether and how populists can effectively represent their constituents while at the same time adapting to liberal democratic norms for reconciling competing interests. That question has not received much attention in the scholarly literature.1 We know a lot more about the origins [End Page 392] and nature of populism, and about how populism can lead to authoritarianism by undermining democratic norms and institutions, than we know about how populists become something closer to mainstream liberal democrats. Research on populists in power is still in its infancy.2 The key to striking a beneficial relationship between national populists and liberal democrats lies in reinforcing the formal and informal institutions that underpin the liberal democratic connection between sovereignty and the national interest. The 'rule of law' debate in Europe and the United States is about protecting those institutions that frame the exercise of sovereignty and ensure that the national interest is defined within the context of liberal democratic politics. So long as those institutions are resilient, national populists will have little choice but to learn how to exercise sovereignty to identify the interests of the nation, rather than bending sovereignty to the service of a national interest they take as given. A study in contrast This relationship between sovereignty and the national interest seems abstract when presented at the start of an essay, but it comes across concretely when laid out in political speeches. Consider the contrast between Donald Trump and Barack Obama. When Donald Trump gave his first address to the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 2017, his message was simple. True patriots everywhere should invest their sovereignty – a word he used twenty-one times during the speech – in the pursuit of the national interest. As Trump explained, 'if we do not invest ourselves, our hearts, and our minds in our nations, if we will not build strong families, safe communities, and healthy societies for ourselves, no one can do it for us'. His only qualification to this notion of self-help is that 'in fulfilling our obligations to our own nations, we also realize that it's in everyone's interest to seek a future where all nations can be sovereign, prosperous, and secure'.3 Trump left open the question how those sovereign nations should reconcile competing claims with one another. Trump's UN speech was different from any given by a United States president to the General Assembly. When Barack Obama spoke at the United Nations the year before, he never mentioned the term sovereignty. There is no question for Obama that the...

COVID-19-related anxieties do not decrease support for liberal democracy.

The COVID‐19 pandemic led to widespread fear among the population. Early studies suggested that this resulted in exclusionary attitudes and increased support for discriminatory policy measures. We still lack an understanding of the longer‐term, potentially erosive consequences that COVID‐19‐specific anxieties may carry for citizens' commitment to liberal democratic norms. In this research note, we present evidence from an original experiment in which we manipulate individuals' cognitive accessibility of their fears related to COVID‐19. We implemented this experiment in Hungary and Romania – two cases where illiberal attitudes are most likely to amplify under conditions of fear – a year and a half after the outbreak of the pandemic. The results show that our intervention is successful in elevating respondents' levels of worry, anxiety and fear when thinking about infectious diseases like COVID‐19. However, these emotions do not carry secondary effects on individuals' levels of right‐wing authoritarianism, nationalism or outgroup hostility, nor do they affect preferences for specific discriminatory policy measures aimed to fight a potential resurgence of COVID‐19. We discuss these findings in light of the literature on the demand‐side determinants of democratic backsliding and the consequences of emotions on political behaviour.

Disinformation Order and Social Media Algorithmic Trap: New Challenges for Sustainability of the Indonesia’s United Nation-State Narrative and Liberal Democratic Norms

The Internet and social media have been increasingly adopted by political entities across the globe. The consequences of such adaptations on the Indonesia’s nation-state narrative and liberal democratic norms have been under-researched however. This article argues that in democratic countries, such adaptations are likely to pave the way for the emergences of disinformation order and social media algorithmic trap. Within the specific context of Indonesia’s democracy, these disinformation order and social media algorithmic trap are likely to polarize political spheres and jeopardize not merely Indonesia’s united nation-state narrative, but also Indonesia’s liberal democratic norms that evolved since the post-reform era. To evaluate such propositions, this article adopts a desk study and selects Jakarta’s 2017 Gubernatorial Election as a study case. Learning from these desk study and study case, this article proposes the following arguments. To manage the consequences of disinformation order and social media algorithmic trap on politics and democracy, we need formulate new political communication and policy research agenda based on the following dictum: who get lost by what/whom in which channel/medium and with what effects. Taking such effort may give us an opportunity to keep the current Indonesia’s united nation-state narrative prevailing and liberal democratic norms flourishing.

The fascist authoritarian model of illiberal democracy

Based on our observations and scholarship about how democratic norms are currently being undermined, we propose a model of fascist authoritarianism that includes authoritarianism, the production and exaggeration of threats, conspiracy-oriented propaganda adoption, and distrust of reality-based professions. We refer to this as the Fascist Authoritarian Model of Illiberal Democracy (FAMID) and argue that all components are essential for understanding contemporary antidemocratic movements. We demonstrate that all components of FAMID correlate with illiberal antidemocratic attitudes, that Republicans generally score higher than Democrats on the model components, and that all components significantly contribute to predicting illiberal antidemocratic attitudes. We find approximately equal support for both left-wing and right-wing illiberal antidemocratic attitudes. The fascist authoritarian model of illiberal democracy helps explain the basic mechanisms by which an authoritarian leader works to erode liberal democratic norms—and does a better job at doing so than simpler authoritarianism theories.

Interrupting a white will to improve: race, design, and community self-determination

This critical case study investigates the cultural politics of one urban renewal effort rhetorically designed to serve the needs of most marginalized community members in Oakland, California. We extend recent scholarship examining the broader landscapes of young people’s lives and examine how the “urban” is made and remade in ways that impact education equity. Informed by critical urban theory and critical whiteness studies, we argue that urban planners enacted a white will to improve: a paternalistic approach to design that utilizes liberal democratic norms of voice and inclusion to deflect attention to the material realities of racism. Paying attention to contests over the urban—specifically the ways in which the “targets” of urban renewal interrupted official urban design processes—offers an important location for considering more ethical approaches to advancing community self-determination and education justice.

A Global Crisis of Liberal Democracy?: On Autocratic Democracy, Populism and Post-Truth Politics

This article proposes that autocratic democracy represents the natural political form of right-wing populism. It argues that while the emergence of autocratic democracy as a genuine political alternative to liberal democracy may be currently located primarily in states where liberal democratic norms were not well-consolidated, there are reasons to hold that structural features of contemporary politics in consolidated democracies relating to the decline of mass parties and the globalisation trilemma create the space for the right-wing mobilisation of populism. It is further claimed that the dilemmas of the EU in conjunction with the politics of immigration and multiculturalism provide resources for the right-wing mobilisation of populist discontents such that we should not be sanguine about the ability of liberal democracy to be resilient in the face of continuing populist pressures.

Biting the bullet: Addressing the democratic legitimacy of transition management

From early on, reflexive governance approaches have been problematised for lacking explicit consideration of formal governance and decision-making structures. Developed over two decades ago, transition management is not an exception; it has been specifically critiqued for being democratically illegitimate and depoliticising issues. Contributing to these debates, this article develops a legitimacy framework for understanding how transition management practices can be legitimised within liberal democratic structures, while safeguarding their transformative potential, or, ‘radical core’, while navigating innovation capture. This framework guides a comparative analysis of six European cities, who employ transition management practices for developing decarbonisation roadmaps towards 2050. We discuss the emphasis on liberal democratic norms, the fuzziness of practices of participation and the closing down of policy options. We recommend the legitimacy framework to be used as a heuristic for reflexive governance, tool for explicating the conditionality of ‘radicality’ in transition management, and guide for designing accountability governance structures.

Melodrama, William Barr, and the imperial presidency

ABSTRACT This essay argues that study of William Barr’s melodramatic imagination best illuminates his rhetorical effort to craft an imperial presidency for the conservative movement. In three speeches given between October 2019 and February 2020, the then-Attorney General blended traditional conservative ideas and strategies with Trumpian hyperbole and conspiracy. By exploiting the discursive resources of the melodramatic mode, Barr sacralized the founding, polarized good and evil, and engorged the executive. The social order and imperial presidency Barr’s discourse created undermined the liberal democratic norms he claimed to defend.

Legal gaslighting

Suppose that an authoritarian regime wants to make changes to legal norms or institutions to consolidate its hold on political power. Suppose further that the regime in question cannot simply ignore the domestic or international costs of doing so, and that it has an interest in responding to critiques of these changes based on liberal democratic norms and the rule of law. How can it do so? One possible approach is to sow confusion and undermine the normative standards themselves – in effect, to ‘gaslight’ the domestic or international audience (or both). To that end, a regime might assert that the change it proposes resembles a ‘best practice’ from one or more other jurisdictions. Such emulation need not be thorough, or even sincere; it may suffice simply to assert that a proposed change resembles that in a jurisdiction with ironclad rule-of-law credentials. The changes being adopted may bear no real resemblance to the ‘comparators’ on closer examination. Alternatively, the measures being adopted may be similar on their face, but operate in such a different context that they end up serving a very different function to the function they perform in the comparator jurisdiction. Such gaslighting need not succeed in deceiving outsiders or subjects; undermining the standards by which legal reforms are measured, sowing confusion, or providing a superficial pretext for inaction may be sufficient.

Liberal Ideology and Foreign Opinion on China

Abstract Why do autocratic powers like China evoke negative attitudes from the citizens of some countries but not from others? Factors like economic and security threat are of course part of the answer, but this study finds that ideational factors exert a distinct effect. Drawing from social theories of the democratic peace and international relations more broadly, it observes that governments and their citizens form communities along ideological lines, which most prominently includes differences in liberal democracy. This argument implies that people within the liberal community tend to view authoritarian powers like China as having a harmful influence on the world. Furthermore, democratic citizens will evaluate China from the standpoint of liberal democratic norms. Because liberal norms are not just about having multiparty, electoral institutions, people's opinions on China could vary even if its single-party political system does not change. Three empirical studies drawing from cross-national observational data, two original survey experiment, and a difference-in-differences analysis of historical polls confirm that liberal democracy affects foreign perceptions about China. The findings advance debates about soft power, democracy and public opinion, and the role of ideology in international society.

Contested spaces of illiberal and authoritarian politics: Human rights and democracy in crisis

The global moral appeal of human rights and democratic governance appears to be in severe crisis. In both the Global North and the South, many countries have witnessed the rise of racist, sexist, and illiberal politicians into the highest positions in the government. As one of Asia's oldest electoral democracies, the Philippines is not an exception in this global pattern of decline in civil liberties and democratic governance. Considering the case of the Philippines, this article addresses the following core question: How and under which conditions do contestations as well as legitimations of the Duterte regime emerge across domestic and transnational spaces? This article examines the transnational and domestic contestations and legitimations of the Duterte regime based on a spatially-oriented analysis of the official results of the 2016 and 2019 elections, while demonstrating the multispatial contestations against and in support of global human rights and liberal democratic norms. While the role of geography and spatialization in the formation of illiberal and authoritarian politics remains underappreciated, this article contributes to the disciplinary fields of political geography, comparative politics, and International Relations. Specifically, the article deploys a spatial approach in understanding the territorially-contingent patterns of contestations and legitimations of liberal democratic politics.

Illiberal Media in a Liberal Democracy: Examining Identity in Australia’s Mandarin Language News

The regime of censorship in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) extends beyond its borders through the extraterritorial application of its media regulations to popular social media platforms like WeChat. This research investigates the effects of the PRC’s extraterritorial control of online content on the identity narratives and norms communicated by comparing Australia’s Special Broadcast Service (SBS) Mandarin language news and the news targeting Australian audiences published on popular WeChat Official Accounts (OAs). We find significant differences in the news content between these two platforms: SBS provides more political content and a focus on political and cultural integration, while WeChat pages tend to avoid political topics that are not otherwise press releases from the PRC and they encourage strong cultural ties with Mainland China. Finally, SBS tends to both inform and cultivate democratic political identities and identification with the Australian political system, whereas WeChat tends to differentiate the Chinese diaspora from the wider Australian community. We situate these findings within a wider understanding of PRC’s national security strategies and doctrine. Whether by requirement or practice, not only the WeChat OAs in Australia implement PRC’s communication controls, but the content on these pages also challenges the liberal democratic practices and norms and supports foreign influence and espionage in Australia.

The Future of Liberal Democracy in the International Legal Order

This chapter asks the question: what will the international law of democratic governance look like in 2050? The question reflects the fact that notwithstanding pluralism, there is much normative architecture supporting liberal democratic norms on the international plane. This architecture is not matched by equally expansive enforcement, but weak mechanisms do exist. This chapter speculates on alternative scenarios and what they might mean for the persistence of liberal democracy as a going concern, through the lens of international law. One scenario is authoritarian dominance; a second is democratic revival; and a third is duopoly between the United States and China. Each scenario has profoundly different implications for democracy and for the character or international law.

Social origins of support for democracy: a study of intergenerational mobility

ABSTRACT Recent evidence suggests that popular disaffection with liberal-democratic norms and institutions has been growing in different regions of the world, but studying the social origins of democratic versus authoritarian political preferences are especially relevant in countries with immature democratic practices. The main concern of this article is the association between intergenerational social mobility and support for democracy in post-socialist societies. I present a theoretical framework in which individuals’ political attitudes are affected by their intergenerational social mobility experiences. I model this theoretical argument using two complementary data-sets and various multivariable and multilevel statistical techniques. The results indicate that intergenerational social mobility, particularly its subjective perception, has statistically significant links with attitudes towards democracy and that this association is moderated by the attained level of democracy in the country where an individual resides. This may suggest that studying social origins of support for democracy by means of intergenerational social mobility can be an important tool to understand the conundrum of democratisation and democratic backsliding in post-socialist societies.